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  • re-heard;5. Sub-section (1) of section 350 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • sub-section (2) of section 117 of the Code all the provisions of the Code
  • sub-section (1) to section 350 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • section 350 itself. Proviso (b) to sub-section (1) of section 350
  • provisions of section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Act V of 1898. While section 350 of the present Code
  • section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • section 350 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • provisions of section 328 of the 1872 Code
  • sub-section (2) of section 117 of the Code
  • provisions of section 107 of the Code
  • there.15. Sub-section (2) of section 117
  • section 328 of the Code of 1872
  • section 491 of the Code of 1872
  • Sub-section (2) of section 117
  • Section 4(k)
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • re-heard;5. Sub-section (1) of section 350 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • sub-section (2) of section 117 of the Code all the provisions of the Code
  • sub-section (1) to section 350 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • section 350 itself. Proviso (b) to sub-section (1) of section 350
  • provisions of section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Act V of 1898. While section 350 of the present Code
  • section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • section 350 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • provisions of section 328 of the 1872 Code
  • sub-section (2) of section 117 of the Code
  • provisions of section 107 of the Code
  • there.15. Sub-section (2) of section 117
  • section 328 of the Code of 1872
  • section 491 of the Code of 1872
  • Sub-section (2) of section 117
  • Section 4(k)
Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion (Debabrata Mookerjee, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was proceeded against under section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the Subdivisional Magistrate of Contai, who required him to show cause why he should not execute a bond with sureties for good behaviour. A substantial body of evidence was recorded by the original Subdivisional Magistrate, Mr. A.K. Sen. Mr. Sen was transferred and succeeded by Mr. S.C. Bhattacharjee, who took up the proceedings from the point reached by his predecessor. The petitioner applied that witnesses already examined before Mr. Sen be re-summoned and their evidence re-heard by the successor Magistrate. The successor Magistrate refused to re-hear the entire evidence but allowed that applications for recall of individual witnesses would be considered on their merits. Dissatisfied, the petitioner obtained a Rule from this Court, contending as a matter of right that all witnesses examined before the predecessor Magistrate should be re-examined before the successor Magistrate.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a person proceeded against under section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has, upon transfer of the enquiring Magistrate, the right as a matter of course to have witnesses re-summoned and their evidence re-heard by the successor Magistrate.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Mukherjee)

  • The petitioner had a right, as a matter of law, to have all witnesses re-called and their evidence re-heard by the successor Magistrate.
  • Principles of adjudication require the deciding court to hear evidence personally before deciding; refusal to re-summon witnesses would force the successor Magistrate to decide on evidence much of which he had not heard himself.
  • Reliance was placed on the decision in Buroda Kanta Roy v. Korimuddi Moonshee (an 1872 Code decision) to support the contention that, in security proceedings under Chapter VIII, a person proceeded against may insist on recall and re-examination before the successor Magistrate.
  • It was argued that an order requiring security is in substance akin to a conviction (because serious consequences may follow from failure to furnish bond), and therefore the person proceeded against should be treated like an accused.
  • Relying on sub-section (2) of section 117 of the Code, it was argued that provisions relating to trials are attracted to security inquiries and thus the incidents of trials (including rights under section 350 provisos) should apply.

The opinion does not present any detailed, distinct arguments advanced on behalf of the State or the successor Magistrate in the same detail; the record as provided focuses on the petitioner's contentions and the Court's analysis.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Buroda Kanta Roy v. Korimuddi Moonshee (4 Cal. L.R. 452) (decision under the Code of 1872) Held that under section 491 of the 1872 Code (roughly corresponding to present section 107) a person proceeded against had the right to have witnesses re-examined under provisions analogous to section 328 of the 1872 Code (roughly corresponding to present section 350). The Court distinguished this authority because it was decided under the 1872 Code. The Court noted that section 328 (1872) used the word "case" (broad), whereas the present section 350 uses the distinct terms "trials" and "inquiries." The Court concluded that Buroda Kanta Roy is not an authority for interpreting the present section 350.
Elachuri Venkatachinnayya v. King-Emperor (I.L.R. 43 Mad. 511) (Madras Full Bench) Relied upon (by petitioner) to support the view that sub-section (2) of section 117 attracts trial incidents to security inquiries. The Court considered this Full Bench decision but expressly disagreed with its conclusions, stating respectful divergence and not accepting that sub-section (2) of section 117 has the effect contended for by that decision.
Hopcroft v. Emperor (I.L.R. 36 Cal. 163) Described (in the opinion) as observing that a party against whom an inquiry under section 107 was instituted is "in the position of an accused person." The Court found this decision of limited assistance and emphasized that saying the party is "in the position of an accused" is far from declaring him to be an accused person for the purposes of attracting the specific rights available at trials.
Anu Sheikh v. Emperor (I.L.R. 37 Cal. 812) Considered section 350 and held that where a Magistrate commenced an inquiry under section 145 and was transferred, the succeeding Magistrate had power under section 350 to proceed without examining the witnesses de novo. The Court cited this case as more to the point and consistent with the conclusion that a successor Magistrate may act on recorded evidence and is not required to re-hear evidence de novo in the context of inquiries.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded from statutory text and structure, construing section 350 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and related provisions. The key analytical steps were:

