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  • section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, read with sections 9(a) and 9(c) of the Opium Act.
  • clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.12.
  • section 20G of the Opium Act, section 74(4) of the Bengal Excise Act
  • sections 160 to 171 of the Code and subsection (4) of the section
  • section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898,
  • section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898,
  • section 252 and subsequent sections of the Code
  • CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • BENGAL EXCISE ACT
  • Bengal Excise Act or the Opium Act
  • sec. 9(a) or 9(c) of the Opium Act
  • secs. 14 and 15 of the Opium Act
  • SECTION 9 OPIUM ACT
  • section 190(1) (b) of the Code
  • SECTION 20 A OPIUM ACT
  • sub-section (3) of section 74
  • provisions of sub-section (1)
  • sec. 25 of the Evidence Act,
  • section 157 or section 173.
  • section 73, sub-section (2),
  • section 161 of the Code.
  • sec. 9 of the Opium Act,
  • BOMBAY ABKARI ACT
  • section 190 (1) (b)
  • section 9 (c)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, read with sections 9(a) and 9(c) of the Opium Act.
  • clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.12.
  • section 20G of the Opium Act, section 74(4) of the Bengal Excise Act
  • sections 160 to 171 of the Code and subsection (4) of the section
  • section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898,
  • section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898,
  • section 252 and subsequent sections of the Code
  • CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • BENGAL EXCISE ACT
  • Bengal Excise Act or the Opium Act
  • sec. 9(a) or 9(c) of the Opium Act
  • secs. 14 and 15 of the Opium Act
  • SECTION 9 OPIUM ACT
  • section 190(1) (b) of the Code
  • SECTION 20 A OPIUM ACT
  • sub-section (3) of section 74
  • provisions of sub-section (1)
  • sec. 25 of the Evidence Act,
  • section 157 or section 173.
  • section 73, sub-section (2),
  • section 161 of the Code.
  • sec. 9 of the Opium Act,
  • BOMBAY ABKARI ACT
  • section 190 (1) (b)
  • section 9 (c)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Rule before the High Court called upon the Chief Presidency Magistrate to show cause why proceedings pending before a Presidency Magistrate against the petitioner, Premchand Khetry, should not be quashed or why other orders should not be made. The petitioner was one of three persons tried for offences under the Opium Act. The prosecution charged them inter alia under section 120B IPC read with sections 9(a) and 9(c) of the Opium Act. The investigation began with an Excise Officer who watched premises at 42 Ganesh Chandra Avenue, Calcutta, observed the petitioner driving a car from which wooden boxes containing opium were removed, and later a search of a room occupied by the petitioner (and another accused) yielded further opium and related materials. The three accused were arrested and produced before the Chief Presidency Magistrate. A challan was submitted on 10 December 1956 against the three originally arrested; two other persons arrested later were discharged by the Magistrate.

The Chief Presidency Magistrate sanctioned prosecution on the conspiracy charge and the case was transferred to another Magistrate (Shri R.D. Roy Chaudhuri) who proceeded under section 251A CrPC. On a date fixed for evidence (16 April 1957) the petitioner objected that section 251A did not apply and that sections beginning with 252 should have been used; the Magistrate adjourned to enable the petitioner to move the High Court, and this Rule followed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether section 251A of the Criminal Procedure Code applies to a warrant case instituted on a report made by an Excise Officer under the Opium Act, or whether the procedure beginning with section 252 must be followed.
  2. Whether a report made by an Excise Officer under section 20G of the Opium Act qualifies as a "police report" in the special sense required for the applicability of section 251A (i.e., a report arising from an investigation under Chapter XIV of the CrPC, such as under sections 157/173).
  3. Whether, for these purposes, an Excise Officer should be treated as a police officer (and thus whether prior authorities holding excise/abkari officers to be "police officers" for other statutory contexts are relevant).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Section 251A CrPC does not apply to the present case; the procedure prescribed by section 252 and subsequent sections should be followed.
  • There was no "police report" in the technical sense required by section 251A because the challan/report was made by an Excise Officer, who is not a police officer, and the investigation was not one conducted under Chapter XIV of the CrPC.

