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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 10 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act
  • Rent Control) Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act,
  • Order XXI, Rule 92(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order XXI, Rule 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act
  • Order XXI, Rule 89 of the Code and Rule 89
  • provisions of Sections 4, 5, 7, 8, 11 and 13
  • Section 213 of Indian Succession Act,
  • Article 127 of the Limitation Act
  • Agricultural Debt Relief Act, 1958.
  • Rule 92 of Order XXI of the Code
  • Order XXI, Rule 89 of the Code
  • Section 11 of the Kerala Act
  • Section 30 of Tamil Nadu Act
  • Rent Restriction Act.6.
  • Indian Succession Act
  • Order XXI, Rule 92(2)
  • Rent Control Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 10 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act
  • Rent Control) Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act,
  • Order XXI, Rule 92(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order XXI, Rule 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act
  • Order XXI, Rule 89 of the Code and Rule 89
  • provisions of Sections 4, 5, 7, 8, 11 and 13
  • Section 213 of Indian Succession Act,
  • Article 127 of the Limitation Act
  • Agricultural Debt Relief Act, 1958.
  • Rule 92 of Order XXI of the Code
  • Order XXI, Rule 89 of the Code
  • Section 11 of the Kerala Act
  • Section 30 of Tamil Nadu Act
  • Rent Restriction Act.6.
  • Indian Succession Act
  • Order XXI, Rule 92(2)
  • Rent Control Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Second Appeal)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant-defendant was a tenant of a building leased by the first plaintiff described as a Church. After the tenancy was terminated the first plaintiff, through its declared representatives (kaikars), filed a suit in the civil Court on 10-03-1995 for recovery of possession (eviction). The building lay in an area to which the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act ("the Act") had been extended. The plaintiffs relied on a Government notification issued under Section 25(1) of the Act dated 07-03-1992 (G.O. (MS) No. 14/92.HSG) that purported to exempt "the buildings of all churches/mosques of all the minority religions" from certain specified provisions of the Act. The defendant resisted the suit, contending inter alia that the suit was not maintainable in the civil Court, that the notification did not apply to the plaint-schedule building, that the building was not owned by the first plaintiff Church (which, it was argued, was not a legal entity) but by the parishioners/Edavaka, and that the defendant was a protected tenant under the Act.

The trial Court (decision dated 16-09-1996) found for the plaintiffs and granted recovery of possession. On 30-10-1996 the earlier notification was amended by G.O. (Ms) 40/96.HSG to enlarge the categories exempted (adding dioceses, arch-dioceses, monasteries, convents, wakfs and madrasas). The defendant appealed from the trial Court decree; the lower appellate Court, while not finding great merit in reliance on the original (07-03-1992) notification, relied on the amended notification (30-10-1996) to sustain the decree. The defendant took the matter in this Second Appeal contending that maintainability had to be tested with reference to the position on the date the suit was instituted (10-03-1995) and that reliance on the later amendment could not retroactively validate a suit that was not maintainable when filed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the eviction suit, i.e., whether maintainability must be tested by reference to the status of the building under the notification in force on the date the suit was instituted (10-03-1995).
  2. Whether an amendment to a Government notification (the amendment dated 30-10-1996) that expands the scope of exemption under Section 25(1) of the Act can be applied to validate or sustain a suit instituted before that amendment came into force.
  3. Whether the expression "church" in the notification dated 07-03-1992 can be given a meaning that makes the notification applicable to a building said to belong to the Church (i.e., whether the Church as used in the notification can be treated as an entity capable of holding property or must be strictly limited to the building used for worship).
  4. Whether the plaintiffs (represented by kaikars and the Vicar) were competent to sue as owners/landlords for the purpose of claiming exemption under the notification.
  5. Whether the decree for compensation for use and occupation (quantum) was supported by legal evidence and required interference.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Defendant) — main contentions

  • The suit was not maintainable in the civil Court because the plaint-schedule building did not fall within the scope of the 07-03-1992 notification; therefore the Act applied and the proper forum was the Rent Control Court established under the Act.
  • The first plaintiff Church was not a legal entity and did not own the plaint-schedule property; the building belonged to the Edavaka or parishioners and not to the Church as a juristic person; hence the notification could not be relied on by the plaintiffs to support a civil suit for eviction.
  • The notification relied upon (07-03-1992) covered only church buildings in the narrow sense and not a commercial premises constructed by parishioners (even if income augmented the Church); thus the defendant remained a protected tenant under the Act.
  • The plaintiffs were not properly represented in the suit (competence to sue contested).
  • The compensation for use and occupation (Rs. 1,500 per month) was excessive relative to the agreed monthly rent (Rs. 250) and not supported by legal evidence.

