AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • India Class III and Class IV Employees (Bonus and Dearness Allowance) Rules, 1981.17.
  • Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred
  • 1976, the LIC (Modification of Settlement) Act, 1976 (Act 72 of 1976),
  • India Class III and Class IV. Employees' (Bonus and DA) Rules, 1981,
  • Sections 48 and 49 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956.
  • SECTION 9 A INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • Section 11(2) of the LIC Act, amending the provision
  • provisions of Article 31(2) of the Constitution
  • Act violated the provisions of Article 31(2)
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • SECTION 10 INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • 1981 Amending Act and the Rules
  • Settlement) Act, 1976,
  • Section 25-F
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • India Class III and Class IV Employees (Bonus and Dearness Allowance) Rules, 1981.17.
  • Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred
  • 1976, the LIC (Modification of Settlement) Act, 1976 (Act 72 of 1976),
  • India Class III and Class IV. Employees' (Bonus and DA) Rules, 1981,
  • Sections 48 and 49 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956.
  • SECTION 9 A INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • Section 11(2) of the LIC Act, amending the provision
  • provisions of Article 31(2) of the Constitution
  • Act violated the provisions of Article 31(2)
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • SECTION 10 INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • 1981 Amending Act and the Rules
  • Settlement) Act, 1976,
  • Section 25-F
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Calcutta High Court — Appeal by Life Insurance Corporation of India)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution filed by class III and class IV employees (and their union) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) challenging two circulars dated 16 April 1981 and 23 April 1981 which treated the period of an April 1981 strike as unauthorised absence and directed proportionate deduction of pay (including PF contributions and HRA adjustments). The employees had earlier obtained orders in their favour — including a Calcutta High Court judgment enforcing a 1974 bipartite settlement for payment of annual cash bonus and subsequent Supreme Court orders directing payment of bonus — but the LIC had failed to pay the bonus. After various legislative and administrative steps (including the Payment of Bonus Amendment (Ordinance), 1975; the LIC (Modification of Settlement) Act, 1976; and the Life Insurance Corporation Amendment Ordinance of 31 January 1981 and related Rules of 1981), litigation continued up to the Supreme Court, which ordered payment and rejected some attempts to supersede the 1974 settlement retrospectively.

When LIC did not comply with orders requiring payment, the employees gave notice and went on strike from 2 April 1981 (after following statutory notice requirements). The strike was called off after the Supreme Court passed an order on 15 April 1981 directing payment within one week. The employees then challenged the circulars of 16 and 23 April 1981 by way of a writ petition under Article 226. The trial judge (P.C. Borooah, J.) made the rule absolute, quashed the circulars, and directed LIC to pay the affected employees the salaries for the strike period with interest at 12% per annum. LIC appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the strike called by class III and class IV employees of LIC in April 1981 was legal under the Industrial Disputes Act (notably compliance with Section 22 notice requirements) and whether it was justified on the facts.
  2. Whether employees who participate in a strike that is legal and justified are entitled to wages for the period of the strike.
  3. Whether the High Court, exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, may direct an employer (here, LIC) to pay wages for a strike period instead of requiring the employees to seek relief under the machinery of the Industrial Disputes Act (i.e., whether an alternative remedy under the Act precludes writ relief).
  4. Whether the circulars dated 16 April 1981 and 23 April 1981 (treating the strike period as unauthorised absence and providing for deductions) were lawful and should be quashed.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (LIC) Arguments

  • The employees are not entitled to wages for the period when they refused to work; under common law the workman is entitled to wages only for work actually performed and there is no statutory obligation to pay wages during strike periods.
  • The strike was illegal and unjustified; even if lawful or justifiable, wages are not payable for the period of refusal to work.
  • The employees should not invoke Article 226 to recover wages for the strike period; they ought to have raised the dispute under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act (or other remedies under the Act), and availability of such alternative remedies bars writ jurisdiction in this context.
  • The employees had been warned in notices (e.g., Chief Personnel Officer's notice of 31 March 1981) that participation in a continuous strike would be treated as unauthorised absence and they would not be entitled to wages ("no work no pay"), and therefore they cannot seek to quash the circulars after choosing to strike notwithstanding the warning.
  • Reliance was placed on precedents holding that where the dispute concerns enforcement of a right created under the Industrial Disputes Act the appropriate remedy is adjudication under that Act (Premier Automobiles; Basant Kumar Sarkar).

Respondents' (Employees/Union) Arguments

  • The Industrial Disputes Act recognises and regulates strikes; a strike that complies with statutory formalities and is justified is a lawful weapon for employees to enforce their rights.
  • The employees had repeatedly obtained favourable orders (Calcutta High Court and Supreme Court) directing LIC to pay bonus under the 1974 settlement, but LIC failed to comply; the strike was the only effective means left to enforce those orders.
  • When a strike is lawful and justified (as demonstrated by facts here — statutory notice given, no violence, immediate recall upon assurance of payment), the employer cannot lawfully deduct wages for the strike period; the High Court exercising Article 226 may direct payment of wages in appropriate cases.
  • Reliance was placed on several authorities (both Indian and English) supporting the right to strike and the proposition that a justified strike may entitle employees to wages for the strike period (cases cited include Morgan v. Fry; Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation case; Churakulam Tea Estate; Gujarat Steel Tubes; Crompton Greaves).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India (Supreme Court) The 1976 LIC (Modification of Settlement) Act was declared void as offending Article 31(2); the Court directed payment of annual cash bonus for specified years in terms of the 1974 settlement. The Court relied on this decision to show that retrospective attempts to nullify the 1974 settlement failed and that employees remained entitled to bonus earned before publication of the 1981 Rules.
A.V. Nachane v. Union of India (Supreme Court) Settlements under Section 18(1) remain binding beyond their stated term until superseded by a fresh settlement, an industrial award or relevant legislation. Used to support the proposition that the 1974 bipartite settlement continued to bind LIC and that unilateral termination by LIC was ineffective to end bonus obligations.
L.I.C. of India v. D.J. Bahadur (Supreme Court) Two settlements could be superseded only by a fresh settlement, industrial award or relevant legislation; writ issued to enforce the terms of the 1974 settlement relating to bonus until superseded. Cited to reinforce that LIC could not unilaterally supersede the 1974 settlement and that the writ enforcing the settlement remained binding on LIC.
Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Karalekar Shantaram Wadke (Supreme Court) Where an industrial dispute relates to enforcement of rights created under the Industrial Disputes Act, the remedy is adjudication under the Act. Appellant relied on it to argue Article 226 was not the proper forum; the Court noted the case but found the present facts distinguishable and did not accept that Article 226 was thereby excluded.
Basant Kumar Sarkar v. Eagle Rolling Mills Ltd. (Supreme Court) Although Article 226 is wide, certain industrial disputes are expected to be dealt with under the Industrial Disputes Act (e.g., by Section 10, or Sections 74/75 remedies). Appellant cited it to support non-exercise of writ jurisdiction; the Court acknowledged the authority but concluded that in this instance Article 226 relief was appropriate given the facts and prior ineffective remedies.
Shiv Singh v. Union of India (Supreme Court) Observations on consequences of participation in strikes (e.g., adverse entries affecting promotions); demonstrates managerial/administrative consequences of strikes and prior warnings. Appellant relied on the decision to show employees were warned and suffered known consequences; Court considered the point but proceeded to find the strike justified and relief appropriate.
Morgan v. Fry (Court of Appeal) English authority recognizing the right to strike where sufficient notice is given; right to strike considered part of collective bargaining if notice equals contract termination notice. Respondents relied on it to support the right to strike; Court cited it when assessing the legitimacy of strike rights and procedural notice compliance.
Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Employees' Union v. A.P. State RTC (Andhra Pradesh High Court) Observation that a justified strike is an inherent right and part of collective bargaining; strike is not per se subversive of industrial peace. Relied on by respondents to support the proposition that a justified strike is legitimate; Court referenced this authority as aligning with its view of the right to strike.
Churakulam Tea Estate (P.) Ltd. v. Workmen (Supreme Court) Holding that where a strike is neither illegal nor unjustified, the workers are entitled to wages for the relevant period. Respondents relied on it; Court accepted the principle and applied it in the circumstances of the present case where the strike was found legal and justified.
Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha (Supreme Court) Observations by Krishna Iyer, J. recognizing the right to strike as part of collective bargaining and subject to legality and civilized norms. Respondents relied on the authority to establish the constitutional and jurisprudential basis for recognizing strikes; Court cited it in support of the right to strike under controlled parameters.
Crompton Greaves Ltd. v. Its Workmen (Supreme Court) Statement that to entitle workmen to wages for strike period the strike should be legal and justified; justifiability is a question of fact; use of violence/sabotage disentitles to wages. Court cited the authority to frame the test applied: legality and justification of the strike must be established before wages can be awarded. The Court found those tests satisfied here.
L. Robert D'Souza v. Executive Engineer, Southern Railway (Supreme Court) Court's power to declare termination illegal and to award reinstatement and back wages where termination amounted to illegal retrenchment; illustrates remedial ambit of higher courts. Cited by the Court to support the proposition that courts have power in appropriate cases to mandate payment of wages/back wages; used as precedent for exercising equitable remedial power in employment disputes.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by applying statutory and factual tests to the issues framed:

  1. Legality of the strike: The Court examined the Industrial Disputes Act provisions (Section 2(q) defining "strike" and Section 22 prescribing notice formalities). The employees had given requisite notice and observed the statutory waiting period required by Section 22(1)(b). Therefore the strike was held to be legal.
  2. Justifiability of the strike: The appellants argued that justifiability is a pure question of fact unsuitable for determination by writ jurisdiction. The Court rejected an absolute formulation of that submission, stating that where the circumstances are clear and undisputed on the record the Court can decide justifiability. On the facts, the LIC had repeatedly failed to obey orders of the Calcutta High Court and the Supreme Court to pay bonus due under the 1974 settlement; there was no evidence of violence or sabotage by employees; the strike was called only after other remedies had been exhausted and was immediately lifted upon assurance of payment. The Court concluded the strike was wholly justified.
  3. Entitlement to wages for the strike period: The Court considered authorities (notably Crompton Greaves, Churakulam Tea Estate and others) establishing the principle that employees may be entitled to wages for strike periods if the strike is legal and justified. Applying that principle to the present undisputed facts, the Court held employees were entitled to wages for the strike period.
  4. Writ jurisdiction and alternative remedies: The appellants contended that the existence of remedies under the Industrial Disputes Act precluded exercise of writ jurisdiction. The Court examined the practical efficacy of those remedies in the present facts and concluded that the employees had been driven "from pillar to post" and other remedies were unlikely to provide speedy or efficacious relief. Given repeated non-compliance by LIC with judicial directions and the scale of affected employees (about 45,000), the Court held that it was appropriate to exercise its Article 226 jurisdiction.
  5. Remedies ordered: The Court found the impugned circulars of 16 April 1981 and 23 April 1981 unlawful and liable to be quashed. The Court upheld the trial judge's direction that LIC must pay the concerned employees the salaries for the strike period together with interest at 12% per annum. The Court also relied on L. Robert D'Souza to show that courts have power in appropriate employment disputes to order payment of wages/back wages.
  6. Procedural/limitation point: The Court further noted a procedural issue not argued — an undertaking given by the appellant regarding inclusion of a list of dates to show the appeal was not barred by limitation. The paper-book did not show compliance with that undertaking; the Court held that the appeal was liable to be dismissed on that ground alone and dismissed the appeal with costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The appeal is dismissed. The trial judge's order (making the rule absolute, quashing the circulars dated 16 April 1981 and 23 April 1981, and directing LIC to pay the concerned employees salaries for the strike period with interest at 12% per annum) is upheld.

Implications and consequences:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The impugned circulars (Annexures "C" and "D") were quashed and LIC was directed to pay the salaries for the strike period to the affected employees with interest at 12% per annum. The appeal against that relief was dismissed.
  • Legal principle applied: The Court affirmed that where a strike is both legal (statutorily compliant) and justified on the facts (e.g., employer's wilful non-compliance with judicial orders, absence of violence), the High Court in appropriate cases can, under Article 226, direct payment of wages for the strike period. The Court relied on established authorities to apply the test of legality and justifiability before awarding wages.
  • Procedure and remedies: The Court recognized the Industrial Disputes Act as the primary statutory framework for industrial disputes but held that where statutory remedies are ineffective or have not produced redress despite orders from higher courts, Article 226 may be an appropriate avenue for relief in suitable cases.
  • Procedural dismissal ground: Independently, the appeal was also dismissed for non-compliance with an undertaking concerning inclusion of material to show the appeal was not barred by limitation; the Court awarded costs certified for two counsel.

No information beyond what appears in the provided opinion was added. Where the opinion specified principles or consequences, those have been reproduced or summarized exactly as reflected in the text.

    Life Insurance Corporation Of India And Others v. Amalendu Gupta And Others

    Baboo Lall Jain, J.:— This is an appeal preferred by Life Insurance Corporation of India and others from the judgment of P.C Borooah, J., delivered on August 25, 1982, pursuant to the application made by Amalendu Gupta and others. The said Amalendu Gupta and others, made an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, inter alia, Insurance Corporation of India (hereinafter also referred to for the sake praying that a-writ in the nature of mandamus be issued, directing Life of brevity as “LIC”) to cancel the circulars and/or orders, dated 16th April, 1981, and 23rd April, 1981, issued by the Senior Divisional Manager, LIC, Calcutta Divisional Office. The said Amalendu Gupta and others (hereinafter also referred to as “the employees”) also prayed that the LIC be directed to refund and/or restore 14-days' wages and allowances deducted by the LIC from April, 1981, salaries of the class III and class IV employees of the LIC. A rule was issued pursuant to the said application and affidavits were also filed on behalf of the parties.

    2. The learned Judge, after hearing the said application of the employees, made the rule absolute and quashed the said circulars, dated 16th April 1981, and 23rd April, 1981. The learned Judge also directed the LIC to pay the concerned employees, the salaries for the strike period together with the interest at 12% per annum. The LIC of India and others have appealed from the said judgment and order of the learned Judge, inter alia, on the grounds that the employees were not entitled to demand wages for the period when they refused to work. It has also been contended that the strike was illegal and unjustified and that even if the strike was legal or justifiable, then also wages for the strike period are not permitted since the employees refused to work. It has further been urged on behalf of the LIC that the employees in any event cannot invoke Article 226 of the Constitution for realising the wages for the period of strike and they should have raised a dispute under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act if they desired to claim the same and there being an alternative and effective remedy they could not come to this Court in its constitutional writ jurisdiction. It has also been urged that whether the strike was justifiable or not is a question of fact which could not conveniently be decided under the jurisdiction of this Court. The contention on behalf of the employees has been that this was a justified and legal strike and that in a case like this the learned Judge was perfectly justified in making an order for payment of the wages for the strike period. The facts of the case are as hereunder:

    Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are the permanent class III employees and respondent No-3 is a permanent class IV employee of the LIC of India. Respondent No. 4 is the federation and registered union of the said employees. There was a bipartite settlement, dated 24th January, 1974, under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the said Act”), between the LIC and the All India Insurance Employees' Association representing class III and class IV employees of the LIC. Under the said settlement the LIC was to pay annual cash bonus to their class III and class IV employees at 15% of their annual wages inclusive of all allowances. This settlement was to continue for a period of 4 years, i.e, from April, 1973, to 31st March, 1977. On 25th September, 1975, an Ordinance was promulgated, called the Payment of Bonus Amendment (Ordinance), 1975. On 26th September, 1976, LIC issued a circular to the effect that payment of bonus was under review of the Ordinance. As the LIC failed to pay bonus in terms of the settlement, the employees made an application to this Court under its constitutional writ jurisdiction. By and under the judgment delivered on 21st May, 1976, in the said matter being matter No. 371 of 1976 [since reported in (1977) 1 L.L.J 415; LabIC (NOC) 41] the appellant was directed to pay the bonus which had till then become due and payable to the said employees in terms of the settlement. On 27th May, 1976, the appellant issued a purported notice of termination of the settlement, dated 24th January, 1974, under the provisions of Section 19(2) of the said Act and also purported to amend the staff regulations relating to bonus. On 22nd May, 1976, the LIC (Modification of Settlement) Act, 1976 (Act 72 of 1976), came into force with retrospective effect from 25th September, 1975. The said Act was challenged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court by the employees of LIC. The Hon'ble Supreme Court declared the said Act to be void as offending Article 31(2) and directed payment of annual cash bonus for the years 1975-76 and 1976-77, according to the settlement of 1974. This judgment has been reported as Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India(1) In March, 1978, LIC issued a notice under Section 9-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, to change the conditions of service relating to annual cash bonus. In May, 1978, LIC amended LIC (Staff) Regulations No. 58 under Section 49 of LIC Act in the matter of annual cash bonus. On 26th May, 1978, the Government of India issued a notice under Section 11(2) of the LIC Act, amending the provision of annual cash bonus the actions of the LIC and the Government of India were challenged by the employees and the matter ultimately went upto the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court by a judgment delivered on 10th November, 1980, directed the LIC to pay annual cash bonus to their class III and class IV employees in terms of the 1974 settlement relating to annual cash bonus. This judgment has been reported in [1981] 1 L.L.J 1; [1980] Lab. I.C 1218. When in spite of the directions or orders of the Supreme Court the LIC failed to pay the bonus, a contempt application was filed and the Supreme Court on 15th January, 1981, passed the following order:

    “Learned Attorney-General who appears on behalf of the LIC of India has made a statement before us that the order passed by this Court in its judgment, dated 10th November, 1980, shall be complied with before April 15, 1981. We may add that this order will naturally be subject to the result of the review petition. Stay petition filed along with the review petition is rejected. Review petition be circulated to Court”

    3. It may be added here that in the meantime the appellant had also filed a review petition.

    4. On 31st January, 1981, the Life Insurance Corporation Amendment Ordinance (No. 3 of 1981) was promulgated amending Sections 48 and 49 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. Acting under the said Ordinance the Central Government framed the Life Insurance Corporation of India Class III and Class IV. Employees' (Bonus and DA) Rules, 1981, taking away their right to receive annual cash bonus from 1st July, 1979, and imposing a ceiling on DA from 2nd February, 1981.

    5. The contempt matter again came up before the Supreme Court on 26th February, 1981, when the Supreme Court was pleased to pass the order which has been set out in para 16 of the writ petition.

    6. When in spite of the repeated orders of the Supreme Court respondent No. 1 failed and neglected to pay the bonus in accordance with the 1974 agreement, respondent No. 4 issued a notice to the applicant for going on strike on and from 2nd April, 1981. The strike notice has been set out in para 23 of the writ petition.

    7. On 17th March, 1981, the Supreme Court rejected the appellant's petition for review of the Supreme Court's earlier order and on the next date, the Senior Divisional Manager of respondent No. 1 issued instructions to all Heads of Departments, Senior Branch Managers and Branch Managers not to grant any leave other than casual leave and maternity leave in view of the proposed strike of the employees. A copy of these instructions is included in Annexure “F” to the petition.

    8. The Ordinance promulgated on 31st January, 1981, as well as the purported notification issued on 2nd February, 1981, were both challenged on behalf of the class III and class IV employees of the appellant in the Supreme Court and both the LIC as well as the Central Government were restrained by an order, dated 30th March, 1981, from giving effect to the said notification issued on 2nd February, 1981, in so far as the same relates to the payment of annual cash bonus to class III and class IV employees. On 2nd April, 1981, the Supreme Court passed the following order:

    “M.K Ramamurthi, R.K Garg, Vimal Deve and A.K Goel on behalf of the petitioners give an undertaking to this Court that in the event of the writ petitioners failing, the Corporation would be entitled to make adjustments from the future emoluments payable to the petitioners in case any overpayment is made to them in terms of the agreement, dated 24th January, 1974, and 6th February, 1974. The interim order made on 30th March, 1981, will continue until further order.”

    9. When in spite of the various orders of the Supreme Court, referred to above, the LIC still did not pay the bonus which became due and payable to the class III and class IV employees, the said employees went on strike as per their notice already given on, and from 2nd April, 1981.

    10. The strike was recalled and the concerned employees went back to work, when the Supreme Court passed the order on the aforesaid-writ petition filed on behalf of the employees, on 15th April, 1981, directing respondent No. 1 to make the payments within one week from the date.

    11. Thereafter, on 16th April, 1981, respondent No. 1 issued a circular to the Divisional Manager (Accounts) of the Calcutta Divisional Office and all Senior Branch Managers and Branch Managers of all branch offices under the Calcutta Division, inter alia, to the effect that the period of strike by class III and class IV employees, will have to be treated as unauthorised absence on loss of pay and accordingly salary for the duration of the strike will have to be deducted on proportionate basis and the deduction would be effected from the salary payable for the month of April, 1981. A copy of this circular is Annexure “C” of the writ petition.

    12. Then on 23rd April, 1981, the Assistant Divisional Manager (Personnel) issued a circular to the Divisional Manager (Accounts) and other officers under the Calcutta Division reproducing the next teleprinter message received from the Zonal Manager, Calcutta, to the effect that apart from the deduction of salary for the strike period for the month of April, 1981, the PF contributions and the house rent allowance should also be adjusted for the said period. A copy of this circular is Annexure “D” to the petition.

    13. In this application under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioners have prayed for appropriate writs commanding the LIC to rescind and cancel the two aforesaid circulars being Annexures “C” and “D” to the petition. The LIC was neglecting and/or refusing to pay the bonus which was due and payable to the class III and class IV employees in terms of the 1974 settlement, in spite of the fact that the concerned employees had been getting orders in their favour for payment of bonus not only from this Court but also from the Supreme Court. In the premises the employees gave notice for calling a strike in accordance with the rights given to them under the Act. As regards the rights of the employees to receive the bonus in terms of the said settlement reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court, in the case of A.V Nachane v. Union of India(2) wherein the Supreme Court observed as follows (at page 116):

    “The 1974 settlements provided, among various other matters, for the payment of annual cash bonus (not a profit sharing bonus) to their class III and IV employees at the rate of 15 per cent of the annual salary. The settlements were to be operative from April 1, 1973, to March 31, 1977. That the settlements were to be operative from April 1, 1973, to March 31, 1977, did not mean that the settlements would cease to be effective peremptorily from April 1, 1977, and, therefore, the annual cash bonus stipulated under the settlements would cease to be payable from that, date onwards. The settlements would continue to be binding even after March 31, 1977, and would not be liable to be terminated by the issuance of a unilateral notice by the employer purporting to terminate the settlements. The settlements would cease to be effective only when they were replaced by ‘a fresh settlement, an industrial award or relevant legislation’. This is the, law and this was what the law that was pronounced to be in L.I.C of India v. D.J Bahadur,(3) on a consideration of the relevant provisions and precedents.

    14. An attempt made to supersede the settlements, in so far as they related to the payment of bonus, by enacting the Life Insurance Corporation (Modification of Settlement) Act, 1976, failed, firstly, because the Act was held, to violate the provisions of Article 31(2) of the Constitution and, secondly, because the Act could not have retrospective effect so as to absolve the Life Insurance Corporation from obeying the writ of mandamus issued by the Calcutta High Court, which, had become final and binding on the parties. This was the decision of this Court in Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India(4) All the seven Judges who constituted the Bench agreeing that the Act violated the provisions of Article 31(2) and four out of the seven Judges, namely, Beg, C.J, Bhagwati, Krishna Iyer and Desai, JJ. taking the view that the Act did not have the effect of nullifying the (writ of mandamus issued by the Calcutta High Court and the other three Judges, Chandraehud, Fazal Ali and Shinghal, JJ., preferring not to express any view on that question.

    15. The second attempt to nullify the 1974 settlements in regard to payment of bonus, by issuing notices under Section 19(2) and Section 9-A of the Industrial Disputes Act and by amending the Standardisation Order and the Staff Regulations was frustrated by the Judgment of this Court in L.I.C of India v. D.J Bahadur(5) the Court taking the view that the two settlements could only be superseded by a fresh settlement, an industrial award relevant legislation. In this case, the Court issued a writ to the Life Insurance Corporation to give effect to the terms of the settlements of 1974 relating to bonus until superseded by a fresh settlement, an industrial award or relevant legislation.

    16. The effect of the two judgments in Madan Mohan Pathak's case, (supra) was clear; the settlements of 1974, in so far as they related to bonus, could only be, superseded by a fresh settlement, an industrial award or relevant legislation. But any such supersession could only have future effect, but not retrospective effect so as to disentitle the class III and class IV employees of the Life Insurance Corporation from receiving the cash bonus which had been earned by them, day by day, and which the Life Insurance Corporation of India was under an obligation to pay in terms of the writ issued in D.J Bahadur's case, (supra). The present attempt made by the 1981 Amending Act and the Rules thereunder, to scuttle the payment of bonus with effect from a date anterior to the date of the enactment must, therefore, fail. The employees are entitled to be paid the bonus earned by them before the date of the publication of the Life Insurance Corporation of India Class III and Class IV Employees (Bonus and Dearness Allowance) Rules, 1981.”

    17. The employees went on strike after serving a notice of the proposed strike in accordance with the provisions of the Act, as the strike was the only weapon left in the hands of the employees, when the appellant repeatedly failed to comply with the repeated orders of the Supreme Court and also an order of this High Court.

    18. Mr. Bholanath Sen, appeared on behalf of the appellants in support of the appeal and, inter alia, contended that under the common law a workman is entitled to wages only for the period he actually works for his employer and there is no provision under any law which casts a statutory obligation on an employer to pay a workman wages for the period the workman goes on strike, and as such, this Court's powers under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be invoked by the workmen of the L.I.C to compel L.I.C to pay the striking employees their salaries for the period they went on strike. Mr. Sen has further submitted that the right to go on strike has been created under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and if the workmen after resorting to a strike seek any remedy, that remedy should be sought within the four corners of the Act and not by taking recourse to this Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. In this connection, Mr. Sen drew our attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Premier Auto mobiles Ltd. v. Karalekar Shantaram Wadke(6) where the Supreme Court held that if the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Industrial Disputes Act, the only remedy available is to get an adjudication under the provisions of the said Act.

    19. That case it may be observed, did not relate to the ambit of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Mr. Sen also drew our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Basant Kumar Sarkar v. Eagle Rolling Mills Ltd.,(7) wherein the Supreme Court held that although the powers conferred on the High Court under Article 226 are very wide they could not take in within their sweep industrial dispute of the kind which the contention of the workmen sought to raise in that case. In the case the Supreme Court held that the proper remedy which was available to the workmen, was to take recourse to Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act or seek relief under Sections 74 and 75 of the Act.

    20. Mr. Sen next drew our attention to a notice dated March 31, 1981, issued by the Chief Personnel Officer of the appellant at Bombay to all employees of the Corporation in response to the notice of continuous strike from. April 2, 1981. A copy-of this notice is annexure “A” to the affidavit in opposition filed by Sri Hiralal Sil, the Administrative Officer of the appellant on May 25, 1982. Mr. Sen has in particular drawn our attention to para 4 of the said notice which is in the following terms:

    “If in spite of the above, the employees choose to go on continuous strike in response to the call given by the aforesaid unions or otherwise, they will render themselves liable to the following:

    (i) the period of strike will be treated as unauthorised absence;

    (ii) the employees who participate in the strike will not be entitled to receive any wages for the duration of the strike on the principle of ‘no work no pay’

    (iii) employees who are on probation either on entry as new recruits or on probationary period extended.”

    21. With reference to this notice, Mr. Sen contended that before they went on strike the employees were fully aware that they would not be entitled to receive any wages for the strike period on the principle of “no work no pay” and after having gone on strike in'spite of the warning given in the said notice they cannot come before this Court, and ask for quashing of the two impugned circulars. In this connection, Mr. Sen drew our attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Singh v. Union of lndia,(8) where the Supreme Court made the following observations (at page 963):

    “As regards the effect of participation in the strike on promotional prospects there were several orders by different authorities. It is not necessary to mention every one of them. Notice may be taken of two orders. On June 16, 1969, the Director-General, Posts and Telegraphs, issued an order to the effect that the employees who had participated in the strike would be considered for promotion provided they were not guilty of acts of violence, active instigation or intimidation and their work and conduct subsequent to September, 1968, had been found to be satisfactory. The petitioner seeks to rely on this order. But this order was ineffective on account of the Office Memorandum of the Ministry of Home Affairs issued on October 19, 1968. The Office Memorandum provided that the adverse entry in the character role of an employee who took part in the strike would be taken into consideration for promotion or confirmation. All employees who were on unauthorised absence on September 19, 1988, would suffer the consequences of strike for five years-Accordingly, the petitioner cannot rely on the order of the Director-General. The petitioner obviously became ineligible for promotion as Sub-Inspector on account of the Office Memorandum for a period of five years. So he could not be considered for promotion as Sub-Inspector in July, 1969, when the respondents ‘optees’ and certain other persons were selected as Sub-Inspectors.”

    22. Mr. Somnath Chatterjee, appearing on behalf of the employees respondents, contended that the Act is a labour welfare legislation which recognises the concept, of strike. The Act also contemplates when a strike shall be lawful and when it shall be deemed to be illegal or unlawful. According to Mr. Chatterjee, the employees concerned were forced to go on strike after giving notice of the proposed strike in accordance with the provisions of the Act as the strike was the only weapon left in the hands of the employees, when, respondent No. 2 repeatedly failed to comply with repeated orders of the Supreme Court and also an order this High Court. Mr. Chatterjee further contended, when a strike is lawful and justified., it is not open to the employer to deduct and/or refuse to pay the salary which is due to the employees for the period when they are forced to go on strike to get a redress of their legitimate grievances, Mr. Chatterjee also contended by referring to certain decisions as here-. inafter referred to, that this Court exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution can direct respondent No. 1 to pay the workmen the salary for the period they were forced to go on strike and also to strike down the two impugned circulars.

    23. In support of his contention that the employees have a right, to go on strike Mr. Chatterjee relied on the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Morgan v. Fry,(9) where the following observations appear:

    “It is difficult to see the logical flaw in that argument; but there must be something wrong with it;. for if that argument were correct, it would do away with the right to strike in this country. It has been held for over sixty years that workmen-have a right to strike (including therein a right to say that they will not work with non-unionists) provided that they give sufficient notice before hand: and a notice is sufficient if it is at least as long as the notice required to terminate the contract.”

    24. As regards an employee's right to go on strike and to receive the wages for the strike period, if the strike is legal and justified. Mr. Chatterjee has referred to a number of decisions. The first decision is that of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Employees' Union v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corpoiration,(10) where Chinnappa Reddy, J., made the following observations (at page 1226):

    “Nor am I prepared to hold that a strike, if justified, could be considered an activity subversive of industrial peace or opposed to the lawful objects of trade unions. A right to strike is labour's ultimate weapon and in the course of a hundred years it has emerged as the inherent right of every worker. It is an element which is of the very essence of the principle of collective bargaining and as stated by an eminent English Judge the right to strike is, An implication read into the contract by the modern law as to trade disputes.”

    25. The next case referred to by Mr. Chatterjee is a decision of the Supreme Court, in an appeal from an award of the Industrial Tribunal, Alleppey by the Management of Churakulam Tea Estate (P.) Ltd. v. Workmen,(11) In this case, the Court held as follows (at page 211):

    “Therefore, the strike must be held to be neither illegal nor unjustified and inconsequence it must be further held that the factory workers are entitled to wages for that day. The finding of the Tribunal in this regard, is accepted.”

    26. The next decision relied on by Mr. Chatterjee is also a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha,(12) where the following observations were made by Krishna Iyer, J. (at page 185):

    “A selective study of the case-law is proper at this place. Before we do this, a few words on the basis of the right to strike and pro-gressive legal thinking led by constitutional guidelines is necessitous. The right to unionise, the right to strike as part of collective bargaining and, subject to the legality and humanity of the situation, the right of the weaker group, viz., labour, to pressure the stronger party, viz., capital, to negotiate and render justice, are process recognised by industrial jurisprudence and supported by social justice. While society itself, in its basic needs of existence, may not be held to ransom in the name of the right to bargain and strikers must obey civilised norms in the battle and not the vulgar or violent hoodlums, industry, represented by intransigent managements, may well be made to reel into reason by the strike weapon and cannot then squeal or wail and complain of loss of profits or others ill-effects but must negotiate or get a reference made. The broad basis is that workers are weaker although they are the producers and their struggle to better their lot has the sanction of the rule of law. Unions and strikes are no more conspiracies than professions and political parties are, and, being far weaker, need succour. Part IV of the Constitution read with Article 19, sows seeds of this burgeoning jurisprudence. The Gandhian quote at the beginning of this judgment sets the tone of economic equity in industry. Of course, adventurist, extremist, extra-neously inspired and puerile strikes, absurdly insane persistence and violent or scorched earth policies boomerang and are anathema for the law. Within these parameters the right to strike is integral to collective bargaining.”

    27. Mr. Chatterjee also referred to another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Crompton Greaves Ltd. v. Its Workmen,(13) where the the Supreme Court observed (at page 1490):

    “It is well settled that in order to entitle the workmen to wages for the period of strike, the strike should be legal as well as justified. A strike is legal if it does not violate any provision of the statute. Again, a strike cannot be said to be unjustified unless the reasons for it are entirely perverse or unreasonable. Whether a particular strike was justified or not is a question of fact which has to be judged in the light of the, facts and circumstances of each case. It is also well settled that the use of force or violence or acts of sabotage resorted to by the workmen during a strike disentitles them to wages for the strike period.”

    28. We agree with the learned trial Judge that the Industrial Disputes Act is a social welfare legislation, enacted by Parliament for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes. If an employer denies or refuses to give its workmen some benefit or emoluments to which they are entitled under the law or under the contract of service with the employer, the Act gives the concerned employees a weapon to force the employer to accede to their demands and gives them the legitimate dues. The weapon is a strike which is recognised under the Industrial Disputes Act and has been defined in Section 2(q) as follows:

    “Strike means a cessation of work by a body of persons employed in any industry acting in combination, or a concerted refusal, or a refusal under a common understanding, of any number of persons who are or have been so employed to continue to work or to accept employment.”

    29. But before going on strike, the Act lays certain formalities. One of the formalities to be observed by a workman, before going on strike, has been laid down in Section 22 of the Act which requires the workman to give his employer notice of the strike within 6 weeks before striking and prohibits the workmen from going on strike within 14 days of giving such notice. In the instant case, the strike was in accordance with the provisions of the Act because the requisite notice was given and the employees went on strike after the expiry of the statutory period as laid down in Section 22(1)(b) of the Act. Therefore, the strike must be deemed to be legal.

    30. The next question arising for consideration is whether the strike by the concerned employees of the L.I.C was justified? According to Mr. Sen, the question of justifiability of a strike is a pure question of fact which cannot be gone into by this Court. This cannot be an absolute proposition of law. If from the materials on record the circumstances under which an employee is forced to go on a strike, is clear and undisputable, this Court is certainly competent to decide the question. In the instant case, evem after the 1974 bipartite settlement and the order of the Calcutta High Court and, therefore, even in spite of repeated orders of the Supreme Court, respondent No. 1, on some pretext or the other, refused and/or neglected to pay to the concerned employees the bonus which was statutorily binding on the parties under the provisions of Section 18(1) of the Act. It is nobody's case that the employees resorted to any acts of violence or intimidation or violated any civilised norms during the period of the strike or prior thereto. On the other hand, the strike was immediately lifted when the outstanding issue of the payment of bonus was finally settled. As such, although the justifiability of the strike had been denied in the affidavit-in-opposition filed by Shri Hiralal Seal, the conclusion that the strike was wholly justified becomes inevitable and does not lie in the realm of any doubt.

    31. The next and the most important question which now has to be determined is whether this Court can mandate respondent No. 1 to pay the striking employees their wages for the strike period and also direct the L.I.C not to give effect to the impugned circulars dated April 16, 1981, and April 23, 1981.

    32. If this Court refuses to exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution and denies reliefs prayed for in this petition, the employees of respondent No-1, who have been affected by the, impugned circulars and who will number about 45,000 will have to fall back on other remedies which may be available to them under the law. A possible remedy is the initiation of conciliation proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act and a reference of the issue arising out of the deduction of the salary to an Industrial Tribunal does not lie in the hands of the employees. When respondent No-1 and the Central Government took recourse to various measures in order to prevent the employees from getting the bonus in terms of the settlement, it is unlikely that the workmen will get a quick and efficacious relief by taking recourse to the remedies available to them under the Act. We agree with the learned trial Judge that the workmen have already been driven from pillar to post and in spite of repeated orders of the highest Court of the land, the appellant did not pay them the bonus to which they were legally entitled, till they resorted to the strike. It must also be borne in mind that the workmen immediately called off the strike on April 15, 1981, on receiving an assurance from the appellant that the bonus will be paid.

    33. That it is within the powers of the Court to mandate respondent No. 1 pay to the workmen, the wages for the strike period and to strike down the impugned circulars will find support from a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of L. Robert D'Souza v. Executive Engineer, Southern Railwayin,(14) In this case, a question arose whether the termination of service for unauthorised absence from duty by a workman amounts to retrenchment and whether the purportedly retrenched workman is entitled to reinstatement and wages. Although these issues were being adjudicated by a Labour Court and the writ petition was dismissed by the High Court, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal by the workman and observed as follows (at page 163):

    “There is no dispute that the appellant would be a workman within the meaning of the expression in Section 2(s) of the Act. Further, it is incontrovertible that he has rendered continuous service for a period over 20 years. Therefore, the first condition of Section 25-F that appellant is a workman who has rendered service for not less than one year under the Railway Administration, an employer carrying on an industry, and that his service is terminated which, for the reasons hereinbefore given, would constitute retrenchment. It is immaterial that he is a daily-rated worker. He is either doing manual or technical work and his salary was less than Rs. 500 and the termination of his service does not fall in any of the excepted categories. Therefore, assuming that he was a daily-rated worker, once he has rendered continuous uninterrupted service for a period of one year or more, within the meaning of Section 25-F of the Act and his service is terminated for any reason whatsoever and the case does not fall in any of the excepted categories, notwithstanding the fact that Rule 2505 would be attracted, it would have to be read subject to the provisions of the Act-Accordingly, the termination of service in this case would constitute retrenchment and for not complying with pre-conditions to valid retrenchment, the order of termination would be illegal and invalid.

    Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and declare that the termination of service of the appellant was illegal and invalid and the appellant continues to be in service and he would be entitled to full back wages and costs quantified at Rs. 2,000.”

    34. We, therefore, hold that if the strike is legal and justified then the employees are entitled to wages for the period of the strike. In the instant case, the strike was legal and justified. The impugned notices dated April 16, 1981, and April 23, 1981, were liable to be quashed and the learned Judge rightly quashed the same. The Court has the power in appropriate cases to direct payment of wages for the strike period if the strike is legal and justified. In the instant case, there is sufficient material before this Court to hold that the srike was legal and jusifiable and hence the employees are entitled to the payment of wages for the period of the strike. For the reasons stated above, we uphold the decision of the learned trial Judge in making the rule absolute and in quashing the circulars dated Aprli 16, 1981, and April 23, 1981, copies whereof are Annexures “C” and “D” to the petition. We also uphold the decisions of the learned trial Judge whereby he directed the appellant to pay the concerned employees the salaries for the strike period together with interest at 12% per annum.

    35. There is another point to be taken into consideration though not argued from the Bar. It appears from the copy of the notice of motion dated September 20, 1982 (pages 151 to 155 of the paper book), that an order was passed by the Appeal Court on September 20, 1982, in terms of prayers “A” to “B” of the said notice of motion. Prayer “A” of the notice of motion reads as hereunder:

    “(a) Leave be given to the petitioners to file the memorandum of appeal without certified copies of the judgment and order dated August 25, 1982, passed by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice P.C Borooah on the following undertakings:

    (i) To have the order dated August 25, 1982, to be drawn up and obtain certified copies of the judgment and order both dated August 25, 1982, and include the same in the paper book.

    (ii) To have the judgment and/or order to be made herein drawn up and filed and included in the paper book.

    (iii) To include in the paper book a list of dates showing that the appeal is not barred by the limitation.”

    36. One of the undertakings given to this Court was to the effect that the appellant will include in the paper book a list of dates showing that the appeal is not barred by limitation. It does not appear from the paper-book that the appellant has complied with the said undertaking. This appeal is in any event liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs certified for two counsel.

    Devi Singh Tewatia, C.J:— I agree.

    37. Appeal Dismissed

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