State's / Prosecution's Arguments

  • Reliance was placed on the Opium Act (sections 20 and 20G) which empower and regulate Excise Officers' investigations and provide that when an Excise Officer forwards an accused to a Magistrate he shall submit a report and that the Magistrate shall treat such a report "in like manner as if such report is a report in writing made by a police officer under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 190".
  • The State relied on prior decisions (Nanoo Sheikh Ahmed v. Emperor; Ameen Sharif v. Emperor; Public Prosecutor v. C. Paramasivan) which had held that for the purposes of section 25 of the Evidence Act, certain excise/abkari officers could be treated as police officers.
  • Implicitly, the prosecution treated the matter as instituted on a police-style report because a challan/report under section 20G had been submitted and the Magistrate proceeded under section 251A.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Manick Chand Chowdhury v. The State (Criminal Revision No. 1161 of 1956) Interpretation of the expression "police report" as used in the Code (earlier judgment delivered the same day). The Court relied on the earlier judgment's analysis to support the view that the expression "police report," when used in sections like 251A, carries the restricted meaning associated with reports made in the context of Chapter XIV investigations (e.g., under sections 157/173).
Bahabal Shah v. Tarak Nath Chowdhury (24 Cal. 691) Authority on whether an offence under section 9 of the Opium Act is cognizable. The Court noted this decision held section 9 opium offences were not cognizable, subject to exceptions for cases falling under section 14 of the Opium Act; the Court observed the decision was given before penalty changes but the exception for section 14 remained relevant to the facts (part seizure in transit / part in building).
Nanoo Sheikh Ahmed v. Emperor (51 Bom. 78) Held that an Abkari Officer/Excise Officer could be treated as a "police officer" for the purposes of section 25 of the Evidence Act. The Court explained this authority concerned the Evidence Act (section 25) and held it was not helpful for deciding whether a report by an Excise Officer is a "police report" in the special CrPC sense required for section 251A.
Ameen Sharif v. Emperor (61 Cal. 607) Similar holding as to an Excise Officer being regarded as a "police officer" for the purposes of section 25 of the Evidence Act. The Court treated the decision as inapposite to the present question because it dealt with the scope of section 25 of the Evidence Act, not with the CrPC concept of a "police report" arising from a Chapter XIV investigation.
Public Prosecutor v. C. Paramasivan (A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 917) Held that an Excise Officer investigating an offence under the Opium Act (as amended in Madras) could be treated as a "police officer" for section 25 Evidence Act purposes. The Court observed the decision is limited to the Evidence Act context and therefore does not resolve whether an Excise Officer's report qualifies as a "police report" for section 251A CrPC.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by examining the statutory scheme enacted by the 1955 amendments which split warrant cases into two classes (section 251 CrPC): (a) cases instituted on a police report, to be tried under section 251A, and (b) other cases, to be tried under section 252 and subsequent provisions. Section 251A prescribes a detailed procedure requiring the Magistrate to ensure that the accused have been furnished with the documents referred to in section 173 CrPC (or such of them as exist).

The Court analyzed the meaning of "police report" in the context of the CrPC. It recalled, relying on its earlier judgment in Manick Chand Chowdhury, that the expression "police report" had acquired a special meaning in prior judicial construction — generally a report arising from an investigation under Chapter XIV (for example, a report under section 173 or earlier material such as a section 157 entry). The Court emphasized that section 251A not only uses the phrase "police report" but also contemplates the existence of the kinds of documents that arise only when there has been an investigation under Chapter XIV (e.g., first information under section 154, statements under section 161, report under section 173).

The petitioner contended that an Excise Officer is not a police officer and that his report could not be a "police report" in the restricted CrPC sense. The Court examined the point and acknowledged prior authorities that had treated excise/abkari officers as "police officers" for the limited purposes of section 25 of the Evidence Act, but held those authorities irrelevant to the present question because they concerned the Evidence Act's object (preventing improper influence in procuring statements) and adopted a broad meaning of "police officer" in that context.

The Court then inspected the Opium Act itself. Sections 20 and 20G of the Opium Act (as substituted/amended in Bengal) empowered the State to authorise officers of Excise to investigate and required an Excise Officer forwarding an accused to submit a report; section 20G provided that upon receipt of such a report the Magistrate shall try the person "in like manner as if such report is a report in writing made by a police officer under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 190" of the CrPC. The Court construed this language as deeming an Excise Officer's written report to be "a report in writing made by a police officer" for the limited purpose of taking cognisance under the Code.

However, the Court drew a critical distinction: being a "report in writing made by a police officer" (for taking cognisance) is not necessarily the same as being a "police report" in the special and restricted sense required for section 251A — i.e., a report that presupposes an investigation under Chapter XIV (sections 157/173) and yields the documents listed in section 173(4). The Court found that an Excise Officer investigates under the Opium Act's own provisions (e.g., sections 20B, 20C, 20E, 20J), not under Chapter XIV of the CrPC; the statements taken are under section 20B not section 161, the diary obligation is under section 20J not section 172, and the forwarding/reporting takes place under section 20G and not sections 170/173 of the CrPC.

