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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
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Acts
  • provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
  • S. 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923,
  • SECTION 5 LIMITATION ACT
  • S. 29(2) of the Limitation Act 1963
  • sub-section (1) of S. 11,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
  • S. 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923,
  • SECTION 5 LIMITATION ACT
  • S. 29(2) of the Limitation Act 1963
  • sub-section (1) of S. 11,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

These are appeals filed under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 ("the Act") against orders of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation (Deputy Labour Commissioner), Kannur. The High Court observed that a large number of appeals were being filed against orders of this Commissioner and directed the office to post them together. On prima facie review the Court found that in most of these appeals the Commissioner had erred in fixing and awarding compensation. The Court issued a notice inviting the Commissioner to appear and to be represented at the final hearing. The Commissioner entered appearance through counsel. From the matters and representations, two general points for consideration were framed: (i) whether in respect of an injury not specified in Schedule I the Commissioner can fix the percentage of loss of earning capacity without an assessment by a qualified medical practitioner; and (ii) whether it is proper for the Commissioner to disburse compensation deposited before the expiry of the appeal period.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, for an injury not specified in Schedule I to the Act, the Commissioner may fix the percentage of loss of earning capacity without an assessment by a qualified medical practitioner (post-1984 amendment to S.4).
  2. Whether it is proper for the Commissioner to disburse the compensation amount deposited before the expiry of the appeal period (Section 30 appeals and related provisos).

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Agent, East Indian Railway v. Maurice Cecil Ryan, AIR 1937 Cal. 526 Distinction between loss of earning capacity and mere physical impairment; earning capacity must be proved by evidence. Used as authority that earning capacity differs from physical capacity and must be proved where injury is non-scheduled; loss is not presumed.
Commissioners for Port of Calcutta v. Prayag Ram, AIR 1967 Cal. 7 Principle that reduction in earning capacity must be established by evidence for non-scheduled injuries. Reiterated that, except for scheduled injuries (where loss is presumed), reduction in earning capacity is a factual question requiring proof.
U.I. Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sethu Madhavan, 1992 (2) KLT 702 Expert/medical opinion is necessary to evaluate nature of injury and its impact; medical certificate is the basic document for assessing loss of earning capacity. Court adopts the reasoning: assessment by qualified medical practitioner is primary, and Commissioner should adjudicate percentage after considering medical certificate and other evidence.
Sukhai v. Hukumchand Jute Mills Ltd., AIR 1957 Cal. 601 Decision dealing with S.4(c)(ii) before the 1984 amendment (historical precedent). Noted that pre-amendment decisions like this may not directly apply to cases arising under the amended provision which requires medical assessment by a qualified practitioner.
Kochu Velu v. Purakkattu Joseph, 1984 ACJ 630 (1984 KLT SN 129 p.79) Considered the meaning of "permanent disability" (pre-amendment context). Used to show that earlier cases addressing permanent disability did not consider the post-1984 mandatory medical assessment requirement.
Pratap Narain Singh v. Shrinivas, (1976) 1 SCC 289 : AIR 1976 SC 222 Held that amputation of left hand above elbow could amount to total disablement in context of a one-handed carpenter (interpretation of total disablement). Cited to explain that the case addressed total disablement and not the necessity of medical certificate assessment; therefore not directly dispositive of post-amendment questions.
M.S.N. Co. Ltd. v. Mohd. Kunju, AIR 1956 T.C. 55 Ordinarily a medical certificate should not be used without examining the medical officer who issued it unless parties agree to be bound by it. Relied upon for the proposition that medical certificates are ordinarily to be proved by calling the medical officer; the Court quoted and endorsed this approach.
Panchanan Ghose v. Bhaggu Bari, AIR 1950 Cal. 261 Observation that the Commissioner is not a medical man and may find it difficult to assess genuineness of alleged injuries by personal observation alone. Quoted to caution against relying on the Commissioner's personal observation in lieu of medical evidence.
Burhwal Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Ramjan, 1982 Lab. I.C. 84 Noted that Section 11(1) does not make a workman's medical certificate conclusively correct if the employer does not invoke the right to obtain examination; employer may challenge the certificate. Used to emphasize that medical certificates can be challenged and are not conclusively binding absent proper proof.
Bengal Coal Co. Ltd. Girimint v. Pujan Harijan, 1983 Lab. I.C. 1285 Doctors who give medical certificates must come and give evidence in support to make the certificate legally admissible; Commissioner should not base findings on personal observation. Adopted for the proposition that medical evidence should ordinarily be led by the doctor and that without medical evidence Commissioner is not in position to decide percentage of physical disability.
T. Venkata Reddy v. State of A.P., (1985) 3 SCC 198 : AIR 1985 SC 724 Principle that courts should not examine the motive, propriety or expediency of legislative action; legislative motive is beyond judicial scrutiny. Invoked to support the statement that the legislature's motive in amending Section 4( c )(ii) in 1984 is not for the courts to examine; the amendment must be accepted as law.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds from statutory text to evidentiary and procedural consequences, and then to the facts observed in the grouped appeals.