Respondents (Plaintiffs / Church) — main contentions

  • The 07-03-1992 notification exempted the relevant building from the specified provisions of the Act, thereby permitting the plaintiffs to sue in the civil Court for eviction.
  • After the trial Court decision, the notification was amended on 30-10-1996 to expressly include buildings of dioceses and arch-dioceses etc., which the plaintiffs relied upon in the appellate proceedings to show the building was exempted.
  • The plaintiff church (through the Vicar and the kaikars) were competent representatives to sue and recover possession as landlord; estoppel was alleged against the tenant who had rented from the first plaintiff.
  • Implicitly, the plaintiffs contended that even if the original notification was imperfect in drafting, it should be given a meaning that allows community-owned church buildings to be covered.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in this Opinion
East India Corporation Ltd. v. Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd., AIR 1991 SC 1094 Statutory provision in pari materia can implicitly bar civil Court jurisdiction (Section 10 Tamil Nadu Act analogous to Section 11 Kerala Act). The Court relied on this to state that if the Act applied on the date of institution, the civil Court could not have entertained the eviction suit.
Kuruvilla Abraham v. P.C. John, 1995 (1) KLT 161 (1996 AIHC 2358) (Full Bench) A decree passed while overlooking a notification making the Act applicable, even if confirmed in appeal, is a nullity and not executable. Used to support the proposition that a decree given without jurisdiction because the Act applied on institution-date would be null and void.
Susheel Kumar Mehta v. Govind Ram Bohara, (1990) 1 SCC 193 A decree passed by a civil Court without jurisdiction is a nullity and "non est". Reinforced the view that if the notification did not apply on the institution date, the trial Court's decree would be void for want of jurisdiction.
R. v. Bolton, (1835) 42 All ER Rep 71 Jurisdiction is determinable at the commencement of the inquiry (i.e., date of institution), not at its conclusion. Quoted as authority for testing jurisdiction by reference to the state of affairs when the proceeding was initiated; favouring dismissal if jurisdiction lacked at initiation.
Rameswar v. Jot Ram, AIR 1976 SC 49 Right to relief must be judged as on the date the suit is instituted; subsequent developments ordinarily cannot defeat rights crystallised on that date. Applied to show that ordinarily the test is the institution-date; but Court noted limited power to take subsequent events into account in exceptional circumstances.
P. Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders, AIR 1975 SC 1409 Court can, cautiously, take cognisance of events subsequent to institution to make relief just and meaningful, provided fairness is maintained. Referred to qualify Rameswar, acknowledging that subsequent events can sometimes be relevant to mould relief.
Kishan v. Manoj Kumar, AIR 1998 SC 999 Suit for eviction instituted when building was exempted may be continued in civil Court even if the Act becomes applicable during pendency. Shown as authority permitting continuation where suit validly began during exemption; distinguished from cases where institution itself was barred.
Anand Prakash Malik v. Bhagwandas, AIR 1998 SC 2105 A suit filed after the period of exemption has expired is not maintainable; relevant date is when suit is instituted. Used to support the proposition that maintainability depends on the state of exemption on the institution date.
Parripati Chandrasekhar Rao & Sons v. Alapati Jalaiah, (1995) 3 SCC 705 (AIR 1995 SC 1781) Distinguishes landlord's common-law rights (vested) from tenant's protective rights under rent legislation (not vested beyond the protection period). Cited to explain that a tenant's protective shield under rent legislation is not a vested right that survives removal of protection; informs analysis whether amendment can deprive tenant of protection.
Iven Krishnan v. Kunhukutty Amma, 1956 TC 402 Court can grant decree for redemption when mortgage term expires during pendency (court may take note of subsequent event). Referenced as an instance where courts took subsequent events into account; Court contrasted such cases with ones where institution was barred by statute.
Sankara Pillai v. Ittiera, 1958 Ker LT 220 (AIR 1958 Ker 245) Similar principle permitting grant of relief taking into account events during pendency (e.g., expiry during litigation). Noted as authority showing courts may sometimes regard events occurring after institution; distinguished on facts.
Hameed v. Ittoop, 1970 Ker LT 501 Power to notice subsequent events cannot be extended to cases where lack of jurisdiction existed at the institution of the proceeding. Applied to hold that subsequent amendment cannot validate a suit that was barred at institution — the Court relied on this limitation.
Kuntbanlal v. Bhagavandas, ILR 1962 (1) Punj 304 Recognises the distinction between cases where subsequent events may be noticed and cases where institution was barred by statute. Referred to support Hameed's limitation on taking subsequent events into account when jurisdiction was lacking at institution.
Syndicate Bank v. Soji Chacko, 1998 (2) Ker LT 25 An appellate Court entertaining an appeal can take note of a statutory amendment (prospective) to decide entitlement to relief when the bar relates to grant of relief and not to institution of suit. Distinguished: used to show that where bar concerns grant of relief (not institution), an appellate Court may rely on subsequent amendment — but that principle did not assist the plaintiffs here because the bar was to institution.
Nolini's case, AIR 1962 SC 1471 Referenced in connection with the distinction between a bar to institution and a bar to grant of relief. Mentioned in relation to Syndicate Bank to illustrate the legal distinction between bars to institution and bars to relief.
Pathummakutty v. Kadiyumma, 1990 (1) KLT 596 (AIR 1990 Ker 286) Held an amendment to a procedural rule could be declaratory and given retrospective effect in a particular context. Cited and examined; the Court expressed reservations about treating the amendment to the notification as declaratory and concluded the ratio was not applicable to the present expansionary amendment.
Chinnamma v. Abraham, 1962 Ker LT 240 Considered the status of a Roman Catholic Church for statutory purposes; suggested Church may be viewed as voluntary organisation or corporation sole or juristic person. Used to support the conclusion that "church" in the notification could be given a broader meaning so as to make the notification workable (i.e., to refer to church as community/institution capable of owning property).
Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan v. Moran Mar Marthoma, AIR 1995 SC 2001 Discusses meanings of "church" — both community and building; parish church as ecclesiastical authority. Quoted to justify a broader construction of "church" in the notification so as not to render the notification meaningless.
K.V. John v. Sooppikka Veettile Kunhibi Wakaf, 1997 (2) Ker LT 464 (1998 AIHC 1163) Exemption notifications under rent legislation should be construed narrowly; favourable references to Supreme Court decisions supporting narrow construction. Applied to emphasise that exemption notifications should be narrowly construed; the Court balanced this with the need to give effect to the notification's purpose.
Sheikh Gulfam v. Sanat Kumar, AIR 1965 SC 1839 Authority referenced in support of narrow construction of exemption provisions. Cited as part of the jurisprudential background for construing exemption notifications narrowly.
Mohd. Shafi v. VIIth Addl. Dist. & Sessions Judge, Allahabad, AIR 1977 SC 836 Authority referenced in support of narrow construction of exemption provisions. Referred to in the discussion on construing exemptions narrowly.
Rt. Rev. Aldo Maria Patroni v. Kesavan & Others, 1964 Ker LT 791 (FB) (AIR 1965 Ker 75) On the question of "minority" — absence of a precise constitutional definition; indicated that minority status is to be determined in context and by evidence. Invoked to show that a Court must decide, on the evidence, whether an institution qualifies as of a minority religion before applying the notification.
Dipendra Nam v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 Pat 101 Used in the context that questions of minority status require adjudication on evidence. Referred to support the proposition that the Court must decide minority status on materials before it.
Sree Jain Swetambar Terapanthi Vidyalaya v. State, AIR 1982 Cal 101 Similar reference about determining minority status by court on evidence. Referred to for the need to determine minority status on the record.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by identifying the central conflict: whether the civil Court had jurisdiction on the basis of the notification in force on the date the suit was instituted (10-03-1995), or whether the subsequent amendment (30-10-1996) enlarging exemption could be invoked in the appellate proceedings to validate a suit that may not have been maintainable when filed.

