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  • provisions contained in S. 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
  • rule 9(a)(i) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules
  • provisions of S. 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
  • S. 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
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citation codes
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  • provisions contained in S. 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
  • rule 9(a)(i) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules
  • provisions of S. 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.
  • S. 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This writ appeal challenges the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Original Petition No. 8700 of 1991-I, dated 15 October 1991, which dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellants (the writ-petitioners). The first writ-petitioner was appointed as a mazdoor and the second writ-petitioner as a meter reader by the Kerala State Electricity Board by orders dated 30 January 1991. Both appointments were temporary for 179 days (or until the Public Service Commission provided candidates or until the Board terminated the service). The first petitioner joined duty on 8 February 1991 and the second on 7 February 1991. Their terms expired on 5 August 1991 and 4 August 1991 respectively.

The petitioners contended that the Public Service Commission had not advised any regular candidates for their posts and had not conducted necessary tests; they alleged discriminatory treatment because certain temporary employees (specifically 172 linemen) were allowed to continue in service beyond their appointment period. The 172 linemen are said to have the benefit of a Supreme Court order in Writ Petition No. 514 of 1988 (remitted to this Court), and were described as being permitted to continue in service periodically. The petitioners sought similar treatment and invoked, inter alia, the benefit of S.25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

The learned Single Judge directed respondents to file a statement about the 172 linemen. The respondent filed a statement explaining that those linemen were allowed to continue under provisions of S.25-H and that some continued under stay orders. The Single Judge referred to several decisions (both of the Supreme Court and of this Court) concerning the legal position of provisional employees and ultimately dismissed the writ petition. This appeal challenges that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioners, who were appointed temporarily for 179 days (with an express condition of termination and no right to regularisation), are entitled as of right to continue in service beyond the period of appointment.
  2. Whether the petitioners are entitled to benefit under S.25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act (i.e., can they be treated as retrenched workmen eligible for re-employment under S.25-H).
  3. Whether the Board's treatment of other provisional employees (notably the 172 linemen) amounts to unlawful discrimination requiring equal relief for the petitioners.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The petitioners argued that regular candidates had not been appointed by the Public Service Commission and relevant tests had not been conducted, so there was no reason to terminate their temporary appointments.
  • They asserted discrimination: certain provisional employees (172 linemen) had been permitted to continue in service beyond their appointment period, while mazdoors and meter readers (including the petitioners) were threatened with termination.
  • The petitioners contended they were entitled to the benefit of S.25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act and that such benefit had been extended to the 172 linemen, therefore similar relief should be granted to them.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents explained that the 172 linemen were being allowed to continue in view of S.25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act and that some continued in service due to stay orders from courts (including an order in Writ Petition No. 514 of 1988 remitted to this Court).
  • The respondents relied on decisions (including Supreme Court decisions in certain writ petitions) that provisional employees appointed under rule 9(a)(i) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules have no right to continue in service beyond the period of their appointment.
  • The respondents asserted that the petitioners were not retrenched workmen within the meaning of S.25-H because their appointments expressly provided that employment would terminate on expiry and would not confer any right to regularisation; hence S.25-H did not apply to them.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Writ Petition No. 514 of 1988 (Supreme Court order remitted to this Court) Explains why the 172 linemen were being allowed to continue in service (they had the benefit of this Supreme Court order and related protection). The court noted that the 172 linemen had the benefit of that Supreme Court order (remitted to this Court) and that the petitioners did not have any similar Supreme Court protection; this distinction weighed against extending the same relief to the petitioners.