  1. Statutory change and its effect:

    The Court compared S.4(c)(ii) before and after the 1984 amendment. Prior to 1984, the provision permitted the Commissioner to award a percentage of the compensation in non-scheduled injuries proportionate to the loss of earning capacity, without an express statutory requirement that such loss be "as assessed by the qualified medical practitioner." The 1984 amendment added the words "as assessed by the qualified medical practitioner." From this textual change the Court concluded that after the amendment it is essential that loss of earning capacity be assessed by a qualified medical practitioner.

  2. Nature of loss of earning capacity:

    The Court explained that loss of earning capacity is distinct from mere physical impairment. Earning capacity is the capacity to earn money; physical injury does not automatically translate into reduced earning power. For non-scheduled injuries the reduction in earning capacity must be proved by evidence showing inability to earn as before as a result of the injury. For scheduled injuries the loss is presumed. The Court relied on prior authorities for this distinction.

  3. Need for medical evidence and proof of certificates:

    The Court emphasized that, as a general rule, the medical assessment by a qualified medical practitioner is the primary basis for determining loss of earning capacity in non-scheduled injuries. Medical certificates are not self-proving simply by production; they must be proved in accordance with the Evidence Act. Ordinarily the doctor who issues the certificate should be examined so that the certificate is proved in evidence, unless parties agree otherwise or special reasons justify dispensing with the doctor's examination.

  4. Role and limits of the Commissioner:

    The Commissioner may personally examine the workman under Section 19 of the Act and may form a view, but this power must be exercised with circumspection. After the 1984 amendment the authority to assess loss of earning capacity is vested primarily in the qualified medical practitioner; the Commissioner cannot normally decide loss of earning capacity in non-scheduled injuries without a medical certificate assessing that loss, except in special circumstances. Even then, the probative value of any medical certificate must be weighed against other evidence before the Commissioner.

  5. Evidence Act and procedure:

    The Act does not exclude the Evidence Act; Section 25 of the Act requires the Commissioner to record brief memoranda of evidence, but that does not mean Commissioners can abandon evidentiary principles. The Court warned against allowing Commissioners to adopt ad hoc procedures and stated that medical certificates must be proved by one of the modes allowed under the Evidence Act.

  6. Appeal period and disbursal of compensation:

    Section 30 appeals must be filed within 60 days (with Section 5 of the Limitation Act applying). The 3rd proviso to Section 30 requires an employer-appellant to deposit the amount payable under the order with the Commissioner before entertaining the appeal. If the Commissioner disburses the compensation to the workman within the 60-day appeal period, the appeal may become infructuous (since recovery from the workman is difficult and the Act provides no provision to recover amounts paid to workmen). Therefore the Court held that disbursal should normally occur only after the 60-day period has expired. An exception exists where the Commissioner, after notice to the employer and hearing objections, orders disbursal (whole or part) on petition of the workman, or in other special cases; and where the employer has notified the Commissioner of an appeal or intention to appeal, disbursal should be after hearing the employer.

  7. Application to the grouped appeals and findings of misconduct/error:

    On review of the grouped appeals the Court found repeated errors: awards that were exorbitant (sometimes exceeding the claim) without supporting evidence; reliance on the Commissioner's personal satisfaction or observation contrary to medical records; large disparities between the Commissioner's assessed percentages and Medical Board findings (examples: Medical Board assessed 5% vs Commissioner 50%; Medical Board found no disability vs Commissioner 75%); disbursal before expiry of appeal period despite appellants' intention to file appeals; and refusal to send claimants for medical examination where requested. The Court concluded these errors warranted setting aside the awards and brought the matters to the attention of the Government for remedial action.