  1. Textual construction of section 350(1): The subsection expressly refers separately to "inquiries" and "trials" and grants the successor Magistrate a broad discretion — he may act on evidence recorded wholly or partly by his predecessor, or may re-summon witnesses and recommence the inquiry or trial. Thus the successor Magistrate's discretion is wide in both contexts.
  2. Importance of proviso (a): The proviso to section 350(1) expressly limits the successor Magistrate's discretion in the case of trials by giving the accused the right, when the second Magistrate commences proceedings, to demand that witnesses (or any of them) be re-summoned and re-heard. The Court emphasized that this is a specific statutory right available to accused persons at trials.
  3. Distinction between "inquiry" and "trial": The Court stressed that the legislature deliberately and consistently distinguished inquiries from trials throughout the Code. Section 4(k) defines "inquiry" as every inquiry other than a trial, reinforcing that inquiries are not trials.
  4. Consequential inference about security proceedings: Because proceedings under Chapter VIII (which includes section 110) are characterized as inquiries concerned with prevention of offences (not punishment of offences), a person proceeded against under section 110 is not an "accused person" for purposes of attracting the specific right in proviso (a) to section 350(1).
  5. Role of proviso (b) to section 350(1): The existence of proviso (b), which enables the High Court or District Magistrate to set aside a conviction made by a Magistrate on evidence not wholly recorded by him (and to order a new inquiry or trial where the accused is prejudiced), further demonstrates that the statutory provisions operate with trials and accused persons in mind. Proviso (b) is confined to trials and refers explicitly to accused persons and convictions; there is no cognate provision for inquiries.
  6. Distinguishing older decisions and alternative statutory regimes: The Court analyzed the precedent under the 1872 Code (Buroda Kanta Roy) and explained that the earlier code used broader terminology ("case") and that the present Code (post-1898 amendments) deliberately replaced that term with separate categories "trials" and "inquiries." Consequently, the earlier decision under the 1872 Code does not control interpretation of section 350 as it currently stands.
  7. Interpretation of section 117(2): The petitioner relied on section 117(2) to argue that trial incidents should be attracted to security inquiries. The Court interpreted section 117(2) as prescribing the procedure to be followed in two types of security inquiries (approximation to summons-case procedure for "keeping the peace" inquiries, and to warrant-case procedure for "good behaviour" inquiries), but rejected the contention that it converts inquiries into trials or imports all incidents of trials into inquiries. The phrase "as nearly as may be practicable" confirms that the Code contemplates procedural approximation without obliterating the distinction between inquiry and trial.
  8. Conclusion from the combined textual and purposive analysis: Given the explicit words of section 350 and the structured distinctions elsewhere in the Code (including section 4(k) and section 117(2)), the Court concluded that proceedings under section 110 are inquiries and that the specific statutory right to demand re-summoning and re-hearing of witnesses upon transfer (found in proviso (a) to section 350) applies to trials and accused persons only, not to persons proceeded against in security inquiries under Chapter VIII.

Holding and Implications

RULE DISCHARGED

Holding: The Court held that proceedings under section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are inquiries (not trials) and that a person proceeded against under section 110, not being an accused person for the purposes of the relevant provisions, does not have as a matter of right the entitlement to have witnesses re-summoned and their evidence re-heard by a successor Magistrate upon transfer.

Direct consequences for the parties: The Rule obtained by the petitioner is discharged; the successor Magistrate may act on the evidence recorded by his predecessor and is not, as a matter of right, obliged to re-hear all previously recorded evidence. The petitioner therefore cannot insist upon a complete de novo re-hearing of witnesses before the successor Magistrate by virtue of section 350(1) proviso (a).

