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Case Number

Civil Rules Nos. 740, 1582 and 1583 of 1949

Advocates

Sitaram Banerjee
Anil Chandra Dutt and Pravash Chandra Chatterjee (in No. 740) Hiran Kumar Roy and Kanti Basu (in Nos. 1582 and 1583) and Hem Chandra Dhar (in No. 1583)

Judges

Das
Das Gupta, JJ.

Acts

provisions of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, (XXXVIII of 1948), 1948, hereinafter called the Act.
sec. 107 of the Government of India Act (since repealed). Sec. 107
rules of the Code of Civil Procedure.18.
BENGAL AGRICULTURAL DEBTORS ACT

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Das, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The matters were heard together and arise from applications under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure ("the Code"). The orders challenged in these Rules were orders made by the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta, modifying orders of the Additional Rent Controller which fixed the standard rent of certain premises under the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948 ("the Act").

A preliminary objection was raised by Mr. Banerjee for the Opposite Party that this Court lacked power to interfere under section 115 of the Code because sections 32(6) and 32(7) of the Act exclude that power. Mr. Mukherjee appeared for the Petitioner and advanced submissions countering that objection. The Court analysed the relevant statutory provisions and authorities, upheld the preliminary objection and discharged the Rules. Das Gupta, J. agreed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether sections 32(6) and 32(7) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948 exclude the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115 of the Code in respect of orders passed by the Rent Controller, the Chief Judge, the District Judge or a person appointed under section 32(2) of the Act.
Whether an appellate tribunal constituted under the Act (i.e., the Chief Judge, the District Judge or the person appointed under section 32(2)) is an "ordinary court" (or an existing/established court) such that the ordinary incidents of civil jurisdiction, including revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code, would attach to its orders.
Whether the word "revise" in section 32(6) should be understood to include an "appeal" or whether that term imposes a limitation on the High Court's powers.

Arguments of the Parties

Opposite Party's Arguments (Mr. Banerjee)

The High Court has no power to interfere under section 115 of the Code with the orders complained of because sections 32(6) and 32(7) of the Act exclude the exercise of that revisional power.

Petitioner's Arguments (Mr. Mukherjee)

