The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Jagannadha Rao, C.J:— In this order, we are dealing with a suo motu notice given by a Division Bench of this Court on 5-11-1993 in CCC 225 of 1993 directing the petitioner in the said CCC, Mr. P.C Jose, to show cause why he should not be declared as a vexatious litigant, the effect of which will be to scrutinise any case proposed to be filed by him in any Court in Kerala, before the same is entertained. CCC 225 of 1993 was a Contempt Case filed by Mr. Jose on 1-10-1993 against Mr. T.K Madhu, Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Cherthala.

2. Sri P.C Jose to whom this show cause notice was issued on 5-11-1993 has been very much before courts. He has nominated himself as President of a self-styled body called the ‘Anti Corruption Society of India.’ Under the garb of the above name, he has been filing case after case against lawyers, Munsiff Magistrates, Chief Judicial Magistrates and also against High Court Judges. In fact, whosoever does not yield to his pressure will have to face a case on the criminal side or for damages. He has also filed Contempt Cases against Judicial Officers and High Court Judges. He also started publishing pamphlets against Judicial Officers and Judges of this Court and engaged the service of Mr. Sukumaran, Anil Printers, Cherthala, to print pamphlets and also used Mr. Kaladharan, Advocate, Ernakulam to sign his affidavits. After launching an unwarranted tirade against the Judicial Officers and judges of this Court, he admittedly started acting as power-of-attorney-holder to various litigants. This Court got a written complaint that Mr. Jose is collecting money on the ground that he has put the judiciary in the dock and can obtain any order from any Court, if he is engaged as power-of attorney-holder. He has admitted in his written objection dated 10-11-1993, filed to the present show cause notice, that he is acting as power-of-attorney-holder for several litigants. What led to the present show cause notice is a story by itself. When the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Cherthala, tried to a curb the unruly and hostile behaviour of Mr. Jose in his Court, Mr. Jose filed a Contempt Case, C.C.C No. 225 of 1993 on 1-10-1993 against the said Magistrate. When the learned Judges issued the present Show cause notice on 5-11-1993 as to why Mr. Jose should not be declared a vexatious litigant, he filed CCC 275 of 1993 against the learned Judges of this Court who issued the show cause notice on 5-11-1993 in the Division Bench. That petition contained scandalous allegations. That Contempt Case was dismissed by us on 30-11-1993. On the same day, we registered CCC 281/93 in regard to the scurrilous allegations he made against the Hon'ble Judges who issued the present show cause notice dated 5-11-1993 in his CCC 275 of 1993 and in his written objection dated 10-1-1993 and affidavit dated 17-11-1993. In CCC 281 of 1993 which we registered against Jose, he reiterated in open Court before us on 30-11-1993 all the allegations in the said objection petition dated 10-1-1993 and affidavit dated 17-11-1993 and in CCC 275 of 1993. On the ground that it amounted to Contempt in the face of the Court, we passed an order of interim detention on 30-11-1993 pending disposal of the Contempt Case, CCC 281 of 1993. He was sent to Jail from the Court. Thereafter, we took up CCC 281 of 1993 on 16-12-1993 and we rejected an apology dated 9-12-1993 filed by him inasmuch as he had, while under interim detention, sent communications which were also contemptuous in nature. On 16-12-1993, we convicted him and sentenced him to three months Simple Imprisonment and allowed deduction of the period covered by interim detention. He has since been released.

3. Thereafter, this show cause notice dated 5-11-1993 issued by the earlier Division Bench as to why he should not be declared a vexatious litigant, has been taken up. Mr. Jose wanted legal and which was granted and now Mr. Johnson Manayani is appearing for him. We heard him. Mr. Jose was also present in Court.

