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citation codes
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Acts
  • Sec. 320 I.P.C or clauses (a) and (b) of Sec. 142 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
  • compensation.7. Sec. 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
  • clause (a) and (b) of sec. 142 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
  • Sec. 142(a), 142(b) or 142(c) of the Motor Vehicles Act.
  • Sec. 320 I.RC in Sec. 142 of the Motor Vehicles Act
  • clause of Sec. 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988,
  • Sec. 142 of the Motor Vehicles Act and Sec. 320
  • Sec. 142(a) or 142(b) or 142(c) of the M.V Act.6.
  • Sec. 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
  • Sec. 142 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
  • Sec. 142(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act.4.
  • Sec. 142(c) of the Motor Vehicles Act.
  • Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.13.
  • Sec. 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
  • Sec. 142 of the Motor Vehicles Act
  • Sec. 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act,
  • sec. 140 of the Motor Vehicle Act.
  • 142(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act.
  • sub-section (1) of section 140
  • MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Sec. 320 I.P.C or clauses (a) and (b) of Sec. 142 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
  • compensation.7. Sec. 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
  • clause (a) and (b) of sec. 142 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
  • Sec. 142(a), 142(b) or 142(c) of the Motor Vehicles Act.
  • Sec. 320 I.RC in Sec. 142 of the Motor Vehicles Act
  • clause of Sec. 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988,
  • Sec. 142 of the Motor Vehicles Act and Sec. 320
  • Sec. 142(a) or 142(b) or 142(c) of the M.V Act.6.
  • Sec. 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
  • Sec. 142 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
  • Sec. 142(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act.4.
  • Sec. 142(c) of the Motor Vehicles Act.
  • Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.13.
  • Sec. 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
  • Sec. 142 of the Motor Vehicles Act
  • Sec. 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act,
  • sec. 140 of the Motor Vehicle Act.
  • 142(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act.
  • sub-section (1) of section 140
  • MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — K.K. Usha, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from an award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kasaragod, in O.P. (MV) 451/93. On 17-03-1993 the claimant (a 28‑year‑old teacher) sustained injuries in a motor accident, including fracture of the right upper front incisor tooth, which was subsequently extracted. The Tribunal found the accident occurred due to the negligence of the respondents in the original petition and held respondents 1 to 3 liable. The Tribunal awarded the claimant Rs. 3,500 for pain and suffering, Rs. 5,000 for loss of earnings, Rs. 1,500 for medical and miscellaneous expenses, and Rs. 12,000 towards disability — a total of Rs. 17,500. The Tribunal thereafter accepted an argument that the claimant had suffered permanent disability under Section 142 of the Motor Vehicles Act and, following an earlier decision cited by the Tribunal, increased the award to Rs. 25,000 (applying the no‑fault Section 140 compensation amount). The Insurance Company (3rd respondent) appealed against the Tribunal's finding that loss of a single front incisor tooth amounted to permanent disablement under Section 142 and against the consequent enhancement to Rs. 25,000.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether loss of one front right upper incisor tooth constitutes "permanent disablement" as defined in Section 142 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (so as to attract the no‑fault compensation under Section 140).
  2. Whether the Tribunal correctly applied the law and relevant authorities in assessing compensation and in concluding that the claimant was entitled to the enhanced amount (Rs. 25,000) under Section 140, given the date of the accident.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Insurance Company / 3rd respondent)

  • Contended that loss of one tooth does not amount to permanent disability as defined under Section 142 of the Motor Vehicles Act and therefore the claimant is not entitled to the enhanced no‑fault compensation under Section 140.
  • Pointed out that there was no authority of the High Court or Supreme Court treating loss of a tooth as permanent disablement under Section 142.
  • Criticized the Tribunal's method of assessing medical expenses and reliance on assumptions rather than evidence/vouchers.

