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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Rule 2 of Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of sub-section (1)
  • Section 14 of the Limitation Act in ILR (1970) 2 Delhi 60, Delhi
  • Order 33, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • SECTION 14 LIMITATION ACT
  • provisions contained in Order 33, Rule 2, CPC
  • clause (f) of Rule 5 of Order 33, CPC. CMA
  • SECTION 14 LIMITATION ACT 1963
  • Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act.
  • Section 2(h) of the Limitation Act
  • Article 55 of the Limitation Act
  • Order 33, Rule 5(f)
  • Order 33, Rule 2
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Rule 2 of Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of sub-section (1)
  • Section 14 of the Limitation Act in ILR (1970) 2 Delhi 60, Delhi
  • Order 33, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • SECTION 14 LIMITATION ACT
  • provisions contained in Order 33, Rule 2, CPC
  • clause (f) of Rule 5 of Order 33, CPC. CMA
  • SECTION 14 LIMITATION ACT 1963
  • Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act.
  • Section 2(h) of the Limitation Act
  • Article 55 of the Limitation Act
  • Order 33, Rule 5(f)
  • Order 33, Rule 2
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal challenges the order in Original Petition (Indigent) No. 8 of 2001 before the Sub-Court, Tirur. The Original Petition (O.P. 8/01) sought permission under Order 33, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure to institute a suit as an indigent person. The underlying suit sought damages of Rs. 36,65,129/-; the court-fee payable was Rs. 2,06,560/-. The petitioner stated he lacked sufficient means to pay the court-fee. The respondent filed a counter-statement asserting (i) the application was not proper, (ii) the petitioner was not indigent, and (iii) the suit was barred by the law of limitation.

The trial court treated maintainability under Order 33, Rule 2 and the limitation question as a preliminary issue. It concluded the petitioner had substantially complied with the procedural requirements of Order 33, Rule 2, CPC, but held the suit barred by limitation. The trial court found the petitioner could not exclude the time spent prosecuting the matter before the Sub‑Court, Ernakulam, in computing limitation. This appeal was prosecuted only against that finding on limitation.

Relevant chronological facts (as set out in the opinion): (a) Cause of action / alleged contract breach occurred on 5-3-1997. Article 55 of the Limitation Act prescribes a three-year limitation for a suit for compensation for breach of contract. (b) An application to sue as an indigent person (and the plaint) was initially presented before Sub-Court, Ernakulam on 12-10-1998. (c) By order dated 28-6-2001, Sub-Court, Ernakulam returned the plaint, finding it had no jurisdiction and identifying Sub-Court, Tirur as the proper forum. (d) The petitioner then filed the application before Sub-Court, Tirur on 12-7-2001 — after the three-year period under Article 55 had expired — leading to the trial court’s conclusion that the suit was time-barred.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, so as to exclude the time spent prosecuting proceedings before a court without jurisdiction (Sub-Court, Ernakulam) in computing the period of limitation for the suit.
  2. Whether, in the facts of this case, the petitioner prosecuted the prior proceedings with due diligence and in good faith such that Section 14(1) applies.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Petitioner's) Arguments

  • The petitioner had instituted proceedings in Sub-Court, Ernakulam on 12-10-1998 — within three years of the alleged breach (5-3-1997) — and therefore, under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the time spent before Ernakulam should be excluded in computing limitation for the fresh proceeding in Tirur.
  • The petitioner and his counsel prosecuted the matter before Sub-Court, Ernakulam with due diligence and in good faith; the respondent delayed raising procedural objections (preliminary objection dated 2-1-2000) and the Ernakulam court passed its order on 28-6-2001 after the three-year period had expired. Had the Ernakulam court ruled earlier, the petitioner could have instituted the suit in Tirur within time.
  • The petitioner relied upon several judicial decisions in support of his entitlement to the benefit of Section 14 (the opinion lists a number of cases cited by the petitioner’s counsel).