Because the documents specified in section 173(4) (except confessions/statements under section 164) can only arise from investigations under Chapter XIV, the Court held that section 251A presupposes such an investigation. In the present case there was no Chapter XIV investigation (the Excise Department treated the offences as non-cognisable and investigated under the Opium Act), and therefore the preliminary condition for section 251A's applicability — that the case be "instituted on a police report" in the restricted sense — was not satisfied.

The Court further noted that purported compliance with section 251A(1) (furnishing documents) could not have been real because there were no section 154 first information reports, no section 161 statements, nor a section 173 report to furnish; whatever documents had been supplied could not substitute for the statutory documents required by section 173. Consequently, the procedure under section 251A could not properly be carried forward (subsections (2) and (3) require consideration "of all the documents referred to in section 173").

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Rule was made absolute; the proceedings so far conducted under section 251A CrPC were quashed.

Implications / Consequences:

  • The learned Magistrate was directed to proceed with the trial in accordance with law, i.e., in accordance with section 252 of the CrPC and the sections immediately following (the procedure applicable to warrant cases "instituted otherwise than on a police report").
  • The direct effect on the parties is that the special procedure under section 251A cannot be applied to offences under the Opium Act instituted on reports made by an Excise Officer where no investigation under Chapter XIV CrPC (sections 157/173) has taken place; instead the regular procedure for other warrant cases (starting at section 252) must be followed.
  • The Court treated prior authorities holding excise/abkari officers to be police officers for the narrow purposes of section 25 Evidence Act as inapposite to deciding whether an Excise Officer's report is a "police report" under section 251A CrPC. The opinion therefore clarifies the limits of applying such precedents to CrPC interpretive questions.

The opinion does not state that it is laying down an abstract new precedent beyond the specific holding; it quashes the 251A proceedings in the present case and directs continuation under section 252, while giving its statutory interpretation of "police report" and the conditions for section 251A's applicability.

Judges: Chakravartti, C.J. (opinion delivered) and Das Gupta, J. (agreed).

    Premchand Khetry v. The State Opposite Party.

    Chakravartti, C.J:— This is a Rule, calling upon the Chief Presidency Magistrate to show cause why the proceedings pending against the petitioner before a Presidency Magistrate should not be quashed or why such other order or orders should not be made as to this court may seem fit and proper. The petitioner, Premchand Khetry, is one of three persons who are on trial for certain offences under the Opium Act and who were being tried according to the procedure laid down in section 251A of the Criminal Procedure Code. His contention is that section 251A does not apply to the case and that the procedure laid down in section 252 and subsequent sections of the Code out to be followed.

    2. The facts are simple. It is alleged that on receipt of some information, an Inspector of Excise, named Shri B.N Ray, began to maintain a watch on premises No. 42, Ganesh Chandra Avenue, Calcutta, from the 24th July, 1956 and on that very day noticed a car, bearing the number MBI-1864, coming to the place at about 8-30 p.m The petitioner was driving the car. On the next day, the same car came to the place twice during the day time and again at about 7-30 p.m When it came in the evening, the petitioner was driving it as on the previous day and he had with him another of the accused persons, Raj Kumar, seated by his side. On arriving at the place, both the men went inside the house and they came out after about 15 minutes, followed by the third accused, Monohar Singh, who was carrying a wooden box. Five such boxes were brought out, one after another, three of which were placed inside the luggage carrier and two on the back seat. The petitioner then took his place at the driver's seat, Raj Kumar seated himself by his side, while Mohohar Singh sat on the back seat by the side of the two wooden boxes. The car then started to go, but it had gone only a few yards when it was stopped. On examining the boxes, it was found that all of them bore the same address, viz., “M. Kumar & Eros., Tinsukia, self,” and inside them were found 1 maund and 10 seers of opium. Subsequently, Room No. 4 of the house, which was in the occupation of the petitioner and Monohar Singh, was searched and a further quantity of opium, weighing 13 seers and 13 chattaks, was recovered. A large assortment of other materials was also found such as packing cases, coverings of postal parcels addressed to M. Kumar & Bros, and false number plates of motor cars. The three men were immediately placed under arrest and they were produced before the Chief Presidency Magistrate on the following day. According to the Excise Officers, all the accused persons bore aliases, the petitioner having as many as ten. The investigation was commenced by Shri B.N Ray, but it appears that after sometime it was taken over by another officer, named Shri P.R Das. In the course of the investigation, two other persons, named Bhawandas Kishindas and Davaldas Kishenchand, were arrested, the former at Bombay and the latter at Delhi. On the 10th December, 1956, Shri P.R Das submitted a challan against only the three persons originally arrested. All of them were charged under section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, read with sections 9(a) and 9(c) of the Opium Act. They were also charged under section 9(a) of the Opium Act in respect of the possession of the 1 maund and 10 seers of opium. In addition, the petitioner and Monohar Singh were further charged under section 9 (c) in respect of the 13 seers and 13 chattaks of opium recovered from the room in their occupation. Simultaneously with the chalian, an application was submitted for the learned Magistrate's sanction under section 196A(2) of the Code of the prosecution of the accused persons on the conspiracy charge on the footing that the offences which it was the object of the conspiracy to commit were non-cognisable offences. As regards Bhawandas Kishindas and Davaldas Kishenchand, it was prayed by a separate application that they might be discharged, as the evidence against them was not sufficient.

