AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • 54.08, 54.09, 54.10, 54.11, 54.12, 55.07, 55.08, 55.09, 55.10, 55.11, 55.12, 58.01, 58.02, 58.03, 58.04, 58.05, 58.06, 59.06 and 60.01 of the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (Central Act 5 of 1986).(iii)
  • 52.05, 52.06, 52.07, 52.08, 52.09, 52.10, 52.11, 52.12, 58.01, 58.02, 58.03, 58.04, 58.05, 59.01, 59.03, 59.05, 59.06 and 60.01 of the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (Central Act 5 of 1986).(ii)
  • article 286(3) of the Constitution read with section 15 of the Central Act.
  • section 3 (charging section) of the U.P Sales Tax Act, 1948 and section 3A
  • section 41 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 (in short, the Act)
  • Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (in short the Central Excise Act)
  • Importance) Act, 1957 (in short, the Additional Excise Act).15.
  • Importance) Act, 1957 (Central Act 58 of 1957).6. Item No. 19
  • Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (Central Act 5 of 1986).5.
  • Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.Item No. 11: (i) Cotton
  • CENTRAL SALES TAX ACT 1956
  • Kerala Finance Act, 1991 (in short the 1991 Act)
  • Kerala Finance Act, 1992 (in short the 1992 Act).
  • Central Excise Act (originally 8, 9, 12, 12A, 12B)
  • ARTICLE 286 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Act 31 of 1958 amended section 15
  • sections 14/15 of the Central Act
  • section 5(1) of the Central Act,
  • section 14 of the Central Act
  • Finance Act 18 of 1987
  • Finance Act 7 of 1986,
  • CENTRAL EXCISE ACT
  • 1, 1958. Section 14
  • Sales Tax Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • 54.08, 54.09, 54.10, 54.11, 54.12, 55.07, 55.08, 55.09, 55.10, 55.11, 55.12, 58.01, 58.02, 58.03, 58.04, 58.05, 58.06, 59.06 and 60.01 of the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (Central Act 5 of 1986).(iii)
  • 52.05, 52.06, 52.07, 52.08, 52.09, 52.10, 52.11, 52.12, 58.01, 58.02, 58.03, 58.04, 58.05, 59.01, 59.03, 59.05, 59.06 and 60.01 of the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (Central Act 5 of 1986).(ii)
  • article 286(3) of the Constitution read with section 15 of the Central Act.
  • section 3 (charging section) of the U.P Sales Tax Act, 1948 and section 3A
  • section 41 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 (in short, the Act)
  • Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (in short the Central Excise Act)
  • Importance) Act, 1957 (in short, the Additional Excise Act).15.
  • Importance) Act, 1957 (Central Act 58 of 1957).6. Item No. 19
  • Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (Central Act 5 of 1986).5.
  • Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.Item No. 11: (i) Cotton
  • CENTRAL SALES TAX ACT 1956
  • Kerala Finance Act, 1991 (in short the 1991 Act)
  • Kerala Finance Act, 1992 (in short the 1992 Act).
  • Central Excise Act (originally 8, 9, 12, 12A, 12B)
  • ARTICLE 286 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Act 31 of 1958 amended section 15
  • sections 14/15 of the Central Act
  • section 5(1) of the Central Act,
  • section 14 of the Central Act
  • Finance Act 18 of 1987
  • Finance Act 7 of 1986,
  • CENTRAL EXCISE ACT
  • 1, 1958. Section 14
  • Sales Tax Act
Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion delivered by Arijit Pasayat, C.J.

Factual and Procedural Background

These are revision applications filed under section 41 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963. The revision applications raise a common question concerning the taxability of tarpaulin; accordingly the matters were taken up together and governed by a single judgment. The judgments of the Kerala Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (of different Benches) are assailed. The assessment years cover the period 1986-87 to 1993-94 (with earlier statutory history referred to for context). The assessee contends that tarpaulin is a 100% cotton fabric falling within the exemption entries in Schedule III (item No. 7 up to March 31, 1992 and item No. 11 from April 1, 1992) and is therefore exempt; alternatively the assessee contends that tarpaulin is a declared good and that additional conditions limit or preclude the levy imposed by the State. The Revenue contends that tarpaulin has been taxable under specific First Schedule entries (initially as item No. 100C from April 1, 1984; renumbered to 152 from July 1, 1987; and as item No. 106 from April 1, 1992) at the first point of sale in the State at the rates set out in those entries. The sole legal question identified for adjudication was whether sale of tarpaulin is exigible to tax.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sale of tarpaulin is exigible to sales tax under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act (i.e., whether tarpaulin is taxable).
  2. Whether tarpaulin falls within the expression "cotton fabrics" (as defined in item No. 19 of the First Schedule to the Central Excise Act) and therefore is covered by item No. 7 (up to March 31, 1992) or item No. 11 (from April 1, 1992) of Schedule III to the Kerala Act and is exempt from tax.
  3. Whether, if tarpaulin is a "declared good" (goods of special importance) under the central enactments, the State's levy (rates and points of levy) is restricted by Article 286(3) of the Constitution and section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act such that the State cannot lawfully levy the tax as it has done.

