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Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is Bajranglal Serowgee, conducting business as Bajranglal Laduram, who applied to the Court for a declaration that an arbitration agreement between the parties was subsisting. The parties executed Contract No. 1633 dated 28 July 1948, by which the petitioner alleged he agreed to purchase 80,000 “heavy cees” bags in 200 bales at a stated rate, with delivery in August 1948. Clause 13 of that contract contained a broad arbitration agreement.

The petitioner alleges that he gave shipping instructions on 16 August 1948 for 50 bales (20,000 bags) and on 18 August 1948 for 100 bales (40,000 bags) to be brought alongside the vessel “Kutsang,” but the respondent failed to do so. The petitioner complained and, by letter dated 31 August 1948, requested a pucca-delivery order for the remaining 60 bales (20,000 bags) and offered to pay. The respondent neither delivered the 150 bales nor furnished any delivery order. The petitioner’s attorneys claimed outstanding bills totalling Rs. 15,992/6/4; the respondent did not pay. On 13 December 1948 the petitioner filed a statement of case and referred the dispute to arbitration before the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, claiming the stated sum.

The respondent denied the transaction and repudiated liability in entirety. Statements and counter-statements were exchanged before the Tribunal of Arbitration and oral evidence was, it is alleged, heard. On or about 8 April 1948 the Registrar of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce informed the petitioner that the arbitrators would not proceed until the Court decided whether an arbitration agreement existed. The petitioner thereupon presented the present application seeking a Court determination that the arbitration agreement was subsisting.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the present application is maintainable — in other words, whether a party who affirms the existence of an arbitration agreement can apply to the Court under Section 33 or any other section of the Arbitration Act for an adjudication that such an arbitration agreement exists and is binding on the parties.
  2. More broadly, the scope and correct construction of Sections 32 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 — specifically whether Section 33 is available to a party seeking a declaration that an arbitration agreement in fact exists (as opposed to a party challenging its existence or validity).

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant / Petitioner's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The petitioner (through Mr. Ganguli, his counsel) contended that Section 33 should be read as permitting an application by (a) a party who desires to challenge the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement or (b) a party who desires to have the effect of an arbitration agreement determined. The petitioner conceded he could not fit within (a), because he affirmed the existence and validity of the agreement, and therefore argued that he fell under (b) — i.e., he sought a judicial determination of the effect of the arbitration agreement (in practice a determination that it exists and is binding).
  • Implicit in the petitioner’s position is reliance on authorities (noted in the opinion) that permit applications to establish existence or validity of an arbitration agreement (for example, the view of Sinha J. in Chaturbhuj and the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in M. Gulamali Abdulhussein), though the opinion records precisely which precedents counsel relied upon.

