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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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Judges
Acts
  • S. 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (for short the Act)
  • sub-section (1) of S. 7
  • Wards Act, 1890;
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • S. 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (for short the Act)
  • sub-section (1) of S. 7
  • Wards Act, 1890;
Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The revision-petitioner is the judgment-debtor in E.P. 6 of 1992 arising from S.F.C.O.P. 283 of 1992 (Family Court, Madras). The respondent is the decree-holder and the petitioner’s husband. The parties have one daughter, aged five years at the time of the proceedings. The revision-petitioner alleges that she left the respondent in May 1989 and has been living at Kollam with the child because of cruelty by the respondent, who is said to be living with a concubine.

The revision-petitioner filed M.C. 26 of 1991 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kollam seeking maintenance for herself and the child. The respondent filed S.F.C.O.P. 283 of 1992 in the Family Court at Madras seeking guardianship and custody of the minor daughter; an ex parte order in that petition directed the revision-petitioner to give custody of the child to the respondent. That ex parte order (decree) was transmitted for execution to the District Court, Kollam because the revision-petitioner and child reside within its jurisdiction.

The revision-petitioner objected to the execution petition in the District Court contending that the decree was not executable because it was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction and, alternatively, that if executable it could be executed only by the Family Court at Thiruvananthapuram. The District Court overruled these objections and made the impugned order. The revision-petitioner sought this revision petition challenging that order.

Relevant dates: the Family Court at Thiruvananthapuram was established on 6-6-1992; the execution petition E.P. 6/1992 was filed on 23-11-1992; the impugned order was rendered on 26-3-1993 (i.e., after establishment of the Thiruvananthapuram Family Court which has jurisdiction over Kollam).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the District Court, Kollam had jurisdiction to execute the custody/guardianship order (decree) passed by the Family Court at Madras after a Family Court (Thiruvananthapuram) had been established for the area including Kollam.
  2. How Section 18(3) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (which permits execution of a decree by "the other Family Court or ordinary Civil Court to which it is sent for execution") should be reconciled with Sections 7 and 8 of the Act, which vest jurisdiction in the Family Court and oust the jurisdiction of district courts in specified matters.
  3. Whether the executability of the decree can be challenged on grounds of lack of jurisdiction in the court that passed the decree (i.e., whether an order of a court lacking jurisdiction is a nullity and whether that affects execution), and whether it was necessary to decide that question for the purposes of this revision.

Arguments of the Parties

Revision-petitioner's Arguments

  • The District Judge's approach (that the Madras Court lacked only territorial jurisdiction and that non-objection to jurisdiction by the judgment-debtor does not affect executability) is incorrect in law.
  • When a District Judge exercises jurisdiction under Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, he does not function as a court for matters falling under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890; there is an inherent lack of jurisdiction in a District Judge to deal with a child who is not a resident within his territorial jurisdiction.
  • The decree should be treated as a nullity for want of jurisdiction in the court which passed it (Madras), and therefore the executability can and should be questioned.
  • Even if the decree's validity is arguable, the immediate important question is whether the District Court, Kollam has jurisdiction to execute the decree; if it lacks jurisdiction, the execution order must be vacated as one rendered without jurisdiction, making it unnecessary to determine whether the decree itself is a nullity at this stage.

Respondent / District Court Position (as described)

  • The District Judge accepted the position based on Section 18(3) of the Family Courts Act that a decree or order of a Family Court can be executed by an ordinary civil court to which it is sent for execution.
  • Implicit in the District Court's approach (as criticized by the revision-petitioner's counsel) was the view that because the judgment-debtor did not object to jurisdiction earlier, territorial jurisdiction issues do not affect executability.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying and construing the relevant statutory provisions of the Family Courts Act, 1984: Sections 7, 8 and 18(3).

- Section 7 (as quoted) grants a Family Court the jurisdiction exercisable by a District Court or subordinate civil court in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature listed in the Explanation; clause (g) of the Explanation expressly includes "a suit or proceeding in relation to the guardianship of the person or the custody of, or access to any minor." Section 7 also deems the Family Court to be a District Court (or subordinate civil court as applicable) for the area to which the Family Court's jurisdiction extends.

- Section 8 provides that where a Family Court has been established for an area, no district court or subordinate civil court (as referred to in Section 7(1)) shall have or exercise jurisdiction in relation to that area in respect of suits or proceedings of the nature referred to in the Explanation; pending suits or proceedings which would fall within the Family Court's jurisdiction are to be transferred to the Family Court.

- Section 18(3) states that "A decree or order may be executed either by the Family Court which passed it or by the other Family Court or ordinary Civil Court to which it is sent for execution."

The court observed that a literal reading of Section 18(3), if taken to permit concurrent execution jurisdiction by ordinary civil courts notwithstanding the clear ouster in Section 8, would produce inconsistency and undermine the legislative design that matters listed in the Explanation to Section 7 are to be within the exclusive domain of Family Courts once established. The court emphasized principles of statutory interpretation: the purpose of discovering legislative intent, reading words in context, and avoiding constructions that render other provisions otiose.

