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Equivalent Citations
citation codes
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  • Order 21, rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure or section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
  • Order 21, rule 90 of the Code or section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.15.
  • Order 21, rule 90 of the Code read with section 18 of the Limitation Act.
  • Order 21, rule 90 of the Code or section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act
  • Order 21, rule 90 or section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act,
  • Order 21, rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Code of Civil Procedure under Order 21, rule 66
  • section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • SECTION 18 INDIAN LIMITATION ACT
  • section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act
  • provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act
  • SECTION 18 LIMITATION ACT
  • provisions of Order 21, rule 90,
  • Order 21, rule 66 of the Code
  • 21, rule 90 of the Code.
  • rule (Order 21, rule 2)
  • Order 21, rule 66(2)
  • Order 21, rule 90
  • Order 21, rule 89)
  • 9, rule 13
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Order 21, rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure or section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
  • Order 21, rule 90 of the Code or section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.15.
  • Order 21, rule 90 of the Code read with section 18 of the Limitation Act.
  • Order 21, rule 90 of the Code or section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act
  • Order 21, rule 90 or section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act,
  • Order 21, rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Code of Civil Procedure under Order 21, rule 66
  • section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • SECTION 18 INDIAN LIMITATION ACT
  • section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act
  • provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act
  • SECTION 18 LIMITATION ACT
  • provisions of Order 21, rule 90,
  • Order 21, rule 66 of the Code
  • 21, rule 90 of the Code.
  • rule (Order 21, rule 2)
  • Order 21, rule 66(2)
  • Order 21, rule 90
  • Order 21, rule 89)
  • 9, rule 13
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion addresses an application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure challenging an appellate court's dismissal of a petition to set aside a sale conducted in execution of a decree for arrears of rent. The sale occurred on October 12, 1955, and the petition to set aside it under section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act was filed on January 2, 1959. The petitioners, judgment-debtors, claimed ignorance of the sale until December 1958 and alleged fraudulent suppression of the sale proceedings. The trial court set aside the sale with respect to one-third share of one judgment-debtor, finding lack of knowledge and undervaluation. Two judgment-debtors settled with the decree-holder, limiting the set-aside to one-third share. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s findings, holding that notices were served and possession was taken peacefully. The present petition under section 115 challenges the appellate court’s order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sale conducted in execution of the rent decree can be set aside on grounds of fraudulent suppression and undervaluation despite the delay in filing the petition.
  2. Whether the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act and the Code of Civil Procedure, specifically Order 21, rule 90, provide the exclusive remedy for setting aside such sales.
  3. Whether the court has inherent power to set aside the sale independently of statutory provisions when the petition is barred by limitation.
  4. What is the effect of undervaluation by the decree-holder and the court’s duty to correct inadvertent or careless omissions in the sale proclamation.
  5. Whether the court can impose conditions, such as deposit of additional sums, for setting aside the sale and the consequences of non-deposit.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Marudanaygam Pillai v. Manickam Vasakam Chettiar, 72 Indian Appeals 104 Fraud in court sale and setting aside sale under Order 21, rule 90 CPC Confirmed that sales obtained by initial misrepresentation and suppression of material facts can be set aside under statutory provisions; inherent power not independently exercised.
Monmatha Nath Chakravarti v. Sachindra Kumar Chakravarti, 59 Calcutta Weekly Notes 1082 Interpretation of proviso to Order 21, rule 90 CPC and fraud in sale proclamation Supported Judicial Committee's view limiting scope of proviso and emphasizing statutory remedy for setting aside sales.
Arjun Singh v. Mahendra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993 Exclusivity of statutory remedies and limitation on inherent powers of courts Held that inherent powers cannot be invoked to override specific statutory provisions for setting aside sales.
Zainul Abdin Khan v. Md. Ashgar Ali, 15 Indian Appeals 12 Exercise of inherent powers and protection of third party interests Emphasized caution in exercising inherent powers when third party interests intervene.
Seth Nanhelal v. Umrao Singh, 58 Indian Appeals 50 Effect of confirmed sales and protection of auction purchaser's rights Held that confirmed sales cannot be set aside lightly, especially to protect innocent third parties.
Chhatraput Singh Dugar v. Kharag Singh Lachmiram, 44 IA 11 Inherent powers and statutory remedies in insolvency context Held that statutory remedies are exclusive and inherent powers cannot be used to circumvent them.
Debi Baksh v. Habib Sah, 40 IA 151 Use of inherent powers to set aside decree in exceptional circumstances Recognized court's inherent power to correct mistakes even when statutory remedy is available but inapplicable.
Manilal Mohanlal v. Sardar Ahmed, 1955(1) SCR 108 Limitations on inherent powers to circumvent statutory provisions Held that inherent powers cannot be used to bypass mandatory statutory provisions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by recognizing that the appeal court had found the sale proclamation was duly served and possession was peacefully taken, rejecting claims of fraudulent suppression and forceful dispossession. It noted that the sale was conducted under the Bengal Tenancy Act as a rent sale, but due to the Estates Acquisition Act, the relationship of landlord and tenant ceased, altering the nature of the sale to one of the judgment-debtor's right, title, and interest rather than occupancy rights.