    3. By an order passed on the same date, the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate gave his sanction for the prosecution of the three original accused on the conspiracy charge and discharged the two accused persons, subsequently arrested. He then transferred the case to Shri R.D Roy Chaudhuri for disposal.

    4. Shri Roy Chaudhuri proceeded under section 251A of the Code. He ascertained that the accused had been furnished with the copies to which they were entitled under the section and then, on a perusal of the police papers, framed charges against the accused as per the challan, fixing the 16th of April, 1957 for evidence. On that date, before any prosecution witness could be examined, an objection was raised on behalf of the petitioner to the procedure that was being followed. It was contended that the procedure prescribed by sec. 251A of the Case, which was applicable only to cases instituted on a police report, could not apply to the case and that the procedure prescribed for other warrant cases ought to have been followed. Subsequently, the petitioner put his objection in writing in the form of an application and prayed thereby that the case might be adjourned for sometime so that he might move this court for a direction as to which procedure was applicable. The learned Magistrate acceded to the prayer and granted an adjournment. Thereafter this court was moved and the present Rule obtained.

    5. The procedure to be followed at the trial is not now the same for all warrant cases. By the amendment of the Code made in 1955, warrant cases were divided into two classes and a new procedure prescribed for one of them. The classification was made by sec. 251, a new section, placed at the beginning of Chapter XXI and reading as follows:

    251. Procedure in warrant cases.— In the trial of warrant cases by Magistrates, the Magistrate state,—

    (a) in any case instituted on a police report, follow the procedure specified in sec. 251A; and

    (b) in any other case, follow the procedure specified in the other provisions cf this Chapter.

    6. The two classes of warrant, cases contemplated by the section are thus (i) cases instituted on a police report and (ii) other cases. Sec. 251A, which prescribes the procedure for the trial of cases coming under cl. (a) of sec. 251, provides by sub-sec. (1) as follows:

    251A. Procedure to be adopted in cases instituted on police report—(1) when in any case instituted on a police report, the accused appeal's or is brought before a Magistrate at the commencement of the trial, such Magistrate shall satisfy himself that the documents referred to in sec. 173 have been furnished to the accused, and if he finds that the accused has not been furnished with such documents or any of them, he shall cause them to be furnished.

    Consistently with sec. 251(a), this section describes the cases, for the trial of which it is prescribing a special procedure, as “any case instituted on a police report.” It also contemplates that there will be in such cases the documents referred to in sec. 173 or at least some of them.

    The entire procedure to be followed at the trial of warrant cases coming under clause (a) of sec. 251 is laid down in sec. 251A, but the procedure to be followed at the trial of other warrant cases is spread over a number of sections, beginning with sec. 252. Consistently with sec. 251(b), sec. 252 describes the cases to which the procedure prescribed by it and some subsequent sections will be applicable as “any case instituted otherwise than on a police report.”

    7. It will thus appear that in order that the procedure prescribed by sec. 251A may be applicable to the trial of a warrant case, it must be a case “instituted on a police report” and the investigation leading up to its institution must be an investigation to which sec. 173 may be applied. The petitioner's contention is that the present case is not a case instituted on a police report, because an excise officer is not a police officer and also because the investigation after which the report was made was not an investigation under Chapter XIV of the Code in which sec. 173 occurs.

