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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • rule 8(4) of Punjab Employment Department Class III Rules,
  • Motor Vehicles Department (Recruitment) Rules, 1991,
  • sub-rule (aaaa) of rule 10
  • rule 3(e)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • rule 8(4) of Punjab Employment Department Class III Rules,
  • Motor Vehicles Department (Recruitment) Rules, 1991,
  • sub-rule (aaaa) of rule 10
  • rule 3(e)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion (Thulasidas, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Original Petition was referred by a single Judge to a Division Bench (order dated 26 September 1990) because important questions arose for which there was no direct authority; the Division Bench in turn referred the matter to a Full Bench (order dated 21 November 1995) on the ground of general importance.

The petitioner applied for the post of Assistant Information Officer pursuant to a notification published in the Kerala Gazette on 26 July 1983. The notification prescribed (a) a B.A./B.Sc./B.Com degree, (b) two years' experience in specified publicity/editorial posts, and (c) ability to prepare press bulletins and handouts.

The petitioner passed the B.A. examination on 7 September 1981 and worked as Sub-Editor in Jayaram News Weekly from 1 January 1981 to 5 September 1983. She submitted her application on 5 September 1983. Initially the first respondent rejected her application (Exhibit P1, 16 February 1984) for lack of prescribed qualifications; subsequently the commission reconsidered and called her for interview (Exhibit P2). On 7 October 1985 the first respondent informed her (Exhibit P3) that her name was proposed to be deleted from the rank list because, it was said, the experience qualification must be acquired after obtaining the basic academic qualification; she was asked to show cause. She replied (Exhibits P4 and P5), but by Exhibit P6 her name was deleted from the supplementary list for Muslims finalised on 25 April 1985.

The petitioner sought writs (certiorari and mandamus) to quash Exhibit P6, to declare the deletion illegal, to direct restoration of her name and appointment (including seniority and benefits), and to restrain advising of candidates below her rank.

In the counter-affidavit the first respondent did not dispute the basic facts (dates of degree and experience). It explained that applications were scrutinised, a written test and interview were held, and a rank list effective 25 April 1985 was finalised. The Commission relied on a general condition (Clause 19) that a candidate is deemed to have passed only from the date of official publication of results; therefore, experience from 1 January 1981 should be counted only from 8 September 1981 (publication date being 7 September 1981), yielding less than two years' qualifying experience. A defect-curing memo issued on 10 August 1984 was not satisfactorily replied to; she was provisionally admitted to test and interview but ultimately, by order dated 3 July 1986, her name was deleted. The list expired on 24 April 1988 and several candidates were advised and appointed from it.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the experience qualification specified in the notification must, as a matter of construction, have been acquired after obtaining the basic academic qualification (i.e., whether experience prior to formal publication of degree results is non-qualifying).
  2. Whether the deletion of the petitioner's name from the supplementary rank list (Exhibit P6) was valid and sustainable in law.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner contended she met the prescribed qualifications: she had a B.A. (passed 7 September 1981) and about two years' experience as Sub-Editor from 1 January 1981 to 5 September 1983.
  • Her application was wrongly treated as defective and her subsequent deletion from the supplementary rank list (Exhibit P6) was illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction.
  • She sought quashing of Exhibit P6 and directions for restoration to the rank list and appointment (with associated reliefs).

Respondents' Arguments

  • The first respondent accepted the factual chronology but argued that Clause 19 of the notification deemed the candidate to have passed the examination only from the date of official publication of results; therefore, experience prior to that date could not qualify.
  • The petitioner's period of qualifying experience after the date of result publication (from 8 September 1981 to 5 September 1983) was less than the prescribed two years; her application was thus defective.
  • The Commission issued a defect-curing memo, provisionally admitted her to test and interview, but ultimately found her explanation unsatisfactory and deleted her name by order dated 3 July 1986; the rank list had since expired and others had been appointed from it.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Subash v. State of Maharashtra, 1995 Supp (3) SCC 332 Principle that a rule requiring experience (rule 3(e) of Motor Vehicles Department (Recruitment) Rules, 1991) did not distinguish between experience acquired before or after acquisition of the basic educational qualification; mere possession of the working experience was sufficient. The court relied on this decision to support the conclusion that the notification in the present case did not require experience to be posterior to the acquisition of the basic degree; Subash reinforced that possession of relevant experience can satisfy the qualification irrespective of temporal order unless the rule expressly provides otherwise.
Sri Salig Ram Kumar v. Secretary, Haryana Public Service Commission, 1973 (1) S.L.R. 1039 Construction of rule 8(4) of Punjab Employment Department Class III Rules: held that the rule did not require one qualification to be acquired before the other; experience need not necessarily post-date the academic qualification. The court cited this authority to show analogous construction where a service rule was held not to demand that experience follow acquisition of an academic credential; used to corroborate the petitioner's construction of the notification.
Sheshrao Jangluji Bagde v. Baiyya, 1995—III LLJ (Suppl.) 290 The decision observed that, "normally" experience means experience after acquiring the minimum qualification unless context demands otherwise; in promotions context the interpretation may differ depending on provisions and type of experience. The court found this decision inapplicable to the facts at hand and therefore refused to place reliance on it; it noted the statement in Bagde but held the reasoning did not assist the respondent in the present factual and regulatory context.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by textual construction of the recruitment notification. It observed that the notification prescribed a bachelor's degree and two years' experience (among other criteria), and that Clause 19 deemed a candidate to have passed only from the date of official publication of results. However, the court emphasised that nothing in the notification's terms required the experience to have been acquired only after obtaining the basic academic qualification. The court therefore refused to import into the notification a limitation that was not expressed in its language.

