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Advocates
  • For the Appellant: T.K.M. Unnithan and P.G. Ganappan, Advocates.
  • For the Respondent: V. Chithambaresh (for No. 4) and Govt. Pleader N. Sankara Menon, (for Nos. 1 to R3).
Judges
  • M.M Pareed Pillay, C.J
  • P.A Mohammed
  • P. Shanmugam, JJ.
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
  • For the Appellant: T.K.M. Unnithan and P.G. Ganappan, Advocates.
  • For the Respondent: V. Chithambaresh (for No. 4) and Govt. Pleader N. Sankara Menon, (for Nos. 1 to R3).
Judges
  • M.M Pareed Pillay, C.J
  • P.A Mohammed
  • P. Shanmugam, JJ.
Acts
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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion considers whether the decision in Rajan Nair v. Mohan (1993 (1) KLT 782) requires reconsideration, specifically on the question whether Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (which prescribes a one-year time limit for initiating contempt proceedings) bars initiation of contempt proceedings in the High Court after the expiry of one year from the alleged contempt.

On the facts presented in this matter: the original petition was allowed by the court as per Ext. P5 dated 12.6.1990. The third respondent (Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies) was directed to issue a certificate pursuant to Exts. P1 to P4 to recover arrears from the first respondent within one month of receiving a copy of the judgment. Instead of issuing the certificate, the second respondent (Joint Registrar) issued Ext. P6 and sent Ext. P7 to the Assistant Registrar (third respondent) stating that Ext. P1 did not specify the amount and therefore the certificate could not be issued. After issuance of Ext. P7, the present contempt proceeding (C.C.C.) was filed on 30.9.1991.

The court ultimately addressed whether the proceeding before it was barred by limitation under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act or whether Article 215 of the Constitution rendered that statutory time-limit inapplicable to contempt of the High Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the decision in Rajan Nair v. Mohan (1993 (1) KLT 782), which applied Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act to bar initiation of contempt proceedings after one year, requires reconsideration.
  2. Whether Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 — prescribing a one year limitation from the date of alleged contempt — operates as an absolute bar to initiating contempt proceedings in the High Court, or whether Article 215 of the Constitution (the High Court's power to punish for contempt) makes that statutory time-limit inapplicable to contempt of the High Court.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rajan Nair v. Mohan, 1993 (1) KLT 782 Held that action by directing issue of notice to the contemner must be within one year from date of alleged contempt; Section 20 places an absolute fetter on the High Court's power to initiate proceedings after one year. The court examined this decision for reconsideration and concluded that it cannot be held to be good law in view of higher authority; the court did not approve Rajan Nair.
N. Venkataramanappa v. D.K. Kaikar, AIR 1978 Kar. 57 Held that Section 20 operates as an absolute bar to initiation of contempt proceedings (suo motu or on complaint) after one year; limitation starts on date contempt is alleged to have been committed and not the complainant's date of knowledge. Referenced as earlier authority relied upon in Rajan Nair; noted by the court in tracing the jurisprudence but ultimately superseded by later Full Bench and Supreme Court authority for purposes of contempt of the High Court.
A.V. Kwodi & Co. v. R.V. Lakshmidevamma, ILR 1990 KAR 4355 (Full Bench) Held that the one-year period in Section 20 applies only to contempt of subordinate courts and has no application to contempt of the High Court; Article 215 confers absolute and unfettered power on High Courts. The court relied on this Full Bench decision to support the proposition that Section 20 does not apply to contempt proceedings in the High Court.
Pritam Pal v. High Court of M.P., 1993 Supp (1) SCC 529 : AIR 1992 SC 904 Supreme Court held that the powers of the Supreme Court and High Court under Articles 129 and 215 are inherent, elastic, unfettered and cannot be restricted by ordinary legislation (including the Contempt of Courts Act). Primary Supreme Court authority used by the court to conclude that Section 20 cannot abridge the High Court's power under Article 215; this led to the conclusion that one-year limitation in Section 20 is inapplicable to contempt of the High Court.
Rajath v. M.S.P. Rajesh, 1980 KLT 802 Division Bench held that the provisions of Section 20 apply to civil contempt; wording of Section 20 is wide enough to embrace all proceedings for contempt (suo motu or on motion) and the starting point for limitation is the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. The court noted this decision as part of the local jurisprudence that treated Section 20 as applicable; however, in view of the Supreme Court authority and Full Bench decisions discussed above, the court declined to apply that limitation to contempt of the High Court in the present matter.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a textual and precedential analysis focusing on whether Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act can limit the High Court's constitutional power under Article 215 to punish for contempt of itself.