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee's Arguments

  • Tarpaulin is 100% cotton cloth and therefore falls within "cotton fabrics" as defined in the Central Excise Act (item No. 19) and so is exempt under item No. 7 (and later item No. 11) of Schedule III to the Kerala Act.
  • Alternatively, tarpaulin is a declared good (a good of special importance) and, accordingly, the levy and the rate prescribed by the State cannot be maintained (i.e., limitations under the Central Act and Article 286(3) restrict the State).

Revenue's Arguments

  • Prior to April 1, 1984 there was no specific entry for tarpaulin in the State Schedules. From April 1, 1984 tarpaulin was specifically classified in the First Schedule as item No. 100C taxable at 8% at the point of first sale in the State.
  • From July 1, 1987 the item was renumbered as item No. 152 ("PVC cloth, water-proof cloth, rexine and their products and tarpaulin") taxable at 8% at the first point of sale in the State (with PVC cloth later omitted by the 1991 Act but no change in rate/point for tarpaulin).
  • From April 1, 1992 tarpaulin is covered by item No. 106 ("Rain coat, tarpaulin and products of water-proof cloth, rexine and PVC cloth") taxable at 10% at the point of first sale in the State.
  • Therefore tarpaulin is properly liable to tax under the specific First Schedule entries for the relevant periods rather than being exempt as a cotton fabric.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Secretary of State v. Hindustan Cooperative Insurance Society Ltd., AIR 1931 PC 149 (1931) 58 IA 259 Cited as part of authorities distinguishing between referential legislation that merely cites another statute and referential legislation that incorporates provisions of another statute. Used, along with other authorities, to explain interpretive approach to statutory references/incorporation; supports proposition about effect of incorporating provisions.
Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathella’ Sampathu Chetty [1962] 3 SCR 786 One of the decisions discussing interpretation principles where an enactment refers to or incorporates provisions of another statute. Referred to as part of the body of decisions drawing the reference-vs-incorporation distinction; relied on generally for interpretive guidance.
Ram Sarup v. Munshi [1963] 3 SCR 858 Authority discussing referential/incorporative legislative techniques. Placed alongside other decisions to illustrate the established principles about incorporation and their consequences.
Ram Kirpal Bhagat v. State of Bihar [1970] 3 SCR 233 Discusses interpretive principles regarding reference to other statutes. Cited in support of the general rule-framework applied by the Court.
New Central Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. Assistant Collector of Central Excise [1971] 2 SCR 92 Another decision in the line concerning referential/incorporative interpretation of statutes. Used as supporting authority for the Court's interpretive analysis.
State Of Madhya Pradesh v. M.V. Narasimhan [1976] 1 SCR 6 Summarised the position: where a subsequent Act incorporates provisions of a previous Act, those provisions become integral and independent of subsequent amendments in the previous Act, subject to specific exceptions (a–d). The Court extracted and applied this proposition (including the enumerated exceptions) as central to determining the effect of references to the Central Excise Act in the State Schedules.
Bajya v. Gopikabai [1978] 3 SCR 561 Included among authorities on referential/incorporative interpretation. Referred to as part of the consistent line of authorities relied upon for interpretive principles.
Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India [1979] 2 SCR 1038 Part of the jurisprudence on statutory reference/incorporation and interpretation. Relied on as corroborative authority for the Court's approach to reference/incorporation issues.
Western Coalfields Ltd. v. Special Area Development Authority [1982] 2 SCR 1 Included among the decisions discussing interpretation where one enactment refers to another. Used to support the Court's interpretive framework; no different application specified beyond that context.
Commissioner, Sales Tax U.P. v. Agra Belting Works, Agra [1987] 66 STC 1 (SC) Principle that when the power to withdraw exemption and to vary the rate vests in the State Government, a later notification prescribing a rate can have the effect of withdrawing an earlier exemption without a separate notification recalling the exemption. The Court treated the fact situation as identical and applied the reasoning to hold that levy by later notification prescribing rate is legally permissible and can withdraw exemption.
Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Punjab [1965] 16 STC 310 Authority relied upon by the assessee for the proposition that, for declared goods, the rate of tax cannot exceed a specified ceiling (as understood by the assessee) and that levy should not be at more than one stage. The Court noted the assessee's reliance but observed the specific constitutional/central-law point was not raised before the Tribunal and that it could not be adjudicated in a revision under section 41 of the Kerala Act in the present proceedings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court approached the single identified question — whether sale of tarpaulin is exigible to tax — by conducting a textual and historical analysis of the State Schedules and the relevant central definitions and by applying established principles on the effect of referential or incorporative statutory language.