The court reasoned that the various qualification clauses should be read disjunctively rather than as imposing a strict temporal sequence (i.e., education must always precede experience) and that the first respondent could not depart from the plain terms of the notification by applying an internal "practice" to the detriment of a candidate. The court noted that a subsequent insertion of a new sub-rule (sub-rule (ab) after the explanation to sub-rule (aaaa) of rule 10 of Part II KSSR) expressly made experience after acquisition of the basic qualification the norm "where the special rules or recruitment rules ... prescribe qualification of experience," underscoring that prior to that insertion the earlier notification did not contain such an express requirement.

The court relied on authorities (Subash and Sri Salig Ram Kumar) that supported the construction adopted by the petitioner — namely, that rules or notifications which do not expressly require experience to have been obtained after acquiring the basic qualification should not be interpreted to impose that sequence. The court rejected the respondent's reliance on Sheshrao Jangluji Bagde as inapplicable on the facts because Bagde's observations were context-sensitive and did not mandate the construction the respondent sought to apply.

Applying those principles to the undisputed facts (petitioner had both the degree and the relevant experience, passed the written test and interview, and was ranked No. 1 in the supplementary list for Muslims), the court concluded that the first respondent misconstrued the notification and misapplied its terms in deleting the petitioner's name (Exhibit P6). The order of deletion was therefore unsustainable.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Original Petition was allowed. The court quashed Exhibit P6 (the order deleting the petitioner's name from the supplementary rank list) and directed the first respondent to advise the second respondent to appoint the petitioner to the post of Assistant Information Officer in the Public Relations Department.

Implications:

  • The direct effect on the parties is that the deletion order (Exhibit P6) is set aside and the respondent is directed to advise the petitioner's appointment.
  • The court qualified its appointment direction by noting that, because of long delay and some laches on the petitioner's part, existing seniority of candidates already appointed from the list need not be disturbed.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a new, broad precedent beyond the specific construction applied to the notification in this case; it relied on earlier authorities to reach its conclusion. No broader or novel rule of recruitment law was expressly formulated in this opinion beyond the applied construction of the notification's terms.
The original petition is allowed as above.

This summary is drawn exclusively from the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences beyond the text excerpt supplied.

    Shaila Beegum v. Kerala Public Service Commission And Another

    Thulasidas, J.:— By order, dated 26th September, 1990, a learned Judge referred the Original Petition for being heard by a Division Bench since important questions were involved, on which there was no direct authority. Subsequently by another order, dated 21st November, 1995. a Division Bench referred the case to a Full Bench on the ground of general importance of the questions that arose for consideration.

    2. The petitioner applied for the post of Assistant Information Officer in the Public Relations Department as per notification issued in part I B, dated 26th July, 1983, of the Kerala Gazette. The qualifications prescribed for the post were:

    (a) B.A, B.Sc or B.Com Degree of any recognised University;

    (b) two years experience in a Government Publicity Organisation or Publicity Department of a private organisation or firm or the Editorial Section of a daily news paper or news agency; and

    (c) ability to prepare press bulletin and press publicity handouts.