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent contended the petitioner was not an indigent person and that the suit was barred by limitation.
  • The respondent argued that the petitioner was not prosecuting the Ernakulam proceedings with due diligence or in good faith and therefore could not claim exclusion under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
  • The respondent pointed to specific documentary communications and pleadings (a reply letter dated 21-4-1998, a counter-affidavit filed 26-9-1999 in IA 4190/98, and a preliminary objection dated 2-1-2000) which repeatedly and expressly informed the petitioner that Sub-Court, Tirur (and courts having jurisdiction over Kottakkal) alone had jurisdiction under the parties' agreement (clause 22).
  • The respondent relied on a Division Bench decision of the Delhi High Court (K.G. Khosla & Co. v. The Trustees of the Port of Bombay, ILR (1970) 2 Delhi 60) — the opinion records that the Delhi Bench took the view that wrong legal advice is not a ground to exclude the period of limitation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ghasi Ram v. Chait Ram Saini, AIR 1998 SC 2476

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

G. Rajarethna Naikkan… v. P.N. Parameswara Kurup…., AIR 1997 Kerala 361

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Deokar Exports Pvt. Ltd. v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., AIR 2001 Bombay 327

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Wamanrao Keshavrao Deshmukh v. Dinkarrao Bhausaheb Deshmukh, AIR 1999 SC 322

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Anas Abdul Khader v. Abdul Nasar, (2001) 1 Ker LT 426

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Mst. Duliyabai v. Vilayalall, AIR 1959 Madh Pra 271

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

RSDV Finance Co. Ltd. v. Shree Vallabh Glass Works Ltd., AIR 1993 SC 2094

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

P. Sarathy v. State Bank of India, AIR 2000 SC 2023

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Vijay Kumar Rampal v. Diwan Devi, AIR 1985 SC 1669

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

India Electric Works Ltd. v. James Mantosh, AIR 1964 Cal 39

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

K.G. Khosla & Co. v. The Trustees of the Port of Bombay, ILR (1970) 2 Delhi 60 Expressly recorded in the opinion as establishing that a wrong legal advice is not a ground to exclude the period of limitation under the principle applied in Section 14. The court relied on the principle from this Division Bench decision to support the view that wrong legal advice (or acting on such advice) does not, by itself, entitle a party to the protection of Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court set out the statutory test in Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act as requiring three essential pre-requisites for exclusion of time:

  1. The plaintiff must have been prosecuting the earlier proceeding with due diligence;
  2. The earlier proceeding and the subsequent proceeding must relate to the same matter in issue (identity of subject-matter and parties); and
  3. The earlier proceeding must have been prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or a like cause, was unable to entertain it.

The court also noted statutory elaborations: the section applies to suits and to applications like Order 33, Rule 2; and the definitions of "good faith" (Section 2(h) of the Limitation Act) require due care and attention.

Applying these principles to the facts, the court observed:

  • The parties’ agreement dated 9-11-1995 contained clause 22: "The Courts having jurisdiction over Kottakkal alone will have jurisdiction to decide all disputes arising out of this contract." The court identified the subordinate courts having Kottakkal jurisdiction (including Sub-Court, Tirur), and noted that because the suit valuation exceeded one lakh, Sub‑Court, Tirur was the proper forum — a fact conceded by the petitioner.
  • The respondent had repeatedly and expressly informed the petitioner that Ernakulam lacked jurisdiction. The record showed: a registered reply dated 21-4-1998 warning that suit must be before Sub-Court, Tirur; a counter-affidavit on 26-9-1999 making the same jurisdictional point; and a preliminary objection filed 2-1-2000 asserting lack of jurisdiction in Ernakulam — all occurring before the three-year limitation expired.
  • Because these communications and pleadings were within the limitation period, the court reasoned the petitioner could have withdrawn the Ernakulam filing and instituted proceedings before the proper forum (Tirur) within the limitation period. Instead, the petitioner and his counsel contested jurisdiction in Ernakulam and only received an adverse jurisdictional ruling on 28-6-2001 — after the limitation period had expired.
  • The court accepted the legal proposition (from the cited Delhi Division Bench) that wrong legal advice is not, by itself, a ground to exclude time under Section 14. Even if the petitioner had been advised to sue in Ernakulam, that would not automatically attract Section 14.
  • Given the statutory requirement of "due diligence" and "good faith" (defined to require due care and attention), and the fact that the petitioner was alerted to the jurisdictional defect early (21-4-1998 onward), the court concluded the petitioner did not prosecute the Ernakulam proceedings with due diligence or in good faith.

On that basis the court held the petitioner could not invoke Section 14(1) to exclude the time spent before the Sub-Court, Ernakulam when computing limitation for the suit. Consequently the suit was held to be barred by Article 55 of the Limitation Act.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Application dismissed. The trial court's conclusion that the petitioner is not entitled to exclude the time spent prosecuting the proceedings before Sub-Court, Ernakulam under Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act was upheld.