    8. In my judgment in Criminal Revision No. 1161 of 1956 (Manick Chand Chowdhury v. The State (1) delivered earlier today, I have pointed out that the expression “police report,” as used in the Code for reports of offences made by the police, carries a special meaning. As used in the old see. 190(1) (b), the expression was interpreted by several High Courts as meaning reports made under sec. 173, that is to say, reports of cognisable offences or non-cognisable offences with regard to which there had been a direction by a Magistrate to investigate, made after an investigation under Chapter XIV. The result of that interpretation was that cognisance of an offence could be taken under sec. 190(1) (b) only on police reports of that particular kind and not on other police reports. Other police reports were to be treated as complaints, coming under section 190(1) (a). Apparently, the Legislature did not desire that the operation of sec. 190(1) (b) should be so restricted and so in 1923 it amended the section by replacing the expression ‘police report’ by the more general words “report in writing of such facts (i.e facts constituting an offence) made by any police officer” which would cover all police reports. At the same time, the Legislature left the expression, as occurring in secs. 170 and 173, untouched. It must thereafter be presumed that the Legislature accepted the judicial construction of the expression ‘police report,’ as used in the Code for reports of offences made by the police, and that where it left the expression used in a similar context untouched, it intended the expression to continue to bear the meaning which had been put upon it by the Courts. Not only did the Legislature not make any change in the expression ‘police report’, when amending the Code in 1923, at any place other than sec. 190(1) (b), but when it amended the Code again in 1955, it itself used the same expression in enacting the new sections 207, 207A, 251 and 251A and in amending secs. 208 and 252. In those circumstances it must equally be presumed that in the amendments made by it in 1955, the Legislature used the expression ‘police report’ in the sense which it had been construed to bear in the old sec. 190(1) (b). The only difference made by the language of sec. 207A and 251A is that while a report under Chapter XIV of the Code is still contemplated, the report on which a case is instituted appears to have been taken to be the earlier report under sec. 157 rather than the later report under sec. 173. For taking that view, I have given detailed reasons in my earlier judgment and it is not necessary to report them here.

    9. Criminal Revision No. 1161 of 1956 was concerned with sec. 207A of the Code. The present case is concerned with sec. 251A, but with regard to the meaning of the expression ‘police report.’ as used in the two sections and the investigation contemplated as leading up to the report, I can find no valid ground for distinguishing one from the other. It is true that the words “the Magistrate receives the report forwarded under sec. 173,” which occur in sec. 207A, do not occur in sec. 251A, but their absence in the latter section appears to me to be immaterial. By sec. 251A(1), the Magistrate is enjoined to see that the documents referred to in sec. 173 have been furnished to the accused. Barring confessions or statements recorded under sec. 164, such documents are the report forwarded under sec. 173(1), i.e the report made after the conclusion of an investigation under Chapter XIV, the first information report recorded under sec. 154, which is a section in the same Chapter, statements of witnesses recorded under sec. 161 (3), i.e, statements of witnesses examined by a police officer making an investigation under Chapter XIV, as the section expressly states, and all other documents or extracts thereof on which the prosecution proposes to rely. I am leaving out confession or statements recorded under sec. 164, because such confessions or statements may be recorded not only in the course of an investigation under Chapter XIV of the Code but also in the course of an investigation “under any other law for the time being in force.” Barring confessions or statements recorded under sec. 164, it is impossible to see how the documents particularly specified in sec. 173(4), specially the report under sec. 173(1), can there be at all, unless there has been an investigation under Chapter XIV. Although sec. 251A says that if the Magistrate finds that the accused has not been furnished with “such documents or any of them,” he shall cause them to be furnished, I would concede that the section does not contemplate that in every case there must be all the documents which section 178(4) mentions. As I pointed out in my earlier judgment, there may not be a; first information report in a case or there may not be any confession. But it does not seem possible that there may not even be a report under sec. 173(1) or an investigation under Chapter XIV. The reference to “the documents referred to in see. 173” implies incontrovertibly that an investigation under Chapter XIV is presupposed, because it is only in the course of such an investigation that all but one of the documents specifically mentioned in sec. 173 (4), including the report under sec. 173(1), can come into existence. The whole basis of sec. 251A is that there has been an investigation under Chapter XIV and that basis appears not only from the use of the expression ‘police report,’ but also from the provision that the accused must be supplied with copies of certain specified documents, none of which except one, can possibly come into existence unless there is such an investigation. The excepted documents, a confession or statement recorded under sec. 164, does not suggest any different intention of the section, because although a confession or statement may be recorded in the course of an investigation “under any other law.” it may also be recorded in the course of an investigation under Chapter XIV and, obviously, it is only confessions of statements, so recorded, that are contemplated. I am accordingly of opinion that although receipt of a report forwarded under sec. 173 is not specifically mentioned in sec. 251A(1) as marking the stage from which the Magistrate is to commence the trial proceedings, the omission does not in this regard, make the import of the section different from that of sec. 207A. Since the copies which are to be furnished to the accused under the former section include a copy of the report forwarded under sec. 173, it is clearly contemplated that such a report has been made and received. Both sec. 207A and sec. 251A thus contemplate that there has been a report by the police under sec. 173, i.e, a report of a cognisable offence or a non-cognisable offence which they had been directed by a competent Magistrate to investigate, made after an investigation under Chapter XIV. Unless there is such a report, neither section can apply.