4. As already stated, Jose filed a written objection dated 10-11-1993 and then an affidavit dated 17-11-1993 in reply to the show cause notice issued to him by the earlier Division Bench on 5-11-1993. The said written objection filed by Jose will give an idea about the various litigations that he was conducting in various Courts. He referred to OS 1508 of 1991 filed by the land-lord against him and another suit, OS 1533 of 1991 filed by the same land-lord. Mr. Jose filed IOP 3 of 1992 for damages against the land-lord which was coverted as OS 938 of 1993 in the Sub Court, Ernakulam and the assets of the land-lord was attached in that suit. Jose also filed CC 26 of 1993 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Ernakulam against the land-lord alleging that the police were not registering his complaint. Jose filed MP 277 of 1992 and the land-lord also filed Claim Petition. After hearing the Assistant Public Prosecutor. Mr. Sankaran, the Judicial Magistrate appears to have passed an order against Mr. Jose. Jose then referred to Crl. R.P 16 of 1992 in the Sessions Court which was said to have been allowed in his favour. Jose filed a case against Typist-cum-Manager for alleged theft of Rs. 25,000/-. Jose also filed CC 620 of 1991 against the same person before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Ernakulam, which is now transferred as CC 285 of 1992 before the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Aluva. On the ground that APP had acted illegally, Jose filed both civil and criminal cases against the APP as IOP 71 of 1992 and OP 14200 of 1992 and CMA 238 of 1993 was filed against the dismissal of IOP. Jose then refers to CC 355 of 1986 and OS 717 of 1987 filed against him. As 58 of 1990 and CRP 2784 of 1992 arose out of the same. EP 92 of 1992 is still pending. Jose then filed OS 101 of 1992 against the judgment-debtor therein claiming damages. It appears that Mr. Jose filed MACT 367 of 1987 through Advocate Prakasan of Cherthala: As there was some dispute between them, the said Advocate filed CC 32 of 1992 against Jose while Jose filed Crl. M.P No. 1077 of 1993 against him before the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Cherthala. On an earlier occasion Jose had created some problem in the same Court and the Magistrate was compelled to invoke his powers under Section 329 Cr. P.C against Jose with a view to get a report from the Mental Hospital at Trivandrum. The complaint filed by Jose against the Advocate was dismissed, but when Jose approached this Court by Crl. M.C No. 522/93 the same was remanded. The said complaint was pending for appearance of Jose and was posted to 29-9-1993. Jose appeared on 18-9-1993 and created a scene with unruly words and the Magistrate was compelled to register CC 467 of 1993 suo motu, The Magistrate then sent the case to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alappuzha where it was renumbered as CC 106 of 1993. Jose was sent to Sub Jail as he failed to produce sureties and later he was released on bail on production of sureties. At the stage of initial detention, Jose started a fast and created a lot of problem in the Jail. After Jose was remanded for the second time, he took food. Thereafter Jose filed Crl. M.C No. 1730/1993 implicating the CJM and the JFCM, Cherthala as respondents for quashing the complaint, C.C No. 106 of 1993. The High Court dismissed the said Petition observing that it was unfortunate that Jose was getting himself involved in cases after cases and was before this Court frequently and in recent times almost ‘every day’. Jose filed Crl. M.C No. 1730 of 1993 with a view to transfer the case pending in that Court to other Court in Ernakulam. (Some of these facts are borne out by the Report submitted by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alappuzha and the report of JFCM, Cherthala). Once the Petition filed against the Magistrate and the CJM were transferred from that Court, Jose filed Contempt Case, C.C.C No. 225 of 1993 against the JFCM, Cherthala. When the said CCC went before the earlier Division Bench on 5-11-1993, they thought it fit to give the present show cause notice. When the Division Bench issued show cause notice as to why Jose should not be declared as a vexatious litigant, Jose filed CCC 275 of 1993 against one of the learned Judges of this Court, who constituted the Bench. That was dismissed by us on 30-11-1993.

5. In view of the various allegations made in the said Contempt Case and also in the present written objection and affidavits, we registered CCC 281 of 1993 as stated earlier and ultimately convicted Jose for three months and the said sentence is now over. Now, we have taken up the show cause notice.

6. We may also here start, that CCC 87 of 1994 was registered against the Printer, Mr. Sukamaran and he was convicted on 18-3-1994 and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 250/-. The Advocate, Mr. Kaladharan was called in the batch of cases, CCC 305 to 315 of 1993 and was given a warning and let off. We have also registered CCC 305 to 315 of 1993 against Jose in regard to various acts which were in nature of Contempt and issued notice and they are now pending. Those CCCs relate to allegations made by Jose against Judicial Officers or High Court Judges in his CMC 42/93, CMA 98/93, Crl. M.P 1968/93, Crl. M.C 1632/93 and also, in regard to various pamphlets he published against Judicial Officers and High Court Judges. Having referred to the large number of cases filed by Jose against lawyers, judicial officers and High Court Judges and incidental litigation in CC against him - some of which were disposed of and some are pending - we shall now deal with the main point that arises for consideration in this show cause notice.