  1. The Court first traced the legislative history of entries in the First Schedule of the Kerala Act concerning tarpaulin: there was no specific entry for tarpaulin until April 1, 1984 (item No. 100C introduced by the Finance Act 7 of 1986), which taxed "PVC cloth, water-proof cloth, rexine and their products and tarpaulin" at 8% at the point of first sale in the State. This entry was renumbered to 152 by the Finance Act 18 of 1987 (continuing the same description and rate). Effective April 1, 1992, the relevant entry became item No. 106 ("Rain coat, tarpaulin and products of water-proof cloth, rexine and PVC cloth") with rate increased to 10% at the first point of sale.
  2. The Court examined the assessee's contention that tarpaulin is covered by the exemption entries in Schedule III (item No. 7 or item No. 11) by reference to the definition of "cotton fabrics" in item No. 19 of the First Schedule to the Central Excise Act. It recognized the need to determine whether the words "cotton fabrics" in the State exemption entries are words of mere reference (so that the Central Excise definition, as amended over time, is read into the State provision) or words of incorporation (so that the definition is fixed as originally referred to and not affected by subsequent changes).
  3. To resolve the referential/incorporative question, the Court relied on established authorities (including the Narasimhan formulation and the cited line of cases) explaining that when a subsequent Act incorporates provisions of a previous Act the borrowed provisions generally become part of the subsequent Act and are not affected by later amendments in the previous Act — subject to enumerated exceptions. The Court used that framework to assess the legal effect of the State's reference to central definitions and lists.
  4. The Court applied the ordinary rule of construction that where there are two entries — one general and one specific — the specific entry prevails. Thus, if a commodity falls both under a general (exemption) entry and under a later or specific First Schedule taxable entry, the specific First Schedule entry must be given effect over the general exemption entry. The Court observed that this principle alone sufficed to reject the assessee's primary contention that tarpaulin was exempt as a cotton fabric.
  5. The Court addressed the assessee's submission (based on the Additional Excise Act and the declared-goods scheme) that tarpaulin being a declared good imposed limits (e.g., maximum rate and single-stage levy). The Court analyzed the effect of central legislation (Article 286, Central Sales Tax Act sections 14/15 and the Additional Excise Act) and the integrated scheme that led to some goods being subjected to additional excise duty and corresponding treatment in State law. It noted the historical policy that certain items from the Central Excise schedule (including "cotton fabrics") were treated as declared goods with special restrictions in the Central Act and Additional Excise Act.
  6. With respect to the contention that the State's levy was beyond legislative competence (because of Article 286(3) and section 15 of the Central Act), the Court observed that the precise constitutional/central-law challenge was not raised before the Tribunal and there were no pleadings on this point. The Court further held that even if the issue were a pure question of law (involving no factual determination), it could not be adjudicated in a revision under section 41 of the Kerala Act in the present proceedings. On the related procedural point, the Court relied on Agra Belting (Commissioner, Sales Tax U.P. v. Agra Belting Works) for the proposition that when power to withdraw exemption and to vary the rate vests in the State Government, a later notification prescribing a rate may have the effect of withdrawing an earlier exemption without a separate recall notification.
  7. In sum, having regard to the legislative history (showing specific taxable entries for tarpaulin from 1984 onwards), the interpretive principles on reference/incorporation, and the basic rule that a specific entry prevails over a general one, the Court concluded there was no merit in the revisions challenging the Tribunal's treatment of tarpaulin as taxable.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: All the tax revision cases are dismissed.

