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Case Number

Matter No. 47 of 1953

Advocates

B.K. Ghose with R.L. Shiha
Advocate-General for West Bengal with A.K. Sen

Judges

Sinha, J.

Acts

section 18 of the Indian Arms Act 1878.
section 18 of the Indian Arms Act,
provisions of the Indian Arms Act.
costs.B/V.S.B18. Rule

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Smart Summary

Concise Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, an Indian citizen, held an arms licence originally issued in 1942 (D.B.B.L. gun) and renewed by a fresh licence in 1946 (Calcutta). In 1951 a .32 bore revolver licence was indorsed on his gun licence. On 25 February 1952 the petitioner's gun and revolver were taken away. By letter dated 1 March 1952 the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, stated that by virtue of powers under section 18 of the Indian Arms Act he cancelled the petitioner's licence in respect of a 12 bore gun and a .32 bore revolver and advised disposal of the weapons and cartridges held in deposit.

The petitioner sought redress by writing to the Chief Minister and to the Commissioner; government correspondence followed, with replies indicating consideration but ultimately refusing to interfere with the Commissioner's decision. The petitioner pursued administrative avenues during 1952; by late April 1953 the Commissioner informed the petitioner that the 1 March 1952 order could not be reconsidered. The petitioner then obtained a rule (issued 13 May 1953) challenging the cancellation and the matter came before the court.

It is noted in the opinion that the original licence would have automatically expired at the end of 1952 unless renewed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the cancellation of the petitioner's arms licence (by the Commissioner of Police on 1 March 1952) complied with section 18 of the Indian Arms Act 1878 — specifically whether the authority cancelling the licence recorded reasons in writing and whether the order showed it was passed because it was necessary for the security of the public peace.
Whether the recording of reasons under section 18 must be done by the officer making the order personally (i.e., whether the reasons must be recorded by the person cancelling the licence).
Whether the statute requires communication of the recorded reasons to the licence-holder, or whether non-communication affects validity.
Whether delay in bringing the challenge (and the subsequent expiry of the original licence) rendered the petitioner's application infructuous or disentitled him to relief.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Mr. Ghosh)

The order of cancellation is not in accordance with section 18 of the Indian Arms Act 1878 because (1) the authority purporting to cancel the licence did not record reasons in writing, and (2) the order does not show that the Commissioner deemed cancellation necessary for the security of the public peace.
The petitioner relied on the decision of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Beni Chand v. Dist. Magistrate Banda, AIR 1953 All 476, which was said to require that (a) the authority suspending or cancelling must record reasons personally, and (b) the order should show it was passed because it was necessary for the security of the public peace.

Respondent's / Government's Arguments

The respondent filed an affidavit stating that the matter had been considered by him and the Deputy Commissioner of Police, "it was deemed necessary by us for the security of the public peace to cancel the license" and that reasons had been "recorded in writing in the file." (The affidavit did not state by whom the reasons were recorded.)
The learned Advocate General argued that the section did not require the recorded reasons to be communicated to the licence-holder and that no order should be made because the original licence had expired (making the application infructuous) and there had been inexcusable delay by the petitioner.
The Advocate General also indicated he had not inspected the file and that the file could not be produced in court when requested.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Beni Chand v. Dist. Magistrate Banda, AIR 1953 All 476 (Division Bench, Allahabad High Court)	Interpreting section 18 of the Indian Arms Act to require: (1) that the authority suspending/cancelling a licence must record reasons for the order himself; and (2) that it should appear from the order that it was passed because it was necessary for the security of the public peace.	The court followed the approach in the Allahabad case, adopting the requirements articulated there and applied them to the facts. On the basis that the 1 March 1952 letter did not show reasons nor that the order was passed because cancellation was necessary for public peace, the court quashed the cancellation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the 1 March 1952 letter (which states "I hereby cancel") and considered whether that instrument constituted a proper order of cancellation under section 18. The following points of analysis were made, in the sequence and terms used in the opinion:

