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Comprehensive Summary of the Opinion — United Printing & Binding Works Ltd. (Application to Set Aside Arbitration Award)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application by United Printing & Binding Works Ltd. (the applicant) to set aside a joint Award made by two arbitrators: Bimal Chatterjee (nominee of the petitioner/applicant) and Kishanlal Mohta (nominee of the respondent, Kishori Lal Saraogi). The arbitration clause was embodied in clause 15 of an Agreement dated 30-3-1954, which provided for arbitration under the Indian Arbitration Act by a single arbitrator if agreed, and otherwise by two arbitrators (one to be nominated by each party).

The applicant's arbitrator, Bimal Chatterjee, was appointed on 17-10-1955 and the respondent's arbitrator, Kishanlal Mohta, on 21-10-1955. Statements and counter-statements were filed before the arbitrators, who issued a joint award on or about 17/19 March 1956. The award directed the applicant to pay Saraogi Rs. 66,300 with interest at 6% per annum from the date of the award and charged specified company assets for payment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the arbitrators acted beyond the matters referred to them (i.e., whether the award exceeded the terms of reference).
  2. Whether failure to appoint an umpire (as envisaged by clause 2 of the First Schedule of the Arbitration Act, 1940) invalidates the arbitration and the award.
  3. Whether the award was invalid for being out of time.
  4. Whether refusal or inability to inspect certain books of account (seized by the police) or denial of opportunity to place the applicant's case renders the award vitiated.
  5. Whether there was a meeting on 16-3-1956 and, relatedly, whether the arbitrators were biased.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

  • The Arbitrators went beyond the matters referred to them and effectively terminated the agreement and conducted a final accounting without proper reference for those matters (petition para 2).
  • The Arbitrators failed to appoint an umpire, and despite repeated requests the applicant was not allowed to nominate an umpire — argued as misconduct rendering the proceedings invalid (relying on clause 2, First Schedule, Arbitration Act, 1940).
  • The award was out of time (by one day).
  • The applicant was not allowed inspection of books of account; alleged false entries by the respondent were not considered; the Arbitrators did not allow the applicant to present its case properly (para 3(g) of the petition).
  • No meeting was held on 16-3-1956, contrary to the respondent's claim; and there is a general allegation of bias arising from the foregoing facts.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The parties had referred "all disputes" to arbitration: the applicant's letter of 17-10-1955 expressly stated that "all disputes between them were referred to arbitration in terms of the agreement" and appointed an arbitrator.
  • The arbitral submissions included specific claims for sums (the respondent's statement sought an award directing payment of Rs. 67,200 plus interest and profits), so the award for Rs. 66,300 fell within the scope of the reference.
  • The arbitrators fixed meetings (initially for 14-3-1956, then purportedly for 16-3-1956), and minutes of 16-3-1956—signed by both arbitrators—record the presence of the Managing Director of the applicant, supporting that the hearing occurred and that the applicant had an opportunity to be heard.
  • The applicant did not follow statutory remedies available (e.g., under Section 8(1)(c) and Section 43 of the Arbitration Act) to remedy alleged procedural defects.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jawala Prasad … v. Amar Nath …, AIR 1951 All 474 (Lucknow Bench of Allahabad High Court) Held (as understood by the applicant) that clause 2, Sch I of the Arbitration Act is mandatory and that failure to appoint an umpire invalidates the award. The court rejected the mandatory-character conclusion of this decision insofar as it holds absence of an umpire invalidates the award. The opinion states an inability to subscribe to that decision because it did not distinguish between mandatory and directory uses of "shall" and was not supported by authorities.
Tikaram Khupchand v. Hansraj Hazarimal, AIR 1954 Nag 241 (Nagpur Division Bench) The decision treated clause 2, Sch I as directory (not mandatory), distinguishing the mandatory/directory construction and relying on persuasive precedents. The court preferred and followed this Nagpur decision over the Lucknow Bench decision, treating the appointment of an umpire under clause 2 as directory and not fatal to the arbitration where arbitrators have otherwise proceeded.
The Bombay Company Ltd. v. The National Jute Mills Co. Ltd., ILR 39 Cal 669 at p. 680 Illustrates the principle that courts should be averse to setting aside proceedings chosen by the parties on mere technical grounds; where arbitrators agree there may be no need for intervention of an umpire. Quoted and relied on to show that technical defects (such as non-appointment of an umpire when arbitrators have agreed) should not lead to setting aside awards. The court used it to support refusal to invalidate the award on this ground.
Shambhu Nath v. Hari Shankar Lal, AIR 1954 All 673 (Allahabad High Court) Holds that where arbitrators fail to appoint an umpire and the parties appear before the arbitrators and present evidence without invoking S.8(1)(c)/S.8(2), the parties are deemed to have waived the irregularity and are estopped. The court cited this decision to support its conclusion that the applicant waived the defect by appearing at hearings without seeking the statutory remedy; it treats that decision as narrowing the earlier Lucknow Bench authority.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed each objection in turn, applying statutory text, party correspondence and conduct, the record before the arbitrators, and precedents:

