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  • provisions of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948.10. By Sec. 5 of the Amending Act
  • sub-section (3) of section 12 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948.8.
  • West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) (Amendment) Act, 1950
  • provisions of Sec. 12(3) of the West Bengal Rent Control Act of 1948.
  • Sec. 18(5) of the West Bengal Rent Control Act, 1950,
  • Sec. 12(3) of the Rent Control Act of 1948.12.
  • Sec. 18(5) of the Rent Control Act of 1950.7.
  • SECTION 4 AMENDING ACT
  • provisions of sub-section (3) of section 12
  • SECTION 5 AMENDING ACT
  • Sec. 18(5) read with sec. 14 of the 1950 Act.
  • Sec. 12(3) of the Rent Control Act of 1948.
  • Sec. 18(5) of the 1950 Rent Control Act
  • West Bengal Rent Control Act of 1950
  • sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 19 of the 1950 Act.
  • Sec. 5 of the amending Act of 1950
  • sub-sec. (5) of Sec. 18 of 1950 Act,
  • Sec. 18(5) in the Act of 1950
  • sub-section (1) of section 12
  • Sec. 5 of the Amending Act
  • Rent Control Act of 1948
  • 31, 1950. Section 18(5)
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948.10. By Sec. 5 of the Amending Act
  • sub-section (3) of section 12 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948.8.
  • West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) (Amendment) Act, 1950
  • provisions of Sec. 12(3) of the West Bengal Rent Control Act of 1948.
  • Sec. 18(5) of the West Bengal Rent Control Act, 1950,
  • Sec. 12(3) of the Rent Control Act of 1948.12.
  • Sec. 18(5) of the Rent Control Act of 1950.7.
  • SECTION 4 AMENDING ACT
  • provisions of sub-section (3) of section 12
  • SECTION 5 AMENDING ACT
  • Sec. 18(5) read with sec. 14 of the 1950 Act.
  • Sec. 12(3) of the Rent Control Act of 1948.
  • Sec. 18(5) of the 1950 Rent Control Act
  • West Bengal Rent Control Act of 1950
  • sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 19 of the 1950 Act.
  • Sec. 5 of the amending Act of 1950
  • sub-sec. (5) of Sec. 18 of 1950 Act,
  • Sec. 18(5) in the Act of 1950
  • sub-section (1) of section 12
  • Sec. 5 of the Amending Act
  • Rent Control Act of 1948
  • 31, 1950. Section 18(5)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion delivered by Harries, C.J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal from the judgment and decree of P.B. Mukharji, J., dated 6 September 1951, made in favour of the plaintiff in a suit for ejectment.

The suit was brought by the plaintiff-respondent to recover possession of portions of premises known as No. 32, Sir Hariram Goenka Street. The tenancy commenced on 1 April 1944 with rent then Rs. 525 per mensem; the rent was later increased in 1948 to Rs. 840 per mensem (no complaint was raised about the legality of that increase in the opinion).

In November 1948 the tenant refused to pay rent and paid no rent thereafter up to the date of the decree (6 September 1951). A suit for ejectment was filed on 29 November 1949.

At the time of institution of the suit the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948 was in force and, on the admitted facts, the tenancy had been ipso facto determined by reason of the provisions of Section 12(3) of that 1948 Act due to default in payment of three consecutive months' rent.

During the pendency of the suit the West Bengal Rent Control Act of 1950 came into operation on 31 March 1950. Section 18(5) of the 1950 Act sought to make certain provisions of the 1950 Act applicable, insofar as may be, to suits pending when the Act came into force. A decision of this Court (S.B. Trading Co., Ltd. v. Satyendra Chandra Sen) held that Section 18(5) did not apply to ejectment suits grounded upon ipso facto determination under Section 12(3) of the 1948 Act.

To remedy the effect of that decision, the Legislature enacted the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) (Amendment) Act, 1950, which came into force on 30 November 1950, redefining “tenant” and amending the text of section 18(5). Section 5 of the Amending Act provided that in all applications and suits referred to in subsection (5) of section 18 which were pending at commencement, the Act as amended "shall apply and shall be deemed always to have applied".