Respondent / Claimant (Petitioner before Tribunal)

  • Claimed that the loss of the front incisor tooth amounted to permanent disability and specifically urged that the injury would fall under Section 142(c) (permanent disfiguration of the head or face).
  • Claimed compensation (in the original petition filed under Section 166) which included Rs. 12,000 for disability; after the Tribunal's application of precedent, sought benefit of the no‑fault Section 140 sum (Rs. 25,000 as per the decision relied upon by the Tribunal).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Unnimayamma & Others, 1995 (1) KLT 323 Authority relied upon by the Tribunal to grant the enhanced no‑fault compensation (Rs. 25,000) under Section 140. The Tribunal followed this decision to award Rs. 25,000 to the claimant; the High Court records that the Tribunal relied on it to justify enhancement but then reviews that application in light of the date of the accident and other authorities.
Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Sheela Ratnan, 1996 (2) KLT 695 (Full Bench) Determination of permissible compensation amounts where the accident occurred prior to the 1994 amendment to Section 140: establishes that for accidents before the amendment the pre‑amendment schedule amounts apply. The Court applied this Full Bench decision to observe that because the accident occurred before the 1994 amendment, the higher post‑amendment Section 140 compensation could not be awarded; this informed the Court's final modification limiting the award to Rs. 17,500.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a detailed critique of the Tribunal's approach and reasoning:

  1. Interpretation of Section 140 and Section 142 — The Court emphasised that Section 140 imposes "no fault" liability only in cases of death or "very serious permanent disablement" as defined by Section 142. Section 142 enumerates severe categories: (a) permanent privation of sight of an eye or hearing of an ear or privation of any member or joint; (b) destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint; and (c) permanent disfiguration of the head or face. The Court read these clauses as indicating a high degree of disablement contemplated by the statute.
  2. Whether a tooth is a "member" or/or causes "permanent impairing" — The Tribunal had reasoned that a tooth qualified as a "member" (citing an extract from Gour's Penal Law and other authorities) and had advanced anthropological and functional theories about the incisor being a distinct functional part (even a "weapon" historically). The Court rejected that reasoning as unsound: by any imagination loss of one tooth cannot be equated with the degree of impairment envisaged by clauses (a) or (b) (such as loss of sight, hearing, or comparable deprivation or permanent destruction of powers of a member/joint).
  3. On "disfigurement" under clause (c) — The Tribunal had also held that loss of the front incisor amounted to permanent disfigurement of the face. The Court disagreed: it found that loss of a single tooth is not comparable to an "ugly scar" or mutilation of facial portions of the gravity contemplated by clause (c). The Court stressed modern dental science and prosthetic replacements (fixed and removable partial prostheses, dentures, dental bridgework) which mitigate functional and cosmetic consequences; therefore loss of one tooth does not constitute the degree of permanent disfigurement contemplated by the statute.
  4. Procedural and evidentiary criticisms — The Court criticised the Tribunal's approach to assessing medical and incidental expenses. The Tribunal awarded medical expenses on the basis of general assumptions and a statement that claimants need not maintain meticulous accounts; the High Court found this reasoning unsustainable, particularly as the petitioner was an educated teacher treated in a government hospital and had not produced evidence for many claimed expenses. Nevertheless, the High Court chose not to disturb the amounts already awarded (to avoid disturbing sums already partially withdrawn by interim order).
  5. Consistency and clarity of Tribunal's conclusions — The Court noted that the Tribunal itself had been inconsistent and uncertain as to which clause of Section 142 (a, b or c) applied; it had successively invoked each clause and ultimately concluded that the injury fell under all three, a conclusion the High Court described as "curious and totally unacceptable."
  6. Application of binding precedent concerning the date of accident — Because the accident occurred before the 1994 amendment that increased the statutory amounts under Section 140, the Court observed that the Tribunal could not properly award the post‑amendment no‑fault sum of Rs. 25,000. The Court referred to the Full Bench decision in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sheela Ratnan to support the proposition that pre‑amendment rates apply to accidents occurring before the amendment.
  7. Conclusion of analysis — On legal and factual analysis, the Court held that loss of one front incisor tooth did not amount to "permanent disablement" under Section 142 and that the Tribunal had erred in extending Section 142 to the claimant's loss. The Court therefore set aside the Tribunal's finding that Section 142 applied and disallowed the consequent Section 140 enhancement to Rs. 25,000, while retaining the Tribunal's original quantification of damages totalling Rs. 17,500 (as awarded under Section 166 and related heads).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court allowed the appeal in part: it set aside the Tribunal's finding that loss of one front incisor tooth amounted to "permanent disablement" under Section 142 of the Motor Vehicles Act and thereby reversed the Tribunal's enhancement of compensation to Rs. 25,000. The award is modified and limited to Rs. 17,500 (with interest) as originally assessed by the Tribunal.