The court examined the statutory framework, specifically Order 21, rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, which provide the exclusive remedies for setting aside sales. It referred to authoritative precedents emphasizing that inherent powers of the court cannot override or circumvent these statutory remedies, particularly when the petition is barred by limitation under section 18 of the Limitation Act.

While acknowledging the court's duty to correct inadvertent or careless errors—such as undervaluation in the sale proclamation—and to prevent unconscionable gain by the decree-holder, the court held that such correction must be exercised cautiously. It must consider the conduct of the judgment-debtor and the interests of innocent third parties. The court rejected the idea that inherent powers alone could set aside the sale if statutory remedies were unavailable or time-barred.

In the present case, the petition was barred by limitation, and the appellate court’s factual findings negated fraudulent suppression. Therefore, the statutory remedy was unavailable. However, the court recognized the decree-holder’s unfair advantage gained by undervaluation and directed that the decree-holder deposit an additional sum of Rs. 300 as compensation for this unconscionable gain. Failure to deposit this amount would allow the judgment-debtor to recover the sum by execution of this order, but the sale itself would not be set aside.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED the petition to set aside the sale on grounds of limitation and absence of fraudulent suppression.

The court held that statutory remedies under Order 21, rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act are exclusive for setting aside sales, and inherent powers cannot be invoked to override these provisions where the petition is time-barred. However, recognizing the unfair undervaluation and consequent unjust enrichment of the decree-holder, the court directed a compensatory deposit of Rs. 300 to be made by the decree-holder. Failure to comply would empower the judgment-debtor to recover this amount by execution, but the sale would stand confirmed.

This decision clarifies the limited scope of inherent powers in execution proceedings, reinforcing the exclusivity of statutory remedies and emphasizing the court’s role in preventing abuse of process and unjust enrichment without contravening statutory limitations. No new precedent was set beyond applying established principles to the facts of the case.

    Basanta Kr. Biswas v. Mihirlal Biswas Opposite Party.

    1. This is an application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against a judgment and order passed by the appellate court dismissing an application for setting aside a sale and reversing the order of the second court of Munsif at Alipore in Execution Case No. 189 of 1956.

    2. This application is by the judgment-debtor. The sale in question was held on October 12, 1955 and the petition for setting aside the sale under section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act was filed on January 2, 1959. The petitioners' case was that they had no knowledge of the sale till December 1958 when the decree-holder came to take possession of the property by force. The case was that all processes were suppressed; that there was fraudulent suppression of all proceedings relating to the publication and conduct of the sale and, further, that the judgment-debtor was kept out of his knowledge of the remedy available to him for having the sale set aside, in other words, the petitioners requisitioned section 18 of the Indian Limitation Act to avoid. the bar of limitation. The trial court set aside the sale with respect to one-third share of the judgment-debtor petitioner. The trial court found that the judgment-debtor had no knowledge of the sale and that the property was sold at an inadequate price. Two of the judgment-debtors, who filed the application for setting aside the sale, settled the matter with the decree-holder; the sale was, therefore, set aside only with regard to one-third share. The proper-ty in question is 1-57 acres of land situated in a village; the rent of the property was Rs. 18|12 as and the land was agri-cultural. Decree was obtained for Rs. 87/- and odd on June 2, 1955 for arrears of rent and the Execution Case was started on August 26, 1955 in respect of the said agricultural land. The case of the petitioner was that the claim in the Rent Suit was false and the property was under-valued in the sals proclama-tion and there were other material irregularities and fraud in publishing and conducting the sale. The appeal court, however, set aside the findings of the trial court and dismissed the petition. Against that order the present petition was filed by one of the judgment-debtors, who did not settle the matter with the decree-holder.

