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  • S. 18(2) of the Limitation Act
  • S. 18 of the Limitation Act,
  • S. 3 of the Limitation Act
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • S. 18(2) of the Limitation Act
  • S. 18 of the Limitation Act,
  • S. 3 of the Limitation Act
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The parties are two partnership firms engaged in coir and coir products. Credit transactions between them continued up to 17-10-1976, and Rs. 13,440.87 was due from the defendants to the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of the amount with interest and costs on 20-3-1981. The claim was, on its face, barred by limitation unless a valid acknowledgment extended the limitation period.

The plaintiff relied on a letter marked Ext. A1, alleged to be written by the defendants in reply to the plaintiff's demand (Ext. B4). Ext. A1 was pleaded and produced as dated 23-10-1978 and asserted to be an acknowledgment saving limitation. The defendants contended that Ext. A1 had in fact been written on 23-10-1976 and that the year “1978” was a typographical error.

The trial Court found in favour of the plaintiff, relying on Ext. A1 (as pleaded) and also on an alleged acknowledgment contained in the defendants' balance-sheet (said to be dated 7-7-1978) as admitted by a defendant witness (DW 1) in cross-examination. The trial Court repelled the plea of limitation and decreed the suit. The defendants appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Ext. A1, relied upon by the plaintiff as a written acknowledgment dated 23-10-1978, in fact bears that date or whether the year “1978” is a typographical error for “1976”, and whether this affects the limitation defence.
  2. Whether a statement of liability appearing in a company's balance-sheet (or a partnership firm's balance-sheet) can amount to an acknowledgment under S.18 of the Limitation Act and save the suit from being barred by limitation.
  3. What is the scope of S.18(2) of the Limitation Act concerning proof of the date of a written and signed acknowledgment — whether oral evidence is barred as to the date and whether clerical/typographic errors in the date may be proved or corrected.
  4. Whether a court may act on an admission in cross-examination about a balance-sheet entry (not pleaded or produced by the plaintiff) to save a plaint that is ex facie barred by limitation.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff pleaded and relied upon Ext. A1, dated 23-10-1978, as a written acknowledgment by the defendants that saved the suit from the bar of limitation.
  • The plaintiff's pleadings presented Ext. A1 as the operative acknowledgment; the trial Court accepted Ext. A1 (and also relied on an alleged balance-sheet entry) and decreed the suit.

Defendants / Appellants' Arguments

  • The defendants contended that Ext. A1 was actually written on 23-10-1976 and that the year “1978” in Ext. A1 was a typographical mistake; if the true date is 1976 the suit filed on 20-3-1981 is barred by limitation.
  • The defendants challenged reliance on an alleged balance-sheet acknowledgment because it was neither pleaded in the plaint nor produced before the Court; any such entry could not be proved by oral evidence if the signed document was not before the Court (reference to S.18(2) of the Limitation Act).
  • The defendants also disputed the trial Court's presumption (arising from DW 1's answers) that a letter of 1978 had been received; they maintained that evidence showed Ext. A1 belonged in October 1976 between Ext. B4 (18-10-1976) and Ext. B6 (29-10-1976).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Eapen Panicker v. Krishna Panicker, (1970 KLT 42) Support for the proposition that law of limitation should not defeat meritorious claims where two views are possible and where there is reasonable doubt the benefit should go to the plaintiff. The Court cited V.R. Krishna Iyer, J.'s statement in this case for the general principle that courts should lean against limitation and in favour of the subsistence of the right to sue when two interpretations exist.
Krishnan Assari v. Akilakerala Viswakarma Maha Sabha, 1981 Tax LR 2465 : (1980 KLT 515) Held that inclusion of a debt in a duly prepared and authenticated balance-sheet may satisfy requirements of a valid acknowledgment under S.18 of the Limitation Act, subject to other conditions being met. The Court acknowledged this decision as authority that a balance-sheet entry can constitute an acknowledgment, but emphasized that such an acknowledgment must be pleaded and produced — it could not be proved by oral evidence if the signed document is not before the Court.
Earlier Supreme Court decisions (unnamed, referred to in the opinion) General support for the approach cited in Eapen Panicker about giving benefit of doubt to plaintiff when two views are possible. The Court stated the Eapen Panicker view followed earlier Supreme Court decisions; the Court relied on this line of authority for the general principle on approach to limitation where there is reasonable doubt.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by applying statutory and evidentiary principles with detailed factual cross-checking of documentary evidence:

