AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • sec. 6(2) and Sec. 8B(3) of the amended Court-fees Act and Order VII, rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code
  • Order VII, rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Schedule 2, Art. 17 (va) of the Court-fees Act.10.
  • section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.9.
  • COURT FEES ACT
  • section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Schedule 2, Art. 17(va) of the Court-fees Act.
  • section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 8B(3) of the Court-fees Act. Notices
  • section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act.
  • Section 7(vi) A of the Court-fees Act
  • Section 8B(3) of the Court-fees Act
  • sec. 8B(3) of the Court-fees Act.
  • Court-fees (Amendment) Act, 1935,
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • sec. 6(2) and Sec. 8B(3) of the amended Court-fees Act and Order VII, rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code
  • Order VII, rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Schedule 2, Art. 17 (va) of the Court-fees Act.10.
  • section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.9.
  • COURT FEES ACT
  • section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Schedule 2, Art. 17(va) of the Court-fees Act.
  • section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 8B(3) of the Court-fees Act. Notices
  • section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act.
  • Section 7(vi) A of the Court-fees Act
  • Section 8B(3) of the Court-fees Act
  • sec. 8B(3) of the Court-fees Act.
  • Court-fees (Amendment) Act, 1935,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Das, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This application was brought by the plaintiffs-petitioners against an order of the Subordinate Judge, Hooghly (Mr. Phatik Chandra Roy Choudhury), holding that the suit was not properly valued and stamped and directing the plaintiffs to put in the deficit court-fees within one week.

The plaint alleged that the disputed properties (items 1–4) formerly belonged to a joint family of four brothers: Bama Charan (defendant No. 1), Shama Charan, Panchanan and Satish (deceased). Shama Charan’s son Kalipada is defendant No. 2. Panchanan’s widow Mahalaxmi and son Dulal are plaintiffs No. 1 and No. 2 respectively. The plaintiffs alleged that a preliminary decree in Title Suit No. 31 of 1947 was inoperative, fraudulent and not binding on them, and claimed adjusted shares in the several scheduled properties (detailed annas shares appear in the plaint). They also alleged that defendant No. 1 had executed the earlier decree and was attempting to realise sums under it, and that the plaintiffs remained in possession of the properties.

Reliefs prayed included: (1) a declaration that the decree dated 24 July 1947 in Suit No. 31 of 1947 was void, inoperative, fraudulent and not binding; (2) declarations about the respective shares in the scheduled items; and (3) a permanent injunction restraining execution of the earlier decree. The plaint valued the suit for partition at Rs. 13,950 (court-fee Rs. 15 paid) and valued the declaration at Rs. 50 (court-fee Rs. 2-13 paid).

Defendants entered appearance and raised a preliminary issue whether the suit was properly valued and whether proper court-fees had been paid. On 27 August 1951 the Subordinate Judge held that the suit should be valued objectively by reference to the increase in plaintiffs' claimed shares over the earlier decree, computed an objective value of Rs. 2,987-8 annas for the excess interest and required deficit court-fees of Rs. 258-12 annas to be paid within one week. The plaintiffs applied under section 151 CPC for reconsideration on 11 September 1951; that application was rejected and the learned Judge recorded an order that the suit be dismissed under Section 8B(3) of the Court-fees Act for non-compliance ("Plaintiffs take no steps. Suit dismissed under Section 8B(3) of the Court-fees Act on contest. Costs to the defendant").

Plaintiffs filed a First Appeal (F.A. 48 of 1952) on 3 January 1952; the Court directed deposit of initial printing costs by 3 July 1952 and, on default, recorded that the appeal stood dismissed for nonpayment on 17 July 1952. Separately, plaintiffs filed an application under section 115 CPC challenging the propriety of the order of 11 September 1951; notices for that application were served on defendants.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit was properly valued and whether the proper court-fees had been paid.
  2. Whether an order dismissing a suit under Section 8B(3) of the Court-fees Act is equivalent to a rejection of the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 CPC (and thus to be treated as a rejection of the plaint).
  3. Whether a dismissal under Section 8B(3) of the Court-fees Act constitutes a "decree" within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (and therefore whether an appeal was competent and could be dismissed for want of prosecution).
  4. Whether the present suit should be classified as a suit for partition (with only consequential or superfluous prayers for declaration) for the purposes of assessing court-fees (specifically whether it falls within Schedule 2, Article 17(va) of the Court-fees Act or within Section 7(iv)(c) or other provisions).
  5. Whether the revision under Section 115 CPC is competent despite the appeal having stood dismissed for non-payment of initial printing costs.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant No. 1 (Mr. Mitter) — Preliminary Objections

  • First objection: Because the First Appeal had stood dismissed for nonpayment of initial printing costs, the present application (petition under section 115 CPC) was incompetent.
  • Second objection: The dismissal under Section 8B(3) of the Court-fees Act should be regarded as the rejection of the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 CPC; such a rejection is a "decree" within Section 2(2) CPC and therefore an appeal (which had been filed) was competent and, having been allowed to be dismissed, the plaintiffs had lost their remedy.