Implications:

  • The Court sustained the treatment of tarpaulin as exigible to tax in accordance with the specific First Schedule entries (as historically introduced and amended): item No. 100C (from April 1, 1984), renumbered to 152 (from July 1, 1987) at 8% and item No. 106 (from April 1, 1992) at 10% at the point of first sale, as described in the opinion.
  • The assessee's primary claim that tarpaulin is exempt as "cotton fabrics" under Schedule III was rejected by application of the rule that a specific entry prevails over a general exemption entry together with the interpretive analysis on incorporation/referential effect.
  • The Court did not decide the broader constitutional/central-law issue (Article 286(3) and section 15 regarding declared goods and limits on State levy) on the merits because that point was not raised before the Tribunal and there were no pleadings; the Court noted that it could not be adjudicated in the present revision proceedings under section 41.
  • No new broader legal principle or precedent beyond applying established interpretive rules and the cited authorities was announced; the decision sustains the tax treatment for the parties in these cases and dismisses the petitions.

Order: Petitions dismissed.

    Reliance Trading Company v. State Of Kerala (And Other Cases)

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Arijit Pasayat, C.J:— As these revision applications under section 41 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 (in short, “the Act”) raise a common question, they are taken up together and shall be governed by this judgment.

    2. The question relates to taxability of tarpaulin. In each case, the judgment of the Kerala Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal of different Benches (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal” for sake of convenience) is assailed. Though the assessment orders are relatable to different assessment years, there is practically no difference so far as the position in law to be decided is concerned. The assessment years concerned in different cases are 1986-87 to 1993-94. According to the assessee, tarpaulin is encompassed by the expression “cotton fabrics” falling under item No. 7 (up to March 31, 1992) and item No. 11 (from April 1, 1992) of the Third Schedule to the Act and, therefore, exempted from tax. Alternatively, it is submitted that tarpaulin being one of the goods of special importance (declared goods), levy of tax thereon and at the rate prescribed cannot be maintained. The Revenue's stand, on the other hand, is that tarpaulin is liable to be taxed as unclassified item at multi-point up to 1983-84, and thereafter as an item classified under the First Schedule at first point inside the State. From July 1, 1987 to March 31, 1992, it was covered by item No. 152 and from April 1, 1992, it is covered by item No. 106.

    3. The only question that, therefore, needs adjudication is whether sale of tarpaulin is exigible to tax. For answering this question, it would be proper, to take note of legislative history of a few items in Schedules I and III. There was no specific entry for tarpaulin till March 31, 1984. It was classified as a separate item under item No. 100C of the First Schedule, taxable at 8 per cent at point of first sale in the State with effect from April 1, 1984. The said position continued till June 30, 1987. The item was re-numbered as 152 with effect from July 1, 1987 and read “PVC cloth, water-proof cloth, rexine and their products and tarpaulin”. The rate continued to be 8 per cent at the point of first sale. This item continued till July 31, 1991. “PVC cloth” was omitted therefrom by the Kerala Finance Act, 1991 (in short “the 1991 Act”) with effect from August 1, 1991. No change in any other item, rate, point of levy was made. This was the position till March 31, 1992 as amended by the Kerala Finance Act, 1992 (in short “the 1992 Act”). The new item No. 106 reads as “Rain coat, tarpaulin and products of water-proof cloth, rexine and PVC cloth”. The rate of tax has been increased to 10 per cent, with no change in the point of levy. According to the Revenue, tarpaulin falls under item No. 100C or 152, as the case may be, taxable at 8 per cent at the first point of sale in the State from April 1, 1984 to March 31, 1992. It falls under item No. 106 with effect from April 1, 1992 taxable at the rate of 10 per cent at the point of first sale in the State. So far as the periods prior to April 1, 1984 are concerned, it is to be noted that there was no specific entry for tarpaulin in the Schedules to the Act. Exemption is claimed by the assessee on the ground that tarpaulin is encompassed by expression “cotton fabrics” coming under item No. 7 of the Third Schedule to the Act.

