Citation Codes

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Case Number

Civil Rules Nos. 3611 of 3614 of 1953

Advocates

Mahabir Prosad
Phanindra Kumar Sanyal and Pritibhusan Barman
S. Chaudhury
R. Chaudhury and Anil Kumar Das Gupta

Judges

Sinha, J.

Acts

sections 5(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) of the Constitution of the Union for:(1) Delegates.(2)
Indian Trade Unions Act XVI of 1926 (hereinafter called the Act)
Trade Unions Act of 1936 (hereinafter referred
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT 1947
Trade Unions. [Section 2(h)].

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is a workman employed as a crane-driver at the Kulti Works of the Indian Iron and Steel Company Ltd. The Asansol Iron and Steel Workers' Union is a registered trade union for workers of that company and allied concerns. The petition challenges the membership/enrolment process of the Union and alleges that the old Executive Committee continued in office illegally because no proper election took place in 1953. The Union asserts that elections were held (12 May 1953) and notified to the Registrar, and that a new Executive Committee was formed (notification of 3 June 1958 that 33 members had been elected to the Executive Committee).

There were labour disturbances beginning in 1953 (lightning strike and go-slow at Burnpur) and conflicting meetings held by workers at Burnpur (2 May 1953) and Kulti (9 August 1953) resolving lack of confidence in the Executive Committee and appointing persons to hold elections; the Registrar declined to treat those resolutions as valid unless declared so by a Civil Court. An industrial dispute between some workers and I.I. & S. Co. Ltd. was referred to an Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and proceedings were pending.

The petitioner alleges he applied on 2 October 1953 to be enrolled as a member but was refused; the Union denies any such application. The petitioner moved the Court under Article 226 (writ jurisdiction) seeking relief relating to enrolment and the Union's election/continuing office-holders. The Court heard evidence and argument and delivered the impugned judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the petitioner in fact made an application to be enrolled as a member of the Union and, if so, whether that application was refused (a disputed question of fact).
Assuming an application was made and refused, whether the petitioner had a legal right enforceable by writ of mandamus to be admitted as a member of the trade union based on the Union's constitution and the Trade Unions Act.
Relatedly, whether the Court should interfere with the internal affairs of the Union (such as membership enrolment and extension of enrolment time) by exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented and supported by counsel)

It was asserted on petitioner's behalf (advanced by the Advocate-General of Bihar and Mr. Sanyal) that the Union's constitution described the class of workers who were entitled to be ordinary members (e.g., "All workers working in Standard Wagon Company ... of the age of 18 years or more shall be entitled, to be an ordinary member of the union") and therefore the petitioner had a legal right to be enrolled as a member.
The petitioner alleged he applied for enrolment on 2 October 1953 and was refused, a factual proposition relied upon to ground the relief sought under Article 226.

Respondents' Arguments

The Union (through the organising secretary's affidavit) denied categorically that the petitioner or others applied for enrolment on 2 October 1953 or at any time, and stated that no enrolment was refused as alleged.
Counsel for the Union (Mr. Chaudhuri) argued that even if the constitution described who could be members, that description does not create an enforceable legal right of membership by mandamus; the right is of a private nature and the courts should not ordinarily interfere in internal matters of a corporation/union. He relied on authority and text (Halsbury) to show courts refuse to interfere in disputes between such bodies and members.
It was further pointed out that the Union's constitution imposed the condition that a worker must have "agreed to abide by the terms of the Constitution" to become a member, and there was no averment or proof that the petitioner had so agreed.
Regarding extension of time for enrolment and the timing of elections, the Union argued (and the Court noted) that the time for holding annual elections under the rules was directory and extension of time for enrolment was a discretionary/policy matter of the Union — not shown to be tainted by mala fides.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Cox v. National Union of Foundry Workers of Great Britain and Ireland (44 Times Law Rep. 845)	Illustrates that courts will not ordinarily interfere with the internal affairs of a union; executive acts internal to union affairs were held not justiciable in that case.	The Court treated this English decision as instructive on the nature of rules framed by a trade union and on the reluctance of courts to intervene in internal union matters.
R. v. Bank of England (1819) 2 B. & Ald. 620	Shows instances where courts refused to interfere in disputes between corporations (working under a Royal Charter) and their members.	Used to support the proposition (via Halsbury) that courts have often declined to interfere between corporations and members, analogous to a registered trade union incorporated under statute.
R. v. London Assurance Co. (1822) 5 B. & Ald. 899	Another example where courts refused to intervene in internal corporate/member disputes.	Adopted for the same general principle that a corporation's internal decisions as to membership and related matters are not readily subject to judicial compulsion absent statutory duty.
Anon (1728) 1 Barn. K.B. 137	Cited for the general historical proposition that corporations may have the right to choose their members unless clearly deprived of that right by express words.	Relied upon as authority for the proposition that a corporation (and analogously a registered trade union) has an incident of corporate power to admit whom it likes unless its charter expressly restricts that discretion.
R. v. West Looe Corporation (1825) C.B. & C. 677	Supports the proposition that corporations have a discretion in admitting members and are not necessarily bound to admit every qualified person.	Used to buttress the Court's view that descriptive qualifications in a constitution do not necessarily create an enforceable right of membership.
R. v. Eye Corporation (1822) 1 B. & C. 85	Authority for the proposition that a person having the requisite qualification does not necessarily possess an absolute right to be a member of a corporation.	Applied to emphasise that mere possession of stated qualifications in a constitution does not automatically generate an enforceable right to membership.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in two parts: (A) factual inquiry about whether the petitioner had in fact applied for enrolment, and (B) legal analysis assuming arguendo that an application had been made.