Plaintiffs / Applicants

  • The plaintiffs filed a revision application under Section 115 CPC challenging the propriety of the Subordinate Judge’s order of 11 September 1951 (dismissing the suit under Section 8B(3) of the Court-fees Act) — this indicates their position that the dismissal/order was incorrect and that revision lay.
  • The plaintiffs also sought reconsideration under Section 151 CPC of the order requiring payment of deficit court-fees; after rejection they did not take further steps in the subordinate court and then pursued the remedies in the High Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sudhir Kumar Chatterjee v. Mohadeb Chakrabortty (52 C.W.N. 684) Support for the view that dismissal under Section 8B(3) of the Court-fees Act is not equivalent to rejection of a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 CPC. The Court relied on the view taken by a member of the Bench in that case to reinforce its interpretation that Section 8B(3) dismissal should not be construed as a rejection under Order VII, Rule 11.
Mnsammat Roop Rani v. Bithal Das (I.L.R. 13 Luck. 628) Decision concerning whether a suit could be treated as a pure suit for partition where an item of joint property had been sold in execution of a prior decree and a final decree for partition had been made. Referred to by defendant’s counsel; the Court noted the facts and holding but treated the decision as distinguishable and not controlling for the present case.
In the matter of Kali Pada Mukherji (34 C.W.N. 870) Principle relating to valuation where a suit is treated as a suit for declaration with consequential relief (affecting valuation and fees). The Court held that the principle in Kali Pada Mukherji did not apply because the present suit was not a suit for declaration with consequential relief but was, on the pleadings, a suit for partition.
Sital Prasad Sah v. Ramdas Sah (I.L.R. 18 Pat. 267) Case concerning valuation where there was a previous completed partition (used as an example of a distinguishable fact pattern for objective valuation). The Court observed that the subordinate judge may have had this decision in mind, but found it clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present case and therefore not a basis to uphold the subordinate judge’s objective valuation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a sequence of legal analyses, applying statutory interpretation and an examination of the plaint as a whole:

  1. Competence of the Section 115 application: The Court rejected the defendants' first preliminary objection that the application was incompetent because the appeal had stood dismissed. The Court treated the present filing as an independent application under Section 115 CPC directed against the impugned order.
  2. Nature of an order under Section 8B(3) of the Court-fees Act and its relation to Order VII, Rule 11 CPC: The Court examined the amendments to the Court-fees Act (by the Court-fees (Amendment) Act, 1935) which distinguished the processes under section 6(2) (rejection of plaint for insufficiency of stamp at the time of filing) and section 8B(3) (inquiry into sufficiency of court-fees after service and appearance). The Court held that although Section 8B(3) uses the expression "the suit shall be dismissed", this dismissal is not equivalent to a rejection of the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11. The amendments drew a clear distinction between rejection at the filing stage and dismissal under Section 8B(3) at a later stage; the Court endorsed the view previously taken in Sudhir Kumar Chatterjee v. Mohadeb Chakrabortty.
  3. Whether dismissal under Section 8B(3) is a decree within Section 2(2) CPC: The Court held that an adjudication confined to court-fees does not determine the matters in controversy between the parties; consequently, dismissal under Section 8B(3) is not a "decree" within the meaning of Section 2(2) CPC. (By contrast, rejection of a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 is expressly included within the definition of "decree" under Section 2(2).)
  4. Classification of the suit for court-fees and valuation purposes: The Court read the plaint as a whole and concluded that, despite a prayer for a declaration, the suit was fundamentally a suit for partition. The declaration sought was superfluous, intended to meet a possible defence, and did not alter the essential character of the suit. Because the suit must be regarded as one for partition, it falls within Schedule 2, Article 17(va) of the Court-fees Act and the applicable court-fee for partition was only Rs. 15. Therefore the Subordinate Judge’s approach of objective valuation by measuring the increase in plaintiffs' share (and arriving at a large deficit fee) was incorrect in the context of the present pleadings.
  5. Distinguishing precedents: The Court distinguished prior decisions relied upon by the subordinate judge (and possibly in the judge's mind) — notably the Sital Prasad Sah case — on the ground that facts (such as a previous completed partition) were different. It also held that the Kali Pada Mukherji principle was inapplicable because this suit was not a pure declaration suit with consequential relief.
  6. Conclusion from the application of principles: On these statutory and pleadings-based grounds the Court concluded that the suit had been properly valued and the correct court-fees had been paid; consequently the orders requiring additional fee payment and the dismissal under Section 8B(3) were set aside.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The orders complained of (the requirement to put in deficit court-fees and the dismissal under Section 8B(3) of the Court-fees Act) are set aside; the preliminary issue is determined in favour of the plaintiffs; the suit is to be regarded as properly valued and stamped and will proceed to trial.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The dismissal under Section 8B(3) is quashed for the present case and the suit will proceed to trial on the merits. The preliminary issue regarding valuation and payment of court-fees has been decided for the plaintiffs.
  • Costs: The Court directed that the parties will bear their own costs.
  • On precedent and broader consequences: The Court interpreted statutory provisions distinguishing rejection at filing (Section 6/Order VII, Rule 11) from dismissal under Section 8B(3) and held that dismissal under Section 8B(3) is not a "decree" for the purposes of Section 2(2) CPC. The opinion applies and relies on earlier decisions but does not state that it establishes a novel legal principle beyond the interpretation and application described; the immediate practical consequence is confined to the case before the Court.