    4. The assessee's stand is that tarpaulin is 100 per cent cotton cloth and consequently exempted from payment of tax as an item falling under item No. 7 or 11 of the Third Schedule to the Act (as the case may be). Schedule III deals with “goods exempted from tax” under section 9 of the Act. Item No. 7 or 11 (as the case may be) on which reliance is placed by the assessee reads as follows:

    “Item No. 7: Cotton fabrics, woollen fabrics and rayon or artificial silk fabrics as defined in items Nos. 19, 21 and 22 respectively of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.

    Item No. 11: (i) Cotton fabrics covered under heading Nos. 52.05, 52.06, 52.07, 52.08, 52.09, 52.10, 52.11, 52.12, 58.01, 58.02, 58.03, 58.04, 58.05, 59.01, 59.03, 59.05, 59.06 and 60.01 of the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (Central Act 5 of 1986).

    (ii) Man-made fabrics covered under heading Nos. 54.08, 54.09, 54.10, 54.11, 54.12, 55.07, 55.08, 55.09, 55.10, 55.11, 55.12, 58.01, 58.02, 58.03, 58.04, 58.05, 58.06, 59.06 and 60.01 of the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (Central Act 5 of 1986).

    (iii) Wooven fabrics of wool covered under heading Nos. 51.06, 51.07, 58.01 and 58.06 of the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (Central Act 5 of 1986).

    5. Excluding PVC cloth, rexine and water-proof cloth on which duty is not levied under the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 (Central Act 58 of 1957).”

    6. Item No. 19 (dealing with cotton fabrics) of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (in short “the Central Excise Act”) is extracted below:

    “19. ‘Cotton fabrics’ means all varieties of fabrics manufactured either wholly or partly from cotton and includes dhoties, sarees, chadders, bed-sheets, bed-spreads, counterpanes, table-cloths, embroidery in the piece, in strips or in motifs and fabrics impregnated or coated with preparations of cellulose derivatives or of other artificial plastic materials but does not include any such fabric if it contains—

    (i) 40 per cent or more by weight of wool;

    (ii) 40 per cent or more by weight of silk;

    (iii) 60 per cent or more by weight of rayon or artificial silk; or

    (iv) 50 per cent or more by weight of jute (including Bimlipatam jute or mesta fibre):

    Provided that in the case of embroidery in the piece, in strips or in motifs and fabrics impregnated or coated with preparations of cellulose derivatives or of other artificial plastic materials, the percentages referred to in (i) to (iv) above shall be in relation to the base fabrics which are embroidered or impregnated, or coated as the case may be”

    7. It is to be noted that sale of tarpaulin was exempted by virtue of a notification issued under section 10 of the Act (S.R.O No. 342 of 1963). That was withdrawn with effect from June 1, 1974. First Schedule to the Act was substituted with effect from July 1, 1987 by the Finance Act 18 of 1987. Prior to that, with effect from April 1, 1986, by the Finance Act 7 of 1986, item No. 100C was introduced to the Schedule. The same reads as follows:

    “100C: PVC cloth, water-proof cloth, rexine and their products and tarpaulin 8 per cent.”

    8. Thereafter, Schedule I was substituted by the Finance Act 18 of 1987 with effect from July 1, 1987, as stated above. In the substituted Schedule, item No. 152 reads as follows:

    “152: P.V.C cloth, water-proof cloth, rexine and their products and tarpaulin 8 per cent.”

    9. Schedule I again underwent change with effect from April 1, 1992 whereby the relevant item was renumbered as item No. 106 and it reads as follows:

    “106: Rain coat, tarpaulin and products of water-proof cloth, rexine and PVC cloth 10 per cent.”

