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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

These appeals arise from two Title Suits (No. 103 of 1941 and No. 105 of 1941) involving the plaintiffs-appellants, villagers of Debgram, who claimed rights over the banks of two tanks known as Chapra tank and Boaria tank. The plaintiffs sought declarations of rights of pasturage over the banks of both tanks and a right of burial on part of the Chapra tank's bank, along with permanent injunctions restraining the defendants from interfering with these rights. The claims were based on immemorial user and asserted under three heads: easement of necessity, lost grant, and customary right.

The trial Court found that while the villagers used the tank banks for grazing cattle, it refused to declare the rights claimed, rejecting easement of necessity and lost grant claims on the basis that such rights could not be claimed by a fluctuating body of persons like villagers. The customary right was denied due to evidence of inconsistent assertion of the right. The right of burial was also denied as unreasonable and prejudicial to local health. The suits were dismissed.

The plaintiffs appealed to the lower appellate Court, which affirmed the trial Court's dismissal on substantially similar grounds. The plaintiffs then preferred these second appeals.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiffs have a right of pasturage over the banks of Chapra and Boaria tanks, claimed as easement of necessity, lost grant, or customary right.
  2. Whether the plaintiffs have a right of burial on the southern part of the northern bank of Chapra tank, claimed on similar grounds.
  3. The validity and applicability of easement of necessity and lost grant doctrines to rights claimed by a fluctuating body of persons such as villagers.
  4. The reasonableness and legal sustainability of customary rights of pasturage and burial in the circumstances of the case.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The right of pasturage should be recognized on the basis of a lost grant, easement of necessity, or customary right.
  • The right of pasturage is necessary for the preservation of about three hundred cattle in the village, making it an easement of necessity.
  • The right of burial on part of Chapra tank's bank is similarly claimed on easement of necessity, lost grant, or customary right grounds.
  • The use of the term “Amul Mamul” in a lease to the defendants preserves the right of pasturage enforceable against them.
  • The plaintiffs should be allowed to amend their plaint to raise a case of prescriptive right of pasturage.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The defendants deny the existence of any right of pasturage or burial as claimed.
  • Suggested that the right of pasturage may have been founded on permission, which was not pleaded by the plaintiffs.
  • Argued that the customary right of burial is unreasonable as it would interfere with the health of the locality due to the tank’s use for irrigation, bathing, and drinking.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhola Nath v. Midnapore Zemindary Co., 31 Cal. 503 Recognition of right of pasturage on the basis of immemorial user and legal origin. The Court held that the Judicial Committee did not base the right on a lost grant but inferred legal origin possibly resting on custom.
Asraoulla v. Kiamatulla, 41 C.W.N 503 Fluctuating body of persons cannot claim lost grant; supports customary right basis. Supported the view that a fluctuating group like villagers cannot claim easement on lost grant but may claim customary rights.
Chuni Lall v. Ramkishen, 15 Cal. 460 (FB) Classification of rights into private, customary, and public rights. Supported Mukherjea, J.’s view on the nature of rights claimed by villagers.
Jamila Khatun v. Kshetra Mohan, 51 C.W.N 179 Customary rights must be reasonable, certain, continuous, and ancient. Reinforced that customary rights claimed by villagers must satisfy these conditions.
Mt. Subhani v. Nawab, 68 I.A 1 Proof of long user infers antiquity for custom. Applied to hold the first condition of valid custom (antiquity) satisfied.
Baba Narayan v. Saboosa, 47 C.W.N 923 Permission does not conclusively negate customary right. Rejected respondents’ argument that use founded on permission negated customary right.
Rogers v. Brenton, (1847) 10 Q.B 26 Customary rights in derogation of general law must be strictly construed. Used to emphasize strict construction of claimed customary rights.
Lutchmeeput Singh v. Sadaulla Nushyo, 9 Cal 698 Reasonableness of custom as a question of law. Applied in assessing reasonableness of right of pasturage.
Kuhja Paria v. Nitya Nanda, 53 C.W.N 346 Reasonableness of customary rights. Supported the Court’s analysis on reasonableness.
Sheo Raj v. Mudeer Khan, 57 All 166 Right of pasturage and burial; destruction of servient tenement; prescriptive rights. Held that right of burial is not an easement and prescriptive right to bury is not sustainable; applied to reject burial claim.
Gopal Krishna v. Abdul Samad, 34 C.L.J 319 Right to bury dead is not an easement or prescriptive right. Supported denial of prescriptive right of burial.
Mangat Ram v. Sirajul-Hasan, A.I.R(11) 1924 Lah 492 Right of burial cannot be acquired as prescriptive easement. Applied to reject burial rights claimed as prescriptive easement.
Jogesh Chandra v. Niranjan, 39 CWN 387 Right to bury or cremate not acquirable as prescriptive easement but possibly by dedication or custom. Supported view that burial rights cannot be prescriptive easements but may be customary.
Howrah Municipality v. Khetra Knsto, 33 Cal 1290 Right of cremation sustained on ground of dedication. Referenced in context of burial rights.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the claims of rights of pasturage and burial under the three asserted bases: easement of necessity, lost grant, and customary right. It rejected the easement of necessity claim for pasturage on the ground that such easements require a dominant tenement and unity of ownership, which cannot exist for a fluctuating body of villagers. The Court explained the legal principle that easements of necessity arise from implied grants or reservations linked to severance of land ownership, citing statutory and case law authorities.

