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Case Number

Civil Revn. No. 277 of 1949

Advocates

Diptendra Mohan Ghose - Apurba Charan Mukherjee

Judges

Das, J.

Acts

sec. 18 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, hereinafter called the Act,
sec. 18 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, XXXVIII of 1948.2.
West Bengal Premises, Rent Control, (Temporary Provisions) Act, XXXVIII of 1948
sec. 18 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act
sec. 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act
sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Rule was brought by Petitioners (tenants) challenging an order dated 1 February 1949 of the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta (6th Bench), which rejected an application made by them under section 18 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, XXXVIII of 1948. The tenants' predecessor occupied Premises No. 38|4B, Bagbazar Street. The landlord served a notice to quit under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and initiated proceedings under section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act alleging default. The Petitioners filed written statements disputing default. An order was made under section 41 on 24 August 1948.

The Petitioners are said to have deposited arrears up to July 1948 and, since the section 41 order, to have been depositing rent before the Rent Controller. The West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act came into force on 1 December 1948. The Petitioners applied under section 18 on 7 January 1949. They allege they tendered costs of the ejectment proceedings to the landlord on 27 December 1948, and, on refusal to accept, deposited the amount in Court on 14 January 1949. The Small Cause Court Judge rejected their section 18 application on 1 February 1949 on the ground that costs were not deposited within time; the Judge did not decide the question of whether tender had occurred. The tenants obtained the Rule from this Court seeking relief.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the alleged tender on 27 December 1948, followed by a deposit in Court on 14 January 1949, constituted sufficient compliance with section 12(1)(b) of the Act so as to attract the protection of section 11.
Whether section 18 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act can be invoked to rescind or vary a decree or order for possession made before 1 December 1948 when execution of possession has not occurred.
If section 18 is invoked, how the expression “date of commencement of the Act” in section 12 should be interpreted when section 18 deems the Act to be in operation on the date the decree or order for possession was made.
Whether the conjunctive requirements of section 12 (clauses (a), (b) and (c)) preclude relief where one requirement (such as timely payment/deposit) is not satisfied.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

Counsel for the Petitioners (Mr. Diptendra Mohan Ghose) argued that the tender on 27 December 1948 followed by the deposit on 14 January 1949 satisfied the statutory requirement in section 12(1)(b) of the Act.
Implicit in the petitioners' case is reliance upon section 18 of the Act to treat the decree/order as if the Act were in operation on the earlier date, thereby allowing the statutory protective provisions to operate in their favour.

Opposite Party's Arguments

Counsel for the Opposite Party (Mr. Apurba Charan Mukherji) contended that the alleged tender, even if established, did not comply with the statutory requirements and so was insufficient.
It was further contended that section 18 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act could not be validly invoked by the Petitioners in the circumstances of this case.
Additionally, the Opposite Party argued that interest on arrears of rent had not been paid as required by section 12(1)(b) of the Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Abley v. Dale	Principle (Jarvis, C.J.) that where statutory words are plain and unambiguous, courts must construe them in their ordinary sense even if it leads to absurdity or manifest injustice.	The Court invoked this authority to justify applying the plain meaning of “commencement of the Act” despite potential hardships; it held that the argument ab inconvenienti could not override clear statutory language.
Simms v. Registrar of Probates	Statement (Lord Hobhouse) that where two meanings both adequately satisfy the statute and one meaning produces great harshness, that may incline the court to adopt the other meaning.	The Court acknowledged this principle but determined it was not applicable because the language of the Act was plain and not ambiguous in the relevant respects.
Gopika Raman Roy v. A.M. Singh	Interpretation by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council that the expression “first hearing of the suit” (found in procedural rules) means the framing of issues.	The Court used this authority to illustrate procedural incongruities arising from treating section 18 as resuscitating suits to the date of the decree or order (making the phrase “first hearing” inappropriate at that stage).
Nanda Lal Roy v. Suresh Chandra Sen	Case turned on the specific words of paragraph 10C of the Bengal House Rent Control Order, 1942 (as amended), and the particular inconveniences did not arise there.	The Court distinguished that decision on the ground that it turned on particular words of a different instrument and that the present inconveniences and incongruities were not present in that case.
Mrs. Julie Sen v. Surendra Mohan Roy	Interpretation of section 11 of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order, 1943, which is in similar terms to provisions before the Court.	The Court noted that the Bench decision supports the view taken in the present opinion regarding interpretation of analogous protective provisions.
Sm. Radharani Debi v. Sanat Kumar Chatterji	Opinion of Mr. Justice Henderson that paragraph 11 of the analogous Order could not be transferred simpliciter.	The Court cited this authority as supportive of the conclusion that section 18 cannot be applied simpliciter to resurrect and vary prior decrees in the manner sought by the Petitioners.
Craies on Statute Law (textbook authority)	General principle that where the words of a statute are plain the court must accept the plain meaning and that arguments based on inconvenience are admissible only where the statute's meaning is obscure.	The Court relied on this text to reinforce the approach of applying an explicit statutory phraseology (“commencement of the Act”) according to its plain meaning rather than re-writing the statute to avoid perceived harshness.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a statutory-interpretive analysis focusing on the interplay between section 18 and the protective provisions in sections 11 and 12 of the Act.