Judge Guha Ray concurred with the judgment. (Signature abbreviation: A.K.D.G.)

    Mahalakshmi Debi And Anr. v. Bamacharan Nandi And Anr. Opposite Parties.

    Das, J.:— This is an application on behalf of the plaintiffs petitioners and is directed against an order made by Mr. Phatik Chandra Roy Choudhury, Subordinate Judge, Hooghly, holding that the suit was not properly valued and stamped and requiring the plaintiffs to put in the deficit court-fees within one week from that date.

    2. The plaintiffs' allegation in the plaint is that the disputed properties which are described in items Nos. 1 to 4 of the plaint belonged at one time to a joint family consisting of four brothers, Bama Charan, defendant No. 1 of this suit, Shama Charan, Panchanan and Satish, Shama Charan's son Kalipada is defendant No. 2 in this suit. Panchanan'swidow Mahalaxmi is plaintiff No. 1 and his son Dulal is plaintiff No. 2. Satish is dead. On certain allegations made in the plaint the plaintiffs alleged that a preliminary decree passed in a previous suit for partition being Title Suit No. 31 of 1947, was inoperative, fraudulent and not binding on the plaintiffs of this suit. The plaintiffs alleged that in items No. 2 to 4 of the plaint in the present suit the plaintiffs have 8 annas share and defendant No. 2 the other 8 annas share and in item No. 1 the plaintiffs have 6 annas share, defendant No. 2, 6 annas share and defendant No. 1, the remaining 4 annas share. The plaintiffs also alleged that defendant No. 1 had executed the decree for partition in the aforesaid suit No. 31 of 1947, and was trying to realise the sums of money which under that decree were to be paid by the present plaintiffs. The plaintiffs further alleged that they were in possession of the disputed properties in spite of the aforesaid decree for partition. The plaintiffs accordingly prayed for a declaration (1) that the decree, dated the 24th of July, 1947, in Suit No. 31 of 1947, was void, inoperative, fraudulent and not binding on the planitiffs, and (2) that in item No. 1 of the plaint schedule, the plaintiffs have 6 annas share, defendant No. 2, 6 annas share and defendant No. 1, the remaining 4 annas share and in the other items the plaintiffs have 8 annas share and defendant No. 2, the remaining 8 annas share, defendant No. 1 having no share in the said properties. The plaintiffs also prayed for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from executing the decree obtained in the said suit No. 31 of 1947. The suit was valued at Rs. 13,950 for partition and a court-fee of Rs. 15 was paid therefor.

    The suit was valued at Rs. 50 for declaration and a court-fee of Rs. 2-13 was paid on the said sum of Rs. 50.