The Court also rejected the lost grant basis for pasturage rights, holding that a fluctuating group cannot be a capable grantee and thus cannot claim rights on a fiction of lost grant. It distinguished the precedent relied upon by the appellants and emphasized that such rights, if existing, must be based on custom.

Regarding customary rights, the Court applied established legal criteria for valid customs—antiquity, certainty, continuity, peaceable enjoyment, and reasonableness—and found these conditions substantially met for the right of pasturage. The Court noted that isolated instances of interference did not negate the overall continuity and certainty of the custom. It rejected the respondents’ argument that the right was permissive in origin and held that the exercise of the right of pasturage was not unreasonable as it did not entirely deprive the owner of their rights.

On the right of burial, the Court referred to multiple precedents holding that burial rights do not constitute easements and cannot be acquired by prescription. It accepted that burial rights may be acquired by dedication or custom but found the claimed right unreasonable because it interfered with the health and use of the tank for irrigation, bathing, and drinking. Therefore, the burial right claim was unsustainable.

The Court declined to allow amendment of the plaint to claim prescriptive rights at this late stage, noting the difference in evidence required for prescriptive versus customary rights and the procedural implications.

Holding and Implications

The appeals are partly allowed. The Court declared the plaintiffs’ right of pasturage over the banks of Chapra and Boaria tanks, subject to the qualification that the defendants and their successors may exercise their own rights so long as sufficient pasturage remains for the plaintiffs and other entitled persons. The defendants are permanently restrained from interfering with the plaintiffs’ exercise of the right of pasturage as described. The plaintiffs’ claim for right of burial is disallowed.

The plaintiffs are awarded half the costs of the appeals in this Court. Costs in the lower Courts are to be borne by the parties themselves as the plaintiffs relied on various untenable grounds below. No new precedent is established; the decision clarifies the application of easement and customary right principles to fluctuating bodies of persons and confirms the unsustainability of burial rights as easements or prescriptive rights in the circumstances.