Step 1: Characterization of section 18 — The Court explained that section 18 operates to give the Act a retrospective operation for a limited purpose: where a decree or order for possession was made prior to the Act's commencement but execution had not occurred, the making court may rescind or vary that decree or order if it would not have been made had the Act been in operation at that earlier date.

Step 2: Consequence of deeming the Act in operation — If section 18 is invoked, the Act is to be deemed in operation on the date the decree or order for possession was made. This leads to the question what the expression “date of commencement of the Act” in section 12 must mean when read with section 18.

Step 3: Plain meaning applied — The Court concluded that the ordinary and plain meaning of “date of commencement of the Act” must be regarded as the date when the decree or order for possession was made (or an earlier date). Therefore, payments or deposits required by section 12 must be made within one month of that date (the date of the decree or order for possession).

Step 4: Conjunctive requirements of section 12 — The Court noted that section 12(1) contains clauses (a), (b) and (c), joined by the conjunctive “and,” and therefore all conditions are required for the tenant to obtain the protection of section 11.

Step 5: Practical and conceptual difficulties — The Court observed that this interpretation creates difficulties and potentially renders section 18 unworkable in many cases (for example where tenants fail to make payments for three months after the date of the decree, section 12(3) provides that the tenant’s interest ceases and he becomes a trespasser). The Court also noted procedural incongruities in applying provisions like section 17 (which refers to the “first hearing of the suit”) if the suit is deemed to be resurrected to the earlier date.

Step 6: Role of construction principles and authorities — The Court considered and applied established principles of statutory construction (citing Craies and the decision in Abley v. Dale) that when statutory words are plain they must be given effect even if consequences are harsh. It acknowledged other authorities (Simms) that permit selection of a less harsh meaning where two meanings are possible, but found the Act’s language not to be ambiguous and therefore not amenable to such corrective interpretation.

Step 7: Distinguishing other decisions — The Court distinguished earlier cases (Nanda Lal Roy; Julie Sen; Radharani Debi) either because they turned on different statutory language or because they involved analogous provisions interpreted in a way that supported the present conclusion; the Court relied particularly on bench decisions and other authorities that indicate difficulty in transferring protective paragraphs simpliciter.

Step 8: Application to the facts — Applying the statutory construction and the conjunctive requirements, the Court held that the alleged tender on 27 December 1948 together with the deposit on 14 January 1949 did not satisfy the precise statutory requirements of section 12(1)(b) when section 18 is given effect as described. Consequently, the tenants could not obtain the relief claimed under section 18.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court concluded that the Rule is discharged. The Court held that section 18, when applied with sections 11 and 12, requires the strict compliance it described and that the alleged tender and subsequent deposit did not satisfy the statutory requirements; accordingly no relief could be given to the tenants in the circumstances of this case. There will be no order as to costs.

Implications: The direct effect is that the Petitioners (tenants) are denied the relief they sought under section 18 and the Small Cause Court's order rejecting their application is effectively upheld by this Court. The opinion emphasizes that the Act must be read according to its plain terms, which may produce incongruities and practical hardships but the court will not re-write the statute to avoid those consequences. The opinion does not purport to establish a broader new legal principle beyond the interpretation applied to the Act's text; it confines itself to construing and applying the Act's provisions to the facts at hand.

Opinion delivered by N.D.R (as recorded in the provided text).

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Sm. Nagendra Bala Hore And Anr Petitioners, v. Sree Sree Iswar Kalimata Thakur, Sebait Kamalesh Ch. Chakrabarty Opposite Party, .

1. This Rule was obtained by the Petitioners who are tenants against an order dated the 1st February, 1949, passed by Mr. M. Mukherji, learned Judge, Court of Small Causes, Calcutta, 6th Bench, rejecting an application under sec. 18 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, XXXVIII of 1948.

