The Judgment of the Court was as follows:
Bachawat, J.:— The plaintiff was appointed a Tracer by the Damodar Valley Corporation with effect from the 17th of January, 1949. The letter of appointment must be read with the appointment offer dated the 3rd of January, 1949. The duration of the appointment was three years. The appointment was terminable on one month's notice on either side. The period of probation was up to the 28th of February, 1949.
1. By letter dated the 27th of April, 1949, Mr. R.N Lahiri, the Executive Engineer of the defendant Corporation: Panchet Hill Division, suspended the plaintiff from office work in his Division from the 28th of April, 1949 forenoon till the defendant Corporation decided finally his case.
2. By office order dated the 21st of May, 1949, Mr. Sohan Lal, Director of Personnel of the defendant Corporation directed that the plaintiff be removed from Corporation services with effect from the 28th of April, 1949. On receipt of this order, the plaintiff by letter dated the 8th of June, 1949. stated that he had the misfortune to be summarily dismissed from his service for no fault of Ms although under the terms of employment he was entitled to one month's notice, and requested reinstatement in service. The letter was addressed to the Director of Personnel, Damodar Valley Corporation and copies of the letter were forwarded to the Chairman and the Secretary of the Corporation. It is noticeable that in this letter the plaintiff does not complain that he had not already been dismissed from service, nor does he say that Sohan Lal had no authority to dismiss him. By letter dated the 1st of September, 1949, addressed inter alia to the Director of Personnel and the Secretary, Damodar Valley Corporation, the plaintiff again reiterated his complaint, and stated that there was no just cause for his summary dismissal, and stated that in any event he was entitled to at least one month's notice before his services are terminated. It is again noticeable that the defendant does not complain that his services have not been already terminated or that Sohan Lad had no authority to dismiss him. In reply by letter dated the 12th of September, 1949, Mr. Sohan Lal stated that the plaintiff had already been removed from the service of the Corporation with effect from the 28th of April, 1949. By letter dated the 22nd of October, 1949, Mr. Sohan Lal again wrote to Mr. P. Roy that his services were not required by the Corporation, and consequently he had been removed from the Corporation Services with effect from the 28th of April, 1949.
3. In this suit the plaintiff prays for a declaration that the order of suspension and removal is ultra vires, void and inoperative, for a decree for setting aside the order of removal, for a decree for Rs. 838-4 on account of arrears of pay for seven months from the 28th of April, 1949, up to the 29th of October, 1949, and for a further decree at the rate of Rs. 117 per month up to the date of reinstatement. The plaintiff complains (a) that at least one month's notice of termination should have been given, (b) that Mr Sohan Lal not being an appointing authority should not remove or dismiss him from services, and therefore, his order is illegal and without jurisdiction, (c) that the plaintiff could not be legally removed from service until the charges were framed against him, and until he is allowed to defend his case as provided in the Government of India Act and Government Servants' Conduct Rules. The learned Munsif passed a decree declaring that the order of the Director of Personnel removing the plaintiff from service is illegal, dismissed the prayer for reinstatement, and passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff for the sum of Rs. 574-13-9 on account of salary and compensation up to the 25th of August, 1949.
4. On appeal, the learned Additional District Judge modified the decree of the trial court and directed that the plaintiff would get remuneration at the rate of Rs. 117 per month as from the 28th April to the 22nd of October, 1949, and Rs. 117 for salary in lieu of notice for one month.
5. It is clear that the Damodar Valley Corporation is an independent statutory corporation and the Government Servants' Conduct Rules and the Constitution have no application in relation to employees in the services of the Corporation.
6. It is clear that the plaintiff is not entitled to any enquiry or to the framing of any charge before he could be lawfully dismissed.
7. It is also clear that under the terms of appointment the services of the plaintiff could be lawfully terminated by one month's notice on either side without assigning any reason. It is also clear that if reasons for dismissal are given, the defendant corporation is not bound to substantiate the reasons as long as it is ready and willing to pay salary for one month in lieu of notice.