    Nani Gopal Dutta And Others Plffs. v. Kshitish Chandra Banerjee And Another

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    G.N Das, J.:— These appeals are on behalf of the plfls. appellants. Second Appeal No. 1571 of 1943 arises out of Title Suit No. 103 of 1941. In this appeal the plffs. pray for a declaration of their right of pasturage over the banks of a tank known as Chapra tank & for a further declaration of a right of burial on the southern part of the northern bank of the said tank. They also pray for a permanent injunction restraining the defts. from interfering with the exercise of their right of pasturage & right of burial as aforesaid. The suit was framed under O. 1, R. 8 of the CPC on behalf of the villagers of a village known as Debgram. The right was based on immemorial user & was claimed under three heads, viz., (i) easement of necessity, (ii) lost grant, & (iii) customary right.

    2. The other S.A No. 1572 of 1943 arises out of Title Suit No. 105 of 1941. The plffs. are the same in this suit & the right is claimed over the banks of a tank called Boaria tank. The right that is claimed is one of pasturage as in the other appeal. The defence in both the suits is a denial of the existence of the right of pasturage & of the right of burial as claimed in the aforesaid two suits.

    3. The trial Court found that the villagers of the village Debgram used to graze their cattle on the banks of the two tanks. But the trial Court refused to declare the right of pasturage on the ground that a right of easement of necessity cannot be claimed on behalf of the villagers of a particular village. The right cannot be claimed on the basis of a lost grant, because a floating body of persons cannot claim a right on this ground. The right of pasturage on the ground of custom was negatived because in some other tank, known as Barapukur, the owner of the tank re-excavated the same & threw earth on the banks of the tank interfering with the right of pasturage & this indicated that the right was not uniformly claimed. In the result, the right of pasturage was negatived. As regards the right of burial, it was held by the trial Court that the right cannot be claimed in law as a prescriptive easement, or on the basis of lost grant, or on the ground of customary right because the right claimed was unreasonable, the exercise of the right being prejudicial to the, health of the people of the locality. The two suits were accordingly dismissed:

    4. Against the decrees of dismissal, the plffs. preferred appeals to the lower appellate Court. The lower appellate Court observed that it was in substantial agreement with the findings of the trial Court, & maintained the decrees of dismissal on grounds similar to those on which the trial Court had proceeded. The plffs. have accordingly preferred these appeals.

    5. Mr. Sarkar, for the appellants, has first dealt with the right of pasturage which was claimed in the two suits. He has argued that the right of pasturage could be claimed on behalf of the plffs., first on the basis of a lost grant, secondly as an easement of necessity & thirdly as customary right. He has also contended that the right of burial was available to his clients on similar grounds in Second Appeal No. 1571 of 1943. We shall deal with these contentions now. We prefer, however, to deal with the second ground raised by him, viz., that the right of pasturage can be claimed as an easement of necessity.

    6. It is submitted that there are as many as three hundred heads of cattle in the village & that the pasture lands, apart from the disputed banks of the tank, are insufficient to sustain the cattle of the village. It is, therefore, argued further that the right of pasturage is necessary for the preservation of the cattle of the village & should be decreed as an easement of necessity. This contention is obviously unsound. An easement is a privilege annexed to some property to be enjoyed over some other property. A right of pasturage claimed by the villagers is claimed by them as residents of a defined locality; there is no dominant tenement in such a case to which the right can attach. A prescriptive right of easement, therefore, is wholly untenable where the villagers claim a right of pasturage.

    7. The further argument that the right can be claimed as an easement of necessity because the villagers find it necessary for the preservation of their cattle is also unsound. The argument so raised is opposed to the fundamental concept underlying easement of necessity. Easements of necessity are based on a fiction of wise paternal guidance, having its origin in the maxim of Code Civil “destination de fere de famille” which means that when a father divided his lands amongst his children, mutual conveniences as regards the user of the different allotments are implied by a fiction of law for the beneficial enjoyment of the different portions so allotted. This fiction Which originated in the case of a division of lands by the father among the children was extended to strangers, ‘Suffield v. Brown’, (1863) 4 De G.J & S. 185.