2. The case of the Petitioners is that their predecessor was a tenant in respect of Premises No. 38|4B, Bagbazar Street. The landlord served a notice to quit under sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and started proceedings under sec. 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act on the ground of default. The Petitioners filed written statements disputing the fact that they were defaulters. On the 24th August, 1948, an order was made under sec. 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. It appears that the Petitioners deposited the arrears up to July, 1948, and it is alleged that since the passing of the order under sec. 41 they are depositing rent before the Rent Controller. On the 1st December, 1948, the West Bengal Premises, Rent Control, (Temporary Provisions) Act, XXXVIII of 1948 came into force. On the 7th January, 1949, the Petitioners made an application under sec. 18 of the said Act. It is alleged by the Petitioners that they tendered the costs of the ejectment proceedings to the landlord on the 27th December, 1948, and on the refusal by the landlord to accept the same deposited the amount in Court on the 14th January, 1949. On the 1st February, 1949, the learned Small Cause Court Judge rejected their application under sec. 18 of the Act on the ground that the costs were not deposited within time. No finding was arrived at as regards the allegation of tender. The tenants moved this Court and obtained this Rule. Mr. Diptendra Mohan Ghose appearing for the Petitioners contended that the tender on the 27th December, 1948, followed by a deposit on the 14th January, 1949, was sufficient compliance with the provisions of sec. 12 (1) (b) of the said Act. Mr. Apurba Charan Mukherji appearing for the Opposite Party contended that the aforesaid tender, even if true, was not sufficient compliance with the statute. He also contended that sec. 18 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act cannot be invoked by the Petitioners. He also contended that interest on arrears of rent was not paid as required by sec. 12 (1) (b) of the Act.

3. In my view of sec. 12 (1) (b) the tender as alleged coupled with the deposit did not satisfy the requirements of the statute. The question as to how far sec. 18 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, hereinafter called the Act, helps the tenants, is one of some difficulty.

4. Sec. 18 runs as follows:—

“Where any decree or order for the recovery of possession of any premises has been made, before the date of commencement of this Act but the possession of such premises has not been recovered from the tenant by the execution of such decree or order, the Court by which the decree or order was made may, if it is of opinion that the decree or order would not have been made if this Act had been in operation at the date of the making of the decree or order, rescind or vary the decree or order in such manner as the Court may think fit for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of this Act.”

5. The effect of sec. 18 of the Act is obviously to give the Act a retrospective operation for the limited purpose of rescinding or varying a decree or order for possession passed before the 1st December, 1948, which is the date of the commencement of the Art. To test whether the decree or order for possession is to be rescinded or varied the Act is to be deemed to be in operation when the decree or order for possession was made. The suit or proceeding for possession must also be deemed to be alive on the date when the decree or order for possession was made and we are to see whether the Court would have made the decree of order for possession on that date if the Act was then in force. This requires a consideration of the other provisions contained in the Act.

6. Sec. 11 of the Act provides that no decree or order for possession can be made if the tenant pays the full rent allowable by the Act and performs the conditions of the tenancy subject, however, to the qualifications stated in the proviso.

7. Sec. 12 (1) then provides that the benefit of sec. 11 can be availed of by the tenant if he complies with cls. (a), (b) and (c) thereof. These clauses are conjunctive as appears from the use of the word “and” in between these clauses. The effect of secs. 11 and 12 is that the tenant will have protection against eviction (1) if he pays rent to the full extent allowable under the Act within the prescribed period, (2) if he pays all arrears of rent to the full extent allowable under the Act “within one month of the date of the commencement of the Act” and also pays interest at the rate of 6 6¼ per cent, on the arrears of rent which is the subject of a suit or proceeding before a Court or of any decree or order of a Court as also such costs as the Court may award, (3) if there has been an increase of rent by the Controller he pays the increased rent within one month of the date specified by the Controller or of the date of the order of the Controller, as the case may be.