    3. The defendants entered appearance and raised a preliminary issue, namely, whether the suit was properly valued and whether proper court-fees were paid. This issue was decided “by the learned Subordinate Judge on the 27th of August, 1951. The learned Judge was of the opinion that the suit should have been valued on an objective basis, that basis being the difference in the value of the plaintiffs' share as decreed in the previous suit for partition and the share as claimed in this suit. On this basis the learned Judge was of the opinion that in item No. 1, the increased share which the plaintiffs claimed was ⅛, and the increased share claimed by the plaintiffs in items Nos. 2 to 4 was ¼. Taking the value of these items from the plaint the learned Judge valued the excess share claimed by the plaintiffs in item No. 1 at Rs. 500 and the value of the excess share in items Nos. 2 to 4 at Rs. 2,487-8 annas, that is to say, the learned Judge thought that the objective value should be Rs. 2,987-8 annas and calculating court-fees ad valorem on this sum the learned Judge was of the opinion that the plaintiffs were required to pay Rs. 258-12 annas. The learned Judge directed that the deficit court-fees should be paid within one week. The case was put up for hearing on the 11th of September, 1951. On the said day the plaintiffs filed an application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for re-consideration of the order made by the learned Judge on the 27th of August, 1951. This application was rejected by Order No. 24. Then the learned Judge recorded the following order on the same day:

    “Defendant files hajira. Plaintiffs take no steps. Suit dismissed under Section 8B(3) of the Court-fees Act on contest. Costs to the defendant”.

    4. It appears from the High Court file that the learned Judge drew up a decree embodying his order that the suit was dismissed under Section 8B(3) of the Court-fees Act and specifying the costs decreed in favour of the defendants. Against the said order the plaintiffs filed a First Appeal in this Court on the 3rd of January, 1952. This appeal was registered as F.A 48 of 1952. It appears from the Order Book that on the 11th of June, 1952, an order was made by this Court directing the plaintiffs to deposit the initial printing cost on or before the 3rd of July, 1952, with a direction that in default of payment the appeal will stand dismissed. No deposit was made as directed and it appears that on the 17th of July, 1952, an entry was made in the Order Book that the appeal had stood dismissed for nonpayment of the initial printing cost. On the 4th of January, 1952, the plaintiffs also made an application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure challenging the propriety of the order made by the learned Subordinate Judge on the 11th of September, 1951, dismissing the suit under Section 8B(3) of the Court-fees Act. Notices of this application were served on the defendants and the office note states that these notices have been properly served.

    5. Mr. Mitter, learned Advocate for defendant No. 1, has raised two preliminary objections. In the first place, he contended that as the appeal had stood dismissed the application itself became incompetent. There is no force in this preliminary objection. The application with which we are now concerned is an Independent application under sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and is directed against the order referred to above.

    6. The second preliminary objection raised by Mr. Mitter was that the order under sec. 8B(3) of the Court-fees Act must be regarded as the rejection of “a plaint under Order VII, rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure” and must be deemed to be a decree within section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and an appeal was competent, that such an appeal had been filed and Was allowed to be dismissed. The plaintiffs have accordingly lost their remedy.

    7. The validity of this objection depends on the fact whether an order under Section 8B(3) of the Court-fees Act must be regarded as rejection of a plaint under Order VII, rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It may be pointed out that by the Court-fees (Amendment) Act, 1935, both secs. 6 and 8 were amended. Section 6 was amended so as to make it clear that when the plaint has been filed on a paper which is insufficiently stamped the Court shall direct payment of the deficit court-fees within a specified time and in case of default shall make an order directing the rejection of the plaint. Section 8B(3) of the Court-fees Act which was added by the amending Act provided that after the summonses of the suit have been served on the defendants, at any time after the defendants have entered appearance or thereafter but before the delivery of the judgment, the Court can make an enquiry as to the sufficiency of the Court-fees necessary to be affixed to the plaint and if the Court is of the opinion that the Court-fees already paid are insufficient the Court shall make an, Order directing the plaintiff either to furnish security or to put in the deficit court-fees within a specified period. Section 8B(3) provides that in case of non-compliance with the said order of the Court within the time so specified by the Court, the Court shall dismiss the suit under Section 8B(3) of the Court-fees Act. It was contended that though section 8B(3) uses the expression “the suit shall be dismissed”, the real effect of the order is a rejection of the plaint. Such art interpretation, though plausible, cannot be accepted. By the said amendments of the Court-fees Act, a distinction has been clearly drawn between the rejection of a plaint in sec. 6(2) and the dismissal of the suit under section 8B(3) of the amended Court-fees Act. We must therefore so construe sec. 6(2) and Sec. 8B(3) of the amended Court-fees Act and Order VII, rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code so as to make them consistent. It seems to us that the real intention of the Legislature was that if after the plaint has been filed the Court is of opinion that the plaint is insufficiently stamped, the Court can make an order for rejection of the plaint. If however the question of court-fees payable is gone into at a later stage after the defendant has entered appearance and the Court then comes to a decision and makes an order under section 8B(3), the effect of disposing of the suit for non-compliance with the order for payment of court-fees is a, dismissal of the suit under sec. 8B(3) of the Court-fees Act. It is (therefore not possible to construe a dismissal of the suit under section 8B(3) as equivalent to a rejection of the plaint under Order VII, rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This view was taken by one of the members of this Bench in the case of Sudhir Kumar Chatterjee v. Mohadeb Chakrabortty (1) (52 C.W.N 684).