7. In the light of the arguments submitted before us by Advocate Johnson Manayani for Jose and the arguments of learned Government Pleader, the following points arise for consideration.

1. Whether the provisions of the Madras Vexatious Litigatioc (Prevention) Act (8 of 1949) can be invoked against Jose and whether if it cannot be so invoked, this Court has inherent power to declare Jose as a vexatious litigant and prevent him from unless filing cases unless scrutinised by the Advocate General or by the Courts concerned?

2. Whether the rule - making power of the High Court, such as, Section 122 CPC or Art. 225 of the Constitution of India, or Section 23 of the Contempt of Courts Act, etc., in matters of ‘procedure’ enables the High Court to make rules to prevent vexatious litigation and require prior permission of the Advocate General or the concerned courts, for entertaining the case filed by such a person?

3. Whether pending such a legislation or making of rules, this Court has inherent power to stay any proceedings as and whens filed by Jose if the Court comes to the conclusion that the said litigation is vexatious and is an abuse of the process of the Court?

8. Point No. 1:— So far as the applicability of the Madras Vexatious Litigation (Prevention) Act, 1949 is concerned, the said Act was in force in the former State of Madras and can apply only to that part of the Kerala State which was formerly within the Madras State prior to 1-11-56. As there was no territorial extension of the said Act to the places where Jose has filed the cases, it will not be possible to apply the provisions of the Madras Act. This is clear from the judgment of the Supreme Court in P.H Mawle v. State of A.P, A.I.R 1965 S.C 1827. A similar view was taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Advocate General v. T.A Rajendran, 1988 (1) K.L.T 305. Following the aforesaid decisions, it must be held that the above said Act of Madras passed by the Madras Legislature cannot be invoked against Mr. Jose.

9. The next question is whether this Court has inherent power to declare Jose as a vexatious litigant and prevent him from filing cases unless scrutinised by the Advocate General or the concerned Courts. We may here point out that the Supreme Court in P.A Mawle's Case, A.I.R 1965 S.C 1827, while holding that the provisions of the Madras Act were not violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution, that the said Act was similar to the English Statutes 16 and 17 Vict. Ch. 30 (now replaced by Section 51 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925 (15 and 16 Geo Vc. 49), that the provisions of the said Act sub-serve public interest and that prior restraint against litigants was designed to promote public good, observed that the High Court of Madras was getting these powers only because of the provisions of the said Act and not otherwise. The Supreme Court has pointed out that High Court has no inherent jurisdiction to declare a person as a vexatious litigant. This is what Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) observed in paragraph 7:

“The Act, which was passed by the Madras Provincial Legislature in 1949, conferred jurisdiction upon the Madras High Court to deal with cases of habitual litigants who were persistently filing vexatious actions and were guilty of an abuse of the process of court. This jurisdiction belonged to the High Court of Madras by virtue of the Act and was not an inherent jurisdiction whether as a Court of Record or otherwise.”

(emphasis supplied)

10. For the aforesaid reasons, we also hold that this Court has no inherent jurisdiction to declare Mr. Jose as a vexatious litigant and to thereby prevent him from approaching this Court unless sanctioned by the Advocate General or by the Courts concerned. Point No. 1 is answered accordingly.