    10. In this case, the Excise Officer has proceeded on the basis that the offences with which the accused were charged were non-cognizable offences. I am not sure that he was right. It is true that under sec. 9 of the Opium Act, as amended in Bengal, the penalty for an offence under clause (a) or clause (c) of the section is rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend upto two years or fine or both. According to the third item under “Offences against other laws” in Schedule II to the Code, the Police shall not arrest anyone for such offences without a warrant. Necessarily, by virtue of the provision with regard to an offence under sec. 120B of the Indian Penal Code, contained in the same Schedule, no arrest without a warrant can be made for a criminal conspiracy to commit such offences. But the definition of a cognizable offence, as given in sec. 4(1)(f) of the Code, is an offence for which a Police Officer, within or without the Presidency towns, may arrest without a warrant “in accordance with the Second Schedule or under any law for the time being in force”. Turning now to the Opium Act, sec. 11 of it provides that in any case in which an offence under sec. 9 of the Act has been committed, the opium in respect of which it has been committed shall be liable to confiscation. Next, sec. 14 of the Act, as amended in Bengal, provides inter alia that any officer, not below the rank of a Sub-inspector of the Department of Excise, Police and any officer of the Customs, Salt and Revenue Departments who may in right of his office be authorised by the State Government in this behalf and who has reason to believe from personal knowledge or information! taken down in writing that opium liable to confiscation under the Act is kept or concealed in any building, vessel or enclosed place, may, at any time by day or night, enter into such building, vessel or place and detain and search and, if he thinks proper, arrest, any person whom he has reason to believe to he guilty of any offence relating to such opium under the Act or any other law. Sec. 15, again, provides that any officer of any of the said Departments or of certain other Departments may seize in any open place or in transit any opium which he has reason to believe to be liable to confiscation under sec. 11 of the Act or any other law and may detain and search any person whom he has reason to believe to be guilty of any offence under the Act or any other law and arrest him, if he has opium in his possession. It will thus be seen that though, in view of the measure of the penalty prescribed for an offence under sec. 9(a) or 9(c) of the Opium Act or a criminal conspiracy to commit the same, the police cannot, under second Schedule to the Code, arrest persons suspected of such offences without a warrant; they can do so under secs. 14 and 15 of the Opium Act itself in the circumstances stated in those sections. Indeed, the accused persons in the present case were in fact arrested without a warrant. On behalf of the petitioner reliance was placed on the decision in Bahabal Shah v. Tarak Nath Chowdhvry (2) (24 Cal. 691) in support of the contention that an offence under sec. 9 of the Opium Act was not a cognisable offence. The decision was given in 1897 when the penalty for an offence under sec. 9 of the Act had not been increased in Bengal to rigorous imprisonment for two years, but as it still remains below three years, the difference is not material. The decision, however, itself excepts cases coming under sec. 14 of the Act. In the present case, a part of the opium was seized in an open place when in transit and a part was seized from a room in a building, in regard to which there was some previous information. The quantity in transit was being transported by all the three accused persons and the room in which the other quantity was found was in the occupation of two of them. In those circumstances it would seem that the offences were cognisable offences, but for reasons presently to be stated it is not necessary for me to decide the point.