Respondent's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The respondent (through Mr. Barwell, his counsel) relied on precedents (Manik Lal and Baijnath) which, as described in the opinion, take the view that the “existence” of an arbitration agreement for the purposes of Section 33 refers to legal existence (e.g., existence in law where grounds such as mistake, fraud, illegality are alleged) and that Section 33 applies where a party admits the factual existence but challenges legal existence.
  • In effect the respondent’s position, reflected by the authorities he relied upon, is that a party who affirms the factual existence of an arbitration agreement cannot use Section 33 to obtain a Court declaration that the agreement in fact exists and is binding; Section 33 is aimed at those who deny legal validity or challenge the agreement on specific legal grounds.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Manik Lal v. Shiva Jute Bailing Ltd., 52 C.W.N 389 Statement (Das J.) that “existence” under Section 32/33 is legal existence; Section 33 applies where factual existence is admitted but legal existence is challenged (e.g., on grounds of mistake, fraud, illegality under Sections 19–30 Contract Act). The court records this authority and notes respondent’s reliance on it; the court does not adopt a conclusive stance resolving the inter‑judge conflict but treats Das J.'s view as a significant precedent opposing the petitioner’s argument.
Baijnath v. Chhotulal, 62 C.W.N 397 Clough J. followed the reasoning in Manik Lal (Das J.). Cited as supporting the narrower construction of Section 33; relied upon by respondent's counsel.
Chaturbhuj v. Bhicamchand Chororia & Sons, 53 C.W.N 410 Sinha J.'s dissenting view that Sections 31–33 create a regime under which questions about existence/validity/effect of arbitration agreements or awards should be litigated only under the Act (and that “existence” should be read in its ordinary meaning — either fact or law). The opinion records that the petitioner relied on Sinha J.'s view; the court declines to resolve this judicial conflict and notes that it is a matter for the Court of Appeal, while explaining its own interpretive conclusions.
Bhagwandas v. Atma Singh, 47 Bom. L.R 716 : A.I.R (32) 1945 Bom. 494 Authority cited to show Section 33 gives a remedy to a party who challenges the existence of an arbitration agreement and can obtain a decision even if the other party does not wish to enforce arbitration. Used to illustrate that Section 33 was intended to provide a remedy to the challenger; cited in support of the description of S.33’s scope.
E.D. Sasson & Co. v. Ramdutt Ramkissen Das, 50 Cal. 1 : A.I.R (9) 1922 P.C 374 Earlier pre‑1940 decisions holding that a suit was required to challenge existence of a submission; Sections 32 and 33 were introduced to negate such decisions. Placed in historical context: Sections 32 and 33 were enacted to change the pre‑existing law exemplified by this case.
Matulal v. Ram Kissendas, 47 Cal. 806 : A.I.R (7) 1920 Cal. 820 Another pre‑1940 decision holding suit was the remedy to challenge submission; cited with E.D. Sasson as the kind of authority overruled in substance by Sections 32 and 33. Used as historical background to explain why Sections 32 and 33 were introduced.
Deokinandan v. Basantlal, I.L.R (1941) 2 Cal. 123 : A.I.R (28) 1941 Cal. 527 Calcutta High Court holding that suits challenging existence/validity/effect of arbitration clause are not maintainable; such challenges must be by application under the Arbitration Act. The court aligns with this Calcutta view and cites it favourably in rejecting the idea that a suit or general application outside the specific statutory scheme is permissible.
Banwari Lal v. The Board of Trustees, Hindu College, Delhi, A.I.R (36) 1949 E.P 165 Division Bench, East Punjab High Court, took a contrary view to Deokinandan (i.e., allowed a different remedy/approach). Noted as a contrary authority; the court prefers the Calcutta High Court view to the East Punjab view.
Rashid Jamshed Sons and Co. v. Moolchand Jothajee, (1945) 2 M.L.J 98 : A.I.R (32) 1945 Mad. 371 Madras High Court adopted the same view as the Calcutta High Court that suits are not maintainable and challenges must be by application under the Act. Cited as supportive of the court’s stance that S.32 bars suits and S.33 prescribes the statutory remedy.
M. Gulamali Abdulhussein & Co. v. Vishwambharlal Ruiya, 51 Bom. L.R 79 : A.I.R (36) 1949 Bom. 158 Division Bench (Chagla C.J. and Tendolkar J.) held an application to establish existence/validity of an arbitration agreement can be entertained under the Arbitration Act (though not necessarily under Section 33); Section 33 was treated as one example of such an application. The court considers and expressly disagrees with this reasoning, concluding that Section 33 is intended to be the specific, exhaustive statutory remedy for challenges and should not be treated as merely illustrative of a broader right to apply.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the pivotal issue as the maintainability of the petition: whether a party who affirms the factual existence of an arbitration agreement may nonetheless apply to the Court (in particular, under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940) for a declaration that the arbitration agreement exists and is binding.

The Court analysed the structure and purpose of Chapter V of the Arbitration Act, particularly Sections 31, 32 and 33:

  • Section 31 confines jurisdiction over questions relating to the validity, effect or existence of an award or arbitration agreement to the Court in which an award under the agreement has been or may be filed, and centralises applications relating to conduct of arbitration to that Court.
  • Section 32 bars suits “on any ground whatsoever” for a decision upon the existence, effect or validity of an arbitration agreement or award and prohibits setting aside or modifying an arbitration agreement or award other than as provided by the Act.
  • Section 33 provides a specific statutory remedy: any party to an arbitration agreement (or person claiming under him) desiring to challenge the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement or award, or to have the effect of either determined, shall apply to the Court and the Court shall decide the question on affidavits (with the proviso allowing further evidence if just and expedient).