Implications and consequences:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner is not permitted to exclude the period during which the matter was pursued before Sub-Court, Ernakulam; consequently, the suit is barred by limitation under Article 55 and the application under Order 33, Rule 2 was dismissed under clause (f) of Rule 5 of Order 33, CPC.
  • Costs: The opinion records "No costs."
  • Precedential effect: The opinion does not state it is laying down any new law; it applies established statutory requirements of Section 14 (identity of issue, due diligence, good faith and defect of jurisdiction) and relies on existing authority (including the Delhi Division Bench view that wrong legal advice does not itself attract Section 14). The court thus resolved the case on application of these authorities to the specific facts rather than announcing a novel principle.

    Mac-N-Hom Systems v. Vaidya Ratnam P.S Varrier'S Aryavaidyasala, Kottakkal .

    1. This appeal is preferred against the order in Original Petition (Indigent) No. 8 of 2001 of Sub-Court, Tirur. O.P 8/01 was preferred under Order 33, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking permission to institute the suit was indigent person. Suit was instituted for a decree for realisation of an amount of Rs. 36,65,129/- as damages from the respondent. Court-fee payable was Rs. 2,06,560/-. Petitioner stated that he does hot have sufficient means to pay the court-fee. Consequently permission was sought for to file the suit as an indigent person. Respondent filed counter statement contending that the application is not proper, that the petitioner is not an indigent person and that the suit is barred by the law of limitation.

    2. Question regarding the maintainability of the application under Order 33, Rule 2 and as to whether the application is barred by Law of Limitation was considered as a preliminary issue. Court below found that petitioner has substantially complied with the provisions contained in Order 33, Rule 2, CPC in making the application. Court below however, took the view that the suit is barred by law of limitation holding that the petitioner is not entitled to exclude the time spent for prosecuting the application in the Sub-Court, Ernakulam in computing the period of limitation. Against the said finding this appeal has been preferred. In this case we are concerned only with the question as to whether the suit is barred by the law of limitation. Counsel on either side addressed their arguments only that point. Under Order 33, Rule 5(f) while entertaining an application to sue as an indigent person the Court can examine whether the suit is barred by law of limitation where the allegations made by the applicant in the application would show the same. Application to sue as an indigent person under Order 33. Rule 2 was initially filed before Sub-Court, Ernakulam on 12-10-98. By order dated 28-6-2001, Sub-Court, Ernakulam found that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and only the Sub Court, Tirur has jurisdiction. Consequently returned the plaint for presentation before Sub Court, Tirur. Thereafter the application was filed by the petitioner before Sub-Court, Tirur on 12-7-2001. Under Article 55 of the Limitation Act, the period prescribed for filing a suit for compensation for breach of contract is three years from the date when the contract is broken. Contract was broken on 5-3-1997. Application to sue as indigent persons was filed in Sub-Court. Tirur only on 12-7-2001 beyond the period of three years. Consequently under Article 55 of the Limitation Act the suit is barred by law of limitation.

    3. Counsel appearing for the petitioner however took up the stand that since he had filed the suit in Ernakulam Sub Court on 12-10-98, i.e within three years from 5-3-1997 he is entitled to get the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act by which the period spent before the Sub-Court, Ernakulam be excluded in reckoning the period of limitation. If the petitioner's case fails under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, evidently that time has to be excluded. However, counsel appearing for the respondent Sri T. Krishnan Unni submitted that petitioner is not entitled to get the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act since he had not prosecuted the case before Sub-Court Ernakulam with due diligence and in good faith. Counsel appearing for the petitioner Sri R. Mayakrishnan submitted that he was prosecuting the matter before the Sub-Court, Ernakulam with due diligence and in good faith. Therefore he is entitled to get the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. Counsel also submitted though he had filed the suit before the Sub Court, Ernakulam on 12-10-1998 respondent filed preliminary objection only on 2-1-2000 and the Court had passed only on 28-6-2001, by the time the three year period mentioned in Article 55 of the Limitation Act expired. Counsel submitted if the Court had passed the order within the period of limitation he could have filed the suit at Sub-Court, Tirur within time. Consequently the suit would not have been barred by Law of Limitation. In order to establish his contention counsel referred to several decisions such as Ghasi Ram v. Chait Ram Saini, AIR 1998 SC 2476; G. Rajarethna Naikkan… v. P.N Parameswara Kurup…., AIR 1997 Kerala 361; Deokar Exports Pvt. Ltd.… v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd.…., AIR 2001 Bombay 327; Wamanrao Keshavrao Deshmukh v. Dinkarrao Bhausaheb Deshmukh, AIR 1999 SC 322; Anas Abdul Khader v. Abdul Nasar, (2001) 1 Ker LT 426; Mst. Duliyabai v. Vilayalall, AIR 1959 Madh Pra 271; RSDV Finance Co. Ltd. Pvt. Ltd. v. Shree Vallabh Glass Works Ltd., AIR 1993 SC 2094; P. Sarathy v. State Bank Of India, AIR 2000 SC 2023; Vijay Kumar Rampal v. Diwan Devi, AIR 1985 SC 1669; India Electric Works Ltd. v. James Mantosh, AIR 1964 Cal 39. Counsel appearing for the respondent. Sri. T. Krishnan Unni took us through the reply notice dated 21-4-1998 and also the preliminary objection dated 2-1-2000 and the terms and conditions of the agreement dated 9-11-1995. Reference was also made to a Division Bench judgment of Delhi High Court in K.G Khosla & Co. v. The Trustees of the Port of Bombay, ILR (1970) 2 Delhi 60.