(A) Factual analysis)

The Court found a genuine dispute of fact as to whether the petitioner applied for enrolment on 2 October 1953. The Union denied any such application in an affidavit by its organising secretary.
The only documentary evidence presented (a letter from someone calling himself "Secretary, Action Committee of Kulti Workers" dated 2 October 1953) was insufficient: the signature was illegible, no affidavit was filed by the author, and the list of names purportedly sent was not before the Court. The Court therefore could not accept that annexure as proof that the petitioner had applied or had been refused enrolment.
The Court reiterated the well-established principle that, in an Article 226 application, a court will not ordinarily try disputed questions of fact except in exceptional circumstances; here the facts were disputed and not proven to the Court's satisfaction.

(B) Legal analysis (assuming an application was made)

The Court examined the nature of the rights conferred (if any) by the Union's constitution and by the Trade Unions Act. It noted that a "description" in the constitution of who may be members (or the relevant qualifications) does not necessarily create an absolute, legally enforceable right to membership.
The Court observed that the rules of a trade union are not statutory rules in the same sense as regulations made under section 29 of the Trade Unions Act; they are internal rules of a corporate body incorporated under the Act.
Relying on authority (cases and Halsbury), the Court reasoned that corporations incorporated under a statute (and, analogously, a registered trade union) possess an incident of corporate discretion to select members unless expressly deprived of such discretion by statute or the charter; historical and English authorities show courts are reluctant to interfere in internal matters of such bodies.
The Court concluded that mandamus will lie to compel a corporation to perform a statutory duty but will not lie to control the exercise of an internal discretion where no statutory duty exists to admit a person.
Further, the constitution itself required a worker to have "agreed to abide by the terms of the Constitution" before becoming a member; the petitioner had not averred or proved such agreement.
On the question of extension of time for enrolment: the Court found the timing for annual elections under the rules to be directory rather than mandatory; extension of enrolment time is a discretionary matter or matter of policy for the Union and was not shown to be tainted by mala fides.
Finally, the Court noted that, if a legal right did exist, the proper forum to resolve disputed questions of fact would be by suit — not by a writ application under Article 226 — and that a writ of prohibition was inapplicable because the respondents were not inferior courts or tribunals.

Holding and Implications

Holding (core ruling): The application under Article 226 was dismissed; the Rule was discharged. In the Court's own terms, "this application fails and must be dismissed."

Direct Orders / Consequences:

The interim orders previously in place were vacated.
There was no order as to costs.
The operation of the dismissal order was stayed for two weeks to enable the petitioner to appeal.
The Respondent Union undertook not to publish the names of persons already elected until disposal of the application; that position was to continue during the two-week stay. Any further stay or direction must be obtained from the Court of Appeal.

Broader implications: The opinion makes clear that, on the facts before the Court, no enforceable legal right to union membership was found to exist that could be compelled by mandamus, and the Court declined to intervene in the internal discretionary affairs of the registered trade union. The Court did not purport to lay down any novel legal precedent; it applied existing principles (as discussed) to the facts and indicated that disputed factual issues should be litigated in an appropriate forum (e.g., a suit) rather than through Article 226 relief in the ordinary course.

Signed: A.K.D.G.

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Mohammad Ibrahim v. Asansol Iron & Steel Workers Union And Ors.