Implications and consequences:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The claimant's entitlement to the no‑fault Section 140 compensation (as applied by the Tribunal) was disallowed; the claimant retains the Rs. 17,500 already awarded by the Tribunal under the claimant's application (Section 166) and the interest allowed by the Tribunal. The appeal of the Insurance Company was allowed to this limited extent.
  • On legal principle: The Court emphasised that Section 140/142's no‑fault liability is intended for death or very serious permanent disablements; loss of a single tooth does not meet that statutory threshold. The opinion reaffirms a narrow construction of "permanent disablement" in the context of no‑fault compensation.
  • On precedent and temporal application: Because the accident occurred before the 1994 amendment increasing Section 140 amounts, the higher post‑amendment statutory compensation could not be applied — reliance on the Full Bench decision (Oriental Insurance v. Sheela Ratnan) supported that outcome.
  • On evidentiary standards: The Court criticised the Tribunal's permissive approach to awarding medical and incidental expenses without sufficient evidence, indicating that even where claimants may not keep every voucher, a claimant (particularly an educated claimant treated in a government hospital) must produce sufficient proof to support significant claims.
  • No new broader precedent was announced beyond the application of existing statutory interpretation and the cited authorities; the Court confined itself to correcting the Tribunal's errors in law and fact as applied to the case before it.

    United India Ins. Co. Ltd. v. P.V Thomas & Ors.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    K.K Usha, J.:— The question that arises for consideration in this appeal at the instance of the Insurance Company is whether loss of front right upper incisor tooth of the injured claimant would amount to a permanent disability as defined under Sec. 142 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kasaragod has taken the view in the award passed in O.P (MV) 451/93 that it would. In a motor accident, which took place on 17-03-1993, the 1st respondent herein sustained certain minor injuries and also fracture of the right incisor tooth. Later the tooth was extracted. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that the accident happened on account of the negligence of the 1st respondent in the O.P (MV) and therefore respondents 1 to 3 are liable to compensate the petitioner. The above finding is not under challenge in this appeal filed by the 3rd respondent Insurance Company.

    2. The claimant is a young man of 28 years old and working as a teacher in a parallel college. The Tribunal held that he is entitled to an amount of Rs. 3,500/- as compensation for pain and suffering, Rs. 5000/- towards loss of earnings, Rs. 1,500/- towards medical and miscellaneous expenses and Rs. 12,000/- towards disability. Thus a total amount of Rs. 17,500/- was found as compensation due to the claimant. Thereafter the Tribunal proceeded to consider a contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the compensation to be awarded cannot at any rate be below Rs. 25,000/- to which he would be entitled to under Sec. 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as petitioner had suffered permanent disability. The argument was that by loss of one front upper incisor tooth the petitioner had suffered permanent disability entitling him to compensation under sec. 140 of the Motor Vehicle Act. The learned Tribunal after comparing the provisions contained under Sec. 142 of the Motor Vehicles Act and Sec. 320 of the I.RC came to the conclusion that though loss of a tooth would easily fall under the definition of grievous hurt under Section 320 I.RC (clause 7) in the absence of a stipulation similar to clause seventhly of Sec. 320 I.RC in Sec. 142 of the Motor Vehicles Act the loss of a tooth cannot be straight away be held to amount to permanent disability as defined under Sec. 142 of the Motor Vehicles Act. After entering the above finding the learned Tribunal proceeded to examine whether the tooth would be a member referred in clause (a) and (b) of Sec. 142 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The following extract from Dr. Hari Singh Gour's Penal Law of India 10th Edition was then quoted:—