The court cited (as an authoritative interpretive guide) a passage from Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes to reinforce that alternative constructions which introduce uncertainty or friction in the statutory scheme should be rejected.

Applying these interpretive principles, the court held that Section 18(3) must be read consistently with Sections 7 and 8. Accordingly, Section 18(3) permits an ordinary civil court to execute a Family Court's decree only where no Family Court has been established for the area in question. If a Family Court has been established for the area (as was the case here, with the Family Court at Thiruvananthapuram established on 6-6-1992 covering Kollam), the District Court for that area has been ousted of jurisdiction by Section 8 and therefore cannot execute the Family Court's order.

The court applied that construction to the facts: because the Thiruvananthapuram Family Court (which has jurisdiction over Kollam) existed before the execution proceedings, the District Court, Kollam lacked jurisdiction to execute the Madras Family Court's custody order. As the impugned order was made by a court without jurisdiction to execute, it was set aside.

Finally, the court observed that having reached the conclusion that the execution order was without jurisdiction and liable to be set aside, it was unnecessary to decide whether the Madras order itself was a nullity for want of jurisdiction; that question might only become relevant should the Family Court at Thiruvananthapuram seek to execute the Madras order.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision petition was allowed and the impugned execution order was set aside. The court concluded that the District Court, Kollam had no jurisdiction to execute the custody/guardianship order of the Family Court at Madras because a Family Court (Thiruvananthapuram), having jurisdiction over Kollam, had been established prior to the execution proceedings.

Core Ruling: The execution order made by the District Court, Kollam was without jurisdiction and is set aside; the C.R.P. is allowed.

Implications: The direct effect is that the order allowing execution in the District Court, Kollam is vacated and the executing court's action is nullified for want of jurisdiction. The court interpreted Section 18(3) consistently with Sections 7 and 8 to mean that ordinary civil courts may execute Family Court decrees only where no Family Court has jurisdiction over the area. The opinion did not proceed to decide whether the original Madras order was a nullity; that issue was left open for resolution in appropriate proceedings (for example, by the Family Court competent for the area). The opinion does not set out any broader pronouncement beyond the immediate statutory interpretation and the direct consequence for the parties.

Petition allowed.

    Marya Teresa Martin v. E. Martin

    1. Judgment-debtor in E.P 6 of 1992 in S.F.C.O.P 283 of 1992 pending in the District Court, Kollam is the revision-petitioner. Respondent is the decree-holder and husband of the revision-petitioner. They have ‘only one issue, a daughter aged 5 years’. Respondent is residing at Madras. According to the revision-petitioner she left him along with her child in May 1989 and started living at Kollam on account of the cruelty of the respondent who according to her is living with a concubine. Revision-petitioner filed M.C 26 of 1991 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate's Court, Kollam claiming maintenance for herself and the child. According to the revision-petitioner, as a counter blast to the said proceeding, the respondent filed S.F.C.O.P 283 of 1992 in the Family Court at Madras for appointing him as guardian of his minor daughter and also for the custody of the child. It is alleged by the revision-petitioner that the respondent has also filed an O.P for restitution of conjugal rights. In S.F.C.O.P 283 of 1992 an ex parte order was passed directing the revision-petitioner to give custody of the child to the respondent. The said order was sent for execution to the District Court, Kollam within whose jurisdiction the petitioner is living along with the child.

    2. Revision-petitioner filed objection to the execution petition contending that the decree is not executable as the same was rendered by a court which has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. It was also contended by the revision-petitioner that even if the decree is executable, the same could be executed only by the Family Court at Thiruvananthapuram. Both the objections were overruled by the lower court as per the impugned order.

    3. Learned counsel for the revision-petitioner maintained that the very approach of the Execution Court that the Madras Court was lacking only territorial jurisdiction and since the judgment-debtor did not object to the jurisdiction, the same cannot affect the executability of the decree is wrong in law as according to the learned counsel, a District Judge when exercises jurisdiction under S. 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (for short ‘the Act’) does not function as a court in relation to matters falling under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890; there is inherent lack of jurisdiction for the District Judge to deal with a child who is not a resident within his jurisdiction. Therefore the revision-petitioner is entitled to question the executability of the decree. It is maintained by the learned counsel that the decree therefore should be treated only as a nullity. But in the circumstance, the more important question to be considered is whether the District Court, Kollam has got jurisdiction to execute the decree. If it is found that the District Court, Kollam has no jurisdiction to execute the decree, on that ground itself the order under attack has to be vacated as one rendered without jurisdiction. In that event, it will not be necessary to go into the question as to whether the decree itself is a nullity; the occasion for considering the said question can arise only when the order is sought to be executed by the Family Court at Thiruvananthapuram.

    4. Therefore, I may first advert to the question as to whether the District Court, Kollam has got jurisdiction to execute the order passed by the Madras Court. The Family Court, Thiruvananthapuram was established on 6-6-1992. According to the revision-petitioner E.B 6/1992 was filed on 23-11-1992. The impugned order was rendered on 26-3-1993. That is after Family Court, Thiruvananthapuram was established which has jurisdiction over Kollam also.