  1. Award beyond reference:
    • The court examined the applicant's own letter of 17-10-1955 which declared that "all disputes between them were referred to arbitration" and preserved a right to put other disputes before the arbitrator(s).
    • The court noted the respondent's statement before the arbitrators specifically sought an award for roughly Rs. 67,200 plus interest and profits; the award for Rs. 66,300 therefore fell within the scope of matters placed before the tribunal.
    • Conclusion: the award did not travel beyond the matters referred and was within the scope constituted by the appointment letters and pleadings.
  2. Non-appointment of an umpire (clause 2, First Schedule):
    • The court recognized clause 2 of the First Schedule requires appointment of an umpire when the reference is to an even number of arbitrators, but determined that failure to appoint an umpire is not necessarily fatal.
    • The court held clause 2 to be directory rather than mandatory: the use of "shall" in that clause does not automatically render breaches incurable; such regulatory provisions may be waived by party conduct.
    • The court preferred the Nagpur Division Bench decision (Tikaram Khupchand) over the Lucknow Bench decision (Jawala Prasad), because the Nagpur decision (a) analyzed the mandatory/directory distinction and (b) relied on persuasive authorities.
    • The court added a statutory reason: Section 8(1)(c) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 expressly provides a procedure where parties or arbitrators fail to appoint an umpire, which would be superfluous if non-appointment irretrievably vitiated the arbitration.
    • The court cited older Calcutta High Court authority (Bombay Company Ltd. v. National Jute Mills Co.) to emphasize judicial reluctance to set aside party-selected tribunal proceedings on technical grounds where arbitrators have agreed.
    • Waiver and conduct: The arbitrators' latest appointment date was 21-10-1955; the one-month period expired 21-11-1955. Nevertheless, the parties appeared before the arbitrators on dates after that (8-12-1955, 17-1-1956, 15-2-1956) without protest. The applicant therefore waived the defect and could have, but did not, invoke the statutory procedure under Section 8(1)(c) and Section 8(2) to secure appointment of an umpire. The court held that failure to follow that curative statutory procedure precludes belated reliance on the irregularity to set aside the award.
  3. Timeliness of the award:
    • The award, if anything, was delayed by one day. But the court had granted an application to extend time. On that basis the court overruled the objection concerning time.
  4. Access to books of account / alleged failure to consider evidence:
    • The court treated these as questions of fact. The Arbitrators had before them detailed statements and counter-statements addressing accounting issues.
    • If the books had indeed been seized by the police, the applicant had the statutory remedy of applying for a subpoena under Section 43 of the Arbitration Act to obtain production of those documents; the applicant did not pursue that remedy before the arbitrators.
    • Conclusion: absent use of the statutory process to procure the evidence, the applicant could not fault the arbitrators for lack of access to those documents; the objections were therefore overruled.
  5. Existence of meeting on 16-3-1956 and allegation of bias:
    • The respondent produced minutes dated 16-3-1956, signed by both arbitrators, recording the presence of S.C. Bhowmick (Managing Director of the applicant). The applicant's purported letter of 17-3-1956 denying a meeting was not shown in the arbitrators' minutes or record and was not sent by registered means; the court found no evidence the arbitrators received it.
    • The minutes signed by the applicant's own arbitrator were prima facie evidence that a hearing occurred and that the applicant was represented. The applicant did not allege that its arbitrator's signature on the minutes was forged or false in the petition.
    • On these facts, the court found no credible basis for the allegation of bias and overruled this objection as well.

Holding and Implications

Holding: APPLICATION DISMISSED.

The court dismissed the applicant's petition with costs, finding that all objections to the award failed. The judge ordered that judgment upon the award would follow with interest and costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The arbitral award requiring payment (Rs. 66,300 plus interest and charge on specified assets) stands; the applicant's challenge to set it aside has been rejected and the applicant must bear costs as ordered.
  • Procedural guidance from the opinion:
    • Failure to appoint an umpire under clause 2 of Sch I is treated as a directory irregularity that can be waived by party conduct, particularly where the parties continue to participate in the arbitral process and do not invoke the curative statutory mechanisms (Section 8(1)(c) and Section 8(2)).
    • When an evidentiary item is unavailable (e.g., seized by police), the party seeking it is expected to use statutory remedies (Section 43) to procure it for the tribunal; failure to do so weakens any later objection based on absence of documents.
  • No broader precedent was expressly declared by this opinion; the court applied existing authorities and statutory provisions to the facts and did not claim to announce a novel legal doctrine beyond the application of those principles.