    4. The only question to be decided in this case is whether the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The said provision is extracted below for easy reference:

    14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in Court without jurisdiction — (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.

    (2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.

    (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 2 of Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted by the Court under Rule 1 of that Order, such permission is granted on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the Court or other cause of a like nature.

    Explanation:— For the purpose of this section,—

    (a) in excluding the time during which a former civil proceeding was pending, the day on which that proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended shall both be counted;

    (b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding;

    (c) misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction.

    In order to attract the above mentioned provision the petitioner has to satisfy three conditions: (1) the petitioner has been prosecuting the other civil proceeding with due diligence, (2) the earlier proceeding and the subsequent proceeding must relate to the same matter in issue and (3) earlier proceeding must have been prosecuted in good faith in a Court which from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature was unable to entertain it. In other words, identity of the matter in issue, due diligence and good faith of the petitioner and the absence of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, in the Court which entertained the prior litigation are essential requisites for an application under Section 14(1). If the above mentioned essential requisites are present and the conduct of the person is bona fide, i.e he has established his good faith, and he has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, he is entitled to the benefit of this section or else he cannot take advantage of it. Further in order to attract the application of the section, the subsequent suit must be against the defendant in the previous case and in the two proceedings there should be the same subject-matter, and the Court in which the earlier suit was being prosecuted should be unable to entertain it from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of alike nature. The section applies in terms to suits as well as applications like Order 33, Rule 2 in the instant case. If we hold that petitioner was prosecuting the proceeding before the Sub-Court, Ernakulam with due diligence and in good faith as we have already indicated he is entitled to get the benefit of Section 14. The cardinal policy of the provisions of Section 14 is to furnish protection against the bar of limitation to a person who honestly and diligently solicits a trial on merits in a forum having no jurisdiction and which forum cannot afford him such a trial. Petitioner cannot be said to have prosecuted the suit with due diligence within the meaning of Section 14 when owing to his own negligence or default, the suit is so framed that the Court cannot try it on the merits.

    5. That being the legal position we may examine the facts of this case. We have already indicated that the agreement was entered into between the parties on 9-11-1995. Clause 22 of the agreement is relevant for the purpose which is extracted below:

    22. The Courts having jurisdiction over Kottakkal alone will have jurisdiction to decide all disputes arising out of this contract.

    Courts having jurisdiction over Kottakkal is Parappanangadi Munsiff Court, Tirur Sub-Court and Manjeri District Court. Since the valuation of the suit is more than one lakh the Court having jurisdiction to decide the suit is Sub-Court, Tirur. This fact is conceded by the petitioner. Consequently he had to file the indigent application before Sub-Court, Tirur. He was aware of clause 22 of the agreement dated 9-11-95. If the petitioner and counsel were vigilant they would not have filed the suit before Sub-Court, Ernakulam but only before Sub-Court, Tirur. Before instituting the suit at Ernakulam on 12-10-1995 the petitioner had sent a lawyer. Notice to the respondent on 30-3-1998 to which respondent replied by registered letter dated 21-4-98. In paragraph 6 of the reply notice issued it has been specifically stated as follows:

    “Having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances. Arya Vaidya Sala is not prepared for any Arbitration as suggested in your notice. There is no question of trade dispute in this matter. You are also advised to inform your client that if the claim made by Arya Vaidya Sala towards damages is not met within a period of 30 days, they have no alternative except to file a suit for damages before Sub-Court Tirur, the Court which alone has got jurisdiction to try any suit under the terms of the agreement”.