8. We have already stated that the effect of sec. 18 is that the Act is to be assumed to be in operation on the date of the passing of the decree or order for possession. This necessarily connotes that the Act has commenced to operate on the said date. The expression “date of commencement of the Act” in sec. 12 must, therefore, be considered to mean the date when the decree or order for possession is made or an earlier date. If this is the correct position then the payments or deposits contemplated by sec. 12 of the Act must be made within one month of the aforesaid date, that is, the date when the decree or order for possession is made. It is true that this interpretation may lead to the conclusion that sec. 18 would be unworkable in a large majority of cases. Mr. Panchanan Ghose who appeared in a similar case before me contended that the Court should shrink from a construction which would render sec. 18 futile. This is quite true but if the words of the statute are plain the Court has to accept the plain meaning of the words used by the Legislature. The argument ab inconvenienti is only admissible in construction where the meaning of the statute is obscure. Where the language is explicit, its consequences are for Parliament and not for the Courts to consider. (Craies on Statute Law, Fourth Edition, p. 87) To the same effect are the observations made by Jarvis, C.J, in the case of Abley v. Dale(1), “Where the words used are plain and unambiguous, Courts are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense even though it does lead to an absurdity or manifest injustice.” I am not unmindful of the rule enunciated by Lord Hobhouse in Simms v. Registrar of Probates(2). “Where there are two meanings each adequately satisfying the meaning (of a statute), and great harshness is produced by one of them, that has legitimate influence in inclining the mind to the other.” It is true that if the words used are ambiguous and susceptible of a narrower and wider meaning the Court would adopt the one or the other in order to give effect to the intention of the legislature. But in the present case, as I have already stated, we have got to give the words “commencement of the Act” its plain interpretation. We cannot construe the said expression in two different senses while applying sec. 18 read with sec. 12 of the Act.

9. There are other difficulties in applying sec. 18 of the Act and to fit it in with cases which were disposed of sometime before the 1st December, 1948. This would appear if we refer to sec. 12 (3) of the Act which lays down that if the tenant fails to pay or deposit the rent due after the commencement of the Act for three consecutive months the interest of the tenant shall ipso facto cease and he shall no longer be deemed to be a tenant. Thus in a case where the tenant fails to pay his rent for three months after the passing of the decree or order for possession and before the 1st December, 1948, the tenant would on the meaning to be put on the words “commencement of the Act,” be a trespasser and no relief ton be given to him under sec. 18 of the Act. The same difficulty arises in applying sec. 17 which requires the Court to decide if there is sufficient cause for proceeding with the suit or proceedings for recovery of possession. This has to be done at the first hearing of the suit or as soon as there may be thereafter. The draftsman was oblivious of the fact that the Act may operate to suits pending on the Original Side of this Court where there is no such procedure as the first hearing of the suit. The expression “first hearing of the suit” is to be found in Or. 13, r. 1 and Or. 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure and was explained by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Gopika Raman Roy v. A.M Singh(3) to mean the framing of issues. If sec. 18 has the effect of resuscitating the suit to the date when the decree or order for possession was made the expression “first hearing of the suit” would be wholly inappropriate at that stage. The resume of the different provisions of the Act shows that the Act was drafted with a view mainly to its having prospec- tive operation. Sec. 18 was inserted without adequate consideration of the incongruities which would arise. I quite agree with the submission of Mr. Panchanon Ghose that the avowed policy of the Act was to give the tenant who was in arrears a period of grace and to afford him an opportunity to pay. We have, however, to construe the Act as it is expressed and not to give it a meaning which may have been intended by the legislature. That would be to usurp the function of the legislature. Mr. Panchanan Ghose also relied on the decision in the case of Nanda Lal Roy v. Suresh Chandra Sen(4). That case, however, turned on the particular words of paragraph 10C of the Bengal House Rent Control Order, 1942, as amended on the 6th July, 1944. The inconveniences and incongruities which have been suggested above did not arise in that case. The view taken by me receives support from the Bench decision in the case of Mrs. Julie Sen v. Surendra Mohan Roy(5) which turned on the interpretation of sec. 11 of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order, 1943, which is in similar terms.

10. I am in entire agreement with the opinion of Mr. Justice Henderson in the case of Sm. Radharani Debi v. Sanat Kumar Chatterji(6), where his Lordship referring to the analogous provisions of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order, 1943, said that it was impossible to transfer paragraph 11 of the Order simpliciter.

11. The same difficulty, in my opinion arises in applying sec. 18 of the Act simpliciter.

12. In my opinion sec. 18 of the Act has failed in its subject. One feels sorry for the tenant whom the legislature wanted to give relief against the consequences of his default but on an interpretation of the Act the conclusion follows that no relief can be given to the tenant in the facts of this case. The alleged tender and the subsequent deposits do not help the tenant. The result, therefore, is that this Rule is discharged but there will be no order for costs.

N.D.R

Sm. Nagendra Bala Ho... v. Sree Sree Iswar Kali...