The Court analysed binding principles from precedent:

  • It accepted the established rule that jurisdiction is ordinarily determined with reference to the situation at commencement of the proceedings (R. v. Bolton; Rameswar), and that a civil Court which lacked statutory jurisdiction at the institution date cannot, by subsequent events, be retroactively clothed with jurisdiction in ordinary cases (East India Corporation; Kuruvilla Abraham; Susheel Kumar Mehta).
  • The Court acknowledged authorities permitting a Court to take cautious notice of subsequent events to mould relief (P. Venkateswarlu) and cases where a suit begun under an exemption may continue even if the Act later becomes applicable (Kishan). It emphasised, however, the critical distinction repeatedly made in authority: whether the later event affects only the grant of relief or, instead, goes to the very power to entertain the suit at institution. Where institution itself was barred, subsequent events cannot retrospectively create jurisdiction (Hameed; Kuntbanlal).
  • The Court observed that subordinate legislation (notifications) are not normally retrospective and that the amendment of 30-10-1996 did not either indicate retrospective intent nor was there any specific power conferred to make the notification retrospective. Hence the amendment could not ordinarily validate the maintainability of a suit instituted before it came into force.
  • Balancing these principles, the Court concluded that the maintainability of this eviction suit must be decided by reference to the content and reach of the notification dated 07-03-1992 (the notification in force when the suit was filed). It held that the lower appellate Court erred in relying on the amendment dated 30-10-1996 to sustain maintainability.

The Court then examined the statutory and linguistic problem of the word "church" as used in the 07-03-1992 notification. Recognising two possible meanings — a narrow (building used for worship) and a broader one (the Christian religious community or institution capable of owning property) — the Court reasoned that a strictly narrow construction would render the notification meaningless (because a building used for worship cannot itself own property). In order to give the notification efficacy, the Court adopted a broader construction (consistent with prior authorities like Chinnamma and Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan) and held that the 07-03-1992 notification could apply to buildings owned by the Christian religious community, provided the institution is shown to be of a minority religion.

On the question whether the plaintiffs had proved minority status and competence to sue, the Court observed that the lower Courts had not explicitly adjudicated the issue but the pleadings and the evidence (cross-examination of PW 1 who stated the Church was of the Catholic Sabha) were sufficient in the record before it to proceed on the basis that the first plaintiff Church was of a minority religion. The Court noted, however, that in general it is necessary for the trial Court to decide whether the institution claiming exemption is of a minority religion on the materials before it.

Finally, on the quantum of compensation for use and occupation, the Court found the figure decreed by the Courts below (Rs. 1,500 per month) "somewhat arbitrary and excessive" in light of the earlier rent (Rs. 250 per month) and the circumstances of the case. The Court therefore reduced the compensation to Rs. 1,000 per month for the relevant period.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court concluded that the question of maintainability had to be decided with reference to the notification dated 07-03-1992 (the position as on the date the suit was instituted) and that the lower appellate Court was substantially in error in relying on the subsequent amendment dated 30-10-1996 to uphold maintainability. Nevertheless, on the evidence and pleadings before it the Court found no fault in confirming the decree for recovery of possession in favour of the plaintiffs.

Direct Ruling (core decision):

  • CONFIRMED — the judgments and decrees of the Courts below so far as they related to the decree for recovery of possession (i.e., eviction) were confirmed.
  • MODIFIED — the decree for compensation for use and occupation was reduced from Rs. 1,500 per month to Rs. 1,000 per month for the period from 01-12-1994 until the defendant surrenders vacant possession.
  • TIME AND CONDITIONS — the defendant was granted one year from the date of the judgment to vacate the building, subject to filing an undertaking not to let in any stranger during the period of one year and depositing, within two months, compensation for use and occupation for the period 01-12-1994 to 31-05-1999 (with credit for any sums already deposited).
  • Each party to bear their respective costs. The Second Appeal was allowed only to the limited extent noted above.

Implications: The opinion emphasises the established procedural principle that statutory jurisdiction (and hence maintainability) is to be determined by reference to the law and notifications in force on the date the suit was instituted. It also recognises limited circumstances in which subsequent events or amendments may be taken into account (e.g., where the bar relates only to grant of relief), but it underscores the fundamental distinction that an amendment cannot generally be applied retrospectively to validate a suit that was barred at institution. The decision did not purport to lay down a new precedent but applied and reconciled existing authorities to the facts of this case.

Order made: Second Appeal allowed to the limited extent of modifying compensation and directing the time and deposit conditions; decree for recovery of possession otherwise confirmed.

