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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners are traders who import and sell outboard motors in India. Outboard motors are typically fitted to fishing boats and sold to fishermen. The Central Government, exercising power under S. 25(1) of the Customs Act, issued a notification dated 27-4-1988 granting an exemption for outboard motors imported into India by "any State Fisheries Corporation" from customs duty in excess of the amount calculated at the rate of 25% ad valorem and from additional duty under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. The petitioners challenged that notification in original petitions on the ground that the exemption is discriminatory and arbitrary, alleged to violate Article 14 of the Constitution.

The opinion records fluctuations in the applicable customs duty rates across years and shows how the exemption produced a substantial reduction in duty payable by State Fisheries Corporations (and similar bodies), enabling those bodies (for example, a State-level Apex Federation called "Matsyafed" in Kerala) to sell outboard motors at prices significantly lower than those offered by the petitioners. The petitioners contended this competitive disadvantage constituted unconstitutional discrimination.

Procedurally, no counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of the first respondent (Government of India). The Collector of Customs, Cochin, was the other respondent. The opinion notes that the primary beneficiaries of the exemption (Matsyafed and other State Corporations) were not impleaded as parties; the petitioners relied on a precedent to justify non-joinder but the court expressed doubt about the applicability of that precedent to the present facts.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the notification dated 27-4-1988, exempting outboard motors imported by State Fisheries Corporations from customs duty beyond a specified rate, is discriminatory or arbitrary and therefore violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
  2. Whether the classification effected by the notification (distinguishing State Fisheries Corporations or Federations from other importers) was supported by satisfaction of the Central Government that such exemption was necessary in the public interest under S. 25(1) of the Customs Act.
  3. Whether non-joinder of the exempted bodies (such as Matsyafed and other State Corporations) was fatal to the maintainability of the petitions or otherwise barred the court from adjudicating the validity of the notification.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The notification creates a discriminatory classification between State Fisheries Corporations (and similar bodies) and other importers, lacking a rational basis and thus offending Article 14.
  • The exemption confers an unfair competitive advantage on the Corporation/Federation (notably Matsyafed), enabling sales at much reduced prices and effectively ousting private traders from the market.
  • There is no public interest justification for the magnitude of the exemption granted to the Corporation/Federation.
  • In the absence of a counter-affidavit from the Government, the burden lies on the Government to provide facts and data supporting the classification; the lack of such a counter-affidavit should be to the petitioners' advantage.

Respondents' Position

  • No counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of the Government of India; the absence of a counter-affidavit is expressly recorded.
  • The notification was issued under the statutory power conferred by S. 25(1) of the Customs Act, which permits exemption of goods of any specified description if the Central Government is satisfied that exemption is necessary in the public interest. The notification itself records that satisfaction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
G.M.S.C Rly. v. A.V