  1. The court identified Rajan Nair v. Mohan as a Division Bench decision which applied Section 20 to bar initiation of contempt proceedings after one year and treated Section 20 as placing an absolute fetter on the High Court's power.
  2. The court traced earlier Karnataka decisions, including N. Venkataramanappa, which also treated Section 20 as an absolute bar. It then noted that a Full Bench (A.V. Kwodi & Co. v. R.V. Lakshmidevamma) had taken a different view, holding Section 20 applicable only to subordinate courts and not to contempt of the High Court itself.
  3. The court placed decisive weight on the Supreme Court's decision in Pritam Pal v. High Court of M.P., which held that the powers of the Supreme Court and High Courts under Articles 129 and 215 are inherent and cannot be restricted by ordinary legislation, including the Contempt of Courts Act. The Supreme Court described those inherent powers as elastic and unfettered.
  4. Applying the Supreme Court's pronouncement, the court concluded that Section 20 cannot "make any inroad" into the High Court's power under Article 215. Consequently, the one-year period in Section 20 does not apply to contempt proceedings initiated in the High Court (whether suo motu or on complaint) for contempt of the High Court itself.
  5. On the facts of the case (Ext. P5 judgment dated 12.6.1990, subsequent communications Ext. P6 and Ext. P7, and the filing of the contempt petition on 30.9.1991), the court applied the foregoing legal conclusions and held that the proceeding was not barred by limitation.
  6. The court therefore held that Rajan Nair v. Mohan could not be treated as good law to the extent it applied Section 20 to bar contempt of the High Court.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that the proceeding initiated against the first respondent is not barred by limitation.

The court concluded that the decision in Rajan Nair v. Mohan (1993 (1) KLT 782) cannot be regarded as good law insofar as it held that Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act places an absolute fetter on the High Court's power to initiate contempt proceedings after one year. Relying on Pritam Pal (Supreme Court) and the Full Bench decision in A.V. Kwodi & Co., the court held that Section 20's one-year limitation does not apply to contempt of the High Court because Article 215 confers an absolute and unfettered power on the High Court to punish for contempt.

Practical consequence for the parties: the contempt proceeding filed on 30.9.1991 was held not to be time-barred and therefore may proceed. The record shows the court listed the matter for further orders on 17.7.1995.

The opinion does not state that it is creating a novel constitutional principle beyond applying the Supreme Court and Full Bench authorities; it expressly relies upon those higher authorities to reach its decision.

Show full summary ...

    A. Mayilswami v. State Of Kerala & Others

    1. The question that arises for consideration is whether the decision in Rajan Nair v. Mohan (1993 (1) KLT 782) requires reconsideration. In the above decision a Division Bench of this court held that the action initiated by directing issue of notice to the contemner should be within a period of one year from the date of the alleged contempt. The Division Bench held that if the court has not initiated proceedings by passing some order within a period of one year from the date of the alleged act of contempt the bar contained Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 comes into operation. The Court held than on a reading of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act it is clear that it places absolute fetter on the power of the High Court to initiate proceedings for contempt after the expiration of the period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.

    2. In the above decision N. Venkataramanappa v. D.K Kaikar (AIR 1978 Kar. 57) was relied. In that decision Karnataka High Court held that Section 20 of the Contempt of Court Act operates as an absolute bar to initiation of contempt proceeding whether sue motu or at the instance of complainant after expiry of one year's limitation starting point of limitation being the date on which contempt is alleged to have been committed and not date of knowledge of complainant.