At trial P.B. Mukharji, J., held that Section 18(5) as amended applied but that the tenant was disentitled to relief under Section 14 of the 1950 Act because of defaults; accordingly the suit was decreed. The present appeal challenges that result. Harries, C.J. delivered the judgment dismissing the appeal; Banerjee, J. agreed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, by virtue of Section 5 of the Amending Act (West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) (Amendment) Act, 1950), the whole of the West Bengal Rent Control Act, 1950 (as amended) was made applicable to suits pending when the 1950 Act came into force, thereby precluding any decree for ejectment based on ipso facto determination of tenancy under Section 12(3) of the 1948 Act.
  2. Whether Section 18(5) of the 1950 Act (as amended) applies to suits for ejectment founded on ipso facto determination of tenancy under Section 12(3) of the 1948 Act.
  3. Whether defaults in payment of rent occurring before the amending Act came into force can be taken into account for the purpose of denying relief under the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 14 of the 1950 Act when Sec. 18(5) is invoked for suits pending at the commencement of the amending Act.
  4. Whether the tenant was entitled to relief by reason of inability to tender or deposit rent after the amending Act came into force, given the landlord's alleged refusal to accept rent.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Tenant) — Mr. Meyer

  • Contended that by virtue of the amending Act of November 1950, the whole of the 1950 Act as amended applied to suits pending when the 1950 Act came into force; consequently no decree for ejectment could be passed on the ground that the tenancy had been ipso facto determined under Section 12(3) of the 1948 Act.
  • Relied on the wording of Section 5 of the Amending Act — particularly the phrase "the said Act as amended by this Act shall apply and shall be deemed always to have applied" — to argue that the amended 1950 Act should be treated as if in force from 31 March 1950 for suits referred to in subsection (5) of section 18.
  • Also argued that the opening words of Section 12 of the 1950 Act ("Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other Act or law...") show an intention that the 1950 Act be retrospective and therefore apply to pending suits.
  • Argued that, if the 1950 Act did apply, he could not be held to have defaulted in payment of rent because the landlord treated him as a trespasser and would not accept rent; therefore he could not truthfully tender or pay rent.

Respondent (Landlord)

  • Contended that even if Section 18(5) of the 1950 Act as amended applied to tenancies ipso facto determined, the tenant was not entitled to relief under Section 18(5) read with Section 14 of the 1950 Act because of his defaults.
  • Argued that the Court could look to defaults occurring before the suit was filed (i.e., defaults before the amending Act) and that the lengthy pre-suit defaults (eleven or twelve consecutive months) precluded any relief.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
S.B. Trading Co., Ltd. v. Satyendra Chandra Sen (1) (54 C.W.N. 756) Held that Section 18(5) of the West Bengal Rent Control Act, 1950 had no application to suits for ejectment based on the tenancy having been ipso facto determined by failure to pay three consecutive months' rent under Section 12(3) of the 1948 Act. The Court explained that the Legislature passed the November 1950 amending Act to nullify the effect of this decision and thereby enable courts to grant relief to persons whose tenancies had been ipso facto determined. The decision provided the context and legislative purpose for the amending Act's provisions which were interpreted in this case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds by close textual and purposive interpretation of the amending provisions and the interplay between the 1948 Act, the 1950 Act, and the November 1950 Amending Act.

1. Construction of Section 5 of the Amending Act:

  • The Court acknowledged that Section 5 is "not very happily worded" and that a literal construction, giving the full breadth of the phrase "the said Act as amended shall apply and shall be deemed always to have applied", would defeat the amending Act's purpose. If the entire amended 1950 Act were to be treated as always applicable to pending suits, then the amending Act would be unnecessary because the 1950 Act itself, so construed, would already preclude decrees for ejectment on the ipso facto ground.
  • Adopting a purposive approach, the Court held that Section 5 must be read so as to give effect to the legislative intention: specifically, the legislature intended to make the amended definition of "tenant" and the amended terms of Section 18(5) applicable to suits pending when the 1950 Act came into force. The Court read Section 5 as limited to such portions of the Act as were necessary to give effect to the amending Act's purpose (principally the amended Section 18(5)), rather than as importing the whole of the 1950 Act into pending suits.
  • The Court observed that the concluding phrase "and shall be deemed always to have applied" was included to meet arguments that the amendment might have no effect for any period prior to the amending Act's commencement; it was not intended to render the entire 1950 Act (as amended) retrospectively applicable to all pending suits.