  1. The Court opened with the general conception of limitation law as a law of repose and justice, but one which should not be used to aid unconscionable conduct; where two constructions are possible courts should favour the continuation of the right to sue (citing Eapen Panicker and earlier authorities).
  2. The Court explained the mandatory nature of S.3 of the Limitation Act: if a suit is instituted after the prescribed period it shall be dismissed even if limitation has not been set up as a defence; therefore the plaintiff bears the burden of showing the suit is within time and must plead or prove any acknowledgment relied upon to save limitation.
  3. The Court reviewed S.18 and S.18(2) of the Limitation Act. It recognized that an acknowledgement in writing and signed by the debtor (or an authorized agent) can save limitation, and that a balance-sheet entry may, in principle, constitute such an acknowledgement (as held in Krishnan Assari's case), but emphasized that such an acknowledgment must be pleaded and the signed document must be produced: oral evidence of the contents of a signed document not before the Court is barred by S.18(2).
  4. The Court found fault with the trial Court's reliance on an alleged balance-sheet acknowledgment that had not been pleaded or produced; the defendants were not called upon to produce the balance-sheet and the court could not accept oral testimony of its contents or draw adverse inferences. Therefore the trial Court erred in relying on that material to save the plaint.
  5. Turning to Ext. A1, the Court analyzed the documentary sequence: Ext. B4 (plaintiff's demand) dated 18-10-1976; Ext. B6 (plaintiff's reply to Ext. A1) dated 29-10-1976; and Ext. A1 (defendants' reply) produced as dated 23-10-1978. The Court found factual markers within the correspondence (references in Ext. A1 to a partner named Gopi coming to settle matters and an invitation to go to Raipur) that were responded to in Ext. B6 dated 29-10-1976, establishing that Ext. A1 must have been written between 18-10-1976 and 29-10-1976.
  6. The Court examined the scope of S.18(2). While S.18(2) generally prohibits proving the date of a written and signed acknowledgment by oral evidence where the instrument is undated, the Court recognized exceptions for proving vitiating factors and clerical/typographical errors. The Court held that S.18(2) cannot be applied to prevent proof that the year in Ext. A1 was a clerical mistake. To deny the possibility of correcting manifest clerical mistakes would frustrate justice.
  7. Considering the evidence (including an office copy/carbon copy Ext. B5 which contained a hand initial dated 23-10-1976, and the absence of any other letter to which Ext. B6 could have been replying), the Court accepted that Ext. A1 was sent on 23-10-1976 and that the “1978” in the printed or typed copy was a mistake. The plaintiff produced no counter-evidence, did not himself testify, and did not produce the original document or any other evidence to show Ext. A1 was of 1978; attempts to introduce a purported 1978 antecedent letter were not proved.
  8. The Court concluded that the plaintiff sought to take advantage of a typographical mistake to obtain a decree on a time-barred claim. Because Ext. A1 was properly dated 23-10-1976, no valid acknowledgment saving limitation stood proved; no other acknowledgment had been pleaded and proved.
  9. On these bases the Court held that the trial Court erred in law and fact in upholding the suit. The appellate court therefore allowed the appeal, set aside the trial Court's decree and dismissed the suit as barred by limitation.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Appeal allowed. The decree and judgment of the trial Court are set aside and the suit is dismissed as out of time. No costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The plaintiff's suit for recovery of Rs. 13,440.87 (with interest and costs) was dismissed as barred by limitation; the trial Court's decree in favour of the plaintiff was set aside.
  • On evidentiary points: The judgment emphasizes that (a) acknowledgments relied upon to save limitation must be pleaded and the signed instrument produced, (b) S.18(2) bars oral proof of the contents of a signed document not before the Court, and (c) clerical or typographical errors in the date of an acknowledgment may be proved and corrected where appropriate to reach the truth and prevent misuse of technical mistakes to evade limitation law.
  • Broader implications: The opinion applies established principles (as illustrated by the cited decisions) about preferring the subsistence of rights where two views are possible, but it also insists on strict compliance with pleading and production rules for acknowledgments relied upon to defeat limitation. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel precedent beyond applying these principles to the facts before the Court.
Appeal allowed.

    Craft Centre And Others v. The Koncherry Coir Factories, Cherthala .