    Bhavanji Hansaraj v. Lourdes Church, Perumanoor And Others

    The defendant is the appellant. The defendant is the tenant of a building leased out to him by the first plaintiff church. After terminating the tenancy the first plaintiff Church through its Kaikars filed the suit for eviction. The building is admittedly located in an area to which the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act stood extended. The plaintiff filed the suit without approaching the Rent Control Court established under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, on the ground that the building belonging to the first plaintiff-Church were exempt from the purview of the Act in lieu of the notification issued under Section 25(1) of the Act as per G.O (MS) No. 14/92.HSG. The defendant resisted the suit contending that the suit was not maintainable. It was contended that the first plaintiff was not properly represented in the suit. The Notification under Section 25 of the Act relied on by the plaintiffs did not apply to the plaint schedule building. The plaint schedule property did not belong to the first plaintiff Church. The plaintiff were not entitled to a decree for eviction as against the defendant. The defendant was a tenant protected by the Act.

    2. The suit was filed on 10-3-1995. The notification dated 7-3-1992 issued under Section 25(1) of the Act which was in force then was to the following effect.

    “………… The Government of Kerala hereby exempt, in public interest, the buildings, of all churches/mosques of all the minority religions from the provisions of Sections 4, 5, 7, 8, 11 and 13 of the said Act.”

    It was contended on behalf of the defendant that the said notification had no application since the building in question was not part of a church building and was not a building of the first plaintiff church since church was not a legal entity and the building was not owned by the church but by the Edavaka and the first plaintiff church was not the church of a minority religion. The trial Court held that the defendant had taken the building on rent from the first plaintiff church, the defendant was not entitled to deny the title of the landlord, that the kaikars were competent to represent the church and in view of the notification under Section 25(1) of the Act, the relevant provision of the Act did not have application and hence the plaintiffs were entitled to a decree for recovery of possession. It cannot be said that the trial Court clearly tackled the question sought to be raised by the defendant or answered it properly. The defendant filed an appeal before the lower appellate Court.

    3. The trial Court rendered its decision on 16-9-1996. On 30-10-1996 a Notification G.O (Ms) 40/96.HSG dated 30-10-1996 was issued in Exercise of powers under Section 25(1) of the Act by amending the earlier notification G.O (Ms) 14/92.HSG dated 17-3-1992. By virtue of the amendment in addition to the buildings of all churches/mosques of all the minority religions, building of all dioceses, Arch-dioceses, monastries, convents, Wakfs and Madrasas in the State were also exempted from the provisions of the Act. It may be better to quote the relevant portion of the amended notification at this stage.

    “………. The Government of Kerala hereby exempt, in public interest, the buildings of all churches/mosques of all the minority religions and buildings of all dioceses, arch-dioceses, monasteries, convents, wakfs and madrasas in the State from the provisions of Sections 4, 5, 7, 8, 11 and 13 of the said Act.”

    The defendant filed the appeal before the appellate Court challenging the decree of the trial Court on 8-11-1996. The defendant contended that the notification dated 7-3-1992 would not enable the first plaintiff church to maintain the present suit for recovery of possession and he was a protected tenant under the Act. The contention of the defendant in essence was that church being not a legal entity could not own property and the building in question was not owned by the church but by the Parishoners and hence there was no question of the church suing for recovery on the strength of the Notification. It was also contended that the Notification dated 7-3-1992 embraced only the church buildings and not a commercial premises like the one constructed by the Parishoners even if it be for augmenting the income of the church. In addition to controverting this contention on behalf of the defendant, the plaintiff-respondents in the appeal relied on the amended notification which came into force on 30-10-1996 to point out that the argument is of no avail since the notification now exempts the buildings of all dioceses and Arch-dioceses and since the building was in any event owned by the dioceses and the tenancy had been created by the first plaintiff church in favour of the defendant, decree for recovery can be sustained. Though the appellate Court stated that it did not find much merit in the argument based on the notification dated 7-3-1992, it rested its decision on the amendment dated 30-10-1996 and held that in the light of the amended notification the building stood exempted from the purview of the Act and since the first plaintiff was the landlord from whom defendant had taken the building on lease, the first plaintiff was entitled to recover the building in the present suit and the decree of the trial Court was liable to be sustained. It is the contention of the defendant in this Second Appeal that the appellate Court was in error in applying the amended notification to the suit in question since the maintainability of the suit had to be tested with reference to the date on which it was instituted and on 10-3-1995 the unamended notification alone applied and on the basis of that notification, plaintiffs were not entitled to recover the building in a suit by taking advantage of the Notification under Section 25(1) of the Act.

    4. In East India Corporation Ltd. v. Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd., AIR 1991 SC 1094; (1991 AIR SCW 1088) the Supreme Court held that Section 10 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act in pari materia with Section 11 of the Kerala Act impliedly barred the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit. In Kuruvilla Abraham v. P.C John 1995 (1) KLT 161: (1996 AIHC 2358) (FB) it was held that where a decree was passed overlooking the notification which makes the Act applicable to the building in question and such a decree is confirmed in appeal even then the decree would be a nullity and could not be executed. In Susheel Kumar Metha v. Govind Ram Bohara, (1990) 1 SCC 193 it was held that a decree passed by the civil Court without jurisdiction is a nullity and non est. If the notification dated 7-3-1992 did not apply to the building in question, then obviously on the date the suit was filed the civil Court could not have entertained the suit and on the date the trial Court passed the decree for eviction it could not have passed a decree for eviction. There was not much controversy before me that the amendment dated 30-10-1996 brought to the notification in question would enable the plaintiffs to contend that the building was exempted from the purview of the Act. But, what was contended was that the Notification dated 3-10-1996 or the amendment brought into effect by that notification could only be treated as prospective and could not be applied retrospectively to make the suit in the present case maintainable.

    5. In R. v. Bolton ((1835) 42 All ER Rep 71) Lord Denman, C.J observed at page 73:—

    “The question of jurisdiction does not depend on the truth or falsehood of the charge, but on its nature; it is determinable on the commencement, not at the conclusion, of the inquiry, and affidavits, to be receivable, must be directed to what appears at the former stage, and not to the facts disclosed in the progress of the enquiry.”