Statutory text: The court reproduced section 18, which permits cancellation or suspension by specified authorities "when, for reasons to be recorded in writing, such officer... deems it necessary for the security of the public peace to cancel or suspend such license." The court treated the statutory language as requiring the recording of reasons and a showing that cancellation was deemed necessary for public peace.
Application of precedent: The court referred to the Allahabad Division Bench (Beni Chand) decision, which identified two requirements: the authority must record reasons himself and the order should show it was passed for security of public peace. The court accepted this interpretation as authoritative for present purposes.
Examination of the record: On the face of the 1 March 1952 letter, the order did not record reasons nor did it indicate that it was passed because cancellation was necessary for the security of the public peace.
Evaluation of the respondent's affidavit: The respondent's affidavit asserted that reasons had been recorded in writing in the file and that the respondent and the Deputy Commissioner deemed cancellation necessary. The court found this affidavit inadequate because it did not state whether the reasons were recorded by the respondent himself (i.e., the person making the order), and the file was not produced for inspection when requested.
Clarification of requirements: The court set out what it considered essential for a valid order under section 18:
- The officer or authority cancelling/suspending must have reasons for deeming cancellation necessary for public peace.
- The person cancelling/suspending must himself record those reasons in writing.
- The order, on its face, should show (a) that it was passed because cancellation/suspension was necessary for the security of the public peace, and (b) that the reasons for thinking so have been recorded in writing by the person making the order.
On communication of reasons: The court noted the statute does not expressly require communication of the recorded reasons to the licence-holder. The court, however, reasoned that the purpose of requiring reasons to be recorded would be undermined if they were completely withheld; the licence-holder is entitled to know broadly why the licence was cancelled so as to be able to challenge it and to prevent arbitrary or irrelevant cancellations. The court stopped short of holding that reasons must necessarily be communicated in every case, but emphasized the licence-holder's right to know broadly the grounds.
Consideration of delay and expiry: The Advocate General argued that the case was now infructuous because the original licence would have expired at the end of 1952 and that there had been inexcusable delay. The court rejected this as a bar to relief: it held the petitioner was justified in seeking administrative redress first, observed that correspondence in late 1952 showed the matter was under consideration, and found the delay insufficient to disentitle the petitioner to relief.
Conclusion of illegality: Because the order of 1 March 1952 neither showed the reasons nor demonstrated that the person making the order had recorded the reasons in writing, and because the affidavit did not remedy this defect, the court held the order was plainly illegal and bad.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court made the rule absolute and quashed the order of cancellation dated 1 March 1952.

Direct implications for the parties:

The cancellation of the petitioner's licence dated 1 March 1952 was set aside.
The court expressly declined to direct the issue of any fresh licence; whether a fresh licence should be granted remains within the respondent's discretion under the provisions of the Indian Arms Act.
The court made no order as to costs.

Broader legal implications (as reflected in the opinion):

The court endorsed and reiterated the interpretation of section 18 exemplified by the cited Allahabad decision, articulating essential procedural requisites for a valid cancellation or suspension under that provision (reasons must exist, be recorded by the person making the order, and the order should show both the necessity for public peace and that reasons were recorded).
The court emphasized the licence-holder's entitlement to know, at least broadly, the grounds for cancellation so that a challenge can be mounted; however, it did not hold that detailed reasons must always be communicated if public interest required otherwise.

No further directions were given about issuing a new licence; the remedy granted was limited to quashing the defective cancellation.

This summary is based exclusively on the text of the provided opinion and does not add or infer information beyond that opinion.

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Haji Md. Vakil v. Commr. Of Police

1. The petitioner is a citizen of the Indian Union. In 1942, a license was issued to him in respect of a D.B.B 1 Gun by the District Magistrate of Balliah, U.P In 1946, a fresh license was issued to him in respect thereof by the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta. In 1951, the petitioner applied for a license in respect of a .32 bore revolver, and it was granted to him, by indorsement on his gun license. On the 25th February 1952, the gun and revolver was taken away from the petitioner. On the 1st March 1952, the petitioner received the following communication from the respondent:

The Commissioner of Police, Calcutta

Janab H. Mohammed Vakil, P. 31 Gonesh Ch. Avenue, Calcutta.