Writ Petitions Nos. 618, 1075 of 1990 and 70 and 229 of 1991 (Supreme Court decisions, as cited) Provisional employees appointed under rule 9(a)(i) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules have no right to continue in service beyond the period of their appointment. The respondents relied on these Supreme Court decisions to support the position that provisional appointees (like the petitioners) cannot claim a right to continue beyond the fixed period; the Single Judge relied on that principle in dismissing the petition.
Original Petition No. 7179 of 1985 and Original Petition No. 2789 of 1986 (High Court orders, unreported) These orders granted provisional appointees the benefit of S.25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act in those specific cases. The court observed these decisions but treated them as confined to their specific facts and not as overruling the broader Division Bench precedents that preclude mandamus for continuation beyond appointment periods.
Sasidharan v. Kerala State Electricity Board [1991 — I L.L.N 1032] Held that provisional hands selected and appointed for 179 days have no right to continue in service or to get employment regularised; also contained an observation that if employer permitted continuation beyond 180 days, such continuation could be presumed until regular appointments were made. The Single Judge relied on this decision to support the conclusion that provisional employees had no right to continue. The present Court noted Sasidharan's additional observation about presumed continuation but found that observation inconsistent with Division Bench decisions.
Sini P. Kuriakose v. State Of Kerala [1987 (2) K.L.T 425] (Division Bench) When appointments are made under statute for a definite period, an appointee is not entitled to continue in service beyond that period; provisional employees have no statutory right to continue in service against statutory rules. The Court treated this Division Bench authority as establishing that no mandamus can be issued for continuance of temporary employees appointed under rule 9(a)(i) after expiry of their appointment; it formed a key basis for dismissing the appellants' claim.
Narayani v. State of Kerala [1984 — I L.L.N 70] (Supreme Court) The Supreme Court clarified that an order passed in that case would not confer any right on petitioners (or others similarly situated) to continue in service or be selected other than in accordance with relevant rules; also clarified such order was not to be treated as a stay of appointments made by Public Service Commission. The Division Bench authorities and the present Court referred to these observations to show that any relief given in earlier cases did not create a general right to continue in service; the Court used Narayani to emphasize statutory limits on continuance of provisional appointees.
S. Parimalom v. State Of Kerala [1985 K.L.T 624] (Division Bench) Considered the Supreme Court decision in Narayani and related circular; interpreted the scope of directions in Narayani and cautioned against construing Narayani as permitting perpetual violation of rule 9(a)(i). The Court cited this authority as part of a line of Division Bench decisions affirming that provisional appointees cannot be permitted to continue indefinitely in violation of rule 9(a)(i).
Sasankan v. State of Kerala [1987 (2) K.L.T 347] Referred to in the context of Supreme Court observations that did not contradict the Division Bench view limiting continuance of provisional appointees. The Court noted that the Supreme Court in Sasankan did not say anything contrary to the Division Bench decisions that restrict continuation of provisional employees beyond the prescribed period.
Remlath case [1984 K.L.T 312] (Division Bench) Division Bench decision to the effect that provisional appointees cannot remain in service against statutory rules beyond the permitted period. Included among the Division Bench precedents relied upon to hold that no mandamus can be issued to continue provisional employees beyond the expiry of the appointment term.
Jacob M. Puthuparambil v. Kerala Water Authority [1990 — II L.L.N 1032] Cited in the Sasidharan decision that the Single Judge considered; referenced in relation to the legal position of provisional appointees. The present Court noted that Sasidharan had referred to Jacob M. Puthuparambil among other authorities when concluding that Division Bench views remain good law; the present Court relied on the line of Division Bench authorities rather than Sasidharan's divergent observation.
H.C. Puttaswamy v. Hon'ble Chief Justice of Karnataka High Court [1991 — I L.L.N 352] Cited in Sasidharan and referenced in relation to principles considered by that Single Judge. The present Court recorded that Sasidharan had taken this decision into account, but nevertheless held that the Division Bench authorities continued to represent good law regarding provisional appointments.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a sequence tied closely to the factual matrix and the authorities cited:

  1. The Court began with the uncontested factual position: the petitioners' appointments were temporary for 179 days with an explicit condition that employment would terminate and would not confer any right to regularisation. The precise dates of joining and expiry of the appointments were recorded.
  2. The petitioners' grievance — delayed Public Service Commission selections, continued service of other provisional employees (172 linemen), and claimed entitlement to S.25-H — was acknowledged and placed against the respondents' explanation about the linemen.
  3. The Single Judge had sought and received a statement from the respondents explaining that the 172 linemen were allowed to continue under S.25-H and on account of stay orders; the Court accepted that those linemen had special protection (including the benefit of the remitted Supreme Court order).
  4. The Court then turned to the legal meaning and applicability of S.25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Court noted that S.25-H provides a re-employment remedy to retrenched workmen "if certain conditions are satisfied." The Court examined the definition of "retrenchment" in S.2(oo) and recorded that sub-clause (bb) excludes termination due to non-renewal of a contract on its expiry. Because the petitioners' appointment orders expressly provided that employment would terminate on expiry and would not confer a right to regularisation, they did not qualify as "retrenchment" under the statutory definition and therefore could not claim S.25-H as of right.
  5. The Court reviewed authorities of this Court (Division Bench decisions in Remlath, S. Parimalom and Sini P. Kuriakose) and relevant Supreme Court observations (including Narayani). Those Division Bench decisions were held to consistently establish that provisional employees appointed under rule 9(a)(i) cannot claim a right to continue in service beyond the period of appointment and that mandamus for continuance contrary to statutory rules cannot be issued.
  6. The Court considered the petitioners' reliance on certain unreported High Court orders (Original Petition Nos. 7179/1985 and 2789/1986) and other single-judge decisions (Sasidharan). It treated the unreported orders as fact-specific and confined in their operation and observed that Sasidharan's remark that continuation beyond 180 days could be presumed until regular appointments are made was inconsistent with the Division Bench precedents already identified.
  7. Given the lack of any Supreme Court order protecting the petitioners (unlike the 172 linemen) and the statutory exclusion of non-renewal-at-expiry from "retrenchment," the Court concluded that the petitioners had not established a right either to continuation of service or to relief under S.25-H.
  8. On that basis — applying statutory definitions and following the cited Division Bench authorities — the Court dismissed the writ appeal.

Holding and Implications

Final Holding: The writ appeal is dismissed. The Court affirmed that the petitioners, who were temporarily appointed for a specified period with explicit termination clauses, have no right to continue in service beyond the period of their appointment and cannot as of right claim the benefit of S.25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act on the facts presented.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the petitioners' claim for continuation of service and for relief under S.25-H fails; no mandamus for continuance was issued in their favour.
  • The Court emphasised adherence to statutory provisions and the line of Division Bench authorities (Remlath, S. Parimalom, Sini P. Kuriakose) which the Court regarded as continuing to represent good law on the question of provisional appointments under rule 9(a)(i).
  • The opinion notes that some other provisional employees (the 172 linemen) were permitted to continue because of distinct circumstances (including a Supreme Court order remitted to this Court and stay orders), but the petitioners did not have such protection; the Court therefore declined to extend the same benefit to the petitioners.
  • The Court did not set out any broader novel precedent extending S.25-H to persons whose appointments expressly terminate on expiry; it confined its decision to the statutory definition of "retrenchment" and to the authorities cited.

This summary is strictly confined to the information and reasoning contained in the provided judicial opinion.

    Rajan v. Kerala State Electricity Board

    1. This writ appeal is preferred against the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Original Petition No. 8700 of 1991-I, dated 15 October, 1991, dismissing the writ petition. The writ-petitioners are the appellants.

    2. The first writ-petitioner was appointed as mazdoor in the Kerala State Electricity Board as per an order passed by the second respondent on 30 January, 1991. A true copy of the said order is marked as exhibit P1. As per exhibit P1, the appointment of the first petitioner was on a temporary basis for a period of 179 days or till the Public Service Commission hands report for duty or as and when the Board deems it necessary to terminate the service of the first petitioner. The second petitioner was appointed as meter reader as per another order of the second respondent passed on 30 January, 1991. The terms of appointment are identical. Both the petitioners were appointed in accordance with the recommendation of the Employment Exchange. The first petitioner joined duty on 8 February, 1991 in the Electrical Section at Mukkarn, while the second petitioner joined duty on 7 February, 1991 in the Electrical Section, Kuttiady. The term of appointment of the first petitioner expired on 5 August, 1991, and that of the second petitioner on 4 August, 1991. The petitioners contended that the Public Service Commission has not so far advised for appointment any regular candidates in the post held by the petitioners. According to them, even the necessary test to be conducted by the Public Service Commission has not yet been conducted. The grievance of the petitioners is that in certain posts in the Board several temporary employees have been allowed to continue in service without any break. For example, in the post of linemen 172 persons were continuing in service, even after the expiry of their term of appointment. It is stated that the said 172 persons approached the Supreme Court by filing Writ Petition No. 514 of 1988. It is stated that the said petition has been remitted to this Court for disposal, and that the petitioners therein are continuing in service since February 1989. It is also stated that the Board is permitting the said persons to continue in service from lime to time. According to the petitioners, the Board is discriminating in its attitude towards linemen who have been appointed on a provisional basis, and in not extending them same benefit to mazdoors and meter readers. It is stated that the Board is taking emergent steps to terminate the service of the petitioners along with 97 others, who are similarly situated. The other 97 persons have been appointed either as mazdoors or meter readers in the Kozhi-kode District. The services of these mazdoors and meter readers are now threatened to be terminated, while the Board is retaining the 172 linemen. It is also stated on grounds E and F that the petitioners are entitled to the benefit of the Industrial Disputes Act, and in particular S. 25-H.