From these provisions the Court drew the following conclusions:

  1. Section 32 removed the substantive right to challenge existence/validity/effect by suit; Section 33 is the statutory corollary providing a remedy but is framed in terms of challenges to existence or validity or requests to determine effect.
  2. Section 33 was intended, in the Court’s view, as a specific and exhaustive provision prescribing the circumstances and procedure by which disputes over existence/validity/effect are to be brought before a Court. The Court rejected the view that Section 33 is merely illustrative or that a broader, general right to apply to the Court is implied by Section 32.
  3. The Court interpreted the word “effect” in Section 33 as referring to the purport, drift or tenor of an agreement (for example, whether a particular dispute falls within the arbitration clause, or whether the clause has been frustrated or rendered inoperative by some supervening event), and not as authorising an application by a party affirming that an arbitration agreement exists to obtain a bare declaration that it in fact exists.
  4. The petitioner’s attempt to “split” Section 33 into two separate classes — (a) those who challenge existence/validity and (b) those who wish to have the effect determined, and to claim entitlement under the latter despite affirming existence — was rejected. The Court held that the petitioner could not properly invoke Section 33 to assert that an arbitration agreement exists and is binding when the petitioner was affirming, not challenging, existence.
  5. The Court rejected the reasoning of the Bombay Division Bench (M. Gulamali) which would treat Section 33 as merely one illustration of a wider implied right to apply under the Act: the Court found it improbable that the legislature, having introduced S.33 to provide a remedy, intended to leave the statute non‑exhaustive and to permit a general right to apply outside the specific statutory framework.
  6. As a practical matter the Court explained that the petitioner is not left without remedy: the arbitration should proceed; the respondent may attend the Tribunal under protest and without prejudice to their contention that there is no submission. If the arbitrators make an award the respondent can then challenge the validity of the award under Section 33; the Court would then be in a position to determine whether a valid arbitration agreement existed before making (or enforcing) a decree based on the award.
  7. The Court expressly declined to express any final view on the factual or legal existence of the arbitration agreement at this stage.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The application by the petitioner is DISMISSED.

Implications and direct consequences (as explained in the opinion):

  • Costs of the application will abide the result of the arbitration (i.e., the question of costs is deferred until the outcome of the arbitration).
  • The Tribunal of Arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce is to be informed of the judgment and is directed to proceed with the arbitration. The arbitrators should continue the reference as indicated by the Court.
  • The respondent may appear before the Tribunal under protest and without prejudice to its contention that there is no arbitration submission; if the arbitrators pronounce an award, the respondent retains the right to apply under Section 33 to challenge the validity of the award (and indirectly raise whether a valid arbitration agreement existed). The Court expressly refrains from deciding the substantive issue of whether an arbitration agreement in fact exists or is valid in this proceeding.

The Court also articulated a legal position on the interpretation of Sections 32 and 33: Section 32 removes the remedy by suit and Section 33 provides the specific statutory remedy for persons who challenge existence or validity or seek the Court to determine the effect of an agreement or award. The Court rejected the contention that Section 33 may be used by a party who affirms the agreement to obtain a declaration of its factual existence.

    Bajrang Lal Laduram v. Agarwal Brothers .

    1. This is an application by Bajranglal Serowgee who carries on business under the name and style of Bajranglal Laduram for having the effect of an arbitration agreement determined by this Court. The application is really for an adjudication that an arbitration agreement between the parties is still subsisting. By contract No. 1633 dated 28th July 1948 the petitioner alleges that he agreed to purchase from the respondent 80,000 heavy cees bags in 200 bales at the rate of Rs. 140/4/- per 100 bags, delivery August 1948. The terms of the agreement appear from a copy of the Bought Note included in the annexure to the petition.

