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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 448, 294(b) and 506(1) read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • Section 448 of the Indian Penal Code. Jurisdiction under Section 482
  • contention.4. Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 258 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • Section 292 of the Indian Penal Code (1960)
  • Section 294(b) of the Indian Penal Code.
  • Section 448 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • Section 294(b) IPC.12.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 448, 294(b) and 506(1) read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • Section 448 of the Indian Penal Code. Jurisdiction under Section 482
  • contention.4. Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 258 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • Section 292 of the Indian Penal Code (1960)
  • Section 294(b) of the Indian Penal Code.
  • Section 448 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • Section 294(b) IPC.12.
Smart Summary

Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners are the accused in C.C. No. 555 of 2002 on the file of the Court of the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class II, Kanjirappally. They face allegations under Sections 448, 294(b) and 506(1) read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. On their appearance, they filed an application under Section 258 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which was dismissed by the trial court; that dismissal was confirmed in Crl. R.P. No. 18 of 2003 by the Court of Session, Kottayam. The current Criminal Miscellaneous Case seeks to quash the order in Crl. R.P. No. 18 of 2003 (Annexure-B) and to quash all proceedings in C.C. No. 555 of 2002.

The First Information Report (Annexure-A) alleges that the accused visited the police station and inquired about a petition submitted by Soosan (the wife of the second accused) relating to Crime No. 206 of 2001. The petitioners' counsel contends that even assuming all allegations in the FIR are true, no offence is made out against the petitioners under Section 294(b) IPC. The Public Prosecutor responds that the FIR alleges utterance of obscene words. The trial court and the Sessions Court had earlier dismissed the petitioners' application under Section 258 CrPC.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the words allegedly uttered by the accused constitute "obscene" words within the meaning of Section 294(b) of the Indian Penal Code.
  2. Whether a vague or general allegation in the FIR that the accused "uttered obscene words" is sufficient to constitute an offence under Section 294(b), or whether the words themselves must be specifically recorded in the FIR/complaint.
  3. Whether the allegations in the FIR constitute an offence under Section 448 of the Indian Penal Code (house trespass) when the alleged entry was into a police station.
  4. Whether the allegations in the FIR constitute an offence under Section 506(1) IPC (criminal intimidation).
  5. Whether the High Court's jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC can be invoked at this stage to quash proceedings in respect of the offences alleged (specifically Section 448, and generally as to other offences).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners' counsel submitted that even if all allegations in the FIR are taken as true, no offence is made out against the petitioners under Section 294(b) IPC (i.e., the words allegedly uttered are not obscene within the statutory meaning).
  • It was argued that the FIR's allegation that the accused "uttered obscene words" is vague; the FIR does not specify the words. Reliance was placed on Santhilal v. Parameswaran Pillai to contend that without specification of the words, a court cannot consider whether Section 294 is attracted.
  • The petitioners contended that no offence under Section 448 is made out (with reference to the fact that the alleged entry was into a police station, which is a public place), implying that ingredients of criminal trespass/house trespass are not satisfied.