The Judgment of the Court was as follows:

1. The petitioner is a workman employed as a crane-driver at the Kulti Works of the Indian Iron and Steel Company Ltd. That company and the Indian Standard Wagon Company Ltd, Burnpur, are allied concerns. The Assansol Iron and Steel Workers' Union is a trade union of the workers of the two companies and is registered under the Trade Unions Act of 1936 (hereinafter referred to as the trade union).

2. A “Trade Union”, as defined by the Indian Trade Unions Act XVI of 1926 (hereinafter called the ‘Act’) means any combination, whether temporary or permanent, formed primarily for the purpose of regulating the relation between workmen and employers or between workmen and workmen or between employers and employers or for imposing restrictive conditions on the conduct of any trade or business and includes any federation of two or more Trade Unions. [Section 2(h)]. Any seven or more members of a Trade Union may, by subscribing their names to the rules of the Trade Union and by otherwise complying with the provisions of the Act with respect to registration, apply for registration of the Trade Union (section 4). In order to be eligible for registration, the trade union must have an executive constituted according to the provisions of the Act, and the rules of the trade union must contain certain provisions as laid down in section 6 of the Act. If the trade union contravenes any provisions of the Act after receiving a notice from the Registrar, the registration can be cancelled. Upon registration, the trade union becomes a body corporate by the name under which it is registered. Under section 29, the State Government has power to frame regulations for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the Act. The constitution and rules of the trade union are annexed to the petition and marked “A”. It contains the following provision: “All workers working in Standard Wagon Company S.C.O.B Ltd., I.I & S. Ltd., Kulti Works, E.L.C Co., of the age of 18 years or more shall be entitled, to be an ordinary member of the union by agreeing to abide by the terms of the Constitution.”

3. The workers of all these companies however do not automatically become members. They have to be enrolled and must agree to abide by the constitution and they have to make certain payments in the nature of subscription and donation. The supreme power of the Union is vested in the delegates' conference, which meets annually and lays down the policy, programme and line of action to be taken by the trade union for the year. The delegates' conference constitutes the General Council. The Council elects the Executive Committee which manages and conducts all affairs of the Union according to the directions of the General Council and the delegates' conference. The annual delegates' conference must, according to the rules, meet not later than the month of May.

4. There is no dispute that the Executive Committee for the year 1951, 52 was duly constituted. According to respondent No. 1 (The Trade Union), the General Council for the years 1953–54 came into being as a result of an election duly held on the 12th May, 1953.

5. The notice convening the election is set out in an annexure to the affidavit-in-opposition (affirmed by Krishna Chandra Prasad). It appears that on the 14th May, 1953, the General Secretary duly intimated to the Registrar of Trade Unions, the fact that the elections had been duly held on the 12th May, 1953. Names of 28 members were forwarded as having been elected to the General Council.

6. On the 3rd June, 1958, further intimation was given that 33 members had been elected to the Executive Committee, Ly the General Council. It is stated that upon the formation of the new Executive Committee, the old Executive Committee relinquished office. According to the petitioner, there was no such election held, and the members of the old Executive Committee are illegally continuing in office. In fact all the members of the old executive Committee have been made parties to this rule “co-nomine” (Opposite Parties Nos. 2 to 36). It appears that since January, 1953, there was trouble between the two companies and a section of their workers. It first started by a lightning strike by the workers of the Hot Mills Sections of the Sheet Mills of the Indian Iron and Steel Co., Ltd., at Burnpur, followed by a “go-slow” policy. The disaffection spread to other sections of the workers at Burnpur and it appears that the efforts of the management of the companies, and the intervention of Government, did not prove very effective, at least for a considerable time.

7. On the 2nd May, 1953, some of the workers at Burnpur convened a meeting and passed resolutions to the effect that the Executive Committee and the office bearers of the trade union did not enjoy the confidence of its members. It appointed 5 persons to take charge of the assets and the affairs of the union and to hold a general election. A similar meeting was held by Kulti workers on the 9th August, 1953, and a similar resolution passed, These resolutions were sent to the Registrar of trade Unions who wrote back on the 22nd April, 1953, and 15th May, 1958, stating that the Constitution of the Union did not contain any provision for such a meeting and no notice of the resolutions could be taken unless the validity thereof was declared by a competent Civil Court. I might mention here that an industrial dispute between some workers and the I.I & S. Co., Ltd., has been referred by Government to an Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the proceedings are pending. The facts regarding the disputes and differences between the companies and the workers are all disputed. It however appears that it assumed noticeable proportion at Burnpur and not at Kulti.