    3. The learned Single Judge directed the respondents to file a statement in regard to 172 linemen who were allowed to continue in service since February 1989. It is stated that the first respondent had filed a statement, dated 27 September, 1991, explaining the circumstances under which the said 172 persons had been allowed to continue by granting them the benefit of the provisions contained in S. 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act. It was also stated that those persons continued in service for a long period under orders of stay obtained from Court. The respondents also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 618, 1075 of 1990 and 70 and 229 of 1991, wherein it has been held that the provisional employees appointed under rule 9(a)(i) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules have no right to continue in service beyond the period of their appointment. The learned Single Judge also referred to the decisions relied on by the petitioners in Original Petition No. 7179 of 1985 and Original Petition No. 2789 of 1986, granting provisional appointees the benefit of the provisions of S. 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act. After referring to the submissions of the writ-petitioners' counsel, as stated above, the learned Single Judge observed as follows:

    “A reading of the above decisions would show that the finding entered therein were not on the basis of adjudication of the claims on the contentions put forward by both the parties in the case. The decisions were rendered on agreed basis.”

    4. Referring to another decision of this Court in Sasidharan v. Kerala State Electricity Board, [1991 — I L.L.N 1032] relied upon by the writ-petitioners, the learned Single Judge stated that even in that case it was held that provisional hands selected and appointed for a period of 179 days have no right to continue in service, or to get their employment regularised. On the above said basis the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition.

    5. In this appeal, learned counsel for the appellants-petitioners raised the contention that the benefit of S. 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act has been extended to the 172 linemen as per the statement filed by the first respondent. Learned counsel submits that similar benefit should be extended to the writ-petitioners.

    6. It may be noticed that the said 172 linemen have, from what is stated in the writ petition, the benefit of the Supreme Court order in Writ Petition No. 514 of 1988, which is said to have been remitted to this Court. Obviously, the petitioners before us do not have any order of the Supreme Court similarly protecting their rights. It was in respect of the linemen, who have the benefit of the order of the Supreme Court, that the Board has stated in the statement filed before the learned Single Judge that those linemen are being allowed to continue in view of the provisions of S. 25-H. Whatever might be the benefit extended to the said employees under S. 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, in so far as the petitioners before us are concerned, they have not established any right under S. 25-H. Under the said provision, the workmen who have been retrenched, can be re-employed, if certain conditions are satisfied. Basically, therefore, they must be retrenched workmen. In this context, the definition of “retrenchment” in S. 2(oo) is relevant. Under Sub-cl. (bb) thereof “retrenchment” does not include termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein. Admittedly, the orders of appointment of the petitioners contain a condition that the employment will be terminated, and will not confer any right for regularisation. There fore, the writ-petitioners cannot, as of right, claim any benefit of S. 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

    7. It has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in Sini P. Kuriakose v. State Of Kerala, [1987 (2) K.L.T 425]:

    “When appointments are made under statutory provisions for a definite period it is not possible to spell out any law to the effect that contrary to the said statute the appointee is entitled to continue in service beyond the period for which he was appointed in accordance with the statute. The power of this Court is to keep within bounds of law and not to issue directions contrary to law. Therefore, the provisional employees have 110 statutory right to continue in service, and they cannot be allowed to remain in service against the statutory rules.”

    While passing the abovesaid orders, their Lordships noticed the observations of the Supreme Court in Narayani v. State of Kerala, [1984 — I L.L.N 70], and took note of the important observations of the Supreme Court towards the end of the judgment which read as follows in Para 7, at Page 71:

    “We would like to make it clear that the order which we are passing today will not confer any right on the petitioners and the others who are similarly situated to, continue in service, or of being selected by the Public Service Commission otherwise than in accordance with the relevant rules and regulations. We must also clarify that this order will not be construed as or operate as a stay of the appointment of candidates who have already been selected or who may hereafter be selected by the Public Service Commission.”