2. On whether the 1950 Act is retrospective:

  • The Court rejected the appellant's contention that the language "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other Act or law" in Section 12 of the 1950 Act evinced a clear intention to confer general retrospective effect. The court emphasized that retrospective effect to an enactment will not be given unless compelled by express words or a clear implication.
  • The Court reasoned that the presence of Section 18(5) in the 1950 Act — which prescribes a limited form of relief for suits pending when the Act came into force — demonstrates that the Act was not intended to be fully retrospective. If the Act had been wholly retrospective, Section 18(5) would have been unnecessary because Section 14 and other provisions would have applied in full to pending suits.

3. Application of Section 14 by way of Section 18(5) to pending suits:

  • The Court accepted that Section 14, in its terms, applies to suits instituted after the 1950 Act came into force and therefore cannot be strictly applied to suits pending at that time. Section 18(5) accordingly enjoins courts to "exercise the powers of granting relief against ejectment given by Sec. 14 ... following the provisions and procedure of that section as far as may be necessary."
  • The Court interpreted this to mean that the principles underlying Section 14 should be applied to pending suits insofar as that is practicable. One such core principle is that specified defaults in payment of rent disqualify a tenant from relief.
  • Accordingly, defaults occurring before the amending Act (including the lengthy period of non-payment prior to suit) may be treated, so far as reasonably possible, as equivalent to defaults which would bar relief if the suit had been brought after the 1950 Act came into force. The Court explained that where pre-suit defaults are of the same character and significance as those that would bar relief under Section 14, they should be treated as fatal to a tenant's claim for relief under Section 18(5).

4. Application to the facts of this case (defaults and tender/deposit):

  • On the facts the tenant refused to pay rent from November 1948 and by the time of the decree had made no payment up to 6 September 1951. At the time the suit was filed (29 November 1949) the tenant had already defaulted for some eleven or twelve consecutive months; even limiting attention to defaults after the amending Act's commencement (30 November 1950) there were at least eight consecutive months' arrears.
  • The Court held that, applying Section 14's principle, the tenant's defaults (whether counted before the amending Act or only after it) were sufficient to bar relief under Section 18(5) read with Section 14. The learned Judge below had concluded that defaults after the amending Act were decisive; the Court held that either approach leads to the same outcome in this case.
  • The Court rejected the appellant's argument that he could not tender or deposit rent because the landlord treated him as a trespasser. The opinion points out that Section 19(1) of the 1950 Act permitted the tenant, once entitled to relief under the amending Act, to deposit rent with the Rent Controller if the landlord refused a tender. The tenant neither tendered nor deposited rent after the amending Act came into force; therefore, even on the trial Judge's narrower view, the tenant's failure to tender or deposit constituted a default that excluded relief.

5. Conclusion of analysis:

  • The Court resolved the statutory construction questions in favour of the view that the amending Act was intended to make Section 18(5), as amended, applicable to pending suits but not to render the entire 1950 Act (as amended) retrospectively applicable in full to such suits.
  • Applying the principles of Section 14 via Section 18(5) to pending suits, the Court found the tenant's defaults fatal to any claim for relief; the learned trial Judge's decree was correct and the appeal was dismissed.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is dismissed with costs; the decree for ejectment entered by P.B. Mukharji, J., on 6 September 1951 in favour of the plaintiff-respondent is upheld.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The landlord's decree for possession is sustained; the tenant's appeal is dismissed with costs.
  • The Court interpreted the November 1950 Amending Act as intended to make the amended definition of "tenant" and the amended wording of Section 18(5) applicable to suits pending when the 1950 Act came into force, but not to render the entirety of the 1950 Act retrospectively applicable to such suits. The decision applies those interpretive conclusions to deny relief to a tenant whose defaults (either before or after the amending Act, on the facts) disqualified him from relief under Section 18(5) read with Section 14.
  • The opinion does not assert that it is laying down a broader new precedent beyond the interpretation and application made in this case; the immediate consequence is the affirmance of the ejectment decree and the dismissal of the appeal.

Additional case particulars contained in the opinion: Solicitors for the appellant were K.K. Dutt & Co.; solicitors for the respondent were P.D. Himmatsingka. Banerjee, J. concurred. The judgment was certified for two Counsel.

    United Commercial Press Ltd. v. Satyanarain Chamaria

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Harries, C.J:— This is an appeal from a judgment and decree of P.B Mukharji, J., dated September 6, 1951, made in favour of the plaintiff in a suit for ejectment.