End of summary — based exclusively upon the contents of the provided opinion.

    United Printing And Binding Works Ltd. v. Kishori Lal .

    1. This is an application by United Printing & Binding Works Ltd., a private limited Company, to set aside’ an Award made by two Arbitrators Bimal Chatterjee and Kishanlal Mohta being respectively the nominees of the petitioner and the respondent Kishori Lal Saraogi. By clause 15 of an Agreement dated 30-3-1954 the petitioner and the respondent agreed to the following arbitration clause:—

    “All disputes and difference arising out of matters relating to the Agreement shall be decided by Arbitration under the Indian Arbitration Act by reference to a single Arbitrator if the parties to these presents so agree upon and in default two arbitrators one to be nominated by either of the parties and to be appointed.”

    The applicant's arbitrator Bimal Chatterjee was appointed on 17-10-1955 and the respondent's Arbitrator Kishanlal Mohta was appointed on 21-10-1955. Various statements and counter-statements were filed before the Arbitrators by the parties. The Arbitrators agreed on their award and published their joint award on or about 17th/19th March 1956.

    2. On behalf of the applicant the first objection taken to the award is that the Arbitrators went beyond the matters which were referred to them for decision. That objection is taken in para 2 of the petition. Paragraph 2 of the petition refers to a letter of 17-10-1955 and makes the allegation that the parties did not make any reference to the Arbitrators to terminate the agreement between the parties and come to any final accounting. A reference to the letter of 17-10-1955 written by the applicant to the respondent shows that “all disputes between them were referred to arbitration in terms of the agreement. In fact, in the letter of 17-10-1955 the applicant writes:—

    “We cannot allow our interest to be jeopardised in this manner any further and we have decided all disputes between us should be referred to arbitration in terms of the said agreement. We have accordingly appointed Sri Bimal Chatterjee of 9/3a Arpuli Lane Calcutta as arbitrator” etc.

    In fact, the last paragraph of that letter also ends with this statement:—

    “We reserve our right to put our other disputes and differences before the arbitrator or arbitrators.”

    Having said all that, it is now contended by the applicant that the award goes beyond the matters referred to the Arbitrators although “all disputes” between the parties were referred to Arbitrators according to the applicant himself. Obviously the disputes related to the agreement between the parties and the financial control mentioned there and the disputes certainly cover the disputes regarding accounts.

    3. The gist of the award of the Arbitrators is (a) that the applicant was to pay to Saraogi a sum of Rs. 66,300/- in full payment of the claim of the said Saraogi against the Company with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of the award until payment, (b) the specified assets of the Company were charged for payment of the said amount. Looking at the award it is clear to me that it did not travel at all beyond the matters referred to the Arbitrators. In fact, I find that the statements and counter-statements filed before the Arbitrators cover the exact point or which the award was made. In the statement of Kishori Lal Saraogi dated 27-1-1956 before the Arbitrators in para 8(k) the respondent actually asked for an, award for Rs. 66,200/- with interest and profits. In fact, this is what was asked in the respondent's statement;

    “Award should be made directing the Company to make payment of the dues of the financier amounting to Rs. 67,200/- plus interest and profits in terms of the agreement.”

    That being so, it is clear to my mind that the award is not beyond the terms of the reference. In fact, I hold it is very much within the terms of reference constituted both by the letters appointing the Arbitrators as well as by the statements and counter-statements filed before them.

    4. The second objection urged against the award is that the Arbitrators did not appoint an Umpire nor did they allow the applicant to nominate an Umpire in spite of repeated requests. This is put forward as a ground of misconduct. I have already quoted the arbitration agreement between the parties in this case. It does not expressly refer to the appointment of an Umpire. The argument is that under cl 2 of the First Schedule of the Arbitration Act, 1940 it is provided:

    “If the reference is to an even number of arbitrators, the arbitrators shall appoint an umpire not later than one month from the latest date of their respective appointments.”

    5. It is, therefore, urged on the basis of this provision that the entire arbitration proceeding before the Arbitrators without the appointment of an umpire is illegal and invalid and the whole award is bad. I have no hesitation in rejecting this argument as unsound. There are many reasons for rejecting this argument. I shall state them briefly.