    (Emphasis added)

    Respondent has also filed a counter-affidavit on 26-9-99 in IA 4190/98. In paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit it has been specifically stated as follows:

    “It is submitted that in the agreement itself it has been specifically stated that the Courts having jurisdiction over Kottakkal alone will have jurisdiction to decide all disputes arising out of the contract. Hence even if the petitioner has any claim or dispute, he has to approach the Courts having jurisdiction over Kottakkal. The agreement was entered into at Kottakkal and it had to be performed at Kottakkal. As per the agreement the machinery had to be delivered, erected and commissioned at Kottakkal. The place of business. Factory, residence of this respondent etc. are also at Kottakkal. Hence only the Subordinate Court, Tirur alone will have jurisdiction to adjudicate any dispute arising out of the contract, and this Hon'ble Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute arising out of the contract entered into between the petitioner and this respondent and on that ground itself the suit and the application for permission to sue as an indigent person is liable to be dismissed.

    Later respondent also filed a preliminary objection on 2-1-2000, wherein it is stated as follows:

    It is submitted that in the agreement entered into between the petitioner and this respondent itself it has been specifically stated that the Courts having jurisdiction over Kottakkal alone will have jurisdiction to decide all disputes arising out of the contract. Hence even if the petitioner has any claim or dispute, he has to approach the Courts having jurisdiction over Kottakkal………………….. Hence only the Subordinate Court, Tirur alone will have jurisdiction to adjudicate any dispute arising out of the contract, and this Hon'ble Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute arising out of the contract entered into between the petitioner and this respondent and on that ground itself the suit and the application for permission to sue as an indigent person is liable to be dismissed”.

    It is evident from the above mentioned facts that the respondent all along had alerted the petitioner that the Sub-Court, Ernakulam had no jurisdiction and only the Sub-Court, Tirur had got jurisdiction. Lawyer notice, counter affidavit to TA. 4190/98 and the preliminary objection were filed within the period of limitation and therefore within the period of limitation itself petitioner could have got the petition withdrawn and file it before Sub-Court, Tirur. Petitioner prosecuted the suit without due diligence, any care and attention in spite of the fact that he was alerted about the wrong filing of the suit before the Sub Court, Ernakulam. In connection we may refer to the Division Bench decision of the Delhi High Court which examined the scope of Section 14 of the Limitation Act in ILR (1970) 2 Delhi 60, Delhi High Court took the view that a wrong legal advice is not a ground to exclude the period of limitation. Appellant submitted he was advised to institute the suit at Ernakulam Sub-Court. We are of the view even if there is a wrong advice and party has acted by that advice that itself is not a ground to get the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

    6. Expression “good faith” has been defined under Section 2(h) of the Limitation Act which reads as follows:

    (h) ‘good faith’ nothing shall be deemed to be done in good faith which is not done with due care and attention.

    Legislature has advisedly used the words “due diligence” in Section 14(1), so also the expression “good faith”. This is a case where the respondent's lawyer has alerted the petitioner and his lawyer as early as on 21-4-1998 that as per the agreement only the Sub-Court, Tirur has got jurisdiction. The petitioner and his lawyer preferred to contest the preliminary objection raised by the respondent with regard to the jurisdiction of the Sub-Court, Ernakulam and got an adverse order after the period of limitation. We are of the view petitioner was not prosecuting the matter with due diligence or in good faith before the Sub-Court, Ernakulam. Under such circumstance we are of the view petitioner is not entitled to get the benefit of Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act. Consequently the Court below is justified in dismissing the application holding that the petitioner is not entitled to exclude the time spent for prosecuting the application in the Sub-Court. Ernakulam in computing the period of limitation. Court below has rightly dismissed the application under clause (f) of Rule 5 of Order 33, CPC. CMA would stand dismissed. No costs.

    Application dismissed.

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    Comments

    Mac-N-Hom Systems v. Vaidya Ratnam P.S Varrier'S Aryavaidyasala, Kottakkal .
    (Aug 12, 2003)