Dated 1st March 1952

Subject:

By virtue of powers vested in me under section 18 of the Indian Arms Act, I hereby cancel your Arms license No. 18266-XVI (Calcutta) in respect of one 12 bore D.B.B.L Gun No. 471E/13089 by Manlicher Schoenauer and one 32 bore revolver No. 17840 by Smith & Wesson.

I therefore advise you to arrange for immediate disposal of the said weapons and thirty six rounds of .32 bore revolver cartridges, now lying in deposit at this office.

Sd. Illegible.

Commissioner of Police.

2. Upon receipt of this communication, the petitioner addressed a letter to the Chief Minister pointing out that no reasons had been assigned for the cancellation and asking for redress. A copy of this letter was sent to the Commissioner of Police. On the 25th April 1952, the petitioner addressed a letter to the respondent referring to the above letter and asked for information as to how the matter stood. On the 8th May 1952, the respondent acknowledged receipt of the said letter and informed the petitioner that intimation would be sent to him as soon as possible. On the 10th May 1952, the private Secretary to the Chief Minister informed, the petitioner that his letter had been forwarded to the Secretary, Home (Police) Department, Writers Building for disposal. On the 28th August 1952, the Assistant Secretary to the Government of West Bengal informed the petitioner that Government had considered his case carefully but regretted that they saw no reason to interfere with the decision of the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta. On the same day, the petitioner wrote to the respondent, referring to this letter and requested him to grant him a fresh license. On the 19th November 1952, the respondent replied saying that the matter was receiving attention and further communication would follow.

3. On the expiry of 1952, the original license automatically would have expired unless it was renewed.

4. On the 25/27 April, 1953, the respondent informed the petitioner that the order dated 3rd March 1952 could not be reconsidered. This rule was issued on the 13th May 1953.

5. Mr. Ghosh appearing on behalf of the petitioner argues that the order of cancellation is not in accordance with section 18 of the Indian Arms Act 1878. The relevant provision stands as follows:

“18. Cancellation and Suspension of license. Any license may be cancelled or suspended, (a) By the officer by whom the same was granted, or by any authority to which he may be subordinate, or by any Magistrate of a District, or Commissioner of Police in a presidency town, within a local limit of whose jurisdiction the holder of such license may be, when, for reasons to be recorded in writing, such officer, authority, Magistrate or Commissioner deems it necessary for the security of the public peace to cancel or suspend such license……”

6. Mr. Ghosh argues that the order of cancellation is bad because

(1) The authority who granted the license and purported to cancel it did not record the reasons in writing;

(2) That the order does not show that the Commissioner deemed it necessary to cancel the license for security of the public peace.

7. Mr. Ghosh has relied on a decision of a division bench of the Allahabad High Court — ‘Beni Chand v. Dist. Magistrate Banda’, AIR 1953 All 476 (A). Speaking of section 18 of the Indian Arms Act, the learned Judges held that the statute required two things. Firstly that the authority suspending or cancelling a licence must himself record the reasons why the order had been passed and secondly that it should appear from the order that it was passed because it was necessary for the security of the public peace to do so.

8. If the letter dated the 1st March 1952, is the order of cancellation (It is not stated that there exists any other order) then on the face of it, neither the reasons have been recorded nor does it appeal that it was passed because it was necessary for the security of the public peace to cancel the license.

9. The respondent however has filed an affidavit and says that the matter was considered by him and the Deputy Commissioner of Police then in charge and “it was deemed necessary by us for the security of the public peace to cancel the license of the petitioner for the gun and the revolver for reasons recorded in writing in the file”. It is quite obvious that this statement is wholly inadequate since it does not say whether the reasons were recorded in writing by the respondent himself.