11. Point No. 2:— Part X of the Code of Civil Procedure which consists of sections 121 to 131 deals with the power of the High Court to make various Rules. Section 122 enables the High Court to make rules regulating its own procedure and the procedure of the civil courts subject to its superintendence and may by such rules annul, alter or add to all or any of the rules in the First Schedule. Section 125 confers similar power to High Courts not coming under Section 122. The above said rules are subject to the approvel of the Government as stated in Section 126. The rules require publication under Section 127. Section 128 mentions the matters with regard to which the rules will be made. Section 128(1) says that the rules may deal with the ‘procedure’ of civil courts. Certain particular items are also mentioned in Section 128(2). Under Section 129, High Court could also make rules not inconsistent with the Letters. Patent or order or other Law, for purposes of regulating its own procedure in exercise of its original civil jurisdiction. Under Section 130 also, rules can be made as to matters other than procedure. Article 225 of the Constitution of India provides for making of rules by the High Court. So does Section 23 of the Contempt of Courts Act. There may be other statutes too which enable the High Court to make ‘procedural’ rules. The question is whether in the absence of any legislation by the State Legislature for declaring litigants as vexatious litigants, the High Court can make its rules under its rule-making power?

12. As of now there are no such rules in Kerala. But inasmuch as cases of abuse of process and vexatious litigation are on the increase, we would like to deal with the question in some detail.

13. A question relating to the rule - making power of the High Court of Australia arose before the Australian High Court in Jones v. Skyring, (1992) 66 Aus. L.J.R 810. Section 86 of the Judicature Act, 1903 (Cth), in paragraph (b), permitted the High Court of Australia to make Rules:

“generally regulating all matter of practice and procedure in the High Court.”

(emphasis supplied)

14. In exercise of that power, the High Court of Australia made rules in Order 63 Rule 6 as follows:

“O. 63. R. 6(1): Upon the application of a Law Officer, or the Australian Government Solicitor or of the Principal Registrar of the Court, the Court of a Justice, if satisfied that a person, or another person in concert with that person, frequently and without reasonable ground has instituted vexatious legal proceedings, may, after hearing that person or that other person or giving him an opportunity of being heard, order that he shall not, without the leave of the Court or a Justice, begin any action appeal or other proceeding in the Court.

(2) Leave shall not be given under this rule unless the Court or a Justice is satisfied that the proceedings are not an absuse of the process of the court and there is prima facie ground for the proceedings.”

15. Question arose before Toohey, J. wheher Order 63, Rule 6 was intra-vires of rule - making power of the High Court. The learned Judge referred to a decision of the High Court in Hutchison v. Bienvenu, (unreported) dated 19 October, 1971, wherein the High Court of Australia had upheld the validity of Order 63 Rule 6(1). A strong Court consisting of Barwick, C.J and McTiernan, Menzies, Windeyer and Owen, JJ. observed:

“The rule (O. 63 Rule 6(1) is made in pursuance of the rule-making power of the Court which is ample to sustain it and not in conflict with any constitutional or statutory provision”.

16. The rule-making power was granted by Section 86 of the Judicature Act, 1903. After referring to the above said decision of the High Court, Toohey, J. observed that O. 63, R. 6 was ‘procedural’ in character. He said:

“It might be said that an order precluding the bringing of any further action by a person goes beyond practice and procedure. But an order under O. 63, R. 6(1) does not have that effect. The rule sustains an order that the person shall not, without the leave of the Court or a Justice, begin any action, appeal or other proceeding in the Court; that leave shall not be given unless the court or a Justice ‘is satisfied that the proceedings are not an absuse of the process of the court and that there is prima facie ground for the proceedings’. Read in its entirety, the rule is concerned with practice and procedure reinforcing the power of the Court to protect its own process against unwarranted usurpation of its time and resources and to avoid the loss caused to those who have to face actions which lack any substance.”

17. Hence such a rule can clearly be made under the Powers of the High Court to make rules of ‘procedure’. Such a rule can be made under Chapter X of the CPC or under Article 225 of the Constitution of India or Section 23 of the Contempt of Courts Act or other similar provisions enabling any High Court to make rules for purpose of ‘procedure’. It is not necessary that the Legislature alone should, intervene.