    2. The suit was brought by the plaintiff-respondent to recover possession of portions of certain premises known as No. 32, Sir Hariram Goenka Street, on the ground that the tenancy of the said premises had been ipso facto determined by reason of the provisions of Sec. 12(3) of the West Bengal Rent Control Act of 1948. It appears that the tenancy commenced on April 1, 1944, the rent then being Rs. 525 per mensem. Later in the year 1948 the rent was increased in circumstances which we know nothing of, to a sum of Rs. 840 per mensem. But no point is taken that this increase was in any way illegal

    3. In November, 1948, there appears to have been some quarrel between the parties and in that month the tenant refused to pay his rent and never paid any rent for the premises thereafter right up until the date of the decree, namely, September 6, 1951.

    4. A suit was filed on November 29, 1949, claiming to eject the tenant-appellant. At that time the Rent Control Act of 1948 was in force and admittedly the tenant was a defaulter for three consecutive months or more and by reason of Sec. 12(3) of that Act his tenancy had been ipso facto determined.

    5. During the pendency of the suit the West Bengal Rent Control Act of 1950 was passed which came into operation on March 31, 1950. Section 18(5) of this latter Act made applicable certain provisions of the 1950 Act, in so far as may be, to suits pending at the date when the Act came into force.

    6. By a decision of this Court, S.B Trading Co., Ltd. v. Satyendra Chandra Sen (1) (54 C.W.N 756), a Bench of this Court held that Sec. 18(5) of the West Bengal Rent Control Act, 1950, had no applications to suits for ejectment based on the ground that the tenancy had been ipso facto determined by failure to pay three months' consecutive rent as provide ed by Sec. 12(3) of the Rent Control Act of 1948. The result of this decision was that a very large number of tenants against whom suits were pending were deprived of the relief contemplated in Sec. 18(5) of the Rent Control Act of 1950.

    7. To remedy this the Legislature passed an amending Act— The West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) (Amendment) Act, 1950— which came into force on November 30, 1950. By this amending statute the term “tenant” was amended and was redefined as meaning “any person by whom rent is, or but for a special contract would be, payable for any premises, and includes (i) any person who is liable to be sued by the landlord for rent; and (ii) any person whose interest in the premises has been ipso facto determined under sub-section (3) of section 12 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948”.

    8. This new definition was to be deemed always to have been substituted for the original definition in the 1950 Act.

    9. Section 4 of this amending Act provided inter alia for the amendment of sub-sec. (5) of Sec. 18 and the words “on the ground that the interest of the tenant in such premises has been ipso facto determined under the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 12” were substituted for the words “on the ground of default in payment of arrears of rent under the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948”.

    10. By Sec. 5 of the Amending Act it was provided: “In all applications made under sub-section (1) of section 18 of the said Act (meaning the 1950 Act) which are pending at the commencement of this Act and in all suits referred to in sub-sec. (5) of the said section which are pending at such commencement, the said Act as amended by this Act shall apply and shall be deemed always to have applied”.

    11. As I have stated earlier in the case of S.B Trading Co., Ltd. v. Satyendra Chandra Sen (1) cited above, this Court had held that relief under Sec. 18(5) of the 1950 Rent Control Act could only be given to two classes of tenants, that is, tenants who had been given by the statute an opportunity of paying the arrears of rent and had not paid the same within the time allowed. The Court had held that Sec. 18(5) had no application to tenants whose tenancies had been ipso facto determined by reason of default in paying three consecutive months' rent. What the legislature did in the amending Act was to give relief only to persons whose tenancies had been ipso facto determined. The other classes of tenants, which this Court had held were entitled to relief under Sec. 18(5) of the 1950 Act as drafted, were excluded by the amending Act from any relief. After the amending Act therefore the position was that the only persons who could claim relief under Sec. 18(5) of the 1950 Act were persons whose tenancies had been ipso facto determined under Sec. 12(3) of the Rent Control Act of 1948.

    12. As I have said the suit which gave rise to this decree was pending when the 1950 Act came into force and was still pending when the amending Act of. 1950 came into force on November 30, 1950.

    13. Before P.B Mukharji, J., who heard the suit it was contended on behalf of the tenant appellant that by reason of the amending Act no decree for ejectment at all could be made against him. On behalf of the landlord respondent it was urged that no relief could be given under Sec. 18(5) of the 1950 Act as amended, though by the amendment that section was made applicable to tenants whose tenancies had been ipso facto determined. On behalf of the landlord it was contended that the tenant was guilty of such default that no relief could be given to him under Sec. 18(5) of the 1950 Act which in terms referred to Sec. 14 of that Act.