    8. The popular notion that whenever a man has no other way, he can claim the right to go over his neighbours' lands is not supported either by principle or by authorities. Easements of necessity, or quasi-easements as they are called, are founded on an implied grant or reservation. The principle underlying such easement was stated in Rolle's Abridgement in the following words: “The grant of a thing passes everything included therein without which the thing granted could not be held.” This principle underlies Section 13 of the Easements Act, (Act XV (15) of 1882). Such easements, therefore, arise out of disposition made by an owner of several heritages, viz. cases of transfer, partition, etc. Such implication have also been made in case of compulsory acquisition of lands under the Land Acquisition Act, ‘Vithal Sakharam v. Collector’, (1874) P.J 118. The right, however, has been denied where a person acquires title to a portion of the land under the statutes of Limitation, ‘Proctor v. Hodgson’, (1855) 10 Ex. 824 & ‘Wilkes v. Greenway’, (1890) 6 T.L.R 449. It is obvious, therefore, that the right does not arise in every case in which the property becomes useless without an easement being raised in favour of the party claiming it. The right is implied only in cases of severance of tenements, Goddard's Law of Easements, 8th Edn. 338. In Gale on Easements, 11th Edn. 181, foot-note (m), it is pointed out that in order to found a claim to an easement of necessity, unity of ownership of the dominant & servient tenement at some time or other is essential. The same principle underlies the cases of ‘Menzies v. Breedalbane,’ Mew's Digest, (1902) Cl. 94, ‘Wheeldon v. Burrows’, (1879) 12 Ch. D. 31; Tustee Mondal v. Kenaram Mondal’, 34 C.L.J 518, ‘Sarojini Devi v. Krista Lal’, 36 C.L.J 406; & ‘Dakshina Ranjan v. Surendra’, 39 C.W.N 1202. The argument in so far as it founds a right of pasturage as a prescriptive easement or an easement of necessity must, therefore, be overruled.

    9. The second ground raised by Mr. Sarkar that the right of pasturage can be claimed on the basis of a lost grant in view of the finding of the Courts below that the right of pasturage has been enjoyed for a long series of years, must also be overruled for the reasons which we shall advert presently. Mr. Sarkar contends that a right of pasturage on a fiction of lost grant is sustainable in law; it was so held by the Judicial Committee in the case of ‘Bhola Nath v. Midnapore Zemindary Co.’, 31 Cal. 503. He relies strongly on the declaration made in that case which was in favour of the plffs. & the ‘other’ persons entitled to the right of pasturage.

    10. In the first place, it has to be observed that the substance of the pleadings & the issues which are set out in the report, clearly show that the right was not claimed on the basis of a lost grant. The decision of the Judicial Committee proceeded on two observations made by their Lordships in their judgment. These observations are as follows:

    “The right of pasturage claimed has been enjoyed by the plffs. & their predecessors from time immemorial, that is from the time of the Hindu Rajas. There was no difficulty in the way of finding a legal origin for the right claimed.”

    11. These observations do not show that their Lordships intended to rest their decision on a fiction of lost grant. They merely stated that the legal origin has got to be inferred. Such a legal origin may have rested on a customary right. That this was so is apparent from the directions given by their Lordships in the concluding portion of the judgment which gave the parties liberty to mention the matter to the Court as occasion might arise thereafter. If the right was based on a fiction of lost grant, the declaration would have been an unequivocal one & would have endured for all time without any qualification. In our opinion, therefore, it cannot be said that the Judicial Committee based their declaration of a right of pasturage on the basis of a lost grant.