    2. Clause 13 of the said contract contained an agreement for arbitration in very wide terms.

    3. The petitioner's case is that on 16th August 1948 he sent shipping instructions to the respondent to bring 50 bales, that is, 20,000 heavy cees bags, and on 18th August 100 bales, that is, 40,000 heavy cees bags alongside the vessel “Kutsang.” The respondent failed to bring the aforesaid goods alongside the ship and a letter was sent to the respondent complaining about this failure.

    4. It is alleged the petitioner by letter dated 31st August 1948, again requested the respondent to tender the pucca-delivery order in respect of the balance of 60 bales of goods, that is, 20,000 heavy cees bags and offered to pay for and take delivery of the said pucca, delivery order. The respondent neither sent the 150 bales in terms of the shipping instructions nor did they give any delivery order. The petitioner's attorneys demanded payment of the different bills amounting to Rs. 15,992/6/4 but the respondent failed to pay. Thereupon on 13th December 1948 the petitioner filed a statement of case and referred the dispute to the arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and claimed the said sum from the respondent.

    5. The reply of the respondent was a complete denial of the transaction. Their case is, they never entered into the contract in question and they repudiated liability in toto. Some statements and counter statements were filed before the Tribunal of Arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce who, it is alleged, heard oral evidence.

    6. On or about 8th April 1948, the petitioner was informed by a letter from the Registrar, Bengal Chamber of Commerce that the Arbitrators were not prepared to proceed with the arbitration until the question of the existence of the arbitration agreement was decided by this Court.

    7. On receipt of this letter from the Registrar of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce dated 8th April 1948 the present application was presented.

    8. The real question I have got to determine is the maintainability of this application.

    9. The question argued before me is this: can a person who affirms the existence of an arbitration agreement apply to the Court under S. 33 or any other section of the Arbitration Act for an adjudication by the Court that such an agreement exists and is binding on the parties?

    10. In Manik Lal v. Shiva Jute Bailing Ltd., 52 C.W.N 389, Das J. held that the “existence” of an arbitration agreement which by Section 32 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, cannot be challenged by a suit is not the factual but the legal existence of an agreement on grounds like mistake, fraud, illegality, etc., under Sections 19 to 30 of the Contract Act. His Lordship further held that S. 33 applies only when the applicant admits the factual existence of an agreement but challenges the “legal” existence thereof on such grounds as misrepresentation, fraud, etc. In Baijnath v. Chhotulal, 62 C.W.N 397, Clough J. followed the judgment of Das, J.

    11. Sinha J. has differed from the judgments of both these learned Judges in Chaturbhuj v. Bhicamchand Chororia & Sons, 53 C.W.N 410. According to the learned Judge the intention of the frames of the Arbitration Act was that the right and liabilities of the parties in respect of an arbitration agreement or an award such as are mentioned in Sections 31 and 32 of the Act should be litigated only in the Court having jurisdiction under S. 31 and on an application made under S. 33 and not by way of suit. The intention of the legislature was to take away the remedy by way of suit which the parties to an arbitration agreement or an award had before the passing of the Act and to relegate them to the remedies as provided in the Act.

    12. The opening words, “any party to the arbitration agreement” in Section 33 of the Act should be construed according to Sinha J. to mean a party who is alleged to be a party to an arbitration agreement but who challenges the existence thereof and that there is nothing in the section to restrict the meaning of the word, ‘existence’ to ‘legal existence’ and it should be read in its ordinary and natural meaning, namely, existence either in fact or in law.

    13. Mr. Barwell, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, relied on the judgment of Das and Clough JJ. while Mr. Ganguli for the petitioner relied on the view of Sinha J. In this case it is not necessary for me to come to any decision regarding this conflict of judicial authorities which should really be resolved by the Court of appeal. Even if Sinha J. is right in the view that he has taken, the party who challenges the existence of an arbitration agreement is entitled to apply under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act. That section provides a remedy to the party who challenges the existence of an agreement to refer to arbitration and he can come to Court and obtain a decision, even when the other side does not wish to enforce it. Bhagwandas v. Atma Singh, 47 Bom. L.R 716 : A.I.R (32) 1945 Bom. 494.