8. Under the Constitution of the trade union, workers who were members on the 31st March, 1958, could alone participate in the general election. It therefore does appear that the actual election was held at a time when matters were in a disturbed state. In view of this, the Union proposed to hold another general election and for that purpose a notice was issued first on the 27th October, 1953, (Annexure ‘C’), and finally by a comprehensive notice dated the 24th November; 1953, (Annexure “D” to the petition), the relevant part of which is as follows:

“Asansol Iron and Steel Worker's Union.

Head Office—Burnpur,

Election of Delegates and General Council Representatives

1. This election of the Delegates and Representatives to General Council of the Asansol Iron and Steel Workers' Union was held in May last. In spite of that, on the advice of the Prime Minister, the Industries Minister, Government of India, and the Chief Minister, Government of West Bengal, the president of the Union has agreed to hold the same.

2. This election will be held as per sections 5(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) of the Constitution of the Union for:—

(1) Delegates.

(2) Representatives of the General Council.

3. The members entitled to take part in this election will be:—

(Section 4.)

For Kulti

(a) Those who fully paid their subscriptions till March, 1958, on or before the 31st March, 1953. Burnpur.

(b) Those who fully paid their subscriptions till March, 1953, on or before the 31st March, 1953.

(c) Those who paid up their arrears or paid one year subscription till the 31st March, 1953, on or before the 22nd September, 1953, according to the notification of the Union.

(d) Those who became members of the Union by paying one year subscription till the 31st March, 1958, on or before the 22nd September, 1953, according to the notifications by the Union.

(e) Those who were in arrears but paid up their subscriptions for one year till the 31st March, 1953, on and from the 28th October, 1953, to the 31st October, 1953, according to the notification by the Union.

(f) Those who became members of the Union by paying one year subscription till 31st March, 1953, on and from the 28th October, 1958, to the 31st October, 1953, according to the notification by the Union”

9. The petitioner states (paragraph 12 of the petition) that on the 2nd October, 1953, he and other workers of the Kulti Works of the I.I & S. Co., Ltd., applied to the opposite parties for having their names enrolled as members of the Union but it was refused. This is categorically denied on behalf of the opposite parties. The organising secretary of the Union in his affidavit (para. 32) says—”It is denied that on the 2nd October, 1953, or on any other date at all the petitioner and| or any other workers applied to be enrolled as members of the respondent union and/or that the respondents or any of them refused to enroll the petitioner or any of the other applicants for enrolment as alleged”

10. Thus there is a dispute on a fact which is vital and goes to the root of the application. If the petitioner never made any application, no question can arise of the maintainability of such an application. It is well-known that in an application under Article 226 the Court does not (except in exceptional-circumstances) go into disputed questions of fact. In the fact, the only evidence produced (apart from the statement of the petitioner) before me is a copy of a letter alleged to have been sent by a person describing himself as “Secretary, Action Committee of Kulti Workers” to the Registrar of Trade Unions, dated 2nd Oct., 1953. This letter states that the writer was sending a list of 4,725 names of employees of the Kulti Works who desired to cast their votes in the “forthcoming annual election of the Union”, but that the Union Secretary had refused to enrol them as members. This letter is stated to be signed by somebody whose signature is illegible, and no affidavit has been filed by him. The list which was sent by him is not before me and I do not know whether it includes the petitioner's name. Under the circumstances, I cannot accept this annexing as any evidence at all to prove the fact that the petitioner did apply for enrolment and that it was refused.

11. This would be quite sufficient to dispose of this application, but I think it is desirable that I should also deal with the legal position, assuming that such an application had been made.

12. The learned Advocate-General of Bihar (followed up by Mr. Sanyal) argued that under the Constitution of the trade union, all workers in the Kulli Works of the I.I & S. Co., Ltd., of the age of 18 years or more are entitled to be members of the trade union and therefore the petitioner had a legal right to be enrolled as a member. No authority has been shown to ma which lays down the proposition that simply because the constitution of a trade union lays down that it is intended to act as a union of a, particular class of workers, that it confers upon-them a legal right to be enrolled as members, a right enforceable by law. The rules of the trade union are not statutory rules and are not like regulations which might be framed under section 29 of the Act. My attention has been drawn to an English decision Cox v. National Union of Foundry Workers of Great Britain and Ireland (1) (44 Times Law Rep. 845). In that case, the rules of a particular union prescribed the amount of superannuation benefit and funeral expenses. The executive council of the Union passed a resolution that payments should be reduced by one-third. A member of the Union objected to this and brought an action contending that this act of the executive council was ultra-vires of the constitution of the Union and asked for an injunction. Asthury, J., refused to interfere, on the ground that the court had no right to interfere with the “Internal affairs” of the Union. Although this decision is not on all fours with the present case, it does throw light upon the question as to the nature of the rules which are framed by a trade union.