    The term “member” as used here, means nothing more than an organ or a limb, being a part of man capable of performing a distinct office. As such, it includes both the eyes, the ears, the nose, mouth, hands, feet and, in fact, all distinct parts of the human body designed to perform a distinct office.”

    3. Then the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the decisions under Sec. 320 IPC are not of much consequence in examining the question under Sec. 142 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Tribunal then took the view that the one tooth lost by the petitioner is a distinct part of the human body designed to perform a distinct office and therefore it would come within the definition of the expression “member”. Passage from-Hawkins dealing with ‘MEYHEM’. the Tribunal derived a theory that the tooth is a weapon of offence to human being as a part of his anatomy. The Tribunal also took the view that different teeth have different functions to perform. The incisor, according to the Tribunal, must have been the principal weapon or principal tooth of the primitive man as a weapon of offence to bite and that the molar tooth may not have had such an office to function for attack/defence. The Tribunal then observed that merely because plurality of members of the anatomy performed the same common office, or function, no part of the body can be said to be not a member. Therefore, it may not be prudent to hold that the loss of one tooth cannot be reckoned as loss of a ‘member’ as to bring the injury suffered within ‘grievous hurt’ as defined under clause fourthly and fifthly of Sec. 320 I.P.C or clauses (a) and (b) of Sec. 142 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Tribunal therefore entered a finding that it is satisfied that the loss of the front incisor tooth is definitely the loss of a ‘member’ and it must be held that such loss results in loss of a ‘member’ as referred to in 142(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the Insurance Company that there is no decision of any High Court or the Supreme Court, which has treated loss of a tooth as a permanent disability coming under Sec. 142 was repelled by the lerarned Tribunal. According to the Tribunal, it is only because no such a question was specifically raised there is no decision on this aspect. The Tribunal then entered a finding that the loss of front incisor tooth of the petitioner must definitely be held to be permanent disablement as defined under Sec. 142(b), if not under Sec. 142(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act.

    4. The learned Tribunal then takes note of the fact that the petitioner had not raised any contention under Sec. 142(a) or (b). According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the permanent disability suffered by the petitioner would come under Sec. 142(c) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The learned Tribunal then extracted a portion from Gour's Penal Law of India 10th Edition page 2839 dealing with the word “disfigure”. The following is the quotation:—

    “The word “disfigure” must be distinguished from the word “disable”. For, to disfigure is to do a man some external injury, which detracts from his personal appearance, but does not weaken him, but the “disable” is to do something creating a permanent disability and not a mere temporary injury. Such disfigurement may be caused by lopping off a man's ear or nose, in which case there would be sufficient disfigurement, without consequential disability, so as to constitute grievous hurt under this clause. A nasty gash on the face leaving a permanent scar would be another instances of this species of injury. So, branding may leave a permanent scar causing disfigurement but whether it will or will not do so is a question of fact depending upon the seriousness of the branding and the injury inflicted upon which the testimony of a medical witness should be material”.