18. We may also state that if any such rule is made by the High Court, for purpose of declaring persons as vexatious litigants and to compel them to seek leave of the Advocate General or of a Court before any case filed by them is entertained, the said procedure would not be unconstitutional or violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India. Such a contention raised with reference to the Madras Act of 1949 was rejected in P.H Mawle's case, A.I.R 1965 S.C 1827. Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) observed in that case as follows:

“The next argument of the appellant before us is that this Act is unconstitutional because it prevents some citizens from approaching the court and obtaining relief to which every one is entitled in a State governed by Rule of Law………………… This argument is also not acceptable to us because the litigants who are to be prevented from approaching the court without the sanction of the High Court are a class by themselves. They are described in the Act as persons who habitually and without reasonable cause file vexatious actions, civil or criminal. The Act is not intended to deprive such a person of his right to go to a court. It creates a check so that the court may examine the bona fides of any claim before the opposite party is harassed. Such an Act passed in England, has been applied in several cases to prevent an abuse of the process of court. In its object the Act promotes public good because it cannot be claimed that it is an inviolable right of any citizen to bring vexatious actions without control, either legislative or administrative. The Act subserves public interest and the restraint that it creates is designed to promote public good. The Act does not prevent a person declared to be habitual litigant from bringing genuine and bona fide actions. It only seeks to cut short attempts to be vexatious. In our judgment, the Act cannot be described as unconstitutional or offending either Act, 19 or 14.”

19. The same reasoning will apply to any procedural rule made by the High Courts. We accordingly hold that it will be permissible for the High Court to make rules under powers granted to make rules of procedure, such as Section 122 CPC, or under Article 225 of the Constitution of India, or Section 23 of the Contempt of Courts Act, etc.

20. Before we part with this point, we have to refer to one other aspect. In Advocate General v. T.A Rajendran, 1988 (1) KLT 305, where the applicability of the Madras Act to Kerala fell for consideration, a question also arose as to whether the provisions of the Madras Act would apply only to cases where a person resorts to repeated action against the same person, but also where a person resorts to different cases against different persons or authorities. The Division Bench came to the conclusion that either type of case fell within the Madras Act. Malimath, C.J observed:

“Though an inference that the litigation is vexatious may be drawn more readily when concentration is on the same person or on the same cause of action, it cannot be said as an invariable rule that litigation cannot be regarded as vexatious merely because he has chosen differant persons and different causes of action. The essenial question for consideration is as to whether the party is habitually bringing actions which are throughly unfounded, not with a view to vindicate justice, but for the purpose of harassing the opponent…….”

21. We decide point No. 2 accordingly.

22. Point No. 3:— If as held under point No. 2, the High Court could make rules applicable at the stage of institution of cases, the question is whether the High Courts have any other inherent power, to deal with vexatious actions once they were filed into Court, to meet situations arising before any such rules are made. It is here that the question of inherent power of the High Court to grant permanent stay of vexatious proceedings arises.

23. At the outset, we want to exclude criminal prosecution from the purview of our discussion because Section 482 Cr. P.C is already there. We do not want that the inherent power of stay should be abused by resorting to our judgment in this case as an alternative to Section 482 Cr. P.C

24. As to whether the Court has inherent power to grant ‘permanent stay’ of proceedings which in the opinion of the Court are not bonafide litigations, there is again another recent authority of the Australian High Court in Williams v. Spautz, (1992) 66 ALJR 585. There, the Australian High Court held that every court has inherent jurisdiction to grant permanent stay of such proceedings which are an abuse of process of court or proceedings. The majority of the Court held that to bring proceedings, to achieve objects ulterior to a purpose of a cause of action as pleaded, is an abuse of process for which a permanent stay should be granted. The Court also held that the long established inherent jurisdiction of the Australian Court enabled it to stay proceedings which were an abuse of process. Where a stay was sought to stop an action that had been instituted and maintained for an improper purpose, the possibility that a similar result might be achieved by application of the law of contempt was not a reason for denying the existence of the court's inherent jurisdiction to protect its own process from abuse. The inherent power of the court extended to preventing an abuse of process resulting in oppression. The abuse of process of court is now treated as a tort in the Law of Torts. It was not essential to the exercise of inherent jurisdiction that these must be an improper act as well as an improper purpose Further, the improper purpose need not be the sole purpose of the moving party. The predominant purpose is the criterion.