  8. Directions:

    Because the Court was setting aside the awards it directed all claimants who had withdrawn compensation amounts to re-deposit those amounts with the Commissioner within one month of the judgment; if not re-deposited, the Commissioner should take steps to recover the amounts. The Registrar was directed to forward a copy of the judgment to the Chief Secretary, State of Kerala, for appropriate action.

Holding and Implications

Core Rulings:

  • Primary assessment of loss of earning capacity in non-scheduled injuries must be by a qualified medical practitioner. The 1984 amendment to S.4(c)(ii) inserted the phrase "as assessed by the qualified medical practitioner," and the Court held that this makes such assessment essential in normal cases.
  • Medical certificates must be proved in evidence, ordinarily by examining the doctor who issued them. The Commissioner should insist on proved medical evidence and may not normally decide loss of earning capacity without such a certificate, except for special reasons recorded in the proceedings.
  • The Commissioner may examine the workman personally but must exercise that power with circumspection; such personal observation cannot substitute for proper medical proof.
  • Compensation disbursal before expiry of the 60-day appeal period is ordinarily improper. Disbursal should be delayed until after the period for appeal, unless the Commissioner, after notice and hearing, orders payment on petition by the workman or other special circumstances exist. If the employer has notified the Commissioner of an appeal or intention to appeal, the Commissioner should hear the employer before disbursing.
  • The awards passed by the Commissioner in the grouped cases under consideration were set aside.

Implications for the parties and administration:

  • Direct effect on parties in the grouped matters: the Court set aside the awards. Claimants who have already withdrawn compensation must re-deposit the amounts within one month; if they fail to do so the Commissioner is to take steps to recover the amounts.
  • Administrative consequence: the Court directed that a copy of the judgment be sent to the Chief Secretary, State of Kerala, for appropriate remedial action to prevent recurrence of the errors and omissions identified.
  • Legal precedent/clarification: the decision clarifies that after the 1984 amendment a qualified medical practitioner's assessment is the primary basis for determining loss of earning capacity in non-scheduled injuries and that medical evidence must be properly proved. The Court reiterated limits on Commissioner's reliance on personal observation and stressed adherence to evidentiary norms.

The Court did not purport to strike down the legislative amendment or to question the legislature's motive in enacting it; it accepted the amendment as binding law and adjusted the evidentiary and procedural expectations for Commissioners accordingly.

    Achoor Estate v. Nabeesa

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    John Mathew, J.:— These are appeals filed under S. 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, for short ‘life Act’, against orders of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation (Deputy Labour Commissioner), Kannur, in different cases. When we noticed that a large number of appeals were being filed agianst the orders of this Commissioner, we directed the office to post them together. On a perusal of the records we prima facie found that in most of these appeals learned Commissioner has erred in fixing and awarding compensation. Accordingly we passed the following order on M.F.A No. 649 of 1993 on 13-7-1993:

    “Notice. Give notice to A.G also. Issue notice to Shri. G. Sasidharan Nair, Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation (Deputy Labour Commissioner) Kannur, informing him that he may appear, if he thinks it necessary, at the final hearing of this case and the following similar cases, since prima facie we are of the view that in these cases some strictures against the officer are likely to be made:

    1) M.F.A 607/93 — W.C.C 124/91

    xxxxxxxxx

    xxxxxxxxx.”

    2. On receipt of this order the learned Commissioner entered appearance through Advocate Mr. M. Ramachandran, who ably represented his case. In the nature of the contentions raised by learned counsel appearing for the parties the following general points arise for consideration:

    i) Whether in the case of an injury not specified in Schedule I to the Act can the Commissioner fix the percentage of loss of earning capacity without an assessment by a qualified medical practitioner?

    ii) Is it proper on the part of the Commissioner to disburse the compensation amount deposited before the expiry of the appeal period?

    Point No. (i)

    3. Prior to 1984 Amendment S. 4 of the Act was as follows:

    “4. Amount of compensation:— (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the amount of compensation shall be as follows, namely:

    (a)…………….

    (b) …………….