    5. Thereafter, the Tribunal enters into an elaborate discussion on the effect of ugly scar on the head and how it could be covered by wearing a wig and so on. The Tribunal then finds that ‘front teeth is definitely a prominent part of the face of a person which gives the face its shape, its beauty and its identity.’ The Tribunal discarded the contention raised by the learned counsel of the Insurance Company that it is always possible to replace one tooth lost by wearing artificial tooth. According to the Tribunal, this is just like the argument that a nasty scar on the face may be corrected by a plastic surgery. The learned Tribunal further compared replacing of one tooth with that of using artificial limbs. The Tribunal then observed that loss of one tooth would completely change the appearance of the petitioner and comes to the conclusion that the petitioner in this case has suffered permanent disfiguration. The injury suffered by the peitioner, according to the Tribunal, amounts to permanent disability as defined under Sec, 142(c) of the Motor Vehicles Act. Finally the following conclusion was arrived at:—

    “Thus in any view of the matter I am satisfied that the physical loss suffered by the petitioner in this case amounts to permanent disability as defined under Sec. 142(a) or 142(b) or 142(c) of the M.V Act”.

    6. Even though the accident happened on 17-3-1993 that is prior to 1994 amendment to the Motor Vehicles Act enhancing the compensation from Rs. 12,000/- to Rs. 25,000/- by following a decision reported in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Unnimayamma & Others, 1995 (1) KLT 323, the Tribunal granted the amount of Rs. 25,000/- as compensation.

    7. Sec. 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 deals with the liability to pay compensation in certain cases, on the principle of no fault. It provides that where death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted room an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles, the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement in accordance with the provisions of the section. The amount of compensation which shall be payable under sub-section (1) in respect of the death of any person was originally fixed at Rs. 25,000/- and the amount of compensation payable in respect of permanent disablement of any person was fixed at Rs. 12,000/-. The above amounts were enhanced as Rs. 50,000/- and Rs. 25,000/- with effect from 14-11-1994 by Act 54 of 1994. The term “permanent disablement” is defined under Sec. 142 which reads as follows:—

    “142. Permanent disablement. For the purposes of this Chapter, permanent disablement of a person shall be deemed to have resulted from an accident of the nature referred to in sub-section (1) of section 140 if such person has suffered by reason of the accident, any injury or injuries involving:—

    (a) permanent privation of the sight of either eye or the hearing of either ear, or privation of any member or joint or

    (b) destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint; or

    (c) permanent disfiguration of the head or face.”

    8. The petitioner before the Tribunal had a fracture of his front incisor tooth. It was later extracted. No application had been filed by the petitioner under Sec. 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 claiming compensation under the no fault clause. The application was one which was filed under Sec. 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Tribunal initially proceeded to assess compensation due to the petitioner who is 28 years old teacher in a parallel college. He claimed an amount of Rs. 74,000/- as compensation. As per Ext. A2 wound certificate issued by the Medical Officer, District Government Hospital, Kanhangad the petitioner had suffered the following injuries:—

    “1) Contusion 2cm × 2cm over right knee.

    2) Contusion 1 cm × 2 cm over left knee

    3) Contusion 2cm × 2cm over the upper lip.”

    9. The Tribunal finds from Ext. A3 discharge slip the petitioner had suffered fracture of the front right incisor tooth. He was an in patient for three days in the hospital. The fractured tooth had to be extracted. Under the heading pain and suffering the Tribunal awarded Rs. 3,500/- as compensation. Towards loss of earning Rs. 500/- was granted on the basis of the claim that the petitioner was receiving an amount of Rs. 1,000/- per mensem and the injuries suffered ‘may have kept him away from work’ for a period of 10 to 15 days. Towards medical expenses the bills produced showed only an amount of Rs. 1,500/-. For granting the above amount reasoning given by the Tribunal is as follows:—

    “But it will be puerile to decide a claim for compensation for expenses incurred on the basis of documents alone. It will be unreasonable to expect claimants like the petitioner to maintain meticulous accounts duly supported by vouchers to prove all the items of expenditure. Reasonable assumptions and presumptions have to be drawn. The nature of the injuries, the nature of treatment, the period of treatment, the place and centre of treatment etc. have to be taken into account. Cautious cognizance of the bills produced has also got to be made. On the basis of the materials available, I am satisfied that the petitioner in this case must have incurred expenditure for transport to hospital, for payment to medical men, for investigations, for purchase of medicines, for expenses of by standers, for extra nourishment etc.”