25. In the above Australian case, a senior Lecturer in the University of New Castle, Dr. Spautz initiated several actions against Prof. Williams. The University Council, after receiving various reports of Inquiry Officers, decided to dismiss Dr. Spautz with effect from a particular date unless he thought of resigning prior to that date, Dr. Spautz did not resign and the dismissal took effect. Dr. Spautz then commenced various proceedings in 1980 in the Courts one after another. The trial Judge found that the predominant purpose of Dr. Spautz in instituting and maintaining the proceedings against Prof. Williams was to exert pressure upon the University to reinstate him or to agree to a favourable settlement of the case involving his wrongful dismissal. The trial Judge further found that the abuse of process was that the proceedings were instituted and maintained for a purpose other than that for which they were properly designed or existed. The proceedings were intended to achieve some collateral advantage beyond that which the law offered or to exert pressure to effect an object not within the scope of the process. The court must consider, on the one hand, the purpose for which the legal proceedings exist in the law, and on the predominent purpose of the person charged with the abuse of process, on the other. In that case, the trial Judge granted a permanent stay of the proceedings, but the same was reversed by the Court of Appeal. However, the High Court of Australia set aside the judgment of the Court of appeal and restored the permanent stay granted by the trial Judge. The court referred to the English decision in Connelly v. DPP, (1964) A.C 1254 at 1301, wherein Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest observed:

“A court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction has powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction………………A court must enjoy such powers in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of its process………………….”

26. The Court also referred to the observations of Lord Scarman in R. v. Sang, (1980) A.C 402 at 455 that every Court is ‘in duty bound to protect itself’ against an abuse of its process. The reasons behind granting of permanent stay were as follows: First is that the public interest in the administration of justice requires that the court protectsits ability to function as a court of law by ensuring that its processes are used fairly by State and citizens alike. Second is that unless the Court protects its ability to function that way; its failure will lead to erosion of public confidence by reason of concern that the court's processes may lend themselves to oppression ??? injustice. After referring to several English cases and also to the American case in Rosemont Enterprise Inc: Random House Inc., (1966) 261 F. Supp 691 at 696-697, and to the New Zealand case in Moevao v. Department of Labour, (1980) 1 NZLR 464 at 481, the Australian High Court observed:

“In elucidating the principles governing the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction, the courts have had regard to the tort of collateral abuse of process. This cause of action has been recognised in England: (Grainger v. Hill, (1838) 4 Bing (NC) 212 (132 ER 769); Gilding v. Eyre, (1661) 10 CB (NS) 592 (142 ER 584); and, more recently, Speed, Seal Ltd. v. Paddington, (1985) 1 W.L.R 1327 at 1334-1335, and Metall & Roshtoff v. Donaldson Inc., (1990, I.C.B 391 at 469), the United States (Prough v. Entriken, (1849) II Pa 81) and Canada (Guildford Industries Ltd. v. Hankinson Services Ltd., (1973) 40 DLR, (3d) 398)…….

The tort of collateral abuse of process differs from the older action for malicious prosecution……………………………………………

Central to the tort of abuse of process is the requirement that the party who has instituted proceedings has done so for a purpose or to effect an object beyond that which the legal process offers………If the proceedings are merely a stalking - horse to coerce the defendant in some way entirely outside the ambit of the legal claim upon which the Court is asked to adjudicate they are regarded as an abuse of process for this purpose: Per Isaacs, J. in Varawa v. Howard Smith Co. Ltd., (1911) 13 CLR 35 at 91.”

27. It is therefore clear that before any rule such as Order 63, Rule 6 of Australia is to be made by the High Courts, in exercise of rule-making powers, it is permissible for the High Courts to grant ‘permanent stay’ of cases amounting to abuse of process, after such cases are filed in Court. Such a petition can be filed, if it relates to the lower courts, as an O.P in the High Court; with adequate pleadings as to the abuse of process of the court concerned. If the case which is an abuse of process is filed in the High Court itself, then a C.M.P can be moved therein pleading the abuse of process and seeking permanent stay. It will then be for the High Court to consider issuing notice to the affected parties who have initiated the cases, and pass appropriate orders.

28. However, a word of caution is necessary. While dealing with any such Petition for ‘permanent stay’, this Court must take care to see that its inherent power is itself not abused. The power should be exercised sparingly and only in cases where the High Court comes to the firm conclusion that there is ‘abuse of process’ either of the High Court or of the lower courts. Otherwise, there is every likelihood of this inherent power itself being abused.