    JUDGMENT

    1. Law of limitation is not meant to be an aid to unconscionable conduct, although, if a claim is clearly barred, the Court must unhesitatingly dismiss the suit. It is a law of repose, peace and justice which bars the remedy after the lapse of a particular period by way of public policy and expediency without extinguishing the right except in certain cases. Therefore, the Court must lean against limitation and in favour of the subsistence of the right to sue where two views are clearly possible. When there is the benefit of a reasonable doubt in the matter of construction of a statement relied upon to serve as an acknowledgment to save limitation, the benefit of that doubt should go to the plaintiff. That is what V.R Krishna Iyer, J. said in Eapen Panicker v. Krishna Panicker, (1970 KLT 42), following earlier Supreme Court decisions.

    2. The Balance-sheet of a Company is the statement of its assets and liabilities as at the end of the financial year approved by the Board of Directors and authenticated in the manner provided by law. The persons who authenticate do so by authorisation as agents of the company. The inclusion of a debt in a Balance sheet duly prepared and authenticated may satisfy the requirements of law for a valid acknowledgment under S. 18 of the Limitation Act, provided the other conditions are satisfied, even though the directors by the authentication did not intend to make an acknowledgment. That is what a Division Bench of this Court said in Krishnan Assari v. Akilakerala Viswakarma Maha Sabha, 1981 Tax LR 2465 : (1980 KLT 515).

    3. Plaintiff and defendants represent two partnership firms dealing in coir and coir products. They had credit transactions admittedly upto 17-10-1976, by which Rs. 13,440.87 was due from the defendants to the plaintiff. The suit for realisation of the amount with interest and cost was filed on 20-3-1981 when the claim was admittedly barred by limitation if there was no valid acknowledgment saving limitation. Ext. A1 letter, alleged to have been written by the defendants to the plaintiff on 23-10-1978, was relied on in the plaint and proved as an acknowledgment saving limitation. If that is accepted, the suit is within time. Liability is admitted. Plea is only one of limitation. The fact that Ext. A1 contains a valid acknowledgment is also not in dispute. But the contention is that it will not help the plaintiff because it was written on 23-10-1976 and the year ‘1978’ mentioned therein is only a typographical error. The trial Court said that even if there is such an error, S. 18(2) of the Limitation Act is such an error, S. 18(2) of the Limitation Act is a bar in proving it. The trial Court also relied on an alleged acknowledgment dated 7-7-1978 contained in the Balance-sheet of the first defendant firm. This is not an acknowledgment pleaded or proved by the plaintiff. But an admission of DW 1 in cross-examination that there was such a statement in the Balance-sheet was relied on. Seeking support from the above two decisions and giving the benefit of doubt to the plaintiff, the plea of limitation was repelled and the suit was decreed. That is how the defendants came up in appeal.

    4. What S. 3 of the Limitation Act says is that every suit instituted after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. It is the duty of the plaintiff to convince the Court that his suit is within time. If it is out of time and the plaintiff relies on any acknowledgment or acknowledgments in order to save limitation, he must plead them or prove, if denied. An acknowledgment not pleaded in the plaint, atleast by way of amendment, cannot be relied on. The plaint must appear on the face of it to be within time. If not, the court can reject it on the ground of limitation even without issuing summons to the defendant and waiting for his plea of limitation. In this case, the only acknowledgment pleaded is Ext. A1 dated 23-10-1978. If the Court finds that the acknowledgment was only on 23-10-1976, the suit filed beyond three years, on 20-3-1981, could be dismissed on that ground itself. The provision in S. 3 is absolute and mandatory. The Court can claim no choice except to obey it in full. It is the duty of the Court to dismiss a suit which on the face of it is barred by time even at the appellate stage despite the fact that the issue was not at all raised.

    5. An acknowledgment, in order to save limitation, must be in writing and signed by the party, against whom the property or right is claimed, or by any person, through whom he drives title or liability. As Explanation (b) indicates, signature of an agent duly authorised is sufficient. The alleged acknowledgment in the Balance-sheet, if duly proved, may be sufficient, as held in Krishnan Assad's case, 1981 Tax LR 2465 : (1980 KLT 515). But that acknowledgment ought to have been pleaded in the plaint, but it is not there. The Court cannot embark upon a rowing enquiry to help the plaintiff on the question of limitation by getting some admission from the defendant to save the plaint, which is ex facie barred by limitation. Apart from the absence of plea of such an acknowledgment in the pleadings, there is one other difficulty. Evidence acknowledgment saving limitation is only the writing signed. If that signed document is not before Court, oral evidence of its contents shall not be received by the Court. That is the mandate of S. 18(2) of the Limitation Act. The alleged Balance-sheet or even its copy is not before Court. The defendants were not even called upon to produce it. Therefore, no question of any adverse inference also can arise apart from the fact that this acknowledgment is not pleaded and not produced. The trial Court did not act legally in acting on such an acknowledgment to save limitation.