    6. The first reason is that failure to appoint an umpire under cl. 2 of the 1st Schedule of the Arbitration Act does not in my judgment render invalid either the arbitration or the award. It is at best a breach of a regulatory provision. My opinion is that the word “shall” in the above cl. 2 of the First Schedule of the Arbitration Act does not make the provision mandatory in the sense that its breach will vitiate the entire arbitration proceeding and make the award illegal. It is directory and not mandatory. All that it does is to make a directory provision whose breach does not necessarily vitiate the arbitration proceeding and whose breach certainly can be waived by the conduct of the parties.

    7. The applicant relied on a decision of the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Jawala Prasad…Defendant-Applicant; v. Amar Nath…Plaintiff Opposite Party., reported in AIR 1951 All 474 (A). It was a decision of a, Division Bench consisting of Sapru and Chandramani, JJ., and the judgment was delivered by Sapru, J. I regret my inability to subscribe to that decision, in so far as it holds that the provisions of cl. (2) of Sch I of the Arbitration Act are of a mandatory character and therefore the absence of appointment of an umpire in such an event makes the award invalid. With respect I consider the sounder view is the one expressed by the Nagpur Division Bench of Hidayatullah and Kaushelendra Rao, JJ. in the case of Tikaram Khupchand v. Hansraj Hazarimal reported in AIR 1954 Nag 241 (B). The Nagpur decision, although a later one, did not notice the Lucknow Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court. My reason for preferring the Nagpur decision to the Lucknow Bench decision is first because the former noticed the difference between mandatory and directory construction of the word “shall” which the latter did not and secondly because the Nagpur decision is based on well known and persuasive precedents while the Lucknow Bench is not supported by authorities.

    8. I shall however add one more reason of my own to those stated in the Nagpur decision in support of the view that appointment of Umpire in cl. (2) of Sch I, Arbitration Act 1940 is directory and not mandatory. It is this Section 8(1)(c) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 expressly provides for the case where the parties are required to appoint an umpire and do not do so and such a provision would have been unnecessary if failure to appoint an umpire under cl. (2) of Sch I of the Act irretrievably and incurably taints and vitiates the arbitration proceedings and the resulting Award.

    9. An older decision of this High Court by Chitty, J., not on Arbitration Act, 1940, but on the old arbitration law in The Bombay Company Ltd. v. The National Jute Mills Co. Ltd. ILR 39 Cal 669 at p. 680 (C) may be usefully quoted for explaining the underlying legal principle:

    “The Court will, I take it, be averse to setting aside, or pronouncing as illegal, the proceedings of a Tribunal selected by the parties themselves. It certainly should not do so on technical grounds. Here it is conceded that the arbitrators have agreed upon their award. There has therefore been no necessity for the intervention of an Umpire. If one had been nominated, the parties would be in the same position. No further reference could have been made by either side to obtain the Umpire's opinion, or to question the correctness of the arbitrators' award.”

    10. Here also in this case the Arbitrators have agreed and there was no occasion for any Umpire. It will be more than insensible technicality in such a case as this to hold that the award is bad because no Umpire was appointed who if appointed would have had no function as the Arbitrators agreed in this case.

    11. Lastly, this argument also fails on the ground of waiver. Now Cl. (2) of Sch I, Arbitration Act makes it a duty of the Arbitrators to appoint an Umpire not later than one month from the latest date of their respective appointments. Now the latest date of appointment in this case was 21-10-1955 One month expired on 21-11-1955. But thereafter on 8-12-1955, on 17-1-1953, and on 15-2-1956 the applicant and the respondent appeared at different sittings before the Arbitrators without any protest. That conduct waives the defect of non-appointment of an Umpire. The applicant also had his remedy in his hands. He should have applied under Section 8(1)(c) of the Arbitration Act for the appointment of an Umpire and not quietly appeared before the Arbitrators who had not appointed the Umpire; and then when the award goes against him he cannot be allowed to make a point that the award is bad because no Umpire was appointed. Section 8(1)(c), Arbitration Act, 1940, is one of the express cases provided by the Statute, “where the parties or the arbitrators are required to appoint an umpire and do not appoint him, any party may serve the other parties or the arbitrators, as the case may be, with a written notice to concur in the appointment or appointments or in supplying the vacancy.” It also provides in S. 8(2) that if such appointment is not made within fifteen days after service of notice, the Court may, upon the application of the party who gave the notice and after giving the other parties an opportunity of being heard, appoint an umpire. Therefore, the applicant, in my opinion, has missed his chance twice, and I do not think he can now avail himself of this irregularity or defect of the non-appointment of an Umpire as a ground for setting aside the Award. Failure of the Arbitrators to appoint an Umpire under cl (2) of Sch I, Arbitration Act being a breach curable by the procedure prescribed by S. 8 of the Act itself, a party who fails to follow the procedure permitted by the Statute to remedy the breach and stands by till the award is made cannot put forward non-appointment of an umpire as a ground for setting aside the Award.