    12. The fiction of lost grant proceeds on the theory that a grant was made, but proof whereof is lost in obscurity. The grant is presumed from long uninterrupted user by the persons claiming the right. To raise such presumption there should be no legal bar in the way of a valid grant at the inception; necessarily there should be a capable grantor & a capable grantee. An indeterminate & fluctuating body of persons, viz., the villagers of a particular village, cannot be a capable grantee. On principle, therefore, a fluctuating body of persons, as the plffs. are in the present cases, cannot claim a fight of pasturage on the footing of a lost grant. This was the view taken by Mukherjea, J. in the case of ‘Asraoulla v. Kiamatulla’, 41 C.W.N 503. We do not see any force in the contention of Mr. Sarkar that Mukherjea, J. misapplied the decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of “Bhola Nath v. Midnapore Zamindary Co.’, 31 Cal 503. On the other hand, the view taken by Mukherjea, J. is fully supported by the decision of this Court in the case of ‘Chuni Lall v. Ramkishen’ 15 Cal. 460 (FB). At p. 464 Wilson, J. delivering the opinion of the F.B dealt With the three classes of rights which may be in controversy; (i) private rights belonging to certain classes of persons which generally originate in prescription or grant; (ii) rights belonging to certain classes of persons, or certain portions of the public, such as the tenants of a minor, which commonly originate in custom; and (iii) public rights in the full sense of the term, which have their source ordinarily in dedication. The view taken by Mukherjea, J. has been followed by this Court in the cases of ‘Abdul Hosain v. Sadai Gobinda Deb’, 42 C.W.N 1102, & ‘Jamila Khatun v. Kshetra Mohan’, 51 C.W.N 179. The decision in the case of ‘Syed Ali v. Sarjan Ali’, 18 C.W.N 735, on which Mr. Sarkar placed reliance, does not militate against this view; rather the view taken by the learned Judges in this case supports the view taken by Mukherjea, J. In the case of ‘Asrabulla v. Kiamatulla’, 41 C.W.N 503. In the case of ‘Syed Ali v. Sarjan Ali’, 18 C.W.N 735, their Lordships observed that the right of pasturage could be held to arise from immemorial user resembling a right based on custom.

    13. The position, therefore, is well settled that a fluctuating body of persons can claim a right of pasturage not on the basis of a lost grant but as a customary right. Such a right, as we have already pointed out, cannot be claimed either as prescriptive easements or as easement of necessity or on a fiction of lost grant. It is, however, to be observed that a right of pasturage based on custom being in derogation of the general, law, has “to be strictly construed, ‘Rogers v. Brenton’, (1847) 10 Q.B 26. The essentials of a valid custom, as was pointed out in the case of ‘Mahamaya Debi v. Haridas Haldar’, 42 Cal 455, are (i) that the custom must be ancient, (ii) invariable & certain, (iii) continuous, (iv) peaceably & openly enjoyed, & (v) reasonable.

    14. The lower appellate Court has found that the right was enjoyed for a long series of years, it is well settled that in this country it is not necessary to prove that the user ran back to a time beyond human memory. The true rule is that on proof of long user antiquity is inferred: ‘Mt. Subhani v. Nawab’, 68 I.A 1. The first condition must, therefore, be deemed to have been satisfied.

    15. The second condition of certainty & invariableness as also the third condition of continuous user must be taken to be satisfied even though in one particular case the villagers did not object to the owner of a tank throwing earth on the banka thereof & thus interfering with the right of pasturage. The right that is claimed in this case is a right of pasturage only in regard to the two tanks in suit. The right was, on the finding of the Courts below, openly & peaceably enjoyed for a long time. The fourth condition was therefore fulfilled.

    16. Mr. Mukherjee, appearing for the respondents, suggested, that the right may have been founded on permission. In the first place the defts. never pleaded a case of permissive user in the written statement. In the second place, as was pointed out in the case of ‘Baba Narayan v. Saboosa’, 47 C.W.N 923,” it is not conclusive against a claim of a customary right that, the practice began by a permission or by a grant.