8. I am satisfied that prior to the 21st of May, 1949, there has been no lawful dismissal of the plaintiff by the defendant. The letter of the Executive Engineer dated the 27th of April, 1949. merely suspended the plaintiff from employment. Suspension is not dismissal. Until the servant is dismissed from office he continues his employment. Where the master chooses to continue the servant in his: employment there is no right to suspend him or to deprive him of any part of the wages. (See Diamond's The Law of Master and Servant, Second Edition, page 199; Halsbury Vol. XXII, page 162; Warburton v. Taff Vale Railway Company. (1) [(1902) 18 T.L.R, 420].
9. The lower appellate court held that the office order dated the 21st of May, 1949, cannot be treated to be a notice of dismissal because it purports to dismiss the plaintiff with retrospective effect as from a prior date.
10. The office order dated the 21st of May, 1949, reads thus: “Mr. P. Roy. Tracer, Office of the Executive Engineer, Panchet Hill Division is removed from Corporation service with effect from the 28th April, 1949”.
11. It is true that the plaintiff could not be dismissed with retrospective effect as from 28th of April, 1949. The order dated the 21st May, 1949, could speak only as from the date of the order. The order, however, is a clear notice that the plaintiff is removed from the Corporation services. The removal could not take effect from the 28th of April, 1949. In my opinion, the order dated the 21st of May, 1949, should be treated as a notice of dismissal as from that date. In fact the plaintiff himself well understood that order to be an order of dismissal and so treated that order in his subsequent letters which I have mentioned above. In my opinion, therefore, the order dated the 21st of May, 1949, which was served upon the plaintiff was and must be deemed to be a clear notice of dismissal as from the 21st of May, 1949.
12. It is said that Mr. Sohan Lal not being the appointing authority could not dismiss the plaintiff. There is a clear confusion of thought in the arguments advanced before me as also in the judgment of the lower appellate court as to the correct approach to this matter. As I have said, the Damodar Valley Corporation is an independent statutory corporation.
13. The rules of the Government servants which provided for dismissal of a Government servant by the authority appointing him or by a higher authority has no application to the employees in the service of the Corporation. The Corporation like any other employer could dismiss its servants. The Corporation could also through its duly authorised agent dismiss its servants. It is remarkable that in the plaint it is not pleaded that Mr. Sohan Lal was not properly or duly authorised by the Corporation to dismiss the plaintiff. The charge in the plaint is that Mr. Sohan Lal not being an appointing authority could not remove or dismiss him from service. The plaint is based upon the assumption that the Government Servants' Conduct Rules apply to the employee in question. Furthermore, in the letter dated the 1st of September, 1949, and the 8th of June, 1949, the plaintiff did not complain that Sohan Lal had no power or authority to dismiss him. There are other materials on the record from which, lawful authority of Mr. Sohan Lal to dismiss the plaintiff could lawfully be inferred. The lower appellate court has clearly held that Mr. Sohan Lal had power to dismiss the plaintiff. I agree with that conclusion, but for different reasons mentioned above. The plaintiff has neither alleged nor proved that Sohan Lal was not the duly authorised agent of the defendant.
14. In view of the finding, the conclusion is that the plaintiff is entitled to (a) salary at the rate of Rs. 117 per month from the 28th of April, up to and including the 21st of May, 1949, (b) a further sum of Rs. 117 on account of one month's salary in lieu of notice.
15. I pass the following order:
The appeal be allowed and the judgment and decree of the learned Additional District Judge dated the 17th of August, 1954 and the judgment and decree of the learned Munsif dated the 7th of May, 1953, be set aside and the suit be remitted to the trial court with the direction that the trial court should forthwith pass a decree is favour of the plaintiff, (a) for salary) at the rate of Rs. 117 per month as from the 28th of April, 1949, up to and including the 21st of May, 1949, (b) for Rs. 117 on account of one month's salary in lieu of notice.
16. As the success of both sides is divided, and having regard to all the circumstances each party do pay its own costs throughout.
17. Let the records be sent down as early as possible.
A.K.D-G.