    10. Towards disability the Tribunal granted an amount of Rs. 12,000/-. The reasoning in support of granting the above amount was that ‘the loss of the tooth affects the capacity of the petitioner to chew food as he used to do earlier, it will have adverse cosmetic consequences, it would have resulted in serious inconvenience and trauma to the young petitioner, wearing artificial tooth is embarassing and inconvenient and he has suffered loss of the functional service of the tooth’. Thus, a total amount of Rs. 17,500/- was found due to the petitioner as compensation.

    11. This is a case where no oral evidence was adduced by the petitioner or the respondents. From the award it is seen that the Tribunal had a physical examination of the petitioner in the chambers of the Tribunal on 27-10-1995. The Tribunal found that the petitioner had lost his, upper right incisor. He is using an artificial denture. When he opens his mouth or smiles after removing the artificial denture the loss of the tooth is very prominently seen and when the artificial tooth is placed in position, it is normal. The Tribunal had assumed that the injury suffered by him might have kept him away from work for a period of 10 to 15 days without evidence on that aspect. We cannot agree with the observations made by the Tribunal regarding computation of the medical expenses. We fail to understand how it is unreasonable to expect claimants like the petitioner to maintain accounts regarding the expenditure incurred by him for treatment. The petitioner is a teacher in a parallel college. He is not an illiterate rustic. Therefore, there is no meaning in the observation of the Tribunal that claimants like the petitioner are not expected to maintain accounts. In this particular case the petitioner was treated in a Government hospital. He was an in patient only for three days. He had not adduced any evidence regarding the expenses incurred by him for medicines or for other items referred in paragraph 13 of the award. While we totally disagree with the principles referred by the Tribunal for assessing the compensation for medical expenses, we do not propose to interfere with the amount granted in this case. No Tribunal can grant compensation for medical expenses on the basis of “assumptions and presumptions”. It may not be possible to keep vouchers in respect of all the expenses, but still there must be evidence adduced by the petitioner to cover at least substantial portion of the claim, especially in the case of enlightened petitioner.

    12. We do not propose to interfere with the above amount, as by interim order this Court had allowed the petitioner to withdraw Rs. 12,500/- from the amount deposited. We have to observe that the reasoning given by the Tribunal is thoroughly unsustainable. Admittedly, the petitioner is already using an artificial tooth. Therefore, there is no question of his difficulty in chewing. There is no longer any adverse cosmetic consequence also. The loss of functional service of the tooth has been magnified by the Tribunal out of all proportion for granting an amount of Rs. 12,000/- as compensation. It is relevant to note that loss of one tooth is not even a scheduled injury under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.

    13. Now coming to main question raised in this appeal namely, the eligibility of the petitioner for a claim under the no fault clause of Sec. 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, we are constrained to observe that the Tribunal has committed a grave error in coming to the conclusion that the petitioner has suffered a permanent disablement as defined under Sec. 142 of the above Act.

    14. It is pertinent to note that the Tribunal itself is not quite sure whether the disability suffered by the petitioner by loss of one incisor tooth would come under clause (a), (b) or (c) of Sec. 142. Initially the Tribunal came to the conclusion that loss of a tooth would be privation of a member, therefore, it comes under clause (a). Then it come to the conclusion that loss of one tooth would be a permanent disablement as defined under Sec. 142(b) if not under Sec. 142(a). Thereafter, it proceeds to consider the contention raised by the petitioner's counsel that the disability would come under Sec. 142(c). After agreeing with the learned counsel that loss of one tooth would amount to disfiguration contemplated by clause (c) ultimately the Tribunal holds that the disability suffered by the petitioner amounts to permanent disability as defined under Sec. 142(a) or (b) or (c). We find that the manner in which the issue was treated by the Tribunal and the ultimate conclusion arrived by it are both very curious and totally unacceptable.