    12. In fact, the very decision of the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court on which reliance was placed by the applicant states that this is a condition which could be waived. In a later decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case Shambhu Nath v. Hari Shankar Lal, reported in AIR 1954 All 673 (D) a Division Bench consisting of Malik, C.J and Sapru, J., came to the conclusion that “where the arbitrators fail to appoint an umpire and the parties do not follow the procedure prescribed by S. 8(1)(c) and S. 8(2), but appear before the arbitrators and produce all their evidence, they must be deemed to have waived the irregularity and are estopped.” That decision clearly says that the failure to appoint the Umpire is only an “irregularity”. In so far as it does so, it whittles down the authority of the previous Lucknow Bench decision, which it considered although not expressly disavowed.

    13. I therefore overrule this objection.

    14. The next objection is that the award was out of time. If anything, it was out of time by a day. But as an application was made to extend the time and that application has been granted by this Court, no further objection can exist on this ground. I, therefore, overrule this objection as to time.

    15. The next objection is that the applicant was not allowed inspection of the books of account and that the Arbitrators did not take into consideration the alleged false entries made by the respondent or that the Arbitrators did not allow the applicant to place its case properly. Now these are questions of fact. The different statements and counter-statements of the parties went into elaborate questions of account. It is, therefore, impossible for this Court to say that the Arbitrators did not give any proper hearing to the applicant. In fact, the objection really is that the books of account were seized and taken away by the Central Government, Detective Department, and as the Arbitrators could not have them, they really had no sufficient evidence to make the award. That objection is taken in para 3(g) of the petition. But the fact there is that if that was so, the applicant could have applied for a subpoena for the production of those documents from the police under Section 43 of the Arbitration Act. But the applicant took no such steps to get such evidence before the Arbitrators. It is, therefore, not open to him to complain that such books as were seized by the police were the only evidence that could be produced before the Arbitrators. I, therefore, overrule these objections.

    16. The last objection is that no meeting was held on 16-3-1956. The respondent's case on this point is that the Arbitrators fixed a meeting for 14-3-1956 by their letter of 8-3-1956, but the said meeting on 14-3-1956 could not be held on account of the inability of the applicant's own Arbitrator Bimal Chatterjee to attend and the respondent's further case is that the next meeting was fixed for the 16th March in the house of Bimal Chatterjee and the parties were orally intimated accordingly and both the respondent and the Managing Director of the petitioner were present at the meeting of 16-3-1956 and the Arbitrators duly heard both parties. Now the applicant disputes it and says that there was no meeting on 16-3-1956. For that purpose he relies on a letter which is written by the applicant on 17-3-1953 to the Arbitrators. Now that letter of 17-3-1956 was not sent by a peon Book or under any registered cover with acknowledgment due. I find that letter is not on the minutes and papers filed by the Arbitrators. Therefore, there is no evidence before me to show that letter was actually received by the Arbitrators. Besides that I find that there is something more damaging to the applicant's case on this point. In fact, I find there are minutes of the meeting of 16-3-1956 which record the presence of S.C Bhowmick, Managing Director of the applicant. The minute says that the meeting was held at the residence of Bimal Chatterjee, the Arbitrator who was the nominee of the applicant. These minutes are signed by the two arbitrators. That being so, the prima facie evidence is entirely against the applicant's case that there was no meeting on 16-3-1956. It is also supported by the fact that although the papers were filed and the applicant had opportunity to inspect the records before he made this objection, not a word is said in his petition that the minute signed by his own nominee Arbitrator Bimal Chatterjee recording his own presence at the meeting of 16-3-1956 is false & that his Arbitrator Chatterjee had signed a false statement by signing those minutes. If it was a fact, I have no doubt in my mind that the applicant would have made that his very first ground of challenging the award. Not a word, however, appears in the petition on that point that Bimal Chatterjee's signature to the minutes of 16-3-1956 records a false statement by recording the presence of the applicant himself.

    17. The general allegation is made on the basis of these facts that the Arbitrators were biassed. I find no bias at all. There are, in fact, no other particulars of alleged bias except those which I have discussed above.

    18. All the objections, therefore, fail. I dismiss this application with costs.

    19. Judgment upon Award will follow with interest and costs.

    H.G.P

    20. Application dismissed.

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    Comments

    United Printing And Binding Works Ltd. v. Kishori Lal .
    (Jun 5, 1956)