    (c) Where permanent partial disablement results from the injury—

    (i) ………………

    (ii) In the case of an injury not specified in Schedule I, such percentage of the compensation payable in the case of permanent total disablement as is proportionate to the loss of earning Capacity permanently caused by the injury.”

    (Explanation and remaining Section are omitted).

    4. Subsequent to the amendment by Act 22 of 1984 the present provision is as follows:

    “4. Amount of compensation.— (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the amount of compensation shall be as follows, namely:—

    (a)…………….

    (b)…………….

    (c) Where permanent partial disablement results from the injury:

    (i)……………

    (ii) In the case of an injury not specified in Schedule I, such percentage of the compensation payable in the case of permanent total disablement as is proportionate to the loss of earning capacity (as assessed by the qualified medical practitioner) permanently caused by the injury;

    xxxxxxxxx

    xxxxxxxxx”

    From a reading of these two provisions it is clear that after the amendment it is essential that the loss of earning capacity is to be assessed by the qualified medical practitioner.

    5. How to estimate the loss of earning capacity was considered by various courts. Loss of earning capacity is different from loss of physical capacity. Earning capacity is capacity to earn money. (See Agent, East Indian Railway v. Maurice Cecil Ryan, AIR 1937 Cal. 526, and Commissioners for Port of Calcutta v. Prayag Ram, AIR 1967 Cal. 7). In some cases any physical defect which may occur as a result of the accident may not reduce the worker's earning capacity or capacity to do work. Incapacity for work is not to be ascertained merely by examining whether the workman is suffering from physical injury. It is to be ascertained by reference to his incapacity to earn wages. If his wage earning capacity is diminished he can be said to be suffering from partial incapacity for work. However, if his wage earning capacity has not been affected, notwithstanding the fact that he may be having some physical injury, he is not entitled to compensation. Therefore the loss of earning capacity is a question which has to be proved by evidence of physical injury resulting in loss of earning capacity. Only in the case of a scheduled injury the loss of earning capacity is presumed. Where the injury is not included in the schedule, the reduction in earning capacity will have to be proved as any other question of fact. It must be proved by evidence which will establish that the workman was unable to earn as much as he did before, as a result of the injury.

    6. This Court in U.I Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sethu Madhavan, 1992 (2) KLT 702. held as follows:

    “10. A certificate prescribing (sic) the nature of the injury and its impact on the organ of the human body involved technical and special knowledge with regard to the same and therefore, expert opinion as regards that aspect becomes necessary. The nature of the injury, the part where it is inflicted and the effect it produces require expertise and therefore opinion of expert in that regard becomes relevant and necessary. The evaluation of the nature of injury is objective. Then its effect on the functioning of organ is also a matter for the expert………. As the percentage of loss of earning power depends upon the disablement and other factors, the same is a question of fact depending upon the nature of work, the age of the workman etc.”

    7. We may observe that the most of the decisions referred to by learned counsel for the respondents and learned counsel who represented the Commissioner were dealing with S. 4(c)(ii) of the Act before its amendment in 1984. As observed above before the amendment the words ‘as assessed by the qualified medical practitioner’ were not present. Those words were added only by Act 22 of 1984. So much so the decisions in Sukhai v. Hukumchand Jute Mills Ltd., AIR 1957 Cal. 601, Commissioners for Port of Calcutta v. Prayag Ram, AIR 1967 Cal. 7, Kochu Velu v. Purakkattu Joseph, 1984 ACJ 630 and Pratap Narain Singh v. Shrinivas, (1976) 1 SCC 289 : AIR 1976 SC 222, may not directly apply to a case arising under the amended provision. In (1976) 1 SCC 289 : AIR 1976 SC 222 the Supreme Court held that amputation of left hand above elbow will amount to total disablement because the carpenter did not work with one hand. The argument in that case centred round the meaning of the words of total disablement. The importance of the medical certificate or the assessment of loss of earning capacity by a qualified medical practitioner was not in issue in that case. In Kochu Velu v. Purakkattu Joseph, 1984 ACJ 630 : 1984 KLT SN 129 p. 79, this court only considered the meaning of ‘permanent disability’. The necessity for assessment of loss of earning capacity by a qualified medical practitioner was not an issue in that case. In U.I Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sethu Madhavan, 1992 (2) KLT 702, this Court held that in deciding the loss of earning capacity the basic document was the certificate by the qualified medical practitioner (see para. 14). Further this Court cautioned that it was for the Commissioner to adjudicate the percentage of loss of earning capacity after taking into consideration the medical certificate as well as other evidence.