    She passed the B.A degree examination on 7th September, 1981 from the Kerala University. She had experience as a Sub-Editor in Jayaram News Weekly, Kaniyapuram, for two years from January 1, 1981 to September 5, 1983. She was therefore, qualified for the post and submitted her application on September 5, 1983. The first respondent rejected her application on the ground that she had not the prescribed qualifications and intimated her about it as per Exhibit P1, dated February 16, 1984. She was also told that no further correspondence will be entertained in the matter. But subsequently, the matter was reconsidered suo motu and she was called for interview as per Exhibit P2. On October 7, 1985 she received Exhibit P3 from the first respondent informing that her name was proposed to be deleted from the rank list on the ground that she had not acquired experience qualification for two years at the time of the application for “according to the Gazette Notification, experience qualification should be one acquired after obtaining the basic qualification, viz., B.A” She was asked to show cause within 15 days of receipt of the communication. To this, she sent Exhibit P4 objecting the proposal to delete her name from the rank list, followed by another detailed reply, copy of which is Exhibit P5. But without considering her case correctly, the first respondent was stated to have illegally and arbitrarily passed Exhibit P6, by which her name was deleted from the supplementary list for Muslims, finalised on April 25, 1985, She has prayed:

    “A. To call for the records of the case leading to the issue of Exhibit P6 communication, dated 3rd February, 1986, and quash the same by the issue of a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction:

    and/or

    to declare that the action of the 1st respondent in deleting the name of the petitioner from the supplementary rank list, dated 25th April, 1985, for the post of Assistant Information Officer in the Public Relations Department is illegal, invalid and without jurisdiction;

    B. To issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of a writ of mandamus directing the first respondent to act in accordance with law and to restore the name of the petitioner in the rank list, dated 25th April, 1985, and to advise the name of the petitioner for appointment to the post of Assistant information Officer in accordance with the Rules regarding appointment:

    C. To issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondents to advise and appoint the petitioner in the next arising vacancy in the post of Assistant Information Officer in the public relations department and to give her seniority and other benefits on the basis of the seniority of the petitioner in the rank list, dated 25th April, 1985,

    D. To issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction forbearing the respondents from advising and apointing any of the persons from the rank is whose rank list below that of the petitioner; and

    E. To pass such other order or orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem just and necessary in the circumstances of the case including cost of this petition.”

    3. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the first respondent the basic facts had not been disputed. It was submitted that about 346 applications were received, of which 67 alone were defect-free. The selection was finalised after a written test followed by an interview. In the main list, 51 candidates and one candidate of the Muslim community in the supplementary list were published on 8th January, 1985 and they were called for interview. In the rank list settled here were 50 candidates, 49 in the main list and one in the supplementary list, which were brought into force with effect from 25th April, 1985. Only 15 vacancies had been notified for the post and five more vacancies were subsequently reported and as such 20 candidates were advised for appointment from the rank list prepared as per the rules of reservation and rotation. Petitioner's experience and the period she spent for study to acquire the essential qualification overlapped and therefore, her application was defective and she was informed accordingly. But while scrutinising the applications, the acceptability of certain certificates of experience submitted by some of the candidates became doubtful and therefore, the Commission by order, dated 12th June, 1984, directed a re-scrutiny. From the documents she produced it was seen that she appeared for the B.A Degree examination in April 1981, while her experience was for the period from January 1, 1981 to September 5, 1983. According to Cl. 19 of the general conditions of the notification, the candidate will be deemed to have passed the examination only with effect from the date of official publication of the results by the University. The experience required for a post before acquisition of the basic academic qualification could not be taken as qualifying experience for “obvious reasons.” Hence, her application as also of some others were rejected as defective. However, her application was provisionally admitted pending information regarding the date of publication of the result and it was later ascertained that the result was published on September 7, 1981. Accordingly her experience from September 8, 1981 to September 5, 1983 alone could be taken into account, which was less that two years. A defect-curing memo” was issued to her on August 10, 1984. By then the written test was fixed to be held on September 15, 1984. She was admitted to the test provisionally. No reply was received from her to the “defect-curing memo” within the prescribed period of 15 days. Even then, provisionally, admission ticket was issued to her to attend the written test and it was decided on September 12, 1984 to direct her to furnish explanation to the defect-curing memo at the time of inter-view. She was also admitted for interview and her name was included provisionally. She was ranked No. 1 in the provisional list for muslims. As stated already, it was ultimately found that she had no experience for the required period after acquiring the basic educational qualification. Her name was therefore, proposed to be deleted from the rank list. Notice was also given to show cause, to which she sent a reply on October 18, 1985, which was unsatisfactory. Eventually by order, dated 3rd July, 1986, her name was deleted and the order was communicated to her. The order is legal and valid. The list had already expired on April 24, 1988. Several candidates from the list were advised and appointed, who are not parties to the original petition which is devoid of merit.