Public Prosecutor / Respondent's Arguments

  • The Public Prosecutor submitted that the FIR contains allegations that the accused persons uttered obscene words and relied upon that allegation to contend that an offence under Section 294(b) is made out (the precise words allegedly uttered were not set out in the reported excerpt of the FIR reproduced in the opinion).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Santhilal v. Parameswaran Pillai (1988 (2) KLT Short Notes Case No. 112 at page 74) Requirement that, when alleging an offence under Section 294 IPC, the complaint or FIR should state the words used; absence of the words makes it impossible to consider whether Section 294 is attracted. The court relied on this precedent to hold that a vague or general statement in the FIR that obscene words were used is insufficient — the words must be stated; hence the allegation in the FIR was inadequate to sustain Section 294(b).
P.T. Chacko v. Nainan Chacko (1967 KLT 799) Applied the test of obscenity (Hicklin test) and considered whether the words uttered were obscene so as to attract Section 294(b). The court followed the reasoning in P.T. Chacko that the words in that case were not obscene and held that the Hicklin test should be applied; this supported the present court's view that the alleged words here are not obscene.
Chacko George v. State of Kerala (1968 KLT 219) Affirms the Hicklin test: obscenity is whether the tendency is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to immoral influences; words must be capable of arousing sexually impure thoughts. The court cited and respectfully followed this articulation of the test of obscenity in concluding that the words allegedly uttered would not be obscene.
Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1965 SC 881) Supreme Court's acceptance of the Hicklin test of obscenity and its application to possession/publication of allegedly obscene material (example: "Lady Chatterley's Lover"). The court relied on Ranjit D. Udeshi for the correct formulation of the test of obscenity and applied that standard to conclude the alleged utterances did not meet the test of obscenity.
Queen v. Hicklin (1868) 3 Q.B. 360 (Cockburn C.J.) Laid down the classic test of obscenity: whether the tendency of the matter is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to immoral influences. The court used this test (as applied in the Indian authorities) as the governing standard to assess whether the alleged utterances were obscene.
Samuel Roth v. U.S.A. (1957) 354 U.S. 476 Described the obscenity test in terms of "substantial tendency to corrupt by arousing lustful desires" and observations that obscene matter must tend to sexual impurity in the minds of readers/hearers. The court cited the discussion in Samuel Roth (Chief Justice Warren and Justice Harlan observations) to reinforce the understanding of the obscenity test and concluded the alleged words did not have such a tendency.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by first setting out the statutory language of Section 294 IPC and isolating the elements of the offence under Section 294(b): that the accused must "sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place" to the annoyance of others. The controlling question identified was whether the words allegedly uttered by the accused would constitute "obscene words" within this statutory provision.

The court then examined precedent authority to determine the proper test of obscenity. It summarized the established Hicklin formulation (Queen v. Hicklin) — adopted in Indian jurisprudence and explicitly accepted by the Supreme Court in Ranjit D. Udeshi — namely, whether the tendency of the matter is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences. The court also cited United States authority (Samuel Roth v. U.S.A.) for similar formulations emphasizing a tendency to arouse lustful or sexually impure thoughts.

Applying those authorities (including P.T. Chacko and Chacko George), the court concluded that the words alleged in the FIR do not have the tendency required by the test of obscenity and therefore cannot be said to be "obscene words" within Section 294(b). The court expressly stated that it respectfully followed the decisions cited which held that certain words, though possibly defamatory, were not "obscene."

The court next addressed the sufficiency of the FIR. Relying on Santhilal v. Parameswaran Pillai, the court held that a vague or general allegation that "obscene words" were used is inadequate. The words alleged to be obscene must be recorded in the FIR/complaint; otherwise the prosecution could introduce evidence of any words later, prejudicing the accused's right to a fair trial. Consequently, the indictment under Section 294(b) could not be sustained where the FIR failed to specify the words.

As to Sections 448 and 506(1), the court considered the petitioners' argument that no offence under Section 448 was made out because the alleged entry was into a police station (a public place). The court rejected the petitioners' contention that the FIR failed to make out an offence under Section 448, and also held that it cannot be said that the allegations do not constitute an offence under Section 506(1). The court observed that its comments on Sections 448 and 506(1) were limited to the question whether jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC could be invoked at this stage to quash proceedings on those counts.

On this basis the court quashed the charge under Section 294(b) but declined to quash proceedings insofar as they related to Sections 448 and 506(1). The court therefore allowed the Criminal Miscellaneous Case in part.

Holding and Implications

Criminal Miscellaneous Case partly allowed.

Holding (direct effect on the parties):

  • The charge against the petitioners insofar as it relates to the offence under Section 294(b) IPC is quashed; cognizance of the offence under Section 294(b) is set aside.
  • Proceedings continue against the petitioners in respect of the remaining offences alleged (including Sections 448 and 506(1) IPC).