The opinion confines its analysis and conclusion to statutory interpretation of the Code as presented; it does not purport to announce broader principles beyond the construction and application of the cited provisions to the facts before the Court.

Judgment delivered by Debabrata Mookerjee, J.; Das Gupta, J. agreed.

    Kali Charan Duary, Accused v. The State Opposite Party.

    Debabrata Mookerjee, J.:— The question that falls to be determined in this revision petition is whether a person proceeded against under the provisions of section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has, on transfer of the enquiring Magistrate, the right to have evidence reheard by the successor Magistrate.

    2. The petitioner was required under section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the Subdivisional Magistrate of Contai to show cause why he should not be ordered to execute a bond with sureties for his good behaviour. The proceedings have had a chequered career. They were being dealt with by Mr. A.K Sen, Subdivisional Magistrate, before whom a large number of witnesses were examined. Mr. Sen was, however, transferred, and he was succeeded by Mr. S.C Bhattacharjee who took up the proceedings from the point reached by his predecessor. An application was then made on behalf of the petitioner praying that the witnesses already examined before Mr. Sen might be re-summoned and their evidence re-heard by the successor Magistrate Mr. Bhattacharjee. The prayer for re-hearing the entire evidence was refused, but consideration on the merits of application for recall of individual witnesses was assured. The petitioner was not satisfied with this concession and moved this Court and obtained the present Rule. Mr. Mukherjee appearing in support of the Rule contends that the petitioner could as a matter of right ask for re-call and examination over again before the new incumbent of all witnesses examined before his predecessor. It is argued that according to well-established principles regulating adjudication upon evidence, the Court must hear the evidence and then decide. The refusal of the learned Magistrate to re-summon the witnesses and re-hear their evidence would, it is contended, necessarily result in his having to decide on evidence a large part of which he will not have heard himself.

    3. Change of Magistrate is a contingency common to enquiries and trials and although the general rule is that the Court holding an enquiry or trial decides on the evidence it hears, the legislature has recognised the need of providing exceptions to the general rule. One such exception is sub-section (1) to section 350 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which is in these words:

    “Whenever any Magistrate, after having heard and recorded the Whole or any part of the evidence in an inquiry or a trial, ceases to exercise jurisdiction therein, and is succeeded by another Magistrate who has and who exercises such jurisdiction, the Magistrate so succeeding may act on the evidence so recorded by his predecessor, or partly recorded by his predecessor and partly recorded by himself; or he may re-summon the witnesses and recommence the inquiry or trial;”

    4. Proviso (a) to the sub-section is also material to our purpose and reads as follows:

    “In any trial the accused may, when the second Magistrate commences his proceedings, demand that the witnesses or any of them be re-summoned and re-heard;”

    5. Sub-section (1) of section 350 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals both with enquiry and trial and gives a wide discretion to the successor Magistrate. He may act on the evidence recorded wholly by his predecessor or partly by his predecessor and partly by himself, or if he thinks fit he may commence the inquiry or trial anew and re-hear the entire evidence. The position, therefore, is that the successor Magistrate's discretion is left-unfettered both when trying a case and when holding an inquiry; but proviso (a) to the sub-section puts a limitation on the Magistrate's discretion in the case of trial and gives the accused person the right to demand that all or any of the witnesses be re-summoned and re-heard.

    6. It follows, therefore, that while in an enquiry the successor Magistrate may re-hear a part or whole of the evidence with or without being asked to do so, in a trial he is obliged to re-summon the witnesses and re-hear the evidence at the instance of the accused; and unless security proceedings under Chapter VIII of the Code can be called trials and persons proceeded against accused persons, the right to have witnesses re-called and their evidence re-heard before the successor Magistrate cannot be held to accrue.

    7. A clear distinction has been made between ‘inquiries’ and ‘trials’ throughout the Code. Section 350 occurs in Chapter XXIV which deals with General Provisions relating to Inquiries and Trials, and it is only reasonable to think that the legislature has made a distinction between ‘trials’ and ‘inquiries’ in view of this and other provisions of the Code to which I shall presently advert.