    14. P.B Mukharji, J., came to the conclusion that Sec. 18(5) of the Act of 1950 as amended was applicable to cases of suits brought against persons whose tenancies had been ipso facto determined. He however held that by reason of certain defaults, Sec. 14 of the Act could not be applied to give the defendant any relief whatsoever and he accordingly decreed the suit.

    15. Before us Mr. Meyer on behalf of the tenant appellant has contended that by reason of the amending Act of 1950 no decree could be passed against his client on the ground that his tenancy had been ipso facto determined by default in payment of arrears of rent for three consecutive months. His contention is that by reason of the amending Act of November, 1950, the Whole of the 1950 Act was made to apply to pending suits and as the 1950 Act did not permit of ejectment on the ground of ipso facto determination of the tenancy no decree for ejectment could be made against the tenant in this case.

    16. Mr. Meyer relief on Sec. 5 of the Amending Act of 1950 and stressed the words “in all suits referred to in sub-section (5) of the said section which are pending at such commencement, the said Act as amended by this Act, shall apply and shall be deemed always to have applied”. Mr. Meyer's argument is that to the suits referred to in sub-sec. (5) of Sec. 18 of 1950 Act, that is, suits pending when that Act came into force, the 1950 Act as amended by the amending Act was to apply and was to be deemed always to have applied. In short his argument is that after the amendment of the 1950 Act by the amending Act of November, 1950, the whole of the 1950 Act as amended was made applicable to pending suits and no decree could be passed against the tenant on the ground of ipso facto determination but could only be passed against him on the grounds provided in the 1950 Act as amended.

    17. There can be no doubt whatsoever that Sec. 5 of the Amending Act of 1950 is not very happily worded and if capable of the construction that is placed upon Sec. 5, then it would defeat the whole purpose of that section and indeed of the amending Act. The purpose of the amending Act was to nullify the effect of the decision in S.B Trading Co., Ltd. v. Satyendra Chandra Sen (1) cited above and to enable the courts to grant relief to tenants whose tenancies had been ipso facto determined by reason of default in payment of rent for three consecutive months. If Mr. Meyer's contention be accepted then the amending Act is wholly unnecessary because no decree could be made at all against such defaulting tenants.

    18. It seems to me that a construction must be given to this section which would give effect to the amending Act rather than render it wholly useless ruling, if such a construction can reasonably be given to the words in Sec. 5. It seems to me that on a true construction of Sec. 5 of the Amending Act all that was intended was the amended definition of “tenant” and the substitution of the words in Sec. 18(5) were to apply to all suits pending at the time when the original 1950 Act came into force. There was possibly no need for the concluding words of the Sec., namely, “and shall be deemed always to have applied” unless they were put in to meet a possible argument that the amendment would have no effect during any period before the date when the amending Act came into force, namely, November 30, 1950. The words “and shall be deemed always to have applied” make it abundantly clear that the Act as amended shall apply as if the amendment was in the original Act as passed on March 31, 1950.

    19. When the Court sees the purpose of the amending Act and sees from the earlier sections what the legislature intended to do, it seems clear that Sec. 5 must be read as meaning that such portion of the Act of 1950 as amended by the amending Act of 1950 shall apply to suits pending when the 1950 Act came into force and shall be deemed always to have applied to such suits. It is true that we are cutting down the full meaning of the words “the said Act as amended shall apply and shall be deemed always to have applied”. But it seems to me we are bound to do that to, give the amending Act any meaning and purpose whatsoever. It is a legitimate method of construction to give an Act a meaning if that can be done reasonably. Too literal a construction should not be followed when it leads to an absurdity if a somewhat more liberal construction would lead to an effective application of the Act. What the legislature clearly had in mind here were the original provisions of Sec. 18(5) and they were not concerned with the other portions of the Act of 1950. Section 5 of the amending Act provides that Sec. 18(5) of the 1950 Act as amended would apply to all pending suits and would always be deemed to have applied and there was no intention whatsoever to make applicable to such suits any other provisions of the 1950 Act.