10. The learned Advocate General took a point that the section did not require such reasons to be communicated to the licence-holder. I asked the file to be produced to satisfy myself whether the respondent had actually recorded the reasons himself but the learned Advocate General frankly confessed that he had himself not been able to see it and it could not be produced in court.

11. Whether it is the duty of the officer cancelling a license to communicate the reasons recorded to the license-holder, is a very difficult question. There is nothing in the section itself to say that the reasons recorded should be communicated. In my opinion, however, the following things are essential to make an order under section 18 valid:

(1) The Officer, authority, magistrate or commissioner, cancelling or suspending the licence, must have reasons for which he deems it necessary for the security of the public peace to cancel or suspend such licence.

(2) The person cancelling or suspending the licence must himself record the reasons in writing:

(3) The order on the face of it should show

(a) that it was passed because it was necessary for the security of the public peace to cancel or suspend such license.

(b) that the reasons for thinking so have been recorded in writing by the person making the order.

12. I would not go to the extent of saying that the reasons must necessarily be communicated, but I think that the licence-holder whose licence has been cancelled or suspended has a right to know the reasons and if the order is challenged the I Court has a right to look into it. Otherwise, I do not see the point in making it essential that reasons should be recorded in writing. If it is to be so recorded and kept back from the whole world, there is no point in recording it at all. The object in recording the reasons is obviously to give the licence-holder an opportunity of knowing why such an extreme step had been taken. It is not necessary to give reasons with the minutest details if such a course is not in the public interest. But the licence-holder is entitled to know broadly why his licence has been cancelled. If the reasons are entirely withheld, the licence-holder would never be able to establish a case of mala fides. Suppose in this case the respondent had cancelled the licence because of a frivolous reason or a reason which has not the slightest connection with security of the public peace. Such a cancellation could not stand for a moment. And yet, if the order of cancellation can be allowed to be as cryptic as in the present case, neither the licence-holder can challenge it, nor the court is in a position to say whether the order has complied with the provisions of law.

13. The order of cancellation in this case is plainly contained in the letter dated 1st March 1952, which says “I hereby cancel”. This order does not show that it was passed because it was necessary for the security of the public peace to do so, nor does it say that any reasons exist for arriving at such a conclusion or that such reasons have been recorded in writing by the person cancelling the licence. It is stated in a subsequent affidavit that such reasons existed and were recorded in writing elsewhere, but not stated by whom. The order is plainly illegal and bad.

14. The learned Advocate General next says that even if the order be bad, no order should be made now because the period for which the original licence was valid having expired, the application has become infructuous. In any event, he says that there has been inexcusable delay. It is true that it does not the within the power of this Court to provide a fresh licence for the petitioner.

15. But I do not agree with the proposition that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. If the order of cancellation stands, he is prejudiced in two ways. Firstly, there is the ignominy of a charge that the petitioner is guilty of something, which is prejudicial to the security of public peace and secondly his chances of procuring afresh licence are greatly prejudiced if the cancellation of his licence is allowed to remain. Whether he will in fact be able to procure one, is not for this court to consider. It depends entirely upon the discretion of the respondent, exercised properly within the limits imposed by the provisions of the Indian Arms Act. As regards-delay, I think that the petitioner was quite justified in moving the authorities before rushing to-court. If the authorities had given an early refusal, it would have been all right. But even as late as November 1952, the matter was still under consideration and the final refusal came in the-last week of April 1953. I do not think that there has been such a delay as to disentitle the petitioner from obtaining any relief.

16. The right order to make is the one, made in the Allahabad case mentioned above, namely quashing the order of cancellation dated 1st March 1952.

17. I however make it clear that I give no direction whatsoever as to the issue of any fresh licence. The rule is made absolute, and the order of cancellation dated the 1st March 1952 is quashed. I make no order as to costs.

B/V.S.B

18. Rule made absolute.

Haji Md. Vakil v. Commr. Of Police

Concise Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Mr. Ghosh)

Respondent's / Government's Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Haji Md. Vakil v. Commr. Of Police

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