    If the above dicta were to be applied, it is possible to say that if the notification dated 7-3-1992 did not cover the building in question, the suit instituted on 10-3-1995 would be one which is not maintainable in the civil Court and the decree passed by the trial Court on 16-9-1996 would be a nullity. In Rameswar v. Jot Ram, AIR 1976 SC 49 the Supreme Court stated at page 52:—

    “It is basic to our procedural jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date suitor institute the legal proceeding. This is the emphatic statement that right of a party is determined by the facts as they exist on the date the action is instituted. Granting the presence of such facts, then he is entitled to its enforcement Later developments cannot defeat his right. Court's procedural delays cannot deprive him of legal justice or rights crystallised in the initial cause of action.”

    But the Court cautioned that Courts can however take note of subsequent events and mould the relief accordingly, but this can be done only in exceptional circumstances. Jurisdiction vested by statute cannot be divested by this equitable doctrine. In the earlier decision in P. Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders, AIR 1975 SC 1409 the same learned Judge had stated at page 1410:—

    “For making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the Court Can, and in many cases must, take cautious, cognisance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously followed”.

    In Kishan v. Manoj Kumar, AIR 1998 SC 999: (1998 AIR SCW 769) it was held by the Supreme Court that a suit for eviction instituted during the period the building was exempted from operation of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act can continue to be entertained by the civil Court which can proceed to pass a decree notwithstanding the fact that the Act became applicable during the pendency of the proceeding. Their Lordships have referred to the relevant earlier decisions of the Supreme Court. But it has to be noted that the decision in East India Corporation Ltd. v. Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. AIR 1991 SC 1094: (1991 AIR SCW 1088) was not referred to. Of course East India Corporation case was one where the suit for eviction was instituted at a time the building in question did not come within the ambit of the Act owing to the exclusion contained in Section 30 of Tamil Nadu Act and the validity of the exemption provision was subsequently struck down by the Supreme Court while the Petition for Leave to Appeal was pending before the Supreme Court. With respect the said decision is not seen referred to probably because of the fact that on the exemption provision being struck down as unconstitutional, it could be taken that it was never in the statute book and hence even on the date of the institution of the suit the suit could not be filed based on such an exemption. In Anand Prakash Malik v. Bhagwandas, AIR 1998 SC 2105: (1998 AIR SCW 1984) their Lordships held that a suit filed after the period of exemption from the provisions of the Act had expired was not maintainable. Of course in that case on the date suit was instituted the building came squarely within the purview of the Rent Restriction Act.

    6. Normally a notification or a subordinate legislation cannot be retrospective. It is not shown that there was any specific conferment of power to issue a notification with retrospective effect. That apart, the amendment dated 30-10-1996 does not indicate that it is intended to be retrospective nor can an intention be gathered from the said notification that it was intended to be retrospective. The question here is notwithstanding the fact that the amendment dated 30-10-1996 is not retrospective would it be said that the suit ought to be thrown out as not maintainable by the appellate Court on the ground that on the day the suit was instituted the suit was not maintainable and notwithstanding the amendment that has come into effect pending the litigation. Here the suit was instituted by the landlord on a claim that the suit could be filed in view of the notification issued by the Government under S. 25(1) of the Act exempting the building from the operation of Section 11 of the Act. A question on the applicability of that notification to the present plaint and the building in question was raised by the tenant, the defendant in the suit. By virtue of the applicability of the Act could it not be said that a right had accrued to the tenant not to be evicted except on one of the grounds referred to in Section 11 of the Act. When such a right had accrued to the tenant could the subsequent amendment to the notification be taken advantage of by the landlord to deprive the tenant of the immunity from eviction he enjoyed on the day the suit was filed in the civil Court. In Parripati Chandrasekhar Rao and Sons v. Alapati Jalaiah, (1995) 3 SCC 705 : (AIR 1995 SC 1781) the Supreme Court has pointed out the difference between the rights vesting in a landlord under the common law and the protective rights conferred on a tenant under the Rent Control legislation and has dealt with the effect of change in the legislation ending the protection or granting exemption. It was held in that decision thus at page 1784 (of AIR):—

    “There is a material difference between the rights which accrue to a landlord under the common law and the protection which is afforded to the tenant by such legislation as the Act. In the former case the rights and remedies of the landlord and tenant are governed by the law of contract and the law governing the property relations. These rights and remedies continue to govern their relationship unless they are regulated by such protective legislation as the present Act in which case the said rights and remedies remain suspended till the protective legislation continues in operation. Hence while it can legitimately be said that the landlord's normal rights vested in him by the general law continue to exist till and so long as they are not abridged by a special protective legislation, in the case of the tenant the protective shield extended to him survives only so long as and to the extent the special legislation operates. In the case of the tenant, therefore, the protection does not create any vested right which can operate beyond the period of protection or during the period the protection is not in existence. When the protection does not exist, the normal relations of the landlord and tenant come into operation. Hence the theory of the vested right which may validly be pleaded to support the landlord's case is not available to the tenant in the present case where the tenant who undoubtedly had the rights and remedies under the Act to claim reliefs against the landlord, lost the same the moment the protection was taken away, the rights and remedies being not vested ones,”

    7. In the case on hand the common law rights of the landlord to evict the tenant through the civil Court on terminating the tenancy stood abridged or curtailed by the application of the Act. If on the date the suit was filed the building was not one that stood exempted by a Notification under S. 25(1) of the Act the civil Court, could not have entertained the suit in the light of the decision in East India Corporation and the decision of the Full Bench in Kuruvilla Abraham v. P.C John (1995) (1) Ker LT 161: (1996 AIHC 2358) (FB). The mantle of protection available to the tenant stood removed by the amendment of the notification brought into force on 30-10-1996. When on 8-11-1996 the tenant filed the appeal against the decree of the trial Court, protection of non-eviction through the civil Court was not available to the tenant. If the right to protection is to be treated as not a vested right as postulated in Parripati Chandrasekhar Rao's case then the defendant may not be able to successfully contended that he cannot be deprived of his right under the Act but if as postulated by Lord Penman C.J in R. v. Bolton the relevant point of time to consider the question of jurisdiction is the date on which the proceeding was initiated, one has to hold that on the date the suit was instituted it was not maintainable though by the subsequent amendment of the notification which came into force subsequent to the decision of the trial Court the suit itself became maintainable. But if we go by Kishari's case, AIR 1998 SC 999: (1998 AIR SCW. 769) we can only consider the state of affairs as on the date of the institution of the suit. Here, in addition if the original notification did not apply even on the date the trial Court passed the decree the trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It would therefore be a case where the decree of the trial Court would be a nullity if the contention of the defendant based on the interpretation of the notification dated 7-3-1992 is upheld.