    11. Whether or not the offences were cognisable offences is not very material for the purposes of the present case, because even assuming that they were cognisable, sec. 251A cannot apply to the trial, unless it can be made out that the case was instituted on a ‘police report.’ The petitioner contended that there was not and could not be any police report in this case, because apart from any other consideration, a police report has to be a report made by the police which the challan, or the earlier report by which the accused were forwarded to the Magistrate in the present case, was not. They were reports made by an Excise Officer who, it was said, was not a police officer. I do not think that that contention can succeed. Whether or not an Excise Officer is a police officer is a vexed question and it is undoubtedly true that although he has been held to be a police officer for certain purposes, it by no means follows that for all purposes he is so. On behalf of the State, reference was made to the decisions in Nanoo Sheikh Ahmed v. Emperor (3) (51 Bom. 78), Ameen Sharif v. Emperor* (4) (61 Cal. 607) and Public Prosecutor v. C. Paramasivan (5) (A.I.R (1953) Mad. 917), where it was respectively held that, for the purposes of sec. 25 of the Evidence Act, an Abkari Officer investigating a cognisable offence punishable under the Bombay Abkari Act, an Excise Officer investigating an offence under the Bengal Excise Act or the Opium Act even before its amendment for Bengal and an Excise Officer investigating an offence under the Opium Act, as amended in Madras, was a police officer. Those decisions are not relevant, because they proceed on a consideration peculiar to sec. 25 of the Evidence Act and hold that the object of the section being to prevent the procurement of statements by an improper exercise of influence, the expression ‘police officer,’ as used in it, should be read not in any strict technical sense, but according to its more comprehensive and popular meaning of persons entrusted with the duty of preventing and detecting crimes. Decisions on sec. 25 of the Evidence Act are thus of no help. At the same time, the petitioner's contention is answered by the Opium Act itself. Sec. 20 of the Act, as substituted in Bengal, empowers the State Government to authorise any class of officers of the Excise, Police or Customs Departments to investigate offences under the Act; and sec. 20G, which appears to be a combination of secs. 170 and 173 of the Code, provides inter alia that when an officer of the Excise Department forwards any person accused of an offence under the Act to a Magistrate, he shall submit a report, containing particulars of the offence charged and of the witnesses, and that

    “Upon receipt of such report, the Magistrate shall inquire into such offence and try the person accused thereof in like manner as if such report is a report in writing made by a police officer under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.”

    12. The sentence I have just quoted from the section is not very accurately worded, because section 190(1) (b) of the Code does not provide for any report being made under it, but only provides that cognisance may be taken of an offence when there is a report by the police of facts constituting the same. The report itself is made under other provisions. Be that as it may, it is clear from section 20G that although an Excise Officer may not be a police officer in fact and in law, the report made by him is to be deemed to be a report by a police officer for the purposes of taking cognisance of the offence reported. From the point of view of the status of the person making the report, a report of an offence under the Opium Act made by an Excise Officer must therefore be held to be a ‘police report’ within the meaning of section 251A of the Code.

    13. This, however, does not dispose of the objection raised on behalf of the petitioner. The effect of section 20G of the Opium Act is no more than that a written report of facts constituting an opium offence made by an Excise Officer is “a report in writing of such facts made by a police officer,” as contemplated by section 190(1) (b) of the Code. But the language of section 190 (1) (b) is very general and covers, as is now well-settled, not merely reports made under section 173 after an investigation under Chapter XIV or earlier reports under section 157 but all reports of an offence made by the police. It follows that although section 20G of the Opium Act makes an Excise Officer's report of an opium offence a report made by a police officer, it does not make it a ‘police report’ in the special and restricted sense of that term. For determining whether it is such a report, an examination of certain other provisions of law is necessary.

    14. It appears to me that a report of an opium offence made by an Excise Officer cannot be said to be a ‘police report’ within the meaning of that term, as used in the Code with respect to reports to offences made by the police. A ‘police report,’ I have already pointed out, is a report, made by the police under section 157 of the Code when entering upon an investigation under Chapter XIV or a report under section 173 made after such investigation. An Excise Officer does not investigate an offence under the Opium Act under Chapter XIV of the Code, indeed he does not investigate it under the Code at all—but does so under section 20 of the Opium Act itself. He examines witnesses in the course of his investigation, but does so under section 20B of the Opium Act and not under section 161 of the Code. If he has the power to compel the attendance of witnesses, it is not a power directly conferred on him by section 160 of the Code but a power conferred on him by section 20B of the Opium Act and also by section 20E which makes the relative provisions of the Code applicable, so far as may be. He can release an accused person when the evidence against him is deficient, but derives his power to do so from section 20C of the Opium Act and not from section 169 of the Code. He has to maintain a diary of the proceedings of his investigation and again, the obligation is cast on him not by section 172 of the Code, but by section 20J of the Opium Act. And lastly, he forwards the accused persons, if arrested, to a Magistrate and makes his report of the offence under section 20G of the Opium Act and not under sections 170 and 173 of the Code. Indeed, it appears that even if a police officer and not an Excise Officer investigates an offence under the Opium Act, he has to do so, not under Chapter XIV of the Code but under the provisions of the Opium Act itself. Where the offence is a non-cognisable one and there is no direction by a competent Magistrate to investigate it, no question of proceeding under Chapter XIV of the Code and making a report under Chapter XIV can at all arise, even in the case of a police officer. In the case of an Excise Officer, to proceed under Chapter XIV of the Code in any circumstances is altogether out of the question.