13. But even if there exists such a right, Mr. Chaudhuri has pointed out that the right is of a private nature and cannot be enforced by a mandamus. He has referred to article 1304 of Halsbury, Vol. 9, pp. 769, whore eases have been referred to of corporations working under a Royal Charter and yet the courts have refused to interfere in disputes between such a body and its members. R. v. Bank of Enqland (2) [(1819) 2 B. and Ald. 620]; R. v. London Assurance Co., (8) [(1822) 5 B. and Ald. 899]. I have not been referred to a case relating to a trade onion which is en all fours to the facts of the present case, but I think that the law relating to corporations incorporated under a statute would be fully applicable. In the case of such a Corporation (here the trade union has been incorporated under the Act), it has, as an incident belonging to it, a right to make any person it likes members, unless it is clearly deprived of that right by prescriptions or express words in its charter [(Halsbury, Vol. 8, p. 30, Article; 44). Anon (1728) 1 Barn (K.B) 137. R. v. West Looe Corporation (4) (1825) C.B & C. 677].

14. A person having the requisite qualification does not necessarily possess an absolute right to be a member of a Corporation [R. v. Eye Corporation (5), (1822) 1 B. & C. 85. Halsbury, Vol. 8, p. 30, article 44).

15. As I have already pointed out, there is nothing in the Act or the rules made under the Act which confers absolute right upon the petitioner to be admitted as a member of this particular trade union. Such a right might have been brought into existence if there was an express provision in the Act or the Constitution of the trade union, that no one having the requisite qualification could be refused membership. A mere description in the constitution of the class of persons which can become members or the qualifications necessary for membership, does not confer an absolute right of becoming a member upon any person who might belong to that class or) answer that description or possess such qualification, and the court will not enforce such a claim by mandamus. In, other words, mandamus will lie to compel a corporation to do its statutory duty, but not where there is no duty cast by statute or where” the corporation has a discretion in the matter.

16. Mr. Chaudhuri also points out that even according to the Constitution of the trade union, a worker of the Kulti Works of the I.I & S. Co., Ltd., is only entitled to become a member if he has “agreed to abide by the terms of the Constitution”, and there is noth-ingr to show that the petitioner ever agreed to do so. There is not even an averment in the petition to that effect.

17. If the right to become a member is not a legal right, then of course the point as to extension of time in the “notice, dated 24th November, 1953, becomes of little consequence. It is argued that under the rules the elections had to be effected by May, 1953. If that was not done, it is said that an extension of time should have been” granted not merely to the Burnpore Workers but also to the Kulti Workers. It is the case of the opposite parties that the election has already been held in May, but as there exist disputes, the present General Council and Executive Committee are willing to have a further election held. I need not go into the question as to the validity of any such further election, because that matter is not before me.

18. It is clear however that the time for holding the annual elections is merely directory and not mandatory. Extension of time for enrolment of members is a discretionary matter or at least a matter of policy. It is said that the extension has been granted to Burnpur and it has not been extended to Kulti Workers because there was trouble at Burnpur and it has not been extended to Kulti Workers, because there was no trouble there Looked at from this point of view, it does not seem to be an unreasonable thing to do. In any event, there is certainly no question of mala, fides.

19. Lastly, if there is a legal right at all in the petitioner, I do not see why he cannot file a suit and get his remedy. Since the matter involves disputed questions of fact, that would be the proper remedy. I may add also that a writ of prohibition cannot lie as the respondents are not inferior courts or tribunals. For the reasons stated, this application fails and must he dismissed. The Rule is discharged. All interim orders are vacated There will however be no order as to costs.

20. The operation of this order is staved for two weeks in order to enable the petitioner to apneal. Respondent Union had agreed not to publish the names of persons who have already been elected, until the disposal of this application. That position will continue during this period. Any further order or stay or direction in that behalf must be obtained from the Court of Appeal.

A.K.D.G

Mohammad Ibrahim v. Asansol Iron & Steel Workers Union And Ors.

Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented and supported by counsel)

Respondents' Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Mohammad Ibrahim v. Asansol Iron & Steel Workers Union And Ors.

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