    8. It has of course been held by the Travancore-Cochin High Court in Iven Krishnan v. Kunhukutty Amma, 1956 TC 402 and the Sankara Pillai…* v. Ittiera…., 1958 Ker LT 220: (AIR 1958 Ker 245) that a decree for redemption can be granted in a suit for redemption which is instituted before the expiry of the mortgage by taking note of the subsequent event of the expiry of the term of the mortgage during the pendency of the litigation. But it has been pointed out by a Division Bench of this Court in Hameed v. Ittoop 1970 Ker LT 501 that power to take note of the subsequent events cannot be extended to a case where there was lack of jurisdiction on the date of the institution of the proceeding to entertain that proceeding. No doubt the decision in Hameed related to the institution of a petition for eviction under the Rent Control Act by a transferee inter vivos before expiry of the period referred to in the third proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act and the argument was that even though the proceeding was instituted before the expiry of the period, the period had expired during the pendency of the suit and the proceeding cannot be dismissed on the ground that it was not maintainable. But the Division Bench surveyed the authorities relevant and held that the principle that the Court can take note of subsequent events has to be confined to cases where there was no bar as such to the institution of the proceeding and the principle cannot be applied to a case where the very institution was barred by the statute. In that decision, the Division Bench has also referred to the decision of the Punjab High Court in Kuntbanlal v. Bhagavandas ILR 1962 (1) Punj 304 recognising such a distinction. The principle thus recognised in Hameed's case can only lead to the conclusion that if the suit for eviction was not maintainable on the day it was instituted, because of the inapplicability of the notification as it existed, subsequent amendment to that notification taking the building out of the purview of the Act would not enable the Court to sustain a decree for recovery of possession granted to the plaintiff-landlord.

    9. In Syndicate Bank v. Soji Chacko 1998 (2) Ker LT 25 this Court has held that even if an amendment to a statute is not retrospective, still, a Court entertain an appeal was entitled to take note of the subsequent events brought about by the amendment while deciding whether the plaintiff was entitled to relief or not. That was a case where the amendment was to the Indian Succession Act doing away with the requirement of getting a will executed by a Christian probated. But in the case of Section 213 of Indian Succession Act, the bar is not against the institution of the suit but the bar is only against the grant of relief by the Court. The principle of the said decision again cannot lead to the conclusion that the present suit must be held to be maintainable on the day it was instituted with reference to the amendment to the notification brought about subsequent to the passing of the decree by the trial Court. This aspect is referred to in that decision in the following words:—

    “In our processual jurisprudence, an appeal is a rehearing of the suit. A litigant can therefore, show with reference to an amendment to the statute that on the day his appeal is heard, he is entitled to relief or that no bar then exists to the grant of reliefs to him. The suit here is pending in Second Appeal, though at the instance of the first defendant. At the hearing of the appeal, the plaintiff-respondent is entitled to exhort the Court to take note of the amendment, be it prospective, and to grant him relief on the basis that the legislature has removed the bar to the grant of reliefs to him by the amendment. This Court therefore is bound to take note of the amendment that was introduced pending the litigation and to decide whether the bar to the grant of relief to the plaintiff now subsists or has been removed. If the bar under S. 213(1) of the Act were to the institution of the suit itself, it might not have enabled the plaintiff to seek relief on the basis of this amendment. But since the bar, as indicated by the Supreme Court in Nolini's case, AIR 1962 SC 1471: (1962 All LJ 695) and the other decisions referred to, is only to the grant of a decree, the plaintiff can take advantage of the prospective amendment and request this Court to grant her relief on the plea that the bar to relief does not any more subsist”.

    (Emphasis supplied)

    10. In Pathummakutty v. Kadiyumma, 1990 (1) KLT 596: (AIR 1990 Ker 286) a Division Bench of this Court held that an amendment to Order XXI, Rule 92(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure can be given retrospective operation since it could be considered only as declaratory and hence could be applied to make maintainable an application made under Order XXI, Rule 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure when the requisite deposit under that Rule was not made within the time prescribed by Rule 92 of Order XXI of the Code as it stood at the time of the application. Though Article 127 of the Limitation Act was amended extending the period for making the application to 60 days, there was no corresponding amendment to Order XXI, Rule 89 of the Code and Rule 89 continued to provide a period of 30 days for making the deposit. It is in that situation that Order XXI, Rule 92(2) was amended by enlarging the time for deposit also to 60 days. It is in that context that the Division Bench held that the amendment to the rule was only declaratory in nature and since it was declaratory, the amendment can be given retrospective effect. With respect, I am not sure whether the amendment could be treated only as declaratory. It was actually an amendment altering the period for the deposit contemplated by Order XXI, Rule 89 of the Code to get rid of a Court sale. I find that the Court had no occasion to consider whether a subordinate legislation could be considered to be retrospective when there was no specific power conferred on the rule making authority to make a retrospective rule. Here, of course, we are concerned with the case of an amendment to a notification. It is also not possible to consider the amendment to the notification as declaratory since the object of the amendment of the notification issued under Sec. 25(1) of the Act is to enlarge the scope of the earlier notification. It may not therefore be possible to apply the ratio of the decision in Pathummakutty to sustain the argument that the suit could be held to be maintainable on the basis that the amendment to the notification is only declaratory in nature and hence is necessarily retrospective. In Anand Prakash Malik v. Bhagwandas, AIR 1998 SC 2105: (1998 AIR SCW 1984) the suit itself was laid after the period of exemption under the Rent Control Act had expired. The Supreme Court held that since the exemption from the Rent Act was not available on the date of the filing of the suit, the suit was not maintainable and the landlord had to necessarily approach the authorities under the Rent Act for relief. The argument that at the time of the construction of the building, exemption operated was held by their Lordships not to be sufficient to make the suit maintainable since on the day the suit was filed, the period of exemption had expired. This decision in my view supports the position that the relevant date to consider the jurisdiction of the Court is the date on which the suit was instituted.