    14. Chapter V, Arbitration Act, contains the general provisions relating to all arbitrations i.e, arbitration without intervention of a Court, or arbitration in suit or arbitration with the intervention of a Court when there is no suit pending.

    15. Section 31 deals with jurisdiction. Sub-section (1) deals with the forum for filing awards. Sub-section (2) provides that all questions relating to the validity, effect or existence of an award or an arbitration agreement shall be decided by the Court in which an award under the agreement has been or may be filed and by no other Court. Sub-section (3) states that all applications relating to the conduct of the arbitration proceedings shall be made to such Court. Sub-section (4) makes it clear that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of a reference and the arbitration proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court.

    16. Section 32 and S. 33 are the new sections introduced by the Arbitration Act of 1940. They were introduced in accordance with the suggestions of the Civil Justice Committee and were meant to negative the decisions in E.D Sasson & Co. v. Ramdutt Ramkissen Das, 50 Cal. 1 : (A.I.R (9) 1922 P.C 374) and Matulal v. Ram Kissendas, 47 Cal. 806 : (A.I.R (7) 1920 Cal. 820), where it had been held that a suit must be filed if a party wants to challenge the existence of a submission. Sections 32 and 33 are in the following derma:

    “32. Notwithstanding any law for the time being in force, no suit shall lie on any ground whatsoever for a decision upon the existence, effect or validity of an arbitration agreement or award, nor shall any arbitration agreement or award be sat aside, amended, modified or in any way affected otherwise than as provided in this Act.

    33. Any party to any arbitration agreement or any person claiming under him desiring to challenge the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement or an award or to have the effect of either determined shall apply to the Court and the Court shall decide the question on affidavits:

    Provided that where the Court deems it just and expedient, it may set down the application for hearing on other evidence also, and it may pass such orders for discovery and particulars as it may do in a suit.”

    17. The first part of S. 32 prevents a substantive right to challenge the existence of an arbitration agreement. The second part of that section prevents the setting aside, amending or modifying or in any way affecting an arbitration agreement, otherwise than as provided by the Act. It has been held by the Calcatta High Court that suit to challenge the existence or validity of an arbitration clause in a contract or for determining the effect of an arbitration agreement or award is not maintainable by reason of Section 33 of the Arbitration Act of 1940 which provides that such a challenge must be made by means of an application and not by means of a suit. Deokinandan v. Basantlal, I.L.R (1941) 2 Cal. 123 : A.I.R (28) 1941 Cal. 527. A contrary view has been taken by a Division Bench of the East Punjab High Court in Banwari Lal v. The Board of Trustees, Hindu College, Delhi, A.I.R (36) 1949 E.P 165. With respect to the learned Judges of the East Punjab in my opinion the correct view was taken by Lort-Williams J., in the Calcutta case cited above. The Madras High Court has also taken the same view as the Calcutta High Court adopted: Rashid Jamshed Sons and Co. v. Moolchand Jothajee, (1945) 2 M.L.J 98 : (A.I.R (32) 1945 Mad. 371).