Broader implications:

The opinion applies and follows established tests of obscenity (Hicklin test as adopted in Indian authorities) and emphasizes the procedural requirement that the words alleged to be obscene must be recorded in the FIR/complaint; it does not purport to create a new precedent beyond following and applying existing authorities. The opinion does not discuss broader doctrinal changes; its practical consequence is the limited quashing of the Section 294(b) charge while allowing other counts to proceed.

    Preethimon & Another v. State Of Kerala

    1. The petitioners are the accused persons in C.C No. 555 of 2002, on the file of the Court of the Judicial Magistrate of the first class II, Kanjirappally. The offences alleged against them are under Sections 448, 294(b) and 506(1) read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. On appearance before the court below, they filed ah application under Section 258 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which was dismissed by the trial court and the order of the trial court was confirmed in Crl. R.P No. 18 of 2003, on the file of the Court of Session, Kottayam. The prayer in the Crl. M.C is to quash Annexure-B order in Crl. R.P No. 18 of 2003 as well as to quash all the proceedings in C.C No. 555 of 2002, on the file of the Court of the Judicial Magistrate of the first class II, Kanjirappally.

    2. It is submitted by the counsel for the petitioner that even if all the allegations contained in Annexure -A FIR are taken as true, no offence is made out against the petitioners. Accused No. 1 is an advocate while accused No. 2 is a member of the Panchayat. It is stated in Annexure-A FIR that the accused came to the police station and enquired about the petition submitted by Soosan, the wife of the second accused and in respect of which Crime No. 206 of 2001 was registered. The further allegation in the FIR is as follows:—

    3. Sri. K. Ramakumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, submitted that the allegations made in the FIR do not constitute an offence under Section 294(b) of the Indian Penal Code. He relied on the decisions in Santhilal v. Parameswaran Pillai (1988 (2) KLT Short Notes Case No. 112 at page 74), P.T Chacko v. Nainan Chacko (1967 KLT 799), Chacko George v. State of Kerala (1968 KLT 219) and Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State Of Maharashtra . (AIR 1965 SC 881) in support of this contention.

    4. Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code reads as follows:

    “294. Obsence acts and songs Whoever, to the annoyance of others—

    (a) does any Obsence act in any public place, or

    (b) sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place,

    shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine, or with both”.

    5. In order to constitute an offence under Section 294(b), the accused must sing, recite or utter any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near nay public place. The question is whether the words allegedly uttered by the accused would constitute obscene words.

    6. Tn P.T Chacko v. Nainan Chacko (1967 KLT 799), Justice K.K Mathew (as His Lordship then was) considered the question whether the words uttered by the first accused would constitute an offence under Section 294(b) and whether those words would be obscene. In paragraph 5 of the judgment it was held thus:

    “5. The only point argued was that the 1st accused has not committed an offence punishable under S. 294(b) IPC, by uttering the words above-mentioned. The courts below have held that the words uttered were obscene and the utterance caused annoyance to the public. I am not inclined to take this view. In the Queen v. Hicklin 1868-3-Q.B. 360 at 371 Cockbum C.J, laid down the test of ‘obscenity’ in these words:

    “………the test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences”.

    This test has been uniformly followed in India.. The Supreme Court has accepted the correctness of the test in Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1965 SC 881 at 887. In Samuel Roth v. U.S.A (1957) 354 U.S 476, Chief Justice Warren said that the test of ‘obscenity’ is the “substantial tendency to corrupt by arousing lustful desires”. Mr. Justice Harlan observed that in order to be ‘obscene’ the matter must “tend to sexually impure thoughts”. I do not think that the words uttered in this case have such a tendency. It may be tat the words are defamatory of the complainant, but I do not think that the words are ‘obscene’ and the utterance would constitute an offence punishable under S. 294(b) IPC”.

    7. In Chacko George v. State of Kerala (1968 KLT 219) Justice K. Sadasivan (as His Lordship then was) laid down the testof ‘obscenity’ as follows:

    “The test of obscenity ‘is whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity, is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences’. The words uttered must be capable of arousing sexually impure thoughts in the minds of the hearers”.