    8. Whether the Medical Officer should be examined? The Travancore-Cochin High Court in M.S.N Co. Ltd. v. Mohd. Kunju, AIR 1956 T.C 55, held that normally a medical certificate shall not be used without examining the medical officer who issued the certificate unless the parties agreed to be bound by the certificate. The Court also quoted with approval the following observation of Harries C.J in Panchanan Ghose v. Bhaggu Bari, AIR 1950 Cal. 261:

    “The Commissioner also noted that he had seen the workman. The Commissioner is not medical man and in this class of litigation malingering and false claims are notorious and I am sure that the Commissioner would find it very difficult to say whether an alleged injury to a joint was real or not”.

    9. The Allahabad High Court in Burhwal Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Ramjan, 1982 Lab. I.C 84, noticed that S. 11(1) of the Act does not prescribe that if a medical certificate has been produced by the workman and the employer does not avail of the right confered under sub-section (1) of S. 11, the medical certificate submitted by the employee will be deemed to be correct. The employer is entitled to challenge the medical certificate produced by the workman. The Calcutta High Court in Bengal Coal Co. Ltd. Girimint v. Pujan Harijan, 1983 Lab. I.C 1285, held that in order to make the medical crrtificate legally admisible, the Doctors giving the same must come and give evidence in support of the certificates. The Court also held as follows:

    “16……But in the case of Panchanan Ghose v. Bhaggu Bari, AIR 1950 Cal. 261 it is observed that it is not proper for the Commissioner to base his findings upon his own observation of the injured person. Further, in the absence of medical evidence the Commissioner is not in a position to decide the percentage of the physical disability of the injured workman”.

    10. The Act nowhere excludes the operation of the Evidecne Act in claims to be decided under the Act. Under S. 25 of the Act the Commissioner is to make a brief memorandum of the substance of the evidence of every witness as the examination of the witness proceed. This only shows that there is some difference between the normal procedure of examination of witness contemplated by the Evidence Act. But it is highly risky to leave to the individual Commissioners to adopt procedures to their liking. It is much safer to adopt the provisions of the Evidence Act. Even if the Evidence Act as such is not made applicable the general principles of the Act would apply to the proceedings before the Commissioner. Medical certificate is not a document which can be admitted in evidence without proof under any of the provisions of the Evidence Act or under any of the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Therefore the certificate will have to be proved in one of the modes allowed by the Evidence Act.

    11. Whether the Commissioner can personally examine the disabled workman to decide the percentage of loss of earning capacity is a question which has considerable importance in workmen's compensation claims. The Commissioner is entitled to examine the workman in a particular case ora particular injury if he feels it is necessary for the purpose of settling the amount as he is enjoined to do under S. 19 of the Act. However, this power should be exercised with circumspection. The Commissioner should always keep in mind that after the 1984 amendment the power to assess the loss of earning capacity in the case of non-scheduled injury is vested in the qualified medical practitioner. We have to accept the position that in spile of numerous decisions of different courts to the effect that in case of non-scheduled injuries the Commissioner is the authority to adjudicate and determine the percentage of losso fearning capacity the legislature thought it necessary to amend S. 4(c)(ii) of the Act in order to vest in the qualified medical practitioner the power to assess the loss of earning capacity in the case of non-scheduled injuries. The motive of the legislature in making the 1984 amendment is beyond the scrutiny of courts. Norcan the courts examine whether the legislature had applied its mind to the provisions of a statute before passing it. The propriety, expediency and necessity of a legislative act are not for the determination of the courts. (Sec T. Venkata Reddy v. State of A.P, (1985) 3 SCC 198 : AIR 1985 SC 724). No doubt while assesing the percentage of loss of earning capacity the authority should have adequate knowledge of various other factors, like the nature of the work, chances of re-employment, number of years of service of the workman etc. The assessment made by the qualified medical practitioner can only relate to the physical disability of the workman. Although that is an important factor in assessing the loss of earning capacity of a workman there may not be any doubt that this is not the only factor. Therefore we cannot hold that after the 1984 amendment the Commissioner has no power at all to determine the loss of earning capacity of an injured workman. However proved medical evidence has to be insisted upon by the Commissioner which is the primary basis on which the loss can be assessed.