    17. The only other condition which has got to be fulfilled is one of reasonableness. It was argued on behalf of the respondents that the custom cannot be said to be reasonable inasmuch as the exercise of the customary right would prevent the owner of the banks of the tanks from enjoying the rights of ownership just as they please: The question of reasonableness of a custom is a question of law, ‘Bastard v. Smith (1837) 2 Moo & R. 129 at p. 135, & ‘Asrabulla v. Kiamatulla’, 41 C.W.N 503 The period for ascertaining whether a custom is reasonable or not is the date of its inception, ‘Tanistry Case (1608) Day. Ir. 28 at p. 32. The reason for the existence of the custom is not to he understood as meaning every unlearned man's reason but artificial & legal, reason, warranted by the authority of law ‘Co. Lit. 62 a.’ It is true, as was pointed out by Willes, C.J, in ‘Broadbent v. Wilks’, (1742) Willes 360 at p. 363, that a custom is unreasonable if it deprives the tenant of the ‘whole’ profits of the land. This principle is not peculiar to any country or any particular state of society, but is in conformity with the dictates of natural justice & has been applied in this country as well: “Lutchmeeput Singh v. Sadaulla Nushyo’, 9 Cal 698: & ‘Kuhja Paria v. Nitya Nanda’, 53 C.W.N 346.

    18. In the present case, the exercise of the right of pasturage does not entirely deprive the owner of the right to use the servient heritage. Destruction of the property need not be physical. It will suffice if the exercise of the right completely takes away the right of the owner ‘Sheo Raj v. Mudeer Khan’, 57 All 166. Judged by the test referred to above, it cannot be said that the exercise of the right of pasturage in the present case should be regarded as unreasonable.

    19. Mr. Sarkar has drawn our attention to the text of Manu, Chap, VIII, Verse 237 & Yajihabalak, Byebahara Adhaya, Sloke 166. These rules contain imperative behests for reserving reasonable quantities of pasture land in a village. In his Tagore Law Lecture 1st Edn. Mr. Sarada Charan Mitter in Chap. XII at pp. 404 & 405 observed that pasture lands are of the utmost importance & a custom as to the use by the community of such pasture lands is reasonable & there is nothing uncertain about it. In our opinion, the right of pasturage claimed fulfils all the requirements of a valid custom & is sustainable in law. The Courts below were, therefore, not right in refusing the plffs'. prayer for declaration of a right of pasturage as claimed.

    20. Mr. Sarkar placed reliance on the use of the words “Amul Mamul” in. Ex. 1, a lease in favour of the defts. & contended that this expression preserved the right of pasturage & made it enforceable against the defts. In our opinion, this contention is not of any substance. The words “Amul Mamul” were not used with reference to the preservation of the customary right & to make it binding so far as the defts. are concerned.

    21. Mr. Sarkar also contended that his clients may be given the liberty to amend the plaint so as to raise a case of prescriptive right of pascurage so far as the plffs. & their predecessors are concerned. In our opinion, this amendment should not be allowed at this late stage. The grant of a prayer like this would involve a remand of the case for further hearing. It may be pointed out that the evidence which supports a prescriptive right is different from the evidence which supports a customary right: ‘Blewett v. Tregonmng’, (1835) 3 A & E 554 & ‘Gopal Krishna v. Abdul Samad’, 34 C.L.J 319. This proceeds on the principle that prescriptive right differs from a customary right, inasmuch as the former involves the creation of a right, while the latter implied the creation of a rule of law.