    8. The question then is whether the dismissal of a suit under Section 8B(3) of the Court-fees Act can be regarded as a decree. The mere fact that a decree has actually been drawn up does not matter because the question whether a decision is a decree or not depends on the terms of section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. An adjudication upon a matter of Court-fees does not determine any of the matters in controversy in the suit. As such, a dismissal under section 8B(3) cannot be regarded as a decree within section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. It may be mentioned that the rejection of a plaint for non-compliance with the direction for payment of Court-fees or otherwise under Order VII, rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is expressly stated to be included within the definition of a decree under section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. I am (therefore of opinion that the dismissal of the suit under section 8B(3) is not a decree and the order complained of was not appealable. The revision petition is therefore competent, provided the matter comes within section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    9. The question in this case is not a mere question of valuing the relief claimed. The question is bound up with the determination of the category to which the suit belongs for the purposes of determining the court-fees payable. In the present case the plaintiffs complained of a preliminary decree which was passed in a previous suit as being invalid and fraudulent and not binding on the plaintiffs. The prayer for a declaration which was made was not really necessary on the allegations made in the plaint. The decree was expressed to be and was in fact a preliminary decree. We have to consider the plaint as a whole and reading it as a whole 1 am of opinion/that the suit as framed was really a suit for partition. The prayer for a declaration which was made in prayer (1) of the plaint was really an unnecessary prayer and was intended to meet a possible defence which might have been raised by the defendants. It is well-known that the passing of a preliminary decree does not bar a second suit for partition. The declaration which was therefore prayed for was a superfluous prayer and does not alter the nature of the suit itself. Regarded in this light the plaint must be regarded as a plaint in a suit for partition with a prayer for an injunction. Such a suit cannot be regarded as coming within section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act. It is not a suit for a declaration where consequential relief is prayed for but it is a suit for partition which comes within Schedule 2, Art. 17(va) of the Court-fees Act. The allegation in the plaint is that the plaintiffs are in possession. Section 7(vi) A of the Court-fees Act can have no application in this case. As the suit comes within Schedule 2, Art. 17(va) of the Court-fees Act the court-fees payable on the prayer for partition is only Rs. 15. Mr. Mitter referred us to a decision of the Oudh Chief Court in the case of Mnsammat Roop Rani v. Bithal Das (2), (I.L.R 13 Luck. 628). In that case an item of joint property had been sold in execution of a prior decree. A final decree for partition had already been made. In those circumstances the Court was of the opinion that the institution of the suit could not be regarded as a pure suit for partition which would come within. Schedule 2, Art. 17 (va) of the Court-fees Act.

    10. Nor does the principle enunciated in the case of In the matter of Kali Pada Mukherji, (3) (34 C.W.N 870), apply because the suit, as already stated, is not a suit for declaration with prayers for consequential relief.

    11. III the latter class of suits the plaintiff has to value the relief for the purposes of jurisdiction and court-fees at an identical figure. In my opinion, the learned Judge was not right in Calculating the difference in the value of the relief which the plaintiffs got in the earlier partition suit and the value of the relief which the plaintiffs prayed for in the present suit. Possibly, the learned Judge had in his mind the decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Sital Prasad Sah v. Ramdas Sah (4), (I.L.R 18 Pat. 267). In that case there was a previous completed partition, and the decision is clearly distinguishable. My conclusion therefore, is that the suit has been properly valued and proper court-fees have been paid.

    12. In the result, the orders complained of in the petition must be, set aside and the preliminary issue must be determined in favour of the plaintiffs.

    13. The suit must be regarded as properly valued and stamped and it will now proceed to trial.

    14. In view of the circumstances we direct that the parties will bear their own costs.

    Guha Ray, J.:— I agree.

    A.K.D.G

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Mahalakshmi Debi And Anr. v. Bamacharan Nandi And Anr. Opposite Parties.
    (Aug 14, 1952)