    11. But there is another aspect to be considered at this stage. If it is found that the amendment of the notification dt. 30-10-1996 applied to the building in question, what will be the effect of this Court or the lower appellate Court not taking note of that notification and non-suiting the plaintiff on the ground that the suit, on the date he instituted it, was not maintainable? In case of the suit being dismissed in that manner, nothing stands in the way of the plaintiff filing a fresh suit for eviction since going by the notification as amended on 30-10-1996, the suit is clearly maintainable. One of the policies of law being to avoid multiplicity of suits, is it not proper for the appellate Court to take note of this situation and grant relief to the plaintiff if he had otherwise made out a case for relief without driving him to file a fresh suit for the purpose? This is in a sense, a principle of public policy recognised with a view to avoid multiplicity of legal proceedings. Recognition of this principle of public policy can justify the acceptance of the contention of the plaintiff that the amended notification must be taken note of by the appellate Court to sustain the decree granted in its favour by the trial Court even though it may hold that on the day the suit was instituted, the trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and even on the day it passed the decree it had no jurisdiction. But if one were to accept the principle laid down in R v. Bolton, (1835) 42 All ER Rep 71; Hameed v. Itoop, 1970 Ker LT 501 and Kishan v. Manoj Kumar, AIR 1998 SC 999: (1998 AIR SCW 769) it has to be held that the suit not being maintainable on the day it was instituted, it has to be dismissed as not maintainable.

    12. Rubinstein in ‘Jurisdiction and Illegality’ at page 215 has pointed out that:

    “The question of jurisdiction, it has been said, is determinable ‘at the comment, not at the conclusion, of the inquiry’. The Court which examines the jurisdiction of another inferior tribunal must confine itself to asking whether, at that preliminary stage of the proceedings, want of jurisdiction could have been established. Facts which cropped up at a later stage, even though established by evidence, must be ignored. If, on the other hand, it is decided that, from the information available at the start of the proceedings, the tribunal clearly had no jurisdiction, that is sufficient.”

    13. I am therefore of the view that the question of maintainability of the suit in this case must be decided with reference to the notification dt. 7-3-1992 and the maintainability of the suit cannot be found based on the amendment to the notification dt. 30-10-1996. The lower appellate Court was therefore substantially in error in relying on the amendment dt. 30-10-1996 to uphold the maintainability of the suit.

    14. Learned counsel for the plaintiff argued that the notification dt. 7-3-1992 exempting the buildings of all churches/mosques of all the minority religions was broad enough to cover the building in question and that it is not correct to say that the suit on the day it was instituted was not maintainable. The notification dt. 7-3-1992 in so far as it relates to the church as involved in this case proceeds as if a church is a legal entity that could own property. The church is a building for public Christian worship. The church as such is not a legal person competent to hold property. The properties necessarily vest in the congregation of the (sic) church or in the diocese. It is argued that it is probably recognising this defect in the notification that the subsequent notification was issued by enlarging the scope of the notification by adding the words ‘buildings of all dioceses, Arch-dioceses, Monastries and convents (in the present context) so as to rope in the buildings owned by dioceses. Since the church is not a legal entity capable of owning property, it has to be held that the notification dt. 7-3-1992 cannot be relied on by the plaintiff in an attempt to sustain the maintainability of the suit.

    15. I must first notice that this aspect has not been properly considered by the Courts below. The trial Court noticed the arguments on this aspect. The lower appellate Court also referred to it. But, the Courts below proceeded on the basis that the defendant was estopped from questioning the title of the landlord and hence could not question the competence of the plaintiffs to sue especially since, the Vicar of the Church represents the Church and the kaikkars also have been impleaded in the suit. It is true that ‘Church’ as per the dictionary meaning is the place of public Christian worship. But that is not the only sense in which that expression is understood in law. The plaint does not disclose whether the first plaintiff Church is a Roman Catholic Church. But in the cross-examination of PW 1, the Vicar of the Church, it is brought out that the Church is of the Catholic Sabha. This Court had occasion to consider the status of a Roman Catholic Church in Chinnamma v. Abraham, 1962 Ker LT 240. Mr. Justice Raghavan (as he then was) held that the Church can be treated as a voluntary organisation and as a person in the context of the Agricultural Debt Relief Act, 1958. The learned Judge also postulated that the head of the Church can be treated as a corporation sole. The third argument according to his Lordship would be to treat the Church as a legal entity or juristic person capable of holding property. The Supreme Court in Most. Rev. PMA Metropolitan v. Moran Mar Marthoma, AIR 1995 SC 2001: (1995 AIR SCW 3133) has referred to the meaning of the expression ‘Church’ given in Encyclopedia Britannica as:—

    “The word ‘Church’ refers both to the Christian religious community and to the building used for Christian worship”.

    In paragraph 59 of the judgment their Lordships have observed:—

    “A parish Church thus, is an ecclesiastical authority operating in a specific area. But they are of a religious order”.