    22. It only remains now for us to consider the right of burial which was claimed in Second Appeal No. 1571 of 1943. For reasons, we have already given, Mr. Sarkar's contention that the right of burial can be claimed as easement of necessity must be negatived. The nature of a right to bury the dead or to cremate the same in another person's land has been subject of judicial decisions in this country & abroad. The right of burial was asserted in the case of ‘Woolridge v. Smith’ (1912) 243 Missouri 190’, where a Full Bench of the Supreme Court of Missouri negatived a prescriptive claim to bury the dead. So far as Indian Courts are concerned, the right to bury the dead was negatived as prescriptive right in the case of ‘Gopal Krishna v. Abdul Samad’, 34 C.L.J 319. Mukherji, J. observed that such a right to bury the dead in another person's lands would not be an easement not being attached to a dominant heritage. It was further stated that such a prescriptive right would involve the creation of a novel easement which the law does not permit. The right to bury the dead as a prescriptive right was also negatived in the case of ‘Mangat Ram v. Sirajul-Hasan’, A.I.R(11) 1924 Lah 492. In the case of ‘Sheo Raj v. Mudeer Khan, 57 All 166 Mukherji, J. negatived a prescriptive claim to a right of burial on the ground that the right claimed did not attach to any land. His Lordship further observed that the right to bury the dead carries with it the right to see that the land under which the body is interred is kept sacred & is not trampled upon, or subjected to sacrilege & this involves a total destruction of the servient tenament. His Lordship, however, held that the right could be acquired on a fiction of lost grant or dedication. Sulaiman, C.J, who concurred in the conclusions of Mukherji, J., commented on the view taken by this Court in the case of ‘Gopal Krishna Sil v. Abdul Samad’, 34 C.L.J 319. The learned Chief Justice observed that the rule that a prescriptive right would be bad as creating a new species of easement, is not a universal rule. His Lordship added that the rule may vary according to the local conditions; for example a right of cutting wood in Gharwal, or a right of affixing cowdung cakes, or a right of privacy. The learned Chief Justice, however, concurred in holding that the right could be claimed as a customary right. In the case of ‘Jogesh Chandra v. Niranjan’, 39 CWN 387. Guha, J., with whom Bartley, J., agreed, was inclined to the view that the right to bury the dead & the right to cremate the dead are analogous, rights & neither of them can be acquired as a prescriptive easement. It was, however, observed that the right can be acquired by dedication, or by prescription as a mode of acquisition or extinction of substantive rights by a certain lapse of time. In the case of ‘Jamila Khatun v. Kshetra Mohan’, 51 C.W.N 179. Chakravati, J., held that the right claimed by the residents of a village could be based on a custom, provided it is reasonable, certain, continuous & ancient. In the case of ‘Mohidin v. Shivlingappa’, 23 Bom 666, a right of burial limited to a number of persons & to a defined space, was held to be reasonable. So far as the public at large is concerned, the right of cremation has been sustained on the ground of dedication in the case of Chairman of the ‘Howrah Municipality v. Khetra Knsto’, 33 Cal 1290.

    23. The conclusion, therefore, follows that the plffs. who are the residents of a village cannot in law acquire the right of burial either as easement by prescription or otherwise, or on a fiction of a lost grant. The plffs. cannot also claim on the basis of acquisition prescription as this case was never made. The claim on the basis of a customary right is unsustainable, because the finding of the Courts below is that the tank in question is used for the purposes of irrigation & for bathing & drinking purposes & as such, the exercise of the right would interfere with the health of the locality & cannot be regarded as reasonable. The Courts below were, therefore, right in refusing the plffs’. prayer for declaration of a right of burial.

    24. The result, therefore, is that these appeals succeed in part, the judgments & decrees of the Courts below are modified. The right of pasturage claimed on the banks of the two tanks in-suit is declared, subject to the qualification that the decree is not to prevent the defts. or their successors-in-interest from exercising their right on the disputed banks of the tanks so long as sufficient pasturage is left for the plffs. & the persons entitled to the right of pasturage claimed, with liberty to the parties from time to time, in case of difference, to apply to the trial Court, as they may be advised. The defts. are permanently restrained from interfering with the exercise by the plffs. of the right of pasturage as described: above. The plff.' right of burial is disallowed. As the plffs'. appeals have succeeded in part, they would get half the costs of the appeals in this Court. As the plffs. rested their claim on various untenable grounds in the Courts below, the parties will bear their own costs in the Courts, below.

    Lahiri, J.: I agree.

    V.B.B

    25. Appeals partly allowed.

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    Nani Gopal Dutta And Others Plffs. v. Kshitish Chandra Banerjee And Another
    (Apr 26, 1949)