    3. That decision was overruled by the Full Bench of that Court in A.V Kwodi & Co. v. R.V Lakshmidevamma (ILR 1990 KAR 4355). The Court held that the period of one year prescribed in Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act is applicable only in respect of Contempt of subordinate courts and it has no application in cases of Contempt of High Court and that the power conferred under Article 215 of the Constitution of India is absolute and unfettered. In Pritam Pal v. High Court of M.P (1993 Supp (1) SCC 529 : AIR 1992 S.C 904) the Supreme Court held that the power of the Supreme Court and the High Court being the Courts of Record as embodied under Articles 129 and 215 respectively cannot be restricted and trammelled by any ordinary legislation including the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act. The Supreme Court further observed that the inherent power of the Supreme Court and the High Court is elastic, unfettered and not subjected to any limit. As the power conferred upon the Supreme Court and the High Court being Courts of Record under Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution respectively is an inherent power and as the jurisdiction vested in these courts is a special one not derived from any other statute but from the aforesaid Articles of the Constitution of India, such power, cannot be either abridged by any legislation or abrogated or cut down. The Supreme Court has expounded the position in explicit terms.

    4. In Rajath v. M.S.P Rajesh (1980 KLT 802) a Division Bench of this court held that provisions of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act would apply to cases of civil contempt. The wording of the Section is wide enough to embrace all proceedings for contempt taken either suo motu or on a motion by parties, and the starting point of limitation under the Section can only be the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed by the person against whom the charge is levelled. This was a case where contempt proceedings were initiated for alleged disobedience of an order passed by the Sub Judge, Palakkad on Report No. 2 of 1978 submitted to that court by the receivers appointed in O.S No. 237 of 1975. The Division Bench held that in view of the language used in Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act the starting point of limitation under the Section can only be the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed by the person against whom the charge is levelled.

    5. Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act provides that no court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. Section 20 cannot make any inroad into the power vested in the High Court under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. The period mentioned in Section 20 cannot be made applicable to a case of contempt of the High Court. Article 215 of the Constitution of India gives a supreme position to the High Court compared to the Lower Courts. As the Article envisages that every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself we cannot approve Rajan Nair v. Mohan (1993 (1) KLT 782) As every High Court has power to determine questions about its own jurisdiction and it has inherent power to punish for its contempt summarily period of limitation in Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act has no application to contempt proceedings initiated in the High Court on its own motion or on complaint regarding contempt of the High Court.

    6. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court it is not possible for us to hold that the period of one year mentioned in Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act is applicable to a case where contempt proceeding is initiated by the High Court for having disobeyed or not complied with its order. As the power conferred on the High Court under Article 215 of the Constitution of India is absolute and unfettered it cannot be said that the time limit specified in Section 20 would apply and the proceeding before this court is barred by limitation.

    7. The original petition was allowed as per Ext. P5 dated 12.6.1990 The third respondent (Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies) was directed to issue certificate to the petitioner pursuant to Exts. P1 to P4 for recovering the amount of arrears due from the first respondent within one month from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment. The second respondent (Joint Registrar) instead of issuing certificate issued Ext. P6 to the Assistant Registrar (third respondent) issued Ext. P7 stating that in Ext. P1 the amount is not specified and so he cannot issue the Certificate. After Ext. P7 the present C.C.C was filed on 30.9.1991

    8. In view of Pritam Pal v. High Court of M.P (1993 Supp (1) SCC 529 : AIR 1992 S.C 904) the decision of the Division Bench of this Court Rajan Nair v. Mohan (1993 (1) KLT 782) cannot be held good law. We hold that the proceeding initiated against the first respondent is not barred by limitation.

    9. Call on 17.7.1995 for further orders.

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    Comments

    A. Mayilswami v. State Of Kerala & Others
    (Jul 13, 1995)