    12. Therefore we hold that primarily the los of earning capacity is to be assessed by the qualified medical practitioner. Normally he should be examined to prove the certificates. However in case there are special reasons the Commissioner may accept other evidence to prove the medical certificate. Normally the Commissioner shall not decide the loss of earning capacity without a medical certificate of a qualified medical practitioner assessing the loss of earning capacity except in cases where there arespecial reasons to dispense with medical certificate. However it goes without saying that the probative value of the medical certificate has to be adjudged by the Comimissioner taking into consideration the other evidence in the proceedings. We respectfully adopt the reasoning of this Court in U.I Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Selhu Madhavan, 1992 (2) KLT 702.

    13. Point No. (ii): Section 30 of the Act confers on an aggrieved party the right to challenge the order of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner before the High Court. The period of limitation for such appeal is 60 days. Section 5 of the Limitation Act is made applicable to the appeals under S. 30 of the Act. Under the 3rd proviso to S. 30 of the Act no appeal by an employer shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against. Thus it is mandatory that the employer should deposit the compensation amount before the appeal can be entertained. In case within the appeal period of 60 days the Commisioner disburses the compensation to the workman the appeal itself may become infructuous since in most of the cases it may not be possible to get back the amount withdrawn by the workman. There is no provision in the Act empowering recovery of the amount paid to the workman. S. 31 of the Act only provides for recovery of any amount payable by the employer. Therefore the disbursal of the compensation amount should be done only alter the expiry of the period of 60 days. Under S. 29(2) of the Limitation Act 1963 the appellant is entitled to the exclusion of lime for obtaining a certified copy of the award. In these cases the Commissioner forwarded the copies of the award to the parlies. Thus the affected parlies will gel sixty days from the date of receipt of such copy to file appeal. In special cases the Commissioner may order disbursal of the whole or part of the compensation amount by order on a petition to be filed by the workman after giving notice to the employer and hearing the employer's objections. Even after the period of 60 days if the employer has informed the Commissioner about the filing of an appeal or the intention to file an appeal the compensation amount may be disbursed only after hearing the employer also.

    14. Now we will deal with individual appeals:

    (Paragraphs 12 to 38 omitted)

    15. On a review of these various cases we have to observe that the learned Commissioner has awarded exhorbitant amounts as compensation, often more than the claim amount, without supporting evidence. We cannot accept the contention of the learned counsel appearing for him that these awards were passed on a misunderstanding of the reported decisions. In most of these cases the Commissioner has observed that the assessment was made on the basis of personal satisfaction of the Commissioner. M.F.A No. 580 of 1993 is an example to show that the personal satisfaction of the Commissioner can be mistaken. In that case the Commissioner observed that the petitioner came to the court with the help of crutches. But the discharge summary specifically mentioned that he was walking without crutches. So also in two of these cases when the petitioners were examined by Medical Board as per the order of this Court, we found that there was no justification for assessing the percentage of disability at the high figure estimated by the Commissioner. In M.F.A No. 608 of 1993 the Medical Board assessed the disability as 5% where as the Commissioner fixed his disability at 50%. In M.F.A No. 750 of 1993 the Medical Board assessed that there is no disability as against 75% disability fixed by the commissioner. We also find that in some of these cases learned Commissioner disbursed the compensation amount before the expiry of the appeal period and that also in spite of the filing of petitions not to disburse the amount since the appellants are intending to file appeal. In some case there was a request to send the claimant for medical examination, the Commissioner refused to send him for medical examination. We bring all these aspects to the notice of the Government in order to take appropriate remedial actions so that these errors or omissions may not happen in future. Since we are setting aside the awards passed by the Commissioner all the claimants who have withdrawn the compensation amount should re-deposit the amount with the Commissioner within one month from the date of this judgment. In case they are not depositing the amount the Commissioner should take steps to recover the amount from the claimants.

    Registrar will forward a copy of this judgment to the Chief Secretary, State of Kerala, for appropriate action.

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    Comments

    Achoor Estate v. Nabeesa
    (Feb 22, 1994)