    15. It is interesting to note that as regards the powers of an Excise Officer to make an investigation and the exercise of those powers, the provisions of the Bengal Excise Act, which is not concerned with opium, are markedly different. Section 74(1) of the Act authorises Excise Officers, specially empowered in that behalf, to exercise the powers of investigation conferred on a police officer by sections 160 to 171 of the Code and subsection (4) of the section requires them, if they find at the close of the investigation that there is sufficient evidence to justify the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate, to submit a report which, it is said, “shall for the purposes of section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, be deemed to be a police report.” It is to be noticed that unlike section 20G of the Opium Act, section 74(4) of the Bengal Excise Act uses the expression ‘police report’ and not ‘report in writing made by a police officer.’ And then there is sub-section (3) of section 74 which provides that

    “For the purposes of section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the area to which Excise Officer empowered under section 73, sub-section (2), is appointed, shall be deemed to be a police station and such officer shall be deemed to be the officer in charge of such station.”

    16. Whether the provision in effect makes an investigation under the Bengal Excise Act an investigation under Chapter XIV of the Code and whether section 74(4) makes the report submitted on the conclusion of such investigation a ‘police report’ for the purposes of section 251A is a question which will have to be decided when a proper occasion for it arises. It is sufficient to note here that, in the Opium Act, there are no provisions like those in the Bengal Excise Act which approximate the investigation under that Act very closely to an investigation under Chapter XIV of the Code, if they do not completely identify one with the other.

    17. So far as the present case is concerned, the Excise Department treated the offences charged against the accused as non-cognisable.

    18. If they were so, the case against the accused was instituted on a report made by an Excise Officer of certain non-cognisable offences. The report might be, by reason of the provisions of section 20G of the Opium Act, a report in writing made by a police officer, but it was not a ‘police report,’ as contemplated by the Code. Even if the offences were cognisable, the report was not a police report, because there was not and could not be any investigation under Chapter XIV of the Code and the report was not made under section 157 or section 173. The challan described itself correctly as a ‘Report to Magistrate under the Opium Act’ because it was under section 20G of that Act that the report was made. The preliminary condition to be satisfied by a case if section 251A of the Code is to apply to it, was thus not satisfied. Nor could section 251A really work, if it was sought to be applied. Although it is true that there may not be in every case all the documents mentioned in section 173(4), it is nevertheless clear that like sections 207A(3) and 207A (6), section 251A(1) contemplates that there has been an investigation under Chapter XIV. Otherwise, there could be no meaning in the sec- lion saying that the Magistrate must satisfy himself that all the documents mentioned in section 173 have been furnished to the accused. As I have already pointed out, except confessions or statements recorded under sec. 164, those documents could come into existence only in the course of an investigation under Chapter XIV. If section 251A was sought to be applied in the present case, it would be found that the provisions of sub-section (1) could not be complied with, because there was neither any first information recorded under section 154, nor any statement recorded I under section 161, nor any report forwarded under section 173 (1) of which copies could be furnished to the accused. It appears from the order-sheet that copies of certain documents were furnished to the accused, obviously, in purported compliance with section 251A(1), hut whatever they were, they could not be copies of any of the documents mentioned in section 173 and therefore there was no real compliance with the section. If copies of the documents mentioned in section 173 could not be and were not furnished and if no such documents were in existence, as they were not, the proceeding, as a proceeding under section 251A, could make no further progress, because the next step, as laid down in sub-sections (2) and (3), could be taken only “upon consideration of all the documents referred to in section 173” and “upon such documents being considered.” It is thus obvious that section 251A of the Code is not so designed as to be applicable to a case of an offence or offences under the Opium Act instituted on a report made by an Excise Officer.

    19. For the reasons given above, this Rule is made absolute and the proceedings so far had under section 251A of the Code are quashed. The learned Magistrate will proceed with the trial in accordance with law, i.e, in accordance with section 252 of the Code and the sections immediately following.

    Das Gupta, J.:— I agree.

    A.K.D.G

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    Premchand Khetry v. The State Opposite Party.
    (Nov 28, 1957)