    3. The question whether the processes were served or not is a question of fact. The appeal court found the factum of service of those notices. It also found that the decree-holder took delivery of possession after the sale was confirmed. The appeal court was inclined to find that there was undervaluation. The appeal court has not believed the judgment-debtor's case that the decree-holder came to take delivery of possession by force on December 19, 1958.

    4. The appeal court proceeded on the basis that as it was a Rent Execution Case, the sale will have the effect of a rent sale under the Bengal Tenancy Act. The courts below did not consider that, at the date when the decree for rent was passed as well as on the date on which the application for the present execution was filed, i.e, on June 22, 1955 and August 26, 1955 respectively, there was no relationship of landlord and tenant as between the parties because the Estates Acquisition Act came into force in the meantime, i.e, on the 1st Baisakh 1362 B.S corresponding to April 14, 1955 and the interest of the decree-holder vested in the State Government. Hence, the sale would not have the effect of a sale under the Bengal Tenancy Act but would merely be a sale of the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor in the property and the decree-holder would not purchase the occupancy holding.

    5. The appeal court considered evidence on record and on a consideration of evidence came to the finding that the judgment-debtor failed to prove any fraudulent concealment preventing him from coming up to the court with an application for setting aside the sale within time. On this finding of fact, the court of revision has no power to interfere either under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure or under article 227 of the Constitution.

    6. But I have been referred to a judgment of the Judicial Committee in (1) 72 Indian Appeals 104 (Marudanay-gam Pillai v. Manickam. Vasakam Che-ttiar), which has been considered by a Division Bench of this Court in (2) 59 Calcutta Weekly Notes 1082 (Monmatha Nath Chakravarti v. Sachindra Kumar Chakravarti). The argument of the learned Advocate for the petitioner is that even if an application is filed under Order 21, rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure and even if the judgment-debtor is not entitled to the benefit of section 18 of the Indian Limitation Act, the court still has inherent power to set aside the sale.

    7. The Judicial Committee in the aforesaid case reported in (1) 72 Indian Appeals 104 held at page 112 as follows:—

    “If he purchased at what he knew was too low a figure based on an upset price accepted by the Court owing to his own initial misrepresentation and subsequent suppression of material facts, his conduct would amount to fraud as the learned subordinate judge points out. The court could not have allowed the respondent purchasing at a court sale to take advantage of his own fraud whatever the conduct of the appellant might be.”

    8. The Judicial Committee held that the court would set aside the sale provided (1) there was an initial misrepresentation of material facts and (2) there was subsequent suppression of material facts. If there be ‘initial misrepresentation of material facts’ the case comes within Order 21, rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure or section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. If there be subsequent suppression of material facts the case comes within section 18 of the Limitation Act. In such circumstances the conduct of the judgment-debtor is not material. At page 113, their Lordships held “the case falls within the language of rule 90 that however dilatory and unsatisfactory the conduct of the appellant might have been he has not on the facts found debarred, himself from the right to have the sale set aside”. The Judicial Committee said the bar of limitation was not there. A Division Bench of this Court in the decision in (2) 59 Calcutta Weekly Notes 1082, considered the matter. Their Lordships considered the observation of the Judicial Committee at page 112 and found that the provisions of Order 21, rule 90, priviso (ii) as in Calcutta, would not, in any way, affect the decision of the Judicial Committee which was with reference to the law then in force in Madras. Their Lordships found that the second proviso would include a case of omission, deficiency and defect in a sale proclamation but not fraud in the causing of its drawing up and in the furnishing of particulars.

    9. The aforesaid discussion will show that the Judicial Committee did not exercise inherent power of a court in setting aside the sale. The sale was set aside on the petition under Order 21, rule 90 which was allowed and the Judicial Committee found that as the conditions laid down under Order 21, rule 90 were fulfilled the application would be maintainable. The Judicial Committee further referred to the suppression of material facts because the application was not within time. Hence, as suppression of meterial facts was proved as under section 18 of the Limitation Act and as conditions laid down in Order 21, rule 90 were also proved, the sale was set aside. In Such circums-tances, the sale would be set aside irrespective of the conduct of the judgment-debtor and irrespective of the dilatory tactics that he might have adopted. Hence, the aforesaid decision of the Judicial Committee is no authority for the proposition that if there is fraud upon the court, the court must set aside the sale independent of the provision of the Limitation Act. If there be fraud upon the court, the conditions under Order 21, rule 90 may be satisfied. The Code of Civil Procedure under Order 21, rule 66 imposes upon the court the duty “to draw up the sale proclamation after notices to the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor” and the court has ordinarily a duty to state the nature and value of the property. But in Calcutta there is a proviso to Order 21, rule 66(2) which is as follows:— “it shall not be necessary for the court itself to give its-own estimate of the value of the property but the proclamation shall include the estimate, if any, given by either or both the parties”. Therefore, if the value of the property is given both by the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor the court will insert them in the sale proclamation; but if only one of them gives his value the court is also empowered to include that value; it shall not be necessary for the court itself to give its own estimate of the value of the property. But this does not mean that in every case the court will leave the matter of valuation to the decree-holder particularly when the judgment-debtor gives no valuation. My learned brother Bijayesh Mukherji, J., in a case reported in (3) 71 Calcutta Weekly Notes 649, has taken the view that Order 21, rule 66 of the Code does not relieve the court of its duty and the court can take judicial notice of certain matters. It has also been decided that the court can correct its own mistakes if they are made inadvertently or carebessly. I entirely agree.

    10. If the decree-holder gives a valuation which is very low and the court finds at the hearing of the application for setting aside the sale that the said valuation was very low and further finds that the court should have-cheeked the said valuation, there would be an inadvertent or careless omission on the part of the court which the court may correct because there is an omission of its own; further the decree-holder should not be allowed to retain an unconscionable gain if he has made it. But before the court exercises its inherent powers to correct that mistake further considerations may arise. They may be (1) that the conduct of the judgment-debtor was such that the court would not be inclined to interfere in his affairs even though it committed an error and (2) if the interests of an innocent third party has intervened. Before the court exercises its inherent power in favour of any person the court will consider whether exercise of such power in favour of that person would result in an abuse of the process of the court or do hardship or injustice to innocent parties: such inherent power is exercised for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of law and for doing justice between the parties. If, in any case, it appears to a court that exercise of such inherent powers would rather be an abuse of the process of law than preventing abuse of the process of law or would do rather injustice than justice, the court would not, because of the very provision of section 151, exercise its inherent powers. I need hardly refer to the case of (4) Zainul Abdin Khan v. Md. Ashgar Ali, reported in 15 Indian Appeals 12. In (5) LR 58 Indian Appeals 50 at page 56 (Seth Nanhelal v. Umrao Singh) the Judicial Committee observed at page 56:— “When once a sale has been effected, third party's interest intervens and there is nothing in this rule (Order 21, rule 2) to suggest that it is to be disregarded”. Hence, if there be an innocent third party auction purchaser the court may not exercise its inherent powers, if any, to set aside the sale which would affect the interest of the said third party. This does not mean that in no case where the auction purchaser is a third party the court will interfere. I merely say if the case does not come under Order 21, rule 90 or if it be barred by limitation, the court may, in proper circumstances, exercise with caution its powers and correct its own mistakes.

    11. Referring to the facts of this case, the finding of facts arrived at by the appellate court below are (i) that the proclamation was served, (ii) that there was under-valuation and (iii) that there was no suppression which would bring the case within section 18 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, whatever be the merit of the petition under Order 21, rule 90 the application will be rejected on the ground of limitation because it was filed more than three years after the sale. But the next question is: Should the sale be set aside by inherent powers if the court cannot set aside the sale under Order 21. Rule 90 of the Code or section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act? This matter was not urged before my brother Bijayesh Mukher-ji, J., in the case referred to above. The sale in that case was set aside substantially under Order 21, rule 90 of the Code read with section 18 of the Limitation Act. But in my view, the application now in question under section 174 is barred by limitation and must therefore be dismissed. The question is can the sale be set aside in exercise of the inherent powers of the court under such circumstances? A sale is ordered under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure or under the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act and the said statutes provide the remedy for setting aside the sale. The law is if a statute grants to a person (the decree-holder) a right to have the property of another (judgment-debtor) sold and further grants one or another remedy to the said another (judgment-debtor) for set ting aside such sale that remedy will ordinarily be considered to be the ex clusive remedy. No further remedy is available in a court unless granted by the statute concerned. That means that a suit would not lie for setting aside the sale though an appropriate proceed ing may lie for declaring the sale to be null and void. The Supreme Court decided so in (6) Arjun Singh v. Mahendra Kumar reported in AIR 1964 SC 993 at 1003:— “If there are specific provisions in the Code………. they ex haust the powers of the Court ………, inherent power cannot be invoked to cut across the powers conferred by the Code.”

    12. The question is if the remedy granted by the statute is not available, should the court grant the same remedy by exercising its inherent power? The authorities answer the question in the negative. The Judicial Committee in (7) Chhatraput Singh Dugar v. Kharag Singh Lachmiram in 44 IA 11 relating to an insolvency matter observed at p. 14: “……… a debtor who brings him self within the terms of the Act is not to be deprived of that right on so treacherous a ground of decision as an abuse of the proceess of the court”. If a case does not come under Order 21, rule 90 of the Code or section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act or if it is barred by limitation, I find it difficult to hold that the court can set aside the sale in its inherent powers on the sole ground of correcting an inadvertent error or careless omission on the part of the Court. The auction purchaser acquires a right under the law and ordinarily he should not be deprived of his property by exercising inherent power where the provisions of law grant him a safe position. In (5) 58 IA page 50 (with reference to Order 21, rule 89) at page 56 the Judicial Committee observed:— “The only means by which the judgment-debtor can get rid of a sale which has been duly carried out are those in section 89”. The Judicial Committee further said:— “Upon the wording of rule 92 the court shall confirm the sale”. In (8) 19 IA 154, the Judicial Committee observed that the court had no power to set aside the sale, on the petition of an auction purchaser, hence it must be confirmed.

    13. A decree-holder who has inserted a low valuation and has purchased at a law valuation has gained an unfair advantage by the use of the rule of procedure and the Court has the inherent power to take appropriate steps for such abuse of the process of law. In (9) Debi Baksh v. Habib Sah, 40 IA 151 the court set aside a decree under its inherent power and even though law recognises order 9, rule 13 as the appropriate remedy for setting aside the decree. The reason is the defendant was dead and the court did not then know it. The case did not really come under order 9, rule 13. The trend of modern judicial decisions has been that the decree-holder should not be allowed to make a profit by his own act of valuing the property too low and the court also, has a duty to correct its own inadvertent or careless mistakes in not checking the sale proclamation and the court has therefore a duty to relieve the judgment-debtor of the hardship caused by the court's own act and the decree-holder's action. The judgment-debtor purchased the one-third share of the property in question in 1953 for Rs. 500/-. The area of the land is 1-52 acres and it is agricultural land in the mufussil. A court sale does not fetch the same price as in a transfer inter-vivos. Hence, the decree-holder auction purchaser should be asked to deposit a further sum of Rs. 300/- in six months from this date.

    14. The next question is if the decree-holder does not deposit the said amount, what orders should be passed? If the sale is directed to be set aside in default, the matter would be made simple; but in that case the sale is set aside on condition; such an order may be made under Order 21, rule 90 of the Code or section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.

    15. But no such order can be made on the petition for setting aside the sale, if the petition is itself barred by time. After rejecting the petition under Order 21, rule 90 or section 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the court cannot indirectly allow it and cannot invoke inherent power to circumvent the mandatory provisions of the Code vide 1955(1) SCR 108 at 116— (Manilal Mo-hanlal v. Sardar Ahmed). The sale cannot be set aside, if the said amount of Rs. 300/- be not deposited. After rejection of the petition, the court will have no other alternative than to confirm the sale. Hence, in default of deposit of Rs. 300)- by the decree-holder, the sale cannot be driected to be set aside.

    16. But the fact is that the decree-holder made gain by giving a low value in the sale proclamation and thus purchasing it at a low price. If the judg ment-debtor has not paid his debt there is nothing wrong in selling the judgment-debtor's, property for satisfaction of the debt, at the same time the judgment-debtor should get a fair-price for the property sold and the decree-holder should not be allowed to make an unconsionable gain. Hence, the decree-holder must pay the proper price. In this matter, there is also involved some amount of inadvertence or carelessness on the part of the court and hence it is not enough for the court to express its regrets to the judgment-debtor and ask him to seek out a relief if he has any in accordance with law. The court should interfere as nobody should suffer because of the act or omission of the court. Hence, the only order that can be passed in default of payment, is that the judgment-debtor may realise the amount of Rs. 300/- by execution of this order. He cannot be relegated to a suit for realisation of this amount and the court can direct realisation by execution of this order. This is in conformity with the decision in 66 IA 84. Hence, I reject the petition under order 21, rule 90 of the Code. But I direct the decree-holder to deposit in the Executing Court a sum of Rs. 300/- within six months from this date for the unconscionable gain that he made. In case of default, the petitioner-judgment-debtor will realise the said sum of Rs. 300/- by execution of this order.

    No order as to costs.

    S.K.B

    Order 21, rule 90

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    Basanta Kr. Biswas v. Mihirlal Biswas Opposite Party.
    (Aug 9, 1967)