    If the narrow meaning of the expression ‘Church’ as only the building where Christian congregate for worship is adopted, the notification dt. 7-3-1992 would be rendered meaningless, since a building used for worship cannot own property. But if a broader meaning is given and the expression understood as an association capable of owning property, the notification can be given a meaning and applied to buildings owned by the community.

    16. It is argued that the Act is a beneficent piece of legislation protecting a class of people from exploitation and from abrupt eviction and any exemption keeping out the operation of the legislation should be construed narrowly and in that context the meaning given to the expression ‘Church’ in the notification dt. 7-3-1992 should be the narrower one rather than the larger meaning suggested in Chinnamma v. Abraham. There cannot be any serious difficulty in accepting this proposition. In fact this Court has taken the view that the exemption notification must be narrowly construed so as to confine the exemption to the extent possible and not to enlarge it, in K.V John v. Sooppikka Veettile Kunhibi Wakaf, 1997 (2) Ker LT 464: (1998 AIHC 1163). In that decision this Court has referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Sheikh Gulfam v. Sanat Kumar, AIR 1965 SC 1839 and Mohd. Shafi v. VIIth Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Allahabad, AIR 1977 SC 836 in support. It is a rule of construction that when a literal interpretation or a narrow interpretation might lead to absurd results the Court must as far as possible give effect to the intention sought to be achieved by the provision. In construing a notification also the said principle has application. If the narrower meaning is given it is possible to argue that the notification dt. 7-3-1992 does not exempt any building from the purview of the Act because a church understood as a building where the Christians join together to worship cannot own property. To give efficacy to the Notification I am therefore inclined to take the view that the buildings of churches referred to in the Notification dt. 7-3-1992 should be understood as the building owned by the Christian religious community. In that view I hold that though slightly ambiguous, the notification dt. 7-3-1992 does take in the building in question provided it is shown that the church is of a minority religion. What are exempted are the buildings of the various institutions referred to in the notification that is of the minority religions. There is nothing to indicate how to determine the status of an institution as to whether it is a minority institution or not. Learned counsel for the defendant brought to my notice the decision in Rt. Rev. Aldo Maria Patroni…* v. Kesavan & Others…, 1964 Ker LT 791 (FB): (AIR 1965 Ker 75) and in particular, the observations in that judgment that ‘the word minority is not defined in the Constitution and in the absence of any special definition, it has to be held that any community, religious or linguistic, which is numerically less than fifty per cent of the population of the State, is entitled to the fundamental right guaranteed by the article and submitted that the Court in which the notification is sought to be relied on has to decide in a given case whether the particular institution is that of a minority religion and there was no adjudication on that question in the case on hand. Counsel pointed out that there was no evidence in the case to show that the particular institution is a minority institution. Counsel asserted that the particular community was not notified as a minority in the notification issued by the Central Government. Counsel also referred to the decisions in Dipendra Nam v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 Pat 101 and Sree Jain Swetambar Terapanthi Vidyalaya v. State, AIR 1982 Cal 101 to emphasise that this question had to be decided by the Court, on the evidence in the case, before it could apply the notification relied on by the plaintiff. I find considerable force in this submission. On the scheme of the notification in question, it appears to me to be necessary for the Court to decide in each case whether the particular institution in respect of which the exemption is claimed, is an institution of a minority religion. The Courts below have not addressed themselves to the question whether the plaintiff has established that it is qualified to claim the exemption on the materials made available to the Court. PW 1 in his evidence has stated that the first plaintiff church is an institution run by a minority religion. The defendant though he questioned the applicability of the notification did not pursue the question whether the first plaintiff church is that of a minority religion by getting an appropriate issue raised in that behalf. It is in that context that the Courts below apparently accepted the assertion of PW 1 that the first plaintiff church is that of a minority religion. Though I hold that it is necessary for the Court in each case where the notification in question is relied on to decide whether the church that owns the building is a minority institution, on the pleadings and the evidence in the case I am of the view that the Courts below cannot be faulted in proceeding on the basis that the first plaintiff church is of a minority religion.

    17. Finally it was argued on behalf of the defendant that the compensation for use and occupation decreed was not supported by any legal evidence and the sum of Rs. 1500 per month decreed was grossly in excess considering that the monthly rent of the building was only Rs. 250. It is pointed out on behalf of the plaintiff that this aspect was not even agitated before the lower appellate Court when the defendant filed the appeal. It is seen from the Memorandum of appeal filed before the appellate Court that the decree for compensation for use and occupation was valued and challenged in the appeal though no specific ground as such is taken regarding the quantum. But considering the circumstances as a whole I am inclined to the view that the compensation for use and occupation decreed by the Courts below is somewhat arbitrary and excessive. I am therefore inclined to interfere with that part of the decree and reduce the compensation for use and occupation to Rs. 1000 per month. It may be noted that the building was taken on lease sometime in the year 1990 on a monthly rent of Rs. 250 and the suit was instituted in the year 1995.

    I therefore confirm the judgments and decrees of the Courts below in so far as it relates to the decree for recovery of possession. I modify the decree for compensation for use and occupation by reducing the compensation to Rs. 1000 per month from 1-12-1994 till the defendant surrenders vacant possession. Considering the circumstances as a whole and taking note of the fact that this Second Appeal taken on file on 6-11-1998 is disposed of expeditiously (normally Second Appeal once admitted would have taken six to seven years for disposal in this Court). I grant the defendant time of one year from this date to vacate the building. The defendant is directed to file an undertaking before the executing Court within one month from this date that he will not let in any stranger into possession of the property during the period of one year and on the defendant depositing in the executing Court compensation for use and occupation for the period from 1-12-1994 till 31-5-1999 within a period of two months from this date. If the defendant has already deposited any portion of the compensation decreed, the same will be given credit to and only the balance need be deposited within the time. The parties are directed to bear their respective costs.

    The Second Appeal is allowed to the limited extent as above.

    Order accordingly.

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