Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of section 112 and sub-section (1) of section 112 and sub-section (1) of section 116,
  • inquiry.2. Section 116 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 116 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • section 108, Section 109, or section 110
  • sub-section (2) of section 116,
  • sub-section (3) of section 116
  • section 117(3) of the Code.
  • perverse.3. Section 116(1)
  • section 111. Section 112
  • Section 116(6) Cr.P.C
  • Section 2(g)
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of section 112 and sub-section (1) of section 112 and sub-section (1) of section 116,
  • inquiry.2. Section 116 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 116 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • section 108, Section 109, or section 110
  • sub-section (2) of section 116,
  • sub-section (3) of section 116
  • section 117(3) of the Code.
  • perverse.3. Section 116(1)
  • section 111. Section 112
  • Section 116(6) Cr.P.C
  • Section 2(g)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The reference question before the Division Bench was when an inquiry under Section 116 of the Code of Criminal Procedure commences. On the facts of the case summarized in the opinion, the petitioner surrendered before the Sub Divisional Magistrate on 5-11-1999. The inquiry, according to the record summarized by the court, continued after 19-5-2000. The appellant asked the Magistrate to terminate the proceedings on the ground that six months had expired from the date of commencement; the Magistrate rejected that prayer. The present opinion addresses that refusal and the underlying question of when the inquiry is deemed to have commenced for the purposes of Section 116(6) Cr.P.C.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. When does an inquiry under Section 116 of the Code of Criminal Procedure commence for the purposes of the six-month limit in Section 116(6) — from the date of recording of evidence or from the date of appearance of the person before the Magistrate?
  2. Whether proceedings under Chapter VIII (sections 106–124) stand terminated automatically on expiry of six months from the commencement of the inquiry unless the Magistrate records special reasons in writing to continue.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mathukutty v. State of Kerala (1995 (1) KLT 742) Held that the inquiry under Section 116 commences only from the date of recording of evidence. The Magistrate had followed this decision; the Division Bench in the present opinion held that Mathukutty was not correctly decided and set aside the impugned order that relied on it.
Saju Varghese v. State (2005 (1) KLD (Cri) 570) Held that the inquiry for the purpose of Section 116(6) commences from the date of appearance of the counter petitioner before the Sub Divisional Magistrate and not from the date of recording of evidence. The court agreed with the view expressed in Saju Varghese and expressly stated its concurrence with that decision.
Madhu Limaye v. Ved Murti ((1970) 3 SCC 739 : AIR 1971 SC 2481) Observed that a Magistrate can ask for an interim bond only if he cannot complete the inquiry and that the power to ask for an interim bond is not to be used to postpone hearing and yet require a bond. The opinion relied on the proposition that the Magistrate must make some inquiry and be prima facie satisfied before insisting on an interim bond, but clarified that Madhu Limaye did not hold that an inquiry commences only at the recording of evidence.
Madhu Limaye v. Sub Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr ((1970) 3 SCC 746 : AIR 1971 SC 2486) Considered whether a Magistrate can defer inquiry and yet ask for an interim bond; emphasized that some inquiry must be made before ordering an interim bond. The court treated this line of authority as establishing that an interim bond can be required only after some inquiry satisfies the Magistrate that there is a prima facie case, while rejecting any inference that inquiry for Section 116 starts only at recording of evidence.
Nareshkumar Jain v. State of UP (1993 Crl. L.J 1352 - All) Held that provisions (sections 106–110) are mandatory and failure to comply renders proceedings invalid. Cited to support the proposition that the statutory requirements in Chapter VIII are mandatory in character and failure to follow them will invalidate proceedings.