    5. The contention of the learned counsel for the revision-petitioner is, after the constitution of the Family Court with respect to matters mentioned in Explanation to S. 7(1) of the Act, only the Family Court will have jurisdiction and in such circumstance the District Court, Kollam has no jurisdiction to entertain the execution petition. Consequently the order rendered by the District Judge is without jurisdiction. But the learned counsel for the revision-petitioner would maintain that as per S. 18(3) of the Act a decree or order of a Family Court can be executed by ordinary civil Court also. The learned District Judge accepted the said position. Now to appreciate the said argument, it is necessary to advert to Ss. 7, 8 and 18 of the Act. So far as it is relevant S. 7 of the Act reads:

    “7. Jurisdiction— (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall —

    (a) have and exercise all the jurisdiction exercisable by any District Court or any subordinate Civil Court under any law for the time being in force in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature referred to in the Explanation; and

    (b) be deemed, for the purposes of exercising such jurisdiction under such law, to be a district court or, as the case may be, such subordinate civil court for the area to which the jurisdiction of the Family Court extends.

    Explanation — The suits and proceedings referred to in this sub-section are suits and proceedings of the following nature namely

    (a) to (f)…………………..

    (g) a suit or proceeding in relation to the guardianship of the person or the custody of, or access to any minor.

    ………………….”

    Section 8 of the Act reads:

    “8. Exclusion of jurisdiction and pending proceedings — Where a Family Court has been established for any area—

    (a) no district court or any subordinate civil court referred to in sub-section (1) of S. 7 shall, in relation to such area, have or exercise any jurisdiction in respect of any suit or proceeding of the nature referred to in the Explanation to that sub-section;

    (b) no magistrate shall, in relation to such area, have or exercise any jurisdiction or powers under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974);

    (c) every suit or proceeding of the nature referred to in the Explanation to sub-sec. (1) of S. 7 and every proceeding under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974):—

    (i) which is pending immediately before the establishment of such Family Court before any district court or subordinate court referred to in that sub-section or as the case may be, before any magistrate under the said Code; and

    (ii) which would have been required to be instituted or taken before or by such Family Court if, before the date on which such suit or proceeding was instituted or taken, this Act had come into force and such Family Court had been established.

    shall stand transferred to such Family Court on the date on which it is established.”

    Section 18 of the Act so far as it is relevant reads:—

    “18. Execution of the decree and orders—

    (1) and (2)……………………

    (3) A decree or order may be executed either by the Family Court which passed it or by the other Family Court or ordinary Civil Court to which it is sent for execution.”

    A reading of S. 8 of the Act along with S. 7 would show that the same completely ousts the jurisdiction of the District Court with respect to matters enumerated in the Explanation to S. 7; and the matter in question falls under clause (g) of the Explanation. The proceedings which were pending at the establishment of the Family Court also would stand transferred to the Family Court. Now, S. 18(3) of the Act of course states that a decree or order could be executed either by the Family Court which passed it or by the other Family Court or ordinary Civil Court to which it is sent for execution.

    6. A plain reading of S. 8 of the Act along with S. 7 would show that the intention of the legislation is, after the establishment of the Family Court with respect to matters enumerated in the Explanation to S. 7 of the Act, only the Family Court will have jurisdiction. In other words the said provision do not envisage concurrent jurisdiction for the Family Court and District Court. If sub-section (3) of S. 18 of the Act is assigned the meaning as is maintained by the respondent, it will bring about a situation where so far as the execution is concerned, the Family Court as well as the District Court will have concurrent jurisdiction which, as noticed, is inconsistent with the provisions contained in S. 8 read with S. 7 of the Act.

    7. Interpretation of a statutory provision is for discovering the intention of the legislature, and that has to be understood with due regard to the object of the legislation also. The words employed in a statute will acquire meaning and content depending on the context in which they are used. Words should not be torn out of the context and understood divorced from the context. An interpretation which would make another provision otiose or redundant should not be adopted.

    8. At page 45 of the Interpretation of Statutes by Maxwell, 12th Edition it is stated:

    “Where alternative constructions are equally open, that alternative is to be chosen which will be consistent with the smooth working of the system which the statute purports to be regulating; and that alternative is to be rejected which will introduce uncertainty, friction or confusion into the working of the system.”

    Therefore, S. 18(3) can convey only one meaning; the District Court can also execute the order passed by the Family Court provided no Family Court is established for that area. When such a meaning is assigned to sub-section (3) of S. 18 of the Act, there will be no inconsistency between S. 8 and S. 18 of the Act. The result is, since a Family Court has already been established for the area including Kollam also, clearly the District Court, Kollam has no jurisdiction to execute the order of the Family Court.

    9. When such is the finding, it is clear that the order under attack is without jurisdiction and has to be set aside as one passed without jurisdiction. Once, that is the finding, it is not necessary, in the circumstance, to go into the question whether the order passed by the Madras Court is a nullity. As indicated, the order under attack in this C.R.P is liable to be set aside and is hereby set aside.

    In the result the C.R.P is allowed as indicated above.

    Petition allowed.

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    Comments

    Marya Teresa Martin v. E. Martin
    (Feb 9, 1994)