    8. This conclusion is re-inforced by considerations arising from another provision contained in section 350 itself. Proviso (b) to sub-section (1) of section 350 enables the High Court or the District Magistrate to set aside a conviction made by a Magistrate on evidence not wholly recorded by him. Where it appears that the accused has been prejudiced, the High Court or the District Magistrate may order a new enquiry or trial. This provision implies that even if the accused has omitted to avail himself of the right given him by proviso (a) to ask for a de novo trial, it will still be open to the courts named in proviso (b) to give re-relief to the accused person by ordering a new trial or inquiry. Proviso (b) is thus obviously enacted with a view to ensuring complete justice to an accused person despite his failure to insist upon his right to ask for a de novo trial. It is to be observed that the provision is confined to a trial only and there is no cognate provision in the case of an inquiry. It is thus impossible to escape the conclusion that the legislature has deliberately made and maintained the distinction between a ‘trial’ and an ‘inquiry’.

    9. It is argued that the distinction is obliterated by reason of the fact that under proviso (b) the High Court or the District Magistrate may in an appropriate case order a new trial or inquiry. The argument is that if by the word ‘inquiry’ is meant something other than a ‘trial’, the consequent implication is that in the event of material prejudice occurring by reason of the evidence not having been wholly heard by the enquiring Magistrate, a fresh inquiry has to be ordered as much a trial. I am afraid this argument is completely repelled by the express words of the statute itself. Proviso (b) in its earlier part refers not only to ‘trial’ but to the ‘accused’ and his ‘conviction’. An interpretation which involves disregard of the plain words of the statute or the assumption that the words ‘trial’ and ‘inquiry’ have loosely been used by the legislature cannot possibly be accepted. Further, the inquiry to be ordered under proviso (b) is perfectly consistent with a conviction being set aside and instead of a new trial being ordered, an inquiry is directed which must mean an inquiry preliminary to commitment under the provisions of Chapter XVIII of the Code. The High Court or the District Magistrate might in a given case think that a magisterial trial would result in deprivation to the accused of the benefit of trial by jury and in that view order an inquiry as a preliminary to such trial. This makes consistent reading of the proviso which expressly deals with ‘trial’ at which the ‘accused’ is ‘convicted’. This enquiry must not, therefore, be confused with other enquiries say under Chapter VIII or Chapter X, or Chapter XI or Chapter XII of the Code.

    10. Reliance was placed by Mr. Mukherjee on a decision of this Court in the case of Buroda Kanta Roy v. Korimuddi Moonshee (1) (4 Calcutta, Law Reports, 452), in suport of the proposition that in security proceedings under Chapter VIII of the Code a person proceeded against may insist on re-call and re-examination of witnesses before the successor Magistrate. That was a decision under the Code of 1872. In that case Morris and White, JJ., held that a person proceeded against under section 491 of the Code of 1872 which roughly corresponds to section 107 of the present Code, had the right to have witnesses re-examined and their evidence re-heard before the successor Magistrate under the provisions of section 328 of the 1872 Code roughly corresponding to section 350 of the present Code. It is to be observed that the Code of 1872 underwent extensive revision and was replaced by the consolidating and amending Act V of 1898. While section 350 of the present Code speaks distinctly of inquiries and trials and the scheme of the section repels, as we have seen, the inference that the words are used interchangeably, section 328 of the Code of 1872 refers to evidence in the ‘case’ being heard in part. The word ‘case’ is a term of wide import and might conceivably have included both trials and inquiries. The legislature must be taken to have advisedly dropped the word ‘case’ and adopted ‘trials’ and ‘inquiries’ instead. The decision, therefore, cannot be held to be an authority in interpreting section 350 of the Code as it now stands.

    11. Mr. Mukherjee next contends that the order requiring security is in substance a conviction. The consequences, it is argued, of inability or of neglect to furnish a bond are very serious and may entail loss of liberty for a considerable time. I am afraid that is no ground for thinking that a person proceeded against under one or other of the security sections is a person accused of an offence. Such a person is proceeded against not because he has committed an offence, but because he is to be prevented from committing one. Indeed, Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to security proceedings comes under Part V of the Code which expressly deals with prevention of offences. A per-son accused of an offence surely cannot give evidence but, a person proceeded against under the provisions of section 107 of the Code is a competent witness to his own case.

    12. The concept of trial and punishment of an accused person for committing an offence is a familiar concept running throughout the Code; but inquiries are different and they relate to miscellaneous matters like those dealt with in Chapter VIII, Chapter X, Chapter XI, Chapter XII and other chapters of the Code. Although ‘trial’ has not been defined in the Code, ‘Inquiry’ has been. Section 4(k) says “Inquiry” includes every inquiry other than a trial conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court. Therefore, if anything, an inquiry is not a trial. There is thus no warrant for the view that the words ‘trial’ and ‘inquiry’ have been loosely used or used in the popular sense in section 350 of the Code.