    6. That takes us back to the question, whether the mistake regarding the year in Ext. A1 could be gone into by the Court. S. 18(2) permits proof of evidence regarding time of signing the acknowledgment in writing when it is undated. From that, a corollary may follow that if the acknowledgment in writing and signed is dated, oral evidence regarding the date is prohibited by implication. But every rule has its exception. Intention or object of S. 18(2) is to find out the real date of the written and signed acknowledgment for the purpose of saving limitation and to exclude fraudulent testimony. Vitiating factors could always be proved. The very purpose of the existence of courts is dispensation of justice between parties by finding out the truth, legality and justice of their contentions and not to deny justice on technical grounds. Even admissions could be explained or disproved. Mistake of fact or errors could always be proved to apprise the Court of the real position. A clerical or arithmetical or typographic error could always be proved. The Court is bound to accept such errors and correct mistakes. S. 18(2) of the Limitation Act cannot stand in the way of disproving the year of Ext. A1. The trial Court fundamentally went wrong in that respect and the approach resulted in failure of justice also. Benefit of doubt on the question of limitation cannot be extended to a person who wanted to misguide the Court by relying on a wrong year of acknowledgment.

    7. Ext. B4 letter was admittedly written by the plaintiff to the defendants on 18-10-1976 demanding the amount. Ext. A1 was produced by the plaintiff himself as the reply sent by the defendants to Ext. B4 acknowledging the liability. Ext. A1 is dated 23-10-1978. The year ‘1978’ is said to be a typing mistake for ‘1976’ and it was spoken to by DW 1. There is no counter evidence. Plaintiff did not examine himself nor any witness. He had no case that Ext. A1 is not the reply of Ext. B4 or Ext. B4 was replied only after two years. So also, there is no case that any other reply was received for Ext. B4 and no such reply was produced also. The office copy (carbon copy) of Ext. A1 was produced by the appellants as Ext. B5. Though the year ‘1978’ is naturally there, it contains a dated initial in hand on the margine bearing the date 23-10-1976. That can be a subsequent insertion also. But Ext. B6 dated 29-10-1976 is admittedly the reply sent by the respondent-plaintiff to Ext. A1. In Ext. A1, which was sent in reply to Ext. B4, two facts are worth mentioning, (i) a statement that a partner by name Gopi is coming to settle the matter; and (ii) an invitation to the plaintiff to go to Raipur where appellants are having business. These two references are replied in Ext. B6, which bears the date 29-10-1976, even though in Ext. B6 the month and year of Ext. A1 are not given, but only the date is given. There is no case that Ext. B6 was in reply to any other letter and no such letter was produced. If so, it is clear that Ext. A1 is the reply to Ext. B4 and Ext. B6 is the reply to Ext. A1. Ext. B4 is dated 18-10-1976 and Ext. B6 is dated 29-10-1976. Ext. A1 must have been sent only in between these two dates.

    8. A mala fide attempt was made by the respondent to contend that Ext. A1 was sent in reply to another letter dated 18-9-1978. A copy purporting to be an office copy of that letter was produced, but not proved. The original was not called for. DW 1 denied having received such a letter. But, in answer to further questions, he said that he could answer only on going through the file. From this answer, the trial Court presumed that such a letter must have been received. Such an inference is not possible from an honest answer given by DW 1. It is immaterial whether Ext. A1 was in answer to Ext. B4 or some other letter. The question is only whether it was written in 1976 or 1978. Ext. B6 and the non-production of any other letter, as the one for which Ext. B6 reply was sent, clearly indicate that Ext. B6 was in reply to Ext. A1 alone. Clearly Ext. A1 was sent on 23-10-1976 and the respondent was making an attempt to take advantage of typing mistake in it in order to plea an acknowledgment for saving limitation. Ext. A1 cannot, therefore, save limitation. There is no other acknowledgment pleaded or proved. Here, there is no question of two interpretations being possible and the plaintiff getting the benefit of any doubt. He was only trying to take advantage of a mistake in getting a decree on a barred claim.

    Appeal is allowed. The decree and judgment of the trial Court are set aside. The suit is dismissed as out of time. No costs.

    Appeal allowed.

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    Craft Centre And Others v. The Koncherry Coir Factories, Cherthala .
    (Jul 7, 1990)