29. As to what is ‘abuse of process’ has been laid down, to a considerable extent, in decided cases and also in the Australian case, Williams v. Spautz, referred to above. We are adopting the reasoning in that except in so far as it deals with criminal cases. It is neither possible nor desirable to give any exhaustive definition of what is meant by ‘abuse of process’. The filing of the case must itself be oppressive. It must have been for a Collateral purpose which is other than what the case is to ultimately deliver according to the legitimate judicial processes. The improper purpose need not be the sole purpose. It is sufficient if it is the predominant purpose of the action. It is not essential that there must be an improper act as well as an improper purpose. Cases which can be dealt with under Section 482 Cr. P.C according to principles laid down by the Supreme Court, can be dealt with under Section 482 Cr. P.C proceedings and therefore such cases need not be dealt with as per Williams v. Spautz. It is equally important, as stated earlier, that freedom of access to courts is preserved. There is, no doubt, risk of the inherent power of stay itself being abused but “that risk and the other policy considerations… are not so substantial as to outweigh counterveiling policy considerations and deter the courts from exercising the jurisdiction in appropriate circumstances”. In the context of the power of permanent stay, other objections arising from the availability of other remedies in the form of contempt, and the tort of collateral abuses of process, have not prevailed.

30. Coming to the facts relating to the present show cause notice before us, it was issued by a Division Bench of this Court on 5-11-1993 when Mr. Jose filed a contempt case, C.C.C No. 225 of 1993 on 1-10-1993 against Mr. Madhu, the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Cherthala. While it is true that a Judicial Officer can be in contempt of his own court in certain rare situations, there are no circumstances in the present case warranting any contempt action against Mr. Madhu. Earlier another Contempt Case was filed by Mr. Jose against Mr. Madhu alleging that inasmuch as an order of Mr. Madhu was set aside and the matter remanded by a learned Single Judge of this Court, Mr. Madhu had committed contempt of his own court. That CCC was dismissed by us. Later, the present CCC was filed by Mr. Jose again against Mr. Madhu under the Contempt of Courts Act. A reading of the Petition reveals to us that Mr. Jose had no bona fides in filing this Contempt Case against Mr. Madhu and it was, in our view, an attack on the Officer for the various judicial orders passed by him and for certain action taken by him in registering a criminal complaint against Mr. Jose in regard to alleged actions of Mr. Jose in the Court of Mr. Madhu. Surely, if such contempt cases are to be freely allowed to be continued, no Judicial Officer can function with a free mind. The case on hand is the clearest case of abuse of process. (What is more, when the Division Bench gave the present show cause notice, Mr. Jose filed a Contempt Case C.C.C No. 275 of 1993 against one of the learned Judges who constituted the Bench. Then we instituted C.C.C No. 281 of 1993 against Mr. Jose and punished him for three mouths). Judicial Officers cannot be oppressed or coerced by pressure tactics of litigants. Under the guise of ‘President’ of a self-styled body ‘Anti-Corruption Society of India’, Mr. Jose intended to terrorise the entire judicial administration from Munsiff-Magistrates to Judges of this Court. This is revealed from the type of attack on all of them in, the various cases filed by him and the pamphlets published by him which are still subject matter of C.C.C Nos. 305 to 315 of 1993 which are all still pending.

31. We are therefore convinced that C.C.C No. 225 of 1993 filed by Mr. Jose against Mr. Madhu is liable to be permanently stayed on the basis of the principles mentioned above. However, Mr. Jose who is now present in Court wants to withdraw the said C.C.C No. 225 of 1993 filed by him against Mr. Madhu. We permit him to do so C.C.C No. 225 of 1993 is accordingly dismissed as withdrawn. But this withdrawal does not preclude action for contempt of court already initiated by us against Mr. Jose in respect of the contemptuous remarks contained in C.C.C No. 225 of 1993 against Mr. Madhu and the other Judicial Officers. Registry can bring to the notice of this Court list of cases filed by Mr. Jose against Judicial Officers for appropriate action. So far as the cases in which Mr. Jose is acting as Power of Attorney for other litigants, Registry may put up a note for appropriate direction to the concerned courts, suo motu, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

32. The show cause notice dated 5-11-1993 in C.C.C No. 226 of 1993 is disposed of accordingly.