    20. The view which I take was the view taken by the learned Judge in the court below and I have no hesitation in holding that the learned Judge arrived at a correct conclusion on this matter. Mr. Meyer also endeavoured to argue that after the 1950 Act came into force and even before the amending Act of 1950 no suit could be brought against a person whose tenancy had been ipso facto determined under Sec. 12(3) of the Rent Control Act of 1948. He urged that the opening words of Sec. 12 of the 1950 Act showed that it was the intention of the legislature that the Act should be retrospective. Mr. Meyer placed reliance on the words “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other Act or law, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court in favour of the landlord against a tenant, including a tenant whose lease has expired:

    Provided that nothing in the sub-section shall apply to any suit for decree for such recovery of possession” where certain facts exist.

    21. Mr. Meyer's contention was that the words “notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other Act or law” show that this Act was intended to govern all cases whether such had been filed or decided before or after the Act came into force and that the Act was clearly made retrospective and would therefore apply to pending cases. The 1950 Act admittedly did not allow a suit to be brought on the ground of ipso facto determination of a tenancy. Therefore it is said that the suit before the learned Judge was bound to be dismissed.

    22. I can see nothing in the words relied upon by Mr. Meyer as suggesting that this Act should be given retrospective effect.

    23. The court leans against giving an Act retrospective effect and will only give it such effect if it is compelled to do so by express words in the statute or where retrospective effect is clearly to be implied from the word's of the statute.

    24. So far from the provisions of this statute suggesting that they should have retrospective effect, the provisions, I think, clearly suggest the contrary. Why should it have been necessary to enact Sec. 18(5) if the whole Act was to have retrospective effect? The Act would have applied to these suits and applied with full force; Sec. 14 of the Act which provides for relief would have been applicable. Yet we find that Sec. 18(5) was enacted which expressly provides that a limited relief will be given to tenants in suits pending when the Act came into force. It is provided that in such cases the Court shall exercise the powers of granting relief against ejectment given by Sec. 14 of the Act following the provisions and procedure of that section as far as may be necessary for the said purpose. The court is enjoined to give effect to Sec. 14 as far as possible in such suits. But if the Act had been retrospective the court would have been bound to give full effect to Sec. 14 in all such suits. It appears to me that the existence of Sec. 18(5) in the Act of 1950 makes it clear that the Act was never intended to be retrospective and was only to have such retrospective effect as was expressly given to it in the statute itself. That being so there is no force in this contention.

    25. Mr. Meyer then contended that if the Act of 1950 applied to suits based on ipso facto determination of the tenancy under Sec. 12(3) of the 1948 Act then he should be granted relief. The learned Judge in the Court below had held that the tenant was not entitled to relief because even after the amending Act came into force on November 30, 1950, he had defaulted for over six consecutive months. According to the learned Judge's view such default prevented the Court from giving him any relief under Sec. 14 of the Act and it will be remembered that in giving relief in pending suits the Court must apply Sec. 14 as far as it can. Section 14 of the Act provides for granting relief to tenants. But there is a proviso to sub-sec. (3) which is in these terms:

    “Provided that the tenant shall not be entitled to the benefit of protection against eviction under this section if he makes default in payment of the rent referred to in clause (i) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 12 on three occasions within a period of eighteen months.”

    26. The learned Judge's view was that as the Act of 1950 was only made applicable to persons whose tenancies had been ipso facto determined by the amending Act which came into force on November 30, 1950, the only default of the tenant which could be regarded was default after November 30, 1950. He held however that after that date no rent whatsoever had been paid or tendered up until the date of the decree, namely, September 6, 1951. There was therefore at least eight consecutive months' rent in arrear and in the view of the learned Judge the proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 14 made it quite impossible for him to afford any relief.

    27. Before the learned Judge it had been argued on behalf of the landlord that the Court could look not only at what occurred after the amending Act came into force, but could look at what occurred before the suit was ever filed. When this suit was filed the tenant had admittedly defaulted for a matter of eleven or twelve consecutive months and it was urged on behalf of the respondent that the default of eleven or twelve consecutive months before the suit made it impossible for any relief to be granted. The learned Judge, as I have said, took the view that the default must occur after the amending Act came into force and that he could not take into account any defaults before the date of the amending Act.