    10. The first limb of the question to be adjudicated is the effect of item No. 7 or 11, as the case may be, in Schedule III. The effect of the words “cotton fabrics” as defined in the Central Excise Act in respect of item No. 7 or 11 of the Third Schedule to the Act has to be considered in the background as to whether they are words of definition or word of incorporation. To appreciate contentions urged, it is necessary to make a brief reference to the principles of interpretation of an enactment which, for purposes of convenience, refers to or incorporates a provision of another. These have been discussed in various decisions, viz., Secretary of State v. Hindustan Cooperative Insurance Society Ltd. AIR 1931 PC 149 : (1931) 58 IA 259; Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathella’ Sampathu Chetty [1962] 3 SCR 786; Ram Sarup v. Munshi [1963] 3 SCR 858; Ram Kirpal Bhagat v. State of Bihar [1970] 3 SCR 233; New Central Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. Assistant Collector of Central Excise [1971] 2 SCR 92; State Of Madhya Pradesh v. M.V Narasimhan [1976] 1 SCR 6; Bajya v. Gopikabai [1978] 3 SCR 561; Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India [1979] 2 SCR 1038 and Western Coalfields Ltd. v. Special Area Development Authority [1982] 2 SCR 1. It is unnecessary to make a detailed reference to these decisions. It is sufficient to say that they draw a distinction between referential legislation which merely contains a “reference to, or citation of”, a provision of another statute and a piece of referential legislation which incorporates within itself a provision of another statute. In the former case, the provision of the second statute, along with all its amendments and variations from time to time, should be read into the first statute. In the latter case, the position will be as outlined in Narasimhan's case [1976] 1 SCR 6, where, after referring to Secretary of State v. Hindustan Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd. case AIR 1931 PC 149 : (1931) 58 IA 259, apex Court summed up the position thus:

    “On a consideration of these authorities, therefore, it seems that the following proposition emerges:

    11. Where a subsequent Act incorporates provisions of a previous Act, then the borrowed provisions become an integral and independent part of the subsequent Act and are totally unaffected by any repeal or amendment in the previous Act. This principle, however, will not apply in the following cases:

    (a) where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are supplemental to each other;

    (b) where the two Acts are in pari materia;

    (c) where the amendment in the previous Act, if not imported into the subsequent Act also, would render the subsequent Act wholly unworkable and ineffectual; and

    (d) where the amendment of the previous Act, either expressly or by necessary intendment, applies the said provisions to the subsequent Act.”

    12. In almost an identical case, it was held by the apex Court with reference to section 3 (charging section) of the U.P Sales Tax Act, 1948 and section 3A thereof (authorising variation of rate of tax) and section 4 (providing for exemption from tax) that a notification of recall of exemption is not a condition precedent. It was held that after notification under section 4 granting exemption from liability to sales tax in respect of certain class of goods, when a subsequent notification under section 3A prescribes the rate of tax leviable on an item of that class, the intention is to withdraw the exemption and make the same liable to tax at the rate prescribed in the notification. The power both of granting exemption and of varying the rate of tax vests in the State Government, and a notification to recall exemption is not a condition precedent for imposing tax at any prescribed rate by a valid notification under section 3A. It was held that levy of tax at the prescribed rate on the sales of “……of all kinds” under notification dated December 1, 1974 was justified notwithstanding the earlier notification dated January 25, 1958 under which “cotton fabrics of all kinds” were exempted. The second notification had the effect both of withdrawing the exemption and of providing a higher rate of tax and ratings [See: Commissioner, Sales Tax, Commissioner, Sales Tax U.P v. Agra Belting Works, Agra. [1987] 66 STC 1 (SC)]. The fact situation is identical here and, therefore, levy as made is perfectly in order. The position that emerges, therefore, is that when the power for both the operation, i.e, withdrawal of exemption and for providing higher rate of tax vests in the State Government and the intention to levy tax is clear, the later notification providing for higher rate of tax is legally permissible and cannot be faulted.

    13. If there are two entries, one general and the other specific, the ordinary rule of construction that a general entry must give way to a specific entry is to be followed. The authority is to see that if two entries are apparently in conflict with one another, an attempt must be made to construe them harmoniously and not to treat them repugnant each other. A commodity falling under the general entry as also a specific entry has to be taxed in terms of special entry as the same is to prevail over the general entry. That itself is sufficient to reject the stand of the assessee.

    14. It is submitted that tarpaulin being one of the goods of special importance covered by Central Excise Act and the additional levy of sales tax is unauthorised. Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 (in short, “the Additional Excise Act”).