    18. Section 33 is a corollary to S. 32. Under S. 33, an arbitration agreement or an award has to be decided by means of an application. Section 33 provides a remedy not to the person who affirms the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement but to the person who challenged the same. Obviously, the legislature thought that the person who sets up a submission can go to arbitration and have the disputes decided by the arbitrators. Mr. Ganguli, learned counsel for the applicant, wants me to split up S. 33 and he contends that an application can be made to the Court (a) by any party to an arbitration agreement desiring to challenge the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement or (b) by any party to an arbitration agreement desiring to have the effect of either an arbitration agreement or an award determined. Counsel concedes that he cannot come under (a) because he is not challenging the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement as he is really asserting the existence of such agreement and is affirming the validity thereof. But he contends that he comes under (b) and he desires to have the effect of the arbitration agreement determined by this Court. I cannot accede to this contention. The words “existence, effect or validity of an arbitration agreement or award” are used in S. 32. Under S. 33 if any one challenges the arbitration agreement he can come to Court. If there is any question raised as to whether there is any particular dispute within the ambit of the arbitration agreement, or whether it has ceased to be operative on account of frustration or any supervening illegality or impossibility then that can also be determined under this section by means of an application. In my opinion, the word “effect” does not mean the existence of an arbitration agreement. It connotes in this context the purport, drift, or tenor of the agreement. What Mr. Ganguli wants me to decide is that there is in fact an existing, valid and binding arbitration agreement. Really there is no question of deciding the effect of that agreement.

    19. My attention has been drawn to a case decided by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in M. Gulamali Abdulhussein and Co. v. Vishwambharlal Ruiya, 51 Bom. L.R 79 : (A.I.R (36) 1949 Bom. 158). The learned Judges Chagla C.J and Tendolkar J., held that an application to establish the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement can be entertained by a Court under the Arbitration Act, 1940, though not under S. 33 thereof. According to these learned Judges when the Legislature enacted S. 32 and barred all suits with regard to the existence, effect or validity of an arbitration agreement and the object of the Legislature was that all questions with regard to these matters should be dealt with under the Arbitration Act, and not by substantive suits, it is open to a party to make any application with regard to which a suit is barred under S. 32. Section 33 according to Chagla C.J, is merely one instance of such an application. The Legislature cannot conceivably deal with all possible applications that may arise with regard to which suits are barred under S. 82.

    20. With great respect, I cannot agree with the view taken by Chagla C.J, in the above case. When the Legislature enacted S. 32 and barred all suits with regard to the existence, validity or effect of an arbitration agreement or award, it realised that proper procedure or remedies should be prescribed or rights should be conferred on litigants for the determination of such questions and that is why S. 33 was enacted. Section 33 to my mind is not to be read as illustrative. It is difficult to follow how a general right to apply may be held to exist when the statute makes specific provisions providing for the right of a litigant to come to Court with regard to a specific class of cases under specific conditions. The fact that the right of suit is taken away by S. 32 does not confer a general right on the litigants to apply to Court. To my mind, it is not correct to urge that S. 32 has impliedly created a general right to apply to Court under that section. If that was the correct view, then S. 33 would be unnecessary. When the Legislature had its attention directed to the necessity of making provisions in order to provide for the situation created by the enactment of a provision like S. 32, then it must be assumed that S. 33 is exhaustive and not illustrative. Therefore, in my opinion, a person who denies the existence of an arbitration agreement cannot apply under the Arbitration Act. I cannot understand how can there be a general right to apply under an Act although there is no right to apply under any specific section of the Act.

    21. Mr. Ganguli contends that if this is the correct view, then the arbitration agreement would be wholly infruotuous and he is left absolutely without any relief or remedy what soever and when a person has a right he must have a remedy. I do not agree that a person in the position of the petitioner is not without any remedy whatsoever. The arbitrators should proceed with the reference. The respondents can appear before the Tribunal of Arbitration under protest and without prejudice to their contention that there is no submission or arbitration agreement. That question cannot be decided by the arbitrators. If the arbitrators make an award on the merits in favour of the petitioner, then the respondent can apply under S. 33 in order to challenge the validity of the award. In any event, the Court will be in a position to determine whether there was a valid and binding arbitration agreement justifying the reference to the Tribunal of Arbitration before a decree is passed on the award. I am expressing no opinion on the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement at this stage.

    22. The application is dismissed. Costs will abide the result of the arbitration. The attention of the Tribunal of Arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce should be drawn to this judgment and they should be asked to proceed with the arbitration as I haw indicated hereinbefore.

    V.B.B

    23. Application dismissed.

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    Comments

    Bajrang Lal Laduram v. Agarwal Brothers .
    (Aug 19, 1949)