    4. We heard counsel for the petitioner and the respondents.

    5. A copy of the notification published by the first respondent on July 26, 1983 is in the file, which prescribed the essential qualifications and those desirable. Certain general conditions also had been notified. The basic educational qualification is a Bachelor's Degree. A candidate shall be deemed to have passed the examination only with effect from the date of official publication of the result of the examinations by the University or the concerned authority. Two years' experience in a Government Publicity Organisation or Publicity Department of a Private Organisation or the Editorial Section of Newspaper or News Agency and ability to prepare news bulletins and news publications are also required. But such experience shall not be in the capacity of paid or unpaid apprentices, trainees or casual labourers.

    6. Petitioner passed the B.A degree examination on September 7, 1981 and had experience as Sub-editor in Jayaram News Weekly for the period from January 1, 1981 to September 5, 1983. These aspects are not in dispute. There was nothing in the notification, by which the parties are bound, to suggest that the experience to count will only be such as had been obtained after obtaining the basic educational qualification. We cannot import into the notification anything that is not warranted by its terms. We cannot also accept or permit a departure from its terms on any “practice” of the first respondent about its construction to the detriment of a candidate. It is not as to how the first respondent understood the notification to convey, but actually what it did could have to the applicants. There could be no doubt on the terms of the notification that what was required was not that the basic educational qualification should have preceded experience. The several clauses regarding qualifications could only be read disjunctively and not in the manner it had been construed by the first respondent, which it was submitted, was aware of this aspect since in the several notifications, it had published, it was careful to state that experience qualification that was required must have followed the acquisition of the basic educational qualification. Several instances were quoted before us that we do not wish to state here, since counsel for the first respondent did not quite frankly contest the submission. Understandably it was to set right the controversy in this behalf that this new sub-rule (ab) was inserted after the explanation to sub-rule (aaaa) of rule 10 of Part II KSSR which reads:

    “Where the special rules or recruitment rules for the post in any service prescribe qualification of experience, it shall, unless otherwise specified, be one gained by persons on temporay or regular appointment in capacities other than paid or unpaid apprentices, trainees and casual labourers in Central or State Government service or in public sector undertaking or registered private sector undertaking after acquiring the basic qualification prescribed for the post.”

    7. In Subash v. State of Maharashtra, [1995 Supp (3) SCC 332], the Supreme Court held that, the rules namely, Motor Vehicles Department (Recruitment) Rules, 1991, framed under Art. 309 of the Constitution, show that a “mere possession of the working experience of at least one year in a reputed automobile workshop as mentioned in rule 3(e)” was enough and that the rule does not make any difference between acquisition of such experience prior to or after the acquisition of basic educational qualification. A candidate must be held to have satisfied the qualifications required for appointment and in that view upset the decision of the Tribunal, which held on the basis of a circular that such working experience was not enough since it had been acquired before the candidate the basic educational qualification.

    8. The Punjab and Haryana High Court in Sri Salig Ram Kumar v. Secretary, Haryana Public Service Commission, [1973 (1) S.L.R 1039], upon construing the language of rule 8(4) of Punjab Employment Department Class III Rules, held that it was not the requirement of this rule that “one qualification should have been acquired before the other” and said that the Public Service Commission was not right to hold that experience in “collection, scrutiny and interpretation of statistical data in a Government office.” Should have been acquired after the petitioner became a graduate in Economics.

    9. Counsel for the first respondent sought reliance upon the decision reported in Sheshrao Jangluji Bagde v. Baiyya, [1995— III LLJ (Suppl.) 290], which in our view, is inapplicable to the facts of this case as evident from what the judgment itself had said that:

    “Normally when one talks of an experience unless the context otherwise demands, it should be taken as experience after acquiring the minimum qualification required and, therefore, necessarily will have to be posterior to the acquisition of the qualification. However, in the case of a promotion, the same interpretation may not be just or warranted. It would depend on the relevant provisions as also the particular type of experience which is required.”

    10. We are of the view that the petitioner had satisfied the qualifications required for the post. She passed the test and came out successful in the interview and was ranked No. 1 in the supplementary list for muslim candidates. It was too late in the day and not proper for the first respondent to have objected to her application as defective on the ground that she had not the required experience after the basic educational qualification was acquired. Such a view was not justified by the terms of the notification, which had been misconstrued and misapplied by the first respondent, which should not have gone behind its plain terms. Exhibit P6 order, in our view, is unsustainable and we accordingly quash the same. We direct the first respondent to advise the second respondent her appointment to the post of Assistant Information Officer in the Public Relations Department. In view of the long delay and some laches on her part, we hold that in giving appointment, the existing seniority of candidates already appointed need not be disturbed.

    The orginal petition is allowed as above.

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    Comments

    Shaila Beegum v. Kerala Public Service Commission And Another
    (Jul 19, 1997)