    13. Mr. Mukherjee finally argued that by reason of Sub-section (2) of section 117 of the Code all the provisions of the Code relating to trial wherever they occur are attracted. Sub-section (2) of section 117 is in these words:

    “Such inquiry shall be made, as nearly as may be practicable where the order requires security for keeping the peace, in the manner hereinafter prescribed for conducting trials and recording evidence in summons-cases; and where the order requires security for good behaviour in the manner hereinafter prescribed for conducting trials and recording evidence in warrant-cases, except that no charge need be framed.”

    14. In support of this contention reliance has been placed upon a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Elachuri Venkatachinnayya v. King Emperor (2) (I.L.R 43 Mad. 511). We have considered this decision but we respectfully differ from the conclusions reached there.

    15. Sub-section (2) of section 117 has only the effect of regulating the procedure to be followed in two types of security proceedings. Where an order requires security for keeping the peace under section 107 of the Code the procedure to be followed in such inquiry will be the procedure laid down in Chapter XX for the trial of summons cases, and when the order requires security for good behaviour the procedure prescribed is the procedure of a warrant case trial laid down in Chapt. XXI of the Code. To my mind Sub-section (2) of section 117 is merely indicative of the procedure to be followed in the two types of inquiries dealt with in Chapter VIII of the Code. The words of the sub-section are sufficiently precise and they admit of no speculation as to their true scope and effect. In Chapter XX and XXI the Code prescribes the procedure to be followed for the trial of summons and warrant cases respectively. This sub-section only enjoins compliance with two types of procedure for two types of security proceedings so that the less serious one, namely, proceedings for keeping the peace may conform to the summons case procedure and the more serious one, namely, proceedings for good behaviour to the warrant case procedure. The inquiry in either case has to approximate as closely as possible to the prescribed procedure. In fact, the words “as nearly as may be practicable” are not without import in the sense that while they forbid departure from or disregard of the prescribed procedure they serve to keep up the barrier that divides trials from inquiries by enjoining in the case of inquiries approximation to the procedure for trials.

    16. To my mind Sub-section (2) of section 117 of the Code far from abolishing the distinction between trials and inquiries has the effect of perpetuating it. The argument which appears to have found favour with the Madras Full Bench that the sub-section has the effect of attracting all the incidents of trial cannot, therefore, be entertained. I am wholly unable to appreciate the further argument that it is by reason of this sub-section that Chapters of the Code containing provisions of a general character like Chapters XXIV and XXV are attracted to enquiries. Those chapters, headed as they are, apply of their own force both to inquiries and trials, and not constructively by reason of the operation of Sub-section (2) of section 117 of the Code. There is no reason to think that although these chapters are expressly made applicable to inquiries, they would remain inert provisions until they are touched to life and brought into play by the operation of Sub-section (2) of section 117 of the Code.

    17. Reference may be made to two later decisions of this Court. The case of Hopcroft v. Emperor (3) (I.L.R 36 Cal. 163) is not of much assistance to us so far as the present Rule is concerned. All that was said there was that a party against whom an inquiry under section 107 of the Code has been instituted is in the position of an accused person. That is to my mind far from saying that he is an accused person. The case of Anu Sheikh v. Emperor* (4) reported in I.L.R 37 Cal. 812 is more to the point. There the learned Judges were considering section 350 itself and it was held that where a Magistrate who has commenced an inquiry under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is transferred and the District Magistrate has made over the case to another Magistrate the latter has power under section 350 of the Code to proceed with it without examining the witnesses de novo.

    18. In my opinion, therefore, the words of section 350 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are sufficiently explicit. The words ‘trial’ and ‘inquiry’ both occurring in the section are perfectly plain words used in the statute and these words must receive full effect.

    19. I hold, therefore, that the proceedings under section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are not trials and a person proceeded against under that section not being an accused person cannot as a matter of right ask for witnesses to be re-summoned and their evidence re-heard before a successor Magistrate.

    20. I would, therefore, discharge this Rule.

    Das Gupta, J.:— I agree.

    A.K.D.G

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    Comments

    Kali Charan Duary, Accused v. The State Opposite Party.
    (Jun 4, 1954)