    15. The residual limb of the question concerns the levy of tax on tarpaulin, it being claimed to be one of the declared goods. Article 286 of the Constitution of India imposed certain restrictions on the legislative powers of the States in the matter of levy of sales tax on sales taking place outside the State, sales in the course of import or export, sales in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and sales of declared goods. The Sales Tax Acts in force in several States were not in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution and attempts to bring those laws to be in conformity with these provisions gave rise to a lot of litigation. This led to an amendment of article 286. Clause (2) of the article, as it stands, since September 11, 1956, authorised Parliament to formulate principles for determining when a sale or purchase of goods can be said to take place in the course of import or export or in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. Clause (3) was amended, to restrict the powers of a State to impose sales or purchase tax on declared goods. The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (in short, “the Central Act”) which came into force on January 5, 1957, formulated the principles referred to in article 286(2). As already mentioned, this Act was amended, inter alia, by Act 16 of 1957 with effect from June 6, 1957 and by Act 31 of 1958 with effect from October 1, 1958. Section 14 listed the goods which are considered to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce. Section 15 of the Act, as originally enacted, was brought into force only with effect from October 1, 1958. It stipulated that levy of salestax on declared goods should not be at a rate exceeding 2 per cent or be levied at more than one point in a State. Before this section came into force, it was amended by Act 16 of 1957 which retained the first restriction and, so far as the second is concerned, provided that the tax should be levied only on the last sale or purchase inside the State and even that should not be levied when that last sale or purchase is in the course of inter-State trade or commerce as defined. Act 31 of 1958 amended section 15 to impose certain modified restrictions and conditions with the details of which we are not concerned here. These restrictions clearly entailed loss of revenue to the States and it was considered expedient and desirable to compensate the States for the proportionate loss of sales tax incurred by them. Thus, even before section 15 was brought into force, the Central Government decided to pass an Act to provide for the levy and collection of additional duties of excise on certain goods and for the distribution of a part of the net proceeds thereof among the States in pursuance of the principles of distribution recommended by the Second Finance Commission in its report dated September 30, 1957. This proposal to levy additional duties of excise on certain special goods was a part and parcel of an integrated scheme under which sales tax levied at different rates by the States on certain goods was ultimately substituted by the levy of additional duties of excise on such goods and the States were compensated by payment of a part of the net proceeds of the said additional levy on such goods. That this clearly was the genesis and object of the 1957 Act also appears from its Objects and Reasons. Some of the items liable to excise duty were picked out from the Schedule to the Central Excise Act. They were listed among the declared goods of section 14 of the Central Act and also made liable to additional excise duty under the Additional Excise Act. A perusal of the lists under the three enactments shows that out of the items listed in the Schedule to the Central Excise Act, sugar, tobacco, cotton fabrics, rayon or artificial fabrics and woollen fabrics were categorised as declared goods and subjected to additional excise duty. When the numerical order of these items in the Central Excise Act (originally 8, 9, 12, 12A, 12B) came to be changed in 1960 (as 1, 4, 19, 21, 22) a corresponding change was effected in the Additional Excise Act. The fact that “cotton fabrics” though listed as item No. 12 in the Schedule to the Central Excise Act was not brought into the list in section 14 till October 1, 1958 does not alter the position that these three Acts are inter-connected and that certain goods taken out from the Schedule to the Central Excise Act were to be subjected to the special treatment outlined in the Central Act and the Additional Excise Act.

    16. So far as the prescription of rate in the background of sections 14/15 of the Central Act is concerned, it has to be noted that meaning or intention of clause (3) of article 286 is not to destroy by operating sections in the Sales Tax Act of the State which shall justify to modify them in accordance thereof. The law of the State is declared to be subject to restrictions and is contained in the law made by Parliament and rate in the State Act would stand modified. The effect of article 286(3) is brought out by second proviso to section 5(1) of the Central Act, but the proviso has been enacted out of abundant caution and even without it result was the same. The proviso was added with effect from April 1, 1966. But the question whether there was violation of the requirement cannot be adjudicated in a revision under section 41 of the Act.

    17. In essence, the submission of the assessee is that the products in question as occurring either in serial No. 19 of Schedule I of the Central Excise Act or heading 52.06-52.07, as covered by section 14 of the Central Act, as declared goods, the rate of tax has to stand per time to move in terms of section 15. Reliance is placed for this purpose on a decision of the apex Court in Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Punjab [1965] 16 STC 310. It is submitted that rate of tax cannot exceed 4 per cent, and no levy is permissible beyond one stage. It is to be noted that levy is questioned on the ground of having made beyond legislative competence of the State. The said submission has been made with reference to article 286(3) of the Constitution read with section 15 of the Central Act. It is to be noted that such a question was not raised before the Tribunal and there are no pleadings to that effect. Even if it is accepted as a pure question of law involving no factual determination, it cannot be adjudicated in an application under section 41 of the Act.

    18. In the result, all the tax revision cases are without any merit and are dismissed.

    19. Petitions dismissed.

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