    8. In Ranjit V. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1965 SC 881), the Supreme Court, while dealing with the question whether the accused persons, who were partners of a book stall committed the offence under Section 292 of the Indian Penal Code (1960) as they were found in possession for the purpose of sale copies of an alleged obscene book called “Lady Chatterley's Lover”, considered the test of obscenity, and held thus:

    “…………I think the test of obscenity is this whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall. ………it is quite certain that it would suggest to the minds of the young of either sex, or even to persons of more advanced years, thoughts of a most impure and libidinous character”.

    9. I am of the view that the words allegedly uttered by the accused cannot be said to be obscene words. I respectfully follow the decisions referred to above.

    10. Learned Public Prosecutor submitted that it is also stated in the FIR as follows:

    11. Learned Public Prosecutor laid stress on the wordand contended that there are allegations in the FIR that the accused persons uttered obscene words. In answer to this contention, Sri. K. Ramakumar submitted that the vague allegation that there was utterance of obscene words in the FIR. is not enough to constitute an offence under Section 294(b) IPC.

    12. He relied on the decision in Santhilal v. Parameswaran Pillai (1988 (2) KLT Short Notes Case No. 112 at page 74), wherein it was held:

    “It is not stated either in the complaint or sworn statement what the words used were, while alleging an offence under S. 294 IPC. Without that, it is not possible for a court to consider whether the offence under S. 294 is attracted”.

    13. A vague or general statement in the FIR that the accused showered obscene words is not enough to constitute an offence under Section 294(b). It is necessary to state the words uttered by the accused: The prosecution would not be justified in bringing in the evidence for the first time the words allegedly spoken to by the accused, when the same is not recorded in the First Information Statement in a case instituted upon police report. The complaint or the FIR, as the case may be, shall contain the words spoken to by the accused, which, according to the prosecution, would attract the offence under Section 294(b) of the Indian Penal Code. Or else, there is every possibility of evidence being tendered putting forth any words as the prosecution witnesses may wish to put forward improving upon or adding to the allegation in the complaint or FIR causing great prejudice to the accused and depriving his right to have a fair trial.

    14. I am of the view that even if all the averments in the FIR are taken as true, no offence under Section 294(b) is made out. Cognizance of offence under Section 294(b) is accordingly, set aside.

    15. Learned counsel for the petitioner would also contend that no offence under Section 448 is made out. He submitted that police station being a public place, it cannot be said that the ingredients of Section 441 (criminal trespass) are made out. Section 441 provides that whoever enters into or upon property in the possession of another with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property, or having lawfully entered into or upon such property, unlawfully remains there with intent thereby to intimidate, insult or annoy any such persons, or with intent to commit an offence is said to commit criminal trespass. Section 442 provides that whoever cemmits criminal trespass by entering into or remaining in any building, tent or vessel used as a human dwelling or any building used as a place for worship, or as a place for the custody of property, is said to commit “house trespass”. Section 448 provides the punishment for, house trespass. I do not agree with the learned counsel for the petitioners that the allegations made in the First Information Report do not make out an offence under Section 448 of the Indian Penal Code. Jurisdiction under Section 482 cannot be invoked to quash the proceedings in this case in respect of the offence under Section 448 of the Indian Penal Code. I am also of the view that it cannot be said that the allegations in the FIR do not constitute an offence under Section 506 (1) IPC. I make it clear that the observations made by me in respect of the offences under Sections 448 and 506(1) are meant only to decide whether jurisdiction under Section 482 can be invoked at this stage.

    16. In the result, the Criminal Miscellaneous Case is partly allowed. The charge against the petitioners, in so far as it relates to the offence under Section 294(b) of the Indian Penal Code, is quashed. The case shall continue against the petitioners only for rest of the offences alleged against them.

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    Comments

    Preethimon & Another v. State Of Kerala
    (Nov 22, 2007)