    15. The Tribunal has lost sight of the nature of the liability under Sec. 140. It is a ‘no fault liability’. A reading of Sec. 140 together with Sec. 142 would clearly show that it is not any injury for which the owner of the vehicle or its insured should be made liable without even proving negligence. Such liability would arise only in case of death or very serious permanent disablement as defined under Sec. 142. The word “member” is used in clause (A) to mean a limb. Privation of the sight of either eye or the hearing of either ear are equated with privation of any member or joint under clause (a). This would clearly indicate the high degree of disablement contemplated by the statute. When we come to clause (b), what is provided is destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint. It would mean that even if an injured is not deprived of any member or joint, he will be treated as having suffered permanent disablement if the power of any member or joint is permanently destroyed.

    16. By any amount of imagination loss of one tooth cannot he compared to impairment referred under clause (a) and (b). We are not impressed by the theory propounded by the learned Tribunal that the tooth is a weapon of offence to the human being as part of his anatomy. The habits of human being living in 20th century cannot be equated to that of an animal or a primitive man.

    17. Then the only question remaining is whether loss of one tooth can be treated as permanent disfiguration of the head or face. According to us, it cannot be equated to an ugly scar on the face or other disfiguration due to mutilation of any portion of the face. The learned Tribunal has taken so much trouble to establish that loss of one tooth would cause disfiguration of the face. According to us, even if the tooth cannot be replaced, the gap left by one tooth cannot be treated as a permanent disfiguration of the face of such gravity as contemplated under clause (c). The science of dentistry has developed so much that loss of one tooth or even few teeth is of not much consequence. Fixed and removable partial prostheses was being practised even during ancient times. There is difference of opinion whether it was the Phoenicians or the Egyptians who are the first to construct dental bridgework. There is reference to artificial teeth in the mouths of mummies in Egypt. In one of the oldest tombs at Saida (ancient Sidon, dating between 300 and 400 B.C) was found an extant Phoenician specimen with bridged in teeth fastening six anterior teeth. In this background, we can only observe that the learned Tribunal has misdirected itself and has taken an unrealistic view on the effect of loss of one tooth. The comparison made by the learned Tribunal with plastic surgery is totally out of place.

    18. The learned Tribunal has utilised several paragraphs of the award to examine the question whether loss of a tooth would come under clause (a) or (b) of Sec. 142 when no such contention was raised on behalf of the petitioner. The observations in paragraph 32 of the award would show the only contention raised by the petitioner's counsel was that the disability of the petitioner would come under clause (c) of Sec. 142. Ultimately the learned Tribunal is not able to come to a final conclusion whether the permanent disablement alleged to have been suffered by the petitioner would come under clause (a) or (b) or (c). The finding is that the loss of one tooth suffered by the petitioner amounts to permanent disability as defined under Sec. 142(a), 142(b) or 142(c) of the Motor Vehicles Act. According to us, the view taken by the learned Tribunal that the loss of one tooth of the petitioner is a permanent disablement coming under Sec. 142 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 cannot be sustained at all.

    19. Apart from the above since the accident had happened prior to the amendment brought under Act 54 of 1994, the amount that can be granted is only Rs. 12,000/-, in view of a Full Bench decision of this Court in Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Sheela Ratnan, 1996 (2) KLT 695. For these reasons we set aside the finding of the Tribunal that the injury sustained by the petitioner would come under Sec. 142 of the Motor Vehicles Act and therefore he is entitled to compensation for Rs. 25,000/-. The award is modified by limiting the amount to Rs. 17,500/- with interest as granted by the Tribunal. The appeal stands allowed as above.

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    United India Ins. Co. Ltd. v. P.V Thomas & Ors.
    (Dec 24, 1999)