    Their Lordships in Kuriakose case (vide supra), referred to another decision of a Division Bench of this Court in S. Parimalom v. State Of Kerala, [1985 K.L.T 624], which had also considered the decision of the Supreme Court in Narayani case (vide supra), and the circular issued thereafter. In that decision, the Division Bench pointed out, after referring to the Supreme Court decision in Narayani case (vide supra), as follows:

    “The directions in Para 6 of judgment has to be appreciated and understood in the context and the circumstances in which it happened to be given, bearing particularly in mind, the restrictions carefully imposed by the learned Judges themselves in regard to the scope and ambit of the directions in the previous paragraphs. It would be totally untrue to the spirit of the directions contained in the judgment if we to are to construe that the Supreme Court permitted a perpetual violation of rule 9 (a)(i). with particular reference to the second proviso thereto, which prohibited the continuation of the persons so appointed in service for a period exceeding 180 days. In our view, the circular, dated 3 May, 1984, issued by the Government reflects correctly the opinion of the Supreme Court in the decision in 1984 — I L.L.N 70.”

    [emphasis supplied]

    The learned Judges also stated that the Supreme Court did not say anything contrary to their orders in Writ Petitions Nos. 410, 1574, 1790 of 1986 and 874 of 1987, Sasankan v. State of Kerala, [1987 (2) K.L.T 347]. The learned Judges also referred to a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Remlath case, [1984 K.L.T 312], to the same effect.

    8. From the aforesaid facts, it is clear that three Division Benches of this Court in Remlath case, [1984 K.L.T 312] (vide supra), S. Parimalom case, [1985 K.L.T 624] (vide supra) and in Sini P. Kuriakose case, [1987 (2) K.L.T 425] (vide supra), clearly hled that no mandamus can be issued for continuance of employees temporarily appointed under rule 9(a)(i) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules after the expiry of the term of their appointment. This is so, notwithstanding the observations and directions issued by the Supreme Court in Narayani case, [1984 — I L.L.N 70] (vide supra), as also the observations of the Supreme Court in Sasankan case, [1987 (2) K.L.T 347] (vide supra).

    9. Learned counsel for the petitioners however relied upon two unreported decisions of this Court in Original Petition No. 7179 of 1985, dated 16 October, 1985 and Original Petition No. 2789 of 1986, dated 30 May, 1986. wherein certain directions have been given for continuance of the employees beyond the period prescribed under the appointment orders. As pointed out by the learned Single Judge, the directions therein would be confined to the facts of those cases.

    10. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on another recent decision of this Court in Sasidharan v. Kerala State Electricity Board, [1991 — I L.L.N 1032] (vide supra). The learned Single Judge therein only considered the Division Bench decisions referred to above, and came to the conclusion that provisional employees had no right to continue in service. While coming to that conclusion, the learned Single Judge also referred to another decision of the Supreme Court in Jacob M. Puthuparambil v. Kerala Water Authority, [1990 — II L.L.N 1032], and also the decision in H.C Puttaswamy v. Hon'ble Chief Justice of Karnataka High Court, [1991 — I L.L.N 352], and held that in spite of the said decisions of the Supreme Court the view taken by the Division Benches of this Court would continue to be good law.

    11. However, having said so, the learned Single Judge in Sasidharan v. Kerala State Electricity Board, [1991 — I L.L.N 1032] (vide supra), made an observation that in case the employer had permitted the employee to continue beyond 180 days, it should be presumed that the administration had permitted him to continue in service till regular appointments are made through Public Service Commission or otherwise according to rules. In that event, their appointment could be terminated only to accommodate regular hands or Public Service Commission hands, as the case may be. The learned Single Judge further held that the administration cannot terminate the appointment to accommodate another batch of provisional hands. In our opinion, the learned Single Judge's above observation would run contrary to the three Division Bench decisions referred to above, which he himself had referred. The petitioners have no right to continue in service, and no mandamus can be issued under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India for their continuance.

    12. For the aforesaid reasons, this writ appeal is dismissed.

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    Rajan v. Kerala State Electricity Board
    (Nov 1, 1991)