    28. I am not satisfied that the view of the learned Judge is right on this question. Admittedly Sec. 14 of the Act of 1950 cannot be literally applied in suits filed before the 1950 Act came into force. The opening words of Sec. 14 make it clear that it can only apply to suits filed after that Act came into force. The opening words of sub-sec. (1) are:

    “If in a suit for recovery of possession of any premises from the tenant the landlord would not get a decree for possession but for clause (i) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 12 the Court shall determine the amount of rent legally payable by the tenant and which is in arrears taking into consideration any order made under sub-section (4) and effect thereof up to the date of the order mentioned……”

    29. It is quite clear that the section in terms only applies to suits brought after the Act came into force and therefore the section cannot be applied strictly and literally to any suits filed before the Act came into force, that is, to suits pending when the Act came into force. That appears to me to be the reason why in Sec. 18(5) of the Act the Court is enjoined to exercise the powers of granting relief against ejectment given by Sec. 14 following the provisions and procedure of that section as far as may be necessary and for the said purpose. It was realised by the draftsman of Sec. 18(5) that Sec. 14 of the Act as drafted could not apply and therefore the Court is enjoined to apply the provisions of Sec. 14 as far as possible to give relief. What was intended, I think, was that the Court under Sec. 18(5) of the 1950 Act should apply the principles underlying sec 14 of the Act and apply those principles as far as possible to a case to which Sec. 14 could not in terms apply. One of the principles upon which Sec. 14 is built is that if there are certain defaults no relief can be given. It is quite clear that if a suit was brought after the 1950 Act came into force and the tenant had been in defaults in the payment of rent for eleven or twelve consecutive months after the Act came into force and before the suit was instituted no relief could possibly be given to him under Sec. 14. It seems to me that that rule must be applied as far as possible to suits filed before the Act came into force and therefore when it is found that in such suits there was default for eleven or twelve consecutive months before the suit was brought then the result should be the same as if those defaults had occurred after the 1950 Act had come into force and were relied upon in a suit under the Act. It appears to me that what the Court has to do is to apply the provisions of Sec. 14 as far as it can to a suit to which the provisions cannot literally apply. If that be so it appears to me that the default in this case is fatal because a similar default, if the suit was really governed by the 1950 Act, would have been fatal and no relief could have been given under Sec. 14. That is in my view sufficient to dispose of this question of relief.

    30. However if the view that I am inclined to take is not the correct view and the view of the trial Court which is also supported by a single Judge decision of Roxburgh, J., is the correct view the result will be the same. Assuming that all that the Court could regard was any default after the date of the amending Act then, as I have already pointed out, there was default in the payment of eight or nine consecutive months' rent, and that would be sufficient to bar any relief under the proviso to Sec. 14(8), applying that proviso strictly.

    31. Mr. Meyer however contended that he could not possibly be held to have defaulted in the payment of rent because the case against his client was that his tenancy had been ipso facto determined and therefore no question of rent could arise. However by the amending Act of 1950 he was given certain relief provided that he did not default in the payment of rent. Mr. Meyer urged that he could not pay rent because the landlord treated him as a trespasser and that there was no provision at all which would have allowed him to deposit the rent in Court after the amending Act came into force.

    32. Mr. Meyer has overlooked the provisions of Sec. 19 of the 1950 Act. The moment the amending Act came into force Mr. Meyer's client could have deposited the rent in the Court of the Rent Controller. There is no force in his contention that the landlord no longer treated him as a tenant and would not accept rent. He could have tendered the rent to the landlord and if the latter had refused to accept it he could then have deposited the rent an the Court of the Rent Controller. That is clear from sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 19 of the 1950 Act. The moment the 1950 amending Act gave him a right to relief if he was not guilty of certain defaults he could have tendered rent and then deposited the rent with the Rent Controller if the tender had been refused. Had he done that there would have been no default if the view of P.B Mukharji, J., is the right view as to the applicability of the proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 14. However he tendered nothing and deposited nothing. So even if the view of P.B Mukharji, J., be right there is still a default which debars the Court from giving the tenant any relief under Sec. 18(5) read with sec. 14 of the 1950 Act. It follows therefore that it is immaterial which view is accepted as to what defaults can be taken into account. On either view the defendant was guilty of such default as debarred him from any relief under Sec. 18(5) read with Sec. 14 of the Act. That being so, the suit of the landlord was rightly decreed by the learned Judge.

    33. The appeal therefore must fail and is dismissed with costs.

    34. Certified for two Counsel.

    Banerjee, J.:— I agree.

    Solicitors: K.K Dutt & Co. for the Appellant; P.D Himmatsingka for the Respondent.

    A.K.D.G

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