The Provincial Legislature may, by appropriate legislation, take away the powers of the High Court to interfere under section 115, but that is a matter of statutory construction.
The insertion of section 32(6) was ex abundanti cautela (out of abundant caution) to meet a possible contention that orders were quasi-criminal in nature and thus otherwise not revisable—implying it should not be taken as limiting the High Court's ordinary revisional powers.
The word "revise" in section 32 should be read broadly, and could include an "appeal."
Section 32(6) is wider in scope than section 115 of the Code and was intended to confer broader powers of revision on the High Court in quasi-criminal cases.
The Chief Judge, District Judge or appointed Judge act as Courts (not persona designata) when hearing appeals under the Act; therefore the ordinary incidents of court jurisdiction (including revisional jurisdiction) should attach.
Relied on precedents including H.D. Chatterji v. L.R. Trivedi and In re: Allen Bros. v. Bando & Co. to support revisional interference in earlier rent-control contexts.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Kokku Partha Saradhi Naidu Garu v. Chint-lacherva Koteswars Rao Garu	Illustration that the word "final" in a statute often means not appealable but open to revision or review.	Used with other authorities to demonstrate ordinary meaning of "final" as contrasted with the statutory limitation created by sub-sec. (6) of section 32.
Phoni Bhusan Sen v. Sarat Kumar Moitra	Authority for the proposition that "final" may mean not appealable but open to revision/review.	Cited alongside other cases to show the usual legal understanding of "final."
The Manager, Spring Mills Ltd. v. G.B. Ambekar	Another case supporting that "final" often denotes non-appealability but revision may remain available.	Considered in defining the ordinary import of "final" in statutory contexts.
National Telephone Co. Ltd. v. Post Master General	Principle (Viscount Haldane) that where special jurisdiction is conferred on an existing or established court, it attracts the ordinary incidents of that court's jurisdiction.	Examined and distinguished: Court noted the principle applies to existing/established courts and stressed its limited application to such courts rather than to newly created tribunals.
Hem Singh v. Basant Das	Applied the principle that when the right of appeal is given to "one of the ordinary courts of the country," the procedure and orders are governed by ordinary rules of the Code.	Relied on by petitioner; Court used it to define the scope of the "existing court" principle but found it inapplicable to newly constituted tribunals without a connecting link.
In re: Allen Bros. v. Bando & Co. (Rankin, J.)	Observation that for the Code to govern a tribunal, an actual relationship or "thread of connecting authority" to the High Court must be established; mere limited powers or similarity is insufficient.	Cited to support the proposition that a new tribunal (such as an appointed Judge under section 32(2)) is not automatically subject to High Court revision absent an established connecting link.
Md. Abdulla Shah Chowdhury v. Giridhari-lal Mundra	Held an appellate officer appointed under the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act was not subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court because the Civil Courts contemplated by the Letters Patent do not cover courts created by a special statute for a special purpose.	Relied upon to show that courts created by special statutes for special purposes may lie outside ordinary revisional jurisdiction of the High Court.
Ram Kumar Sukul v. Ali Newaj	Illustrated that the fact the appellate officer was the Munsif ex-officio was immaterial to the question of revisional jurisdiction.	Used to support the view that the formal status of an appellate officer does not necessarily attract ordinary revisional jurisdiction.
Nur Mahommed v. Khan Saheb S.M. Solaiman (Mitter, J.)	Laid down general rules: (1) when a matter reaches a Civil Court it attracts the proceedings of Civil Courts; (2) this applies only where it comes as part of ordinary jurisdiction and not by reason of special jurisdiction conferred upon it.	Quoted for the general rule and its limitation; Court used these rules to analyse whether orders under the Act attract ordinary revisional jurisdiction.
H.D. Chatterji v. L.R. Trivedi	Prior rent-control context in which this Court interfered in revision of Rent Controller orders, but under section 107 of the Government of India Act (now repealed).	Distinguished: Court noted earlier interference was under a different statutory superintendence provision (sec. 107), and that those cases had a connecting thread to High Court jurisdiction which does not exist under the present Act's scheme.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by a close textual and contextual analysis of section 32 of the Act (sub-sections (1)–(7)) and relevant authorities. The main points of reasoning were:

The Court set out the statutory scheme: section 32(1) provides for appeals from the Rent Controller to be presented to the Chief Judge or the District Judge; section 32(2) permits appointment by the Provincial Government of a person to exercise powers of a District Judge in hearing appeals presented to the Chief Judge and of a judicial officer to hear appeals presented to the District Judge; section 32(3) permits transfer/withdrawal to/from the appointed Judge; section 32(4) prescribes procedure; section 32(5) provides for review; section 32(6) authorises High Court revision in specified circumstances (fines of not less than Rs. 500) with a 30-day limitation; and section 32(7) declares that decisions of the Chief Judge, District Judge or appointed person shall, subject to sub-sec. (6), be final.
The phrase "subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (6)" was interpreted as necessarily excluding other revisional powers of the High Court. The Court concluded that these words imply a limitation rather than an extension of the High Court's revisional powers.
The Court rejected Mr. Mukherjee's contentions:
- The submission that section 32(6) was inserted ex abundanti cautela to preserve High Court revision in quasi-criminal orders was rejected because the High Court already possessed ample revisional powers in appropriate cases; the legislative insertion cannot be read as merely precautionary in the manner suggested.
- The contention that "revise" should be read broadly to include "appeal" was rejected because the Act itself uses the distinct terms "appeal, review and revision," suggesting deliberate distinctions.
- The argument that section 32(6) was intended to be wider than section 115 of the Code was rejected on textual grounds: the words "subject to sub-sec.(6)" indicate a limitation on the High Court's powers.
The Court engaged with the authorities on special jurisdiction. It recognised the principle from National Telephone Co. (Viscount Haldane) that conferring special jurisdiction on an existing/established court will attract the ordinary incidents of that court's jurisdiction, but emphasised that principle applies to existing or established courts and not necessarily to newly created tribunals lacking a "thread of connecting authority" with the High Court (citing Rankin, J. in Allen Bros.).
The Court observed that later authorities extended the reasoning to some courts exercising special jurisdiction; however, applying the statutory scheme and the reasoning against anomalous results (i.e., it would be anomalous if revisional jurisdiction depended on whether an appeal happened to be heard by Chief/District Judge as against an appointed Judge), the Court adopted a coherent construction: sections 32(6) and 32(7), by necessary intendment, remove the High Court's power to revise under section 115 of the Code in respect of orders passed by the Rent Controller, the Chief Judge, the District Judge or the appointed Judge except in the specific cases identified in section 32(6).
The Court therefore concluded that it had no jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code to interfere with the orders under challenge (which did not fall within section 32(6) exceptions), and the preliminary objection was sustained.
The Court declined to express a final view on whether the Chief Judge, District Judge or appointed Judge act as a Court or persona designata because that determination was unnecessary to dispose of the preliminary objection.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that sections 32(6) and 32(7) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948, by necessary implication, take away the High Court's power to revise under section 115 of the Code in relation to orders passed by the Rent Controller, the Chief Judge, the District Judge or the person appointed under section 32(2), except in the specific instances preserved by section 32(6). The preliminary objection was accordingly upheld and the Rules were discharged.

Immediate consequences for the parties:

The Court's decision means it had no jurisdiction under section 115 to entertain the revision applications challenging the impugned orders (which did not fall within section 32(6)).
Because the question was in a state of uncertainty, the parties were directed to bear their own costs in these revision cases.
The Rules filed in revision were discharged.

Broader legal implications: The opinion focuses on statutory construction of sections 32(6) and 32(7) and their effect on revisional jurisdiction; it does not purport to create a new universal precedent beyond this construction or to resolve finally whether the appellate tribunal under the Act is a court for all purposes — the Court expressly declined to determine that latter point finally for the purposes of this decision.

Judgment delivered by: Das, J. — Das Gupta, J. concurred.

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Indian Homoeopathic Medical Association v. Kanailal Pal .

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Das, J.:— The above cases were heard together. They arise out of applications under sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, hereinafter called the Code. The orders complained of in these Rules were passed by the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta, hereinafter called the Chief Judge, modifying on appeal the orders made by the Additional Rent Controller fixing the standard rent of certain premises under the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, (XXXVIII of 1948), 1948, hereinafter called the Act. Mr. Banerjee appearing for the Opposite Party has raised a preliminary objection that this Court has no power to interfere with the orders complained of, under sec. 115 of the Code. His contention is that the exercise of this power under sec. 115 of the Code has been excluded by sec. 32 (6) and (7) of the Act.

2. It has not been disputed by Mr. Mukherjee appearing on behalf of the Petitioner that the Provincial Legislature may, by appropriate legislation, take away the powers of this Court to interfere under sec. 115 of the Code with an order passed by a Judicial Tribunal of Civil Jurisdiction. In order to deal with this matter it is necessary to refer to certain provisions of the Act. Sec. 32 (1) of the Act impliedly provides for an appeal from an order of the Rent Controller, and requires it to be presented either to the Chief Judge or to the District Judge.

3. Sec. 32 (2) empowers the Provincial Government to appoint a person who has exercised the power of a District Judge to hear appeals presented to the Chief Judge and a judicial officer not below the rank of a Subordinate Judge to hear appeals presented to the District Judge.

4. For the sake of brevity I shall hereinafter call the person appointed by the Provincial Government as the appointed Judge.

5. Sec. 32 (3) confers on the Chief Judge or the District Judge the powers to transfer and withdraw case to or from the appointed Judge.

6. Sec. 32 (4) lays down the procedure to be followed in hearing an appeal.

7. Sec. 32 (5) provides for a review.

8. Sec. 32 (6) empowers the High Court to revise an order imposing or confirming an order passed by the Controller imposing a fine under sec. 20, sec. 33 or sec. 34 when the amount of fine is not less than five hundred rupees. The period of limitation is fixed at 30 days.

9. Sec. 32 (7) then provides that “all decisions of the Chief Judge, or the District Judge, or a person appointed under sub-sec. (2) as the case may be shall, subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (6), be final.”

10. Accordingly, to the large majority of decisions the word “final” means not appealable but open to revision or review. Kokku Partha Saradhi Naidu Garu v. Chint-lacherva Koteswars Rao Garu(1), Phoni Bhusan Sen v. Sarat Kumar Moitra(2) and The Manager, Spring Mills Ltd. v. G.B Ambekar(3).

11. In my opinion the words “subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (6)” necessarily exclude whatever other powers of revision the High Court may possess.

12. Mr. Mukherjee appearing for the Petitioner submitted that the insertion of sub-sec. (6) was made ex-abundanti cautela with a view to provide against a possible contention that as the orders referred to were of a quasi-crimmal nature, revision was barred. This contention cannot be accepted. The High Court has ample powers of revision even in regard to orders of quasi-criminal nature in appropriate cases.

13. Mr. Mukherjee next contended that the word “revise” has been used in a wide sense and includes an appeal. This contention cannot also be accepted because in sec. 32 itself, the Act uses the words “appeal, review and revision.”

14. It was lastly contended that sub-sec. (6) is wider in scope than sec. 115 of the Code and was inserted with a view to confer on the High Court wider powers of revision in cases of a quasi-criminal nature. This contention cannot also be accepted because the words “subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (6)” clearly imply a limitation and not an extension of the powers of the High Court.

15. In my opinion the conclusion is irresistible that the power of the High Court to revise an order passed by the Rent Controller or the Chief Judge, the District Judge or the appointed Judge except in the specific cases mentioned in sec. 32 (6) of the Act has been taken away by necessary implication. It is not disputed that the orders now in question do not come within the purview of sec. 32 (6) of the Act. This Court has, therefore, no jurisdiction to interfere with the orders complained of.

16. Mr. Mukherjee was at considerable pains to show that the Chief Judge or the District Judge or the appointed Judge acts as a Court and not as a persona designata. He referred us to a long catena of cases in support of his submission. In the view I have taken it is not necessary to express a final opinion on this question. Conceding that the Chief Judge or the District Judge or the appointed Judge is a Court when hearing an appeal from the order of the Rent Controller, before this Court can interfere with an order passed in appeal the Appellate tribunal must be subject to the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under sec. 115 of the Code. It cannot be disputed that the appellate tribunal constituted under the Act is a Court of special jurisdiction, on the well-settled principle that where a statute confers on a judicial tribunal the power to determine a right or liability which is the creation of the statute but which, but for that statute it would have had no jurisdiction to try, such jurisdiction is said to be special jurisdiction.

17. The question, therefore, arises whether an order passed by a Court of special jurisdiction is revisable by this Court under the provision of sec. 115 of the Code. Mr. Mukherjee relied on the principle enunciated by Viscount Haldane, L.C, in National Telephone Co. Ltd. v. Post Master General(4), namely, where a special jurisdiction is conferred on an existing or established Court without more; it will attract all the ordinary incidents of the ordinary jurisdiction of such Court. The rule thus enunciated refers to an existing or established Court. This is also emphasised by Lord Atkinson in the same case at page 555 where the rule is said to imply simply the question of extending the jurisdiction of an existing Court of law. Lord Parker of Waddington at page 562 (Ibid) speaks of the principle as applicable to cases “where by statute matters are referred to the arbitration of Court of record.” Mr. Mukherjee also relied on the decision in Hem Singh v. Basant Das(5) where the principle was applied in cases where the right of appeal was given to “one of the ordinary courts of the country” and it was observed that in such cases “the procedure, orders and decrees of that Court will be governed by the ordinary rules of the Code of Civil Procedure.”

18. It is fairly clear from the above discussion that the above principle only applies where the order complained of is an order passed either by the ordinary Court of the land or by a Court of record. The position was clarified by Rankin, J., in the case of In re: Allen Bros. v. Bando & Co.(6).

19. The relevant observations run as follows:—

“From the Act of 1861, from the Letters Patent and from the decisions, I draw the conclusion that it is not enough for the purposes of the Code or the Letters Patent which deal on definite principles with a regular order of Courts, that from the limited nature of the powers conferred or from a mere comparison with other Courts, or from possible relationship thereto not yet subsisting a new, Court may be styled an inferior Court. An actual relationship to this Court must be established; an existing thread of connecting authority must be disclosed.”

20. If this view is accepted then an order made by the appointed Judge which ex concessis must be regarded as a new tribunal will not be subject to revision by this Court.

21. In later cases, however, the principle has been extended to all Courts exercising special jurisdiction. Thus in the case of Md. Abdulla Shah Chowdhury v. Giridhari-lal Mundra(7) it was held that an Appellate officer appointed under the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act is not subject to revisional jurisdiction of the High Court on the ground that the Civil Courts contemplated by clause 16 of the Letters Patent do not cover Courts which are created by a special statute for a special purpose. In the later case of Ram Kumar Sukul v. Ali Newaj(8) the fact that the appellate officer was the Munsif ex-officio was held to be immaterial.

22. All the cases cited at the bar were reviewed by Mr. Justice Mitter in the case of Nur Mahommed v. Khan Saheb S.M Solaiman(9). At page 16 the learned Judge lays down the following general rules “:

“(1) The general rule is that when a matter reaches a Civil Court, the proceedings of Civil Courts would be attracted including the provisions regarding appeals from its judgments, decrees and orders, but

(2) The general rule is applicable only where the matter comes to that Court as part of its ordinary jurisdiction and not by reason of special jurisdiction having been conferred upon it.”

23. If this extended view is taken then this Court would have no power of revision under sec. 115 of the Code in regard to orders passed either by the Rent Controller, the Chief Judge, the District Judge or the appointed Judge.

24. Reliance was placed on behalf of the Petitioner on the case of H.D Chatterji v. L.R Trivedi(10) as also on the case of In re: Allen Bros. v. Bando & Co.. It is significant to note that in both these cases this Court interfered in revision with orders passed by the Rent Controller under the earlier Rent Act, not under sec. 115 of the Code but under sec. 107 of the Government of India Act (since repealed). Sec. 107 empowered the High Court to exercise power of superintendence over all Courts subject to its Appellate Jurisdiction. As Mr. Justice Rankin pointed out in the latter case of In re: Allen Bros., in cases arising under the earlier Rent Act, there was a thread of connecting link between the Rent Controller and the High Court through the President of the Tribunal because this Court had the power to hear an appeal from a decision of the President of the Tribunal in certain cases These cases are, therefore, distinguishable.

25. Even if we take the limited view as regards the power of this Court to interfere in revision with orders of the special tribunal, it cannot be disputed that this Court cannot interfere with an order passed by the appointed Judge under sec. 115 of the Code.

26. If we are to hold that the power of revision is not excluded in those cases where the appeal under sec. 32 of the Act is heard by the Chief Judge or the District Judge, the result would be anomalous. The question would then depend on the fortuitous circumstance as to whether the appeal is heard by the Chief Judge, or the District Judge or the appointed Judge. Such a construction should not be adopted.

27. In my opinion, a reasonable view to take of the matter is to hold that sec. 32 (6) and (7) of the Act, by necessary intendment, has taken away the powers of this Court to interfere in revision under sec. 115 of the Code with an order passed by the Rent Controller or by the Chief Judge or the District Judge or the appointed Judge.

28. The preliminary objection, therefore, succeeds.

29. As the question involved was in a state of uncertainty the parties will bear their own costs in these revision cases.

30. The Rules are accordingly discharged.

Das Gupta, J.:— I agree.

N.D.R

Indian Homoeopathic Medical Association v. Kanailal Pal .

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Das, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Opposite Party's Arguments (Mr. Banerjee)

Petitioner's Arguments (Mr. Mukherjee)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Indian Homoeopathic Medical Association v. Kanailal Pal .

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