Babulal v. State of MP (1991 Crl. L.J 786 - MP) Before issuing a show-cause notice under section 111, the Magistrate must apply his mind, consider the police report and be satisfied that a prima facie case exists to take action under sections 107–110. Cited as authority for the requirement that the Magistrate must be satisfied of a prima facie case before issuing show-cause notice under section 111.
State of Kerala v. Achutha Panicker (1975 KLT 703) Observed that the trial of an accused person commences when he is called upon to plead and proceedings up to framing charge are in the nature of an inquiry; distinguished inquiry from trial. Used to explain statutory distinction between inquiry and trial and to support the court's reading of Section 116 and related provisions about when inquiry begins.
Fakruddin v. State Police (AIR 1962 AP 236) Referenced as part of authorities discussing the distinction between inquiry and trial. Referred to by an earlier judgment (Achutha Panicker) as supporting material on the inquiry/trial distinction; relied upon indirectly for definition and scope of inquiry.
Narayanaswami Naidu v. Emperor (ILR 32 Mad. 220) Referenced as part of authorities discussing the distinction between inquiry and trial. Referred to by an earlier judgment (Achutha Panicker) and used as supporting authority for the distinction between inquiry and trial.
Sita Ram v. State of Bihar (AIR 1980 Pat. 257) Full Bench of Patna High Court held that the date of appearance of the person to be proceeded against is the starting point of inquiry. The opinion expressly adopted this view and stated that inquiry commences as soon as the accused appears before the court.
Bhajan Rai v. State (1990 (2) Crimes 307) Followed the Patna Full Bench view that inquiry begins on the date of appearance. Noted as following the Sita Ram principle; cited as supporting authority for commencement on appearance.
Dwarkanath Ramxhandra Angachekar v. State of Maharashtra (1997 Crl. L.J 120) Division Bench held that when an accused is present in court the inquiry is deemed to have commenced on that very day irrespective of recording of plea or further steps. Quoted at length and relied on as supporting the position that presence/appearance triggers commencement of inquiry.
J.C. Mehta v. State (1982 Crl. L.J 1488) Expressed view that inquiry commences on appearance/presence of accused. Referred to as another authority adopting the appearance-as-commencement view.
Hasan Ali v. State of Rajasthan ((1979) 12 WLN 151) Expressed view similar to appearance-start rule. Noted among decisions consistent with the view that inquiry starts on appearance.
Sons Khan v. State (1981 Crl. L.J 39) Full Bench of Orissa High Court held that inquiry starts only from the date when recording of evidence starts. Identified as a contrary view; Mathukutty followed this Full Bench; the present court rejects the conclusion that Section 116 inquiry starts only at recording of evidence.
Paresh Chandra Hati v. Ahitosh Panda (1978 Crl. L.T 1171) Calcutta High Court decision holding that inquiry commences when recording of evidence starts. Noted as a decision taking the recording-of-evidence view and relied upon by Mathukutty; treated as part of the contrary line of authority.
Motilal Jivanbhai v. Jesangbhai Nagjibhai (1988 Crl. L.J 255) Gujarat High Court decision following the recording-of-evidence commencement rule. Noted as another authority in the contrary line; used to illustrate division of opinion among High Courts.
Sona Khan v. State (1981 Cri. L.J 39) Full Bench decision (Orissa) holding that some inquiry must be made before ordering interim bond; cited regarding limits on Magistrate's power to insist on interim bond without inquiry. Cited for the principle that some inquiry is necessary before an interim bond is ordered; the court reads this as consistent with requiring prima facie satisfaction before ordering bond, not as fixing the commencement date at recording of evidence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began with the statutory text of Section 116 Cr.P.C., emphasizing subsection (1) which directs that "when an order under section 111 has been read or explained under section 112 to a person in Court, or when any person appears or is brought before a Magistrate in compliance with section 113, the Magistrate shall proceed to inquire into the truth of the information ... and to take such further evidence as may appear necessary." Subsection (2) prescribes the manner of inquiry to follow the summons-case procedure "as nearly as may be practicable," and subsection (6) prescribes completion of the inquiry within six months from the date of its commencement unless special reasons are recorded in writing.

The court considered the statutory definition of "inquiry" in Section 2(g) — "every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court" — and the procedural provisions governing recording of evidence (Chapter XXIII; sections 274 and 275). It relied on the distinction drawn in State of Kerala v. Achutha Panicker that proceedings up to framing of a charge are in the nature of an inquiry and that inquiry is distinct from trial.

The opinion reviewed conflicting High Court authorities: one line (Patna Full Bench, Bombay Division Bench, Delhi and Rajasthan High Courts and others) treats appearance/presence as the commencement point; another line (Orissa Full Bench, Calcutta and Gujarat High Courts) treats commencement as the date recording of evidence starts. The court analyzed Supreme Court authority in Madhu Limaye (and related Madhu Limaye decisions), concluding that the Supreme Court requires some inquiry and prima facie satisfaction by the Magistrate before ordering an interim bond but did not hold that the statutory inquiry for Section 116 begins only at the recording of evidence.

Interpreting Section 116(1) together with the definition of "inquiry", the court held that the inquiry commences when the accused appears before the Magistrate and the Magistrate proceeds with the case (for example by reading/explaining the order under section 111 as required by section 112). The court emphasized that subsection (3) (allowing interim bonds "after the commencement and before the completion of the inquiry") indicates that "commencement" precedes any interim bond but does not fix commencement to the technical moment of recording evidence. The court concluded that the proper construction is that appearance and the Magistrate's action of reading/explaining the order marks commencement of the inquiry, subject to the Magistrate's duty to make some inquiry and be prima facie satisfied before imposing an interim bond.

Applying this analysis to the facts, the court found that the inquiry commenced when the petitioner surrendered on 5-11-1999. Because the proceedings continued beyond six months (i.e., after 19-5-2000) and no special reasons had been recorded by the Magistrate to continue them, the court held that the proceedings stood terminated on expiry of the six-month period. The Magistrate's refusal to terminate the proceedings (on the ground of Mathukutty) was therefore incorrect and was set aside.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that an inquiry under Section 116 Cr.P.C. commences as soon as the person against whom action is taken appears before the Magistrate and the Magistrate proceeds (for example by reading/explaining the order under section 111), and that proceedings under Section 116(6) stand terminated on expiry of six months from that commencement unless the Magistrate records special reasons in writing to continue. The court set aside the impugned order and held that the proceedings taken against the appellant came to an automatic end.

Immediate implications for the parties: The impugned order refusing to terminate the proceedings was set aside; the proceedings against the appellant were deemed to have terminated automatically on the expiry of six months from the date of appearance (5-11-1999 in this case).

Further, the court expressly held that the decision in Mathukutty (1995 (1) KLT 742) was not correctly decided and agreed with the view expressed in Saju Varghese (2005 (1) KLD (Cri) 570). The opinion stresses that preventive proceedings under Chapter VIII are intended to be disposed of expeditiously and that undue delay undermines the purpose of the statutory provision.

The opinion did not elaborate broader doctrinal consequences beyond these specific holdings and did not set out additional implications beyond the direct effect on the parties and the court's critique and disapproval of the Mathukutty decision.

    Muhammedkutty Thomas v. State Of Kerala

    J.B Koshy, J.:— When an inquiry under Section 116 of the Code of Criminal Procedure commences is the question referred by a learned single Judge of this court to be decided by the Division Bench. In Mathukutty v. State of Kerala (1995 (1) KLT 742) it was held that the inquiry will commence only from the date of recording of evidence. Another learned single Judge in Saju Varghese v. State (2005 (1) KLD (Cri) 570) held that the inquiry commences for the purpose of section 116(6) from the date of appearance of the counter petitioner before the Sub Divisional Magistrate and not fro the date of recording of evidence. Section 116(6) Cr.P.C provides that inquiry under section 116 shall be completed within a period of six months from the date of commencement and on the expiry of six months, the said period shall stand terminated unless for special reasons to be recorded in writing the Magistrate otherwise directs. Chapter VIII of Cr. P.C (sections 106 to 124) provides preventive measures for keeping public peace etc. and are aimed at persons who are potential danger to the general public by reason of their likelihood of commission of certain offences by them. Therefore, they can be directed to execute a bond as security for keeping peace and for good behaviour and on default of execution of bond, results in the detention. Even;though, in appearance, it as an administrative order as held in Madhu Limaya v. Sub Divisional Magistrate. Monghyr ((1970) 3 SCC 746 : AIR 1971 SC 2486), it is really judicial in character. Sections 106 to 110 details circumstances when a person can be directed to execute a bond or security. Sections 111 to 124 provides the procedure according to which security and execution of bond can be asked for keeping peace or for good behavious. Section 111 obliges that the Magistrate acting under section 107 to 110 to require such persons to show cause by order in writing setting forth the substance of the information received, the amount of bond to be executed, the terms for which it is to be in force and the number, character and class of sureties, if any, required. The above provisions are mandatory in character failing which the proceedings will become invalid as held in Nareshkumar Jain v. State of UP (1993 Crl. L.J 1352 - All). Before issuing an order of show cause notice under section 111, Magistrate shall apply his mind and shall consider the police report and shall be satisfied that a prima facie case has been made out to take action under section 107 to 110 (See: Babulal v. State of MP, 1991 Crl. L.J 786 - MP). When a person is called upon to show cause why he should not be required to give security for good behavious, he must be ready with his evidence when he appears in obedience to the notice unless he obtains; an adjournment for reasonable cause. The notice issued to the person must accompany the preliminary order under section 111. Section 112 prescribes the procedure when such person is present in court. The Magistrate is bound to read over to him the substance of the order/show cause notice passed against him and it shall be explained to him, if he so desires. Section 113 enables the Magistrate to summon directing him to appear before the Magistrate. Proviso to section 113 enables the Magistrate to issue arrest warrant in certain cares and section 114 provides that copy of the order with show cause notice should be delivered along with the warrant. Section 115 gives power to dispense with personal attendance and section 116 prescribes the procedure to conduct the inquiry.

    2. Section 116 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows:

    “116. Inquiry as to truth of information:— (1) When an order under section 111 has been read or explained under section 112 to a person in Court, or when any person apears or is brought before a Magistrate in compliance with, or in execution of, a summons or warrant, issued under section 113, the Magistrate shall proceed to inquire into the truth of the information upon which action has been taken, and to take such further evidence as may appear necessary.

    (2) Such inquiry shall be made, as nearly as may be practicable, in the manner hereinafter prescribed for conducting trial and recording evidence in summons - cases.

    (3) After the commencement, and before the completion, of the inquiry under sub-section (1), the Magistrate, if he considers that immediate measures are necessary for the prevention of a breach of the peace of disturbance of the public tranquility or the commission of any offence or for the public safety, may, for reason to be recorded in writing, direct the person in respect of whom the order under section 111 has been made to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for keeping the peace or maintaining, good behaviour until the conclusion of the inquiry and may detain him in custody until such bond is executed or, in default of execution, until the inquiry is concluded:

    Provided that—

    (a) no person against whom proceedings are not being taken over under section 108, Section 109, or section 110 shall be directed to execute a bond for maintaining good behavious;

    (b) the conditions of such bond, whether as to the amount thereof or as to the provision of sureties or the number thereof or the pecuniary extent of their liability, shall not be more onerous than those specified in the order under section 111.

    (4) For the purposes of this section the fact that a person is a habitual offender or is so desperate and dangerous as to render his being at large without security hazardous to the community may be proved by evidence of general repute or otherwise.

    (5) Where two or more persons have been associated together in the matter under inquiry, they may be dealt within the same or separate inquiries as the Magistrate shall think just.

    (6) The inquiry under this section shall be completed within a period of six months from he date of its commencement, and if such inquiry is not so completed, the proceedings under this Chapter shall, on the expiry of the said period, stand terminated unless, for special reasons to be recorded in writing, the Magistrate otherwise directs:

    Provided that where any person has been kept in detention pending such inquiry, the proceeding against that person, unless terminated earlier, shall stand terminated on the expiry of a period of six months of such detention.

    (7) Where any direction is made under sub-section (6) permitting the continuance of proceedings, the Sessions Judge may, on an application made to him by the aggrieved party, vacate such direction if he is satisfied that it was not based on any special reason or was perverse”.

    3. Section 116(1) very clearly states that when an order is passed under section 111 has been read or explained or when a person is present before the Magistrate, the Magistrate shall proceed to inquire into the truth of the information upon which action has been taken and to take such further evidence as may appear necessary. Sub-section (2) states that, as far as practicable, the inquiry shall be conducted in the manner prescribed for conducting the trial and recording of evidence in a summons case and sub-section (6) provides that such enquiry, in normal case, unless a special order is passed, should be within a period of six months. So, on the expiry of six months of the commencement, such proceedings should stop unless special order is passed otherwise by the Magistrate.

    4. Before going to the contentions raised, we will come tot he definition of ‘inquiry’. Section 2(g) defines ‘inquiry’ as follows:

    “‘inquiry’ means every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court;”

    5. Mode of taking an recording evidence in enquiries and trials are mentioned in Chapter XXHI of Cr. P.C Recording of evidence in summons case and enquiries are specifically mentioned in section 274 and in warrant cases recording shall be done as provided under section 275. In this connection, we also refer to the decision reported in State of Kerala v. Achutha Panicker (1975 KLT 703) wherein it was observed that “the trial of mi accused person commences when he is called upon to plead to a charge and the proceedings up to the point of framing a charge is in the nature of an inquiry. There is real distinction between a trial and an inquiry. The definition of inquiry in the Code puts it beyond doubt that an inquiry is different from trial and that inquiry stops when the trial begins.” I holding so, the learned Judge has referred to the Division Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Fakruddin v. State Police (AIR 1962 AP 236) as well as in Narayanaswami Naidu v. Emperor (ILR 32 Mad. 220).

    6. It is true that the there is divergence of opinion regarding various High Courts regarding the question when enquiry High Courts regarding the question when enquiry starts. A Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Sita Ram v. State of Bihar (AIR 1980 Pat. 257) held that date of appearance of the person to be proceeded against is the starting point of enquiry. This was followed in Bhajan Rai v. State (1990 (2) Crimes 307). A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Dwarkanath Ramxhandra Angachekar v. State of Maharashtra (1997 Crl. L.J 120) held that the Magistrate is bound to proceed into the truth of the information when the accused is present and the enquiry starts as soon as the accused is present in court. In paragraph 26 it was held as follows:

    “26. Having regard to the provisions of section 112 and sub-section (1) of section 112 and sub-section (1) of section 116, and the fact that a summons procedure is prescribed for an enquiry by sub-section (2) of section 116, it would, appear that in the case of a person who is present in Court when the order under section 111 is passed, the said order must be read over to him and the substance thereof explained to him if so desired by him, on that very day and, therefore, the inquiry in his case shall be deemed to have commenced on that very day irrespective of the fact whether the Magistrate records his plea or not. In the case of an opponent who is not present in Court when the order made; under section 111 is passed, but, whose presence is secured by a summons or a warrant, as provided under section 113, it would appear that since there is nothing to prevent the Magistrate from reading the accusations to him and recording his plea on the very day when he so appears or is brought before the Magistrate and on the other hand there is a legislative mandate to proceed in inquire into the truth of the accusation on the happening of such an event it would appear that, irrespective of the fact whether the Magistrate records the plea of the opponent or not, and irrespective of the fact whether the Magistrate proceeds with the inquiry or not, the inquiry in the proceedings must be deemed to have commenced against such a person on the very day when his presence is thus secured on the day fixed by the Court.”

    7. A similar view was expressed by the Delhi High Court in J.C Mehta v. State (1982 Crl. L.J 1488) and Rajasthan High Court in Hasan Ali v. State of Rajasthan ((1979) 12 WLN 151). A Full Bench of the Orissa High Court took a different view in Sons Khan v. State (1981 Crl. L.J 39) and held that enquiry starts only from the date when recording of evidence starts. Similar view was taken by the Calcutta High Court in Paresh Chandra Hati v. Ahitosh Panda (1978 Crl. L.T 1171) and the Gujarat High Court in Motilal Jivanbhai v. Jesangbhai Nagjibhai (1988 Crl. L.J 255).

    8. In Mathukutty's case (supra), the learned single Judge of this Court followed the view expressed by the Full Bench of the Orissa High Court that enquiry under Section 116 of the Code of Criminal Procedure commences from the date on which the Magistrate starts recording of evidence. While coming to the conclusion, the court mainly relied on the Full Bench decision of the Orissa High Court in Sona Khan v. State (1981 Cri. L.J 39), Division Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Paresh Chandra Hati v. Ahitosh Panda (1978 Cri. L.J 1171). The learned single Judge of this court mainly relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Madhu Limaye v. Ved Murti ((1970) 3 SCC 739 : AIR 1971 SC 2481). In the above case, the Supreme Court observed as follows:

    “…. A Magistrate can ask for an interim bond only if he cannot complete the enquiry and ‘during the completion of enquiry’ postulates a commencement of the enquiry, which means commencing of a trial according to the summons procedure. The power to ask for an interim bond is not given to the Magistrate to postpone the case and hear nobody and yet ask a person to furnish a bond for good conduct….”

    9. In Madhu Limave's case (supra) it was held as follows:

    “It will be noticed that before the Magistrate took action to call for an interim bond, he did not make any efforts to enquiry into the truth of the information as is required by section 117(3) of the Code. He only say the Police report and was satisfied from it, without even questioning the Sub Inspector. He did question him with regard to Narender Shastri who is described in the Order as O.P No. 3 but not others. It is also to be noticed that the case was fixed on the following day for statements of Madhu Limaye and Ram Adhar Giri and there is no mention that any witnesses were to be present. In fact even on the next day the Magistrate was not going to try the case but only take statements from the petitioners….”

    10. It was also held ad follows in Madhu Limave's case at paragraph 16:

    “It appears to us that the powers of the Magistrate to ask for an interim bond were not property exercised in this case and consequently the order to the petitioners to furnish interim bond could not be made. That stage had not been reached under the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Magistrate could only ask for an interim bond if he could not complete the enquiry and during the completion of the enquiry postulates a commencement of the enquiry, which means commencing of a trial according to the summons procedure. It as not given to the Magistrate to postpone the case and hear nobody and yet ask the petitioners to furnish a bond for good conduct. The Magistrate should have made at least some effort to get a statement from Brij Mohan or Ved Murti Bhatt or any of the witnesses named in the challan. Nothing of this kind was done. Therefore the proceedings for asking for an interim bond were completely illegal.”

    11. The Full Bench or the Orissa High Court has referred to the sub-section (3) of section 116 which starts with ‘after the commencement and before the completion of the inquiry’. This change according to the Full Bench has been made so as to put the matter beyond doubt that an interim bond can be called for only after the commencement of the inquiry and before its completion. We are of the opinion that in Madhu Limaye's case (supra) the Supreme Court only held that the Magistrate can insist for an interim bond only if it is satisfied that there is a prima facie case. That can be done only after commencement of inquiry. Provisions for making the interim bond are mentioned in section 116(3). It prescribed that only when the Magistrate considers that immediate measures are necessary before completion of the inquiry, interim bond can be ordered to be executed. In other words, the Magistrate should be satisfied that there is a prima facie case before insisting for interim bond.

    12. In the next case of Madhu Limaye v. Sub Divisional Magistrate. Mondhvr ((1970) 3 SCC 746 : AIR 1971 SC 2486), it was observed as follows:

    “A question was raised before us whether the Magistrate can defer the inquiry and yet ask for an interim bond. There is a difference of opinion in the High Courts. Some learned Judges are of opinion that this action can be taken as soon as the person appears because then the Magistrate may be said to have entered upon the inquiry. Other learned Judges are of the opinion that sub-sections (1) and (2) envisages that the Magistrate must proceed to inquiry into the truth of the information and only after prima facie satisfying himself about the truth and after recording his reasons in writing can the interim bond be asked for.”

    13. After considering both views, the Supreme Court held in Sona Khan's case (supra) that:

    “…. Therefore, as the liberty of a person is involved and that person is being proceeded against on information and suspicion, it is necessary to put a strict construction upon the powers of Magistrate. The facts must be of definite character…. The Magistrate adjourned the case from day to day and yet asked for an interim bond. This makes the proceedings entirely one sided. It cannot be described as an inquiry within an inquiry as has been said in some cases. Some inquiry has to be made before the bond can be ordered. We, therefore approve of those cases in which it has been laid down that some inquiry should be made before action is taken to ask for an interim bond or placing the person in custody in default.”

    14. Therefore, in substance, the Supreme Court only held that before asking for an interim bond under section 116(3), the Magistrate should make some inquiry so as to satisfy himself that there is some truth in the allegations and there is a prima facie case for insisting for an interim bond. We are of the opinion that the above observation, in no way, holds that inquiry under section 116 will commence only from the time of recording of evidence. In fact, section 116(1) suggests that the enquiry commences with the appearance of the person and the Magistrate putting the question or appearance as provided under section 110 or 112, as the case may be, and it is the duty of the Magistrate to read out the order and from that point onwards, the enquiry starts. Of course, interim bond can be insisted only after the Magistrate prima facie satisfies that the allegation in the enquiry cannot be completed.

    15. Considering the definition of ‘inquiry’ and also considering section 116(1), we are of the opinion that the enquiry commences as soon as the accused appears before the court and Magistrate proceeds with the case as held by the Patna High Court in Sita Ram's case (supra). On the facts of this case, petitioner surrendered before the Sub Divisional Magistrate on 5-11-1999. Even though enquiry commenced from 5-11-1999, it continued after 19-5-2000 and, therefore, the appellant required the Magistrate to terminate the proceedings as six month's period was already over. The above prayer was rejected by the Magistrate. We are of the opinion that in the circumstances of the case, there was no justification at all for prolonging the case and proceedings are deemed to have terminated on the expiry of six months of the commencement of the proceedings, that is, from the appearance of the accused before the Magistrate as these preventive proceedings are intended to be disposed of as expeditiously as possible. Undue delay and continuance of the proceedings beyond six months destroys the purpose of the section itself. No order was passed by the Magistrate giving special reasons to continue the proceedings beyond six months. Therefore, order refusing to terminate the proceedings by the Magistrate following the decision in Mathukutty's case (supra) (1995 (1) KLT 742) is not correct. Impugned order is set aside and we hold that proceedings taken against the appellant came to an automatic end. Hence, we also hold that the decision in 1995 (1) KLT 742 was not correctly decided and we agree with the views expressed by the learned single Judge in 2005 (1) KLD (Cri) 570).

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Muhammedkutty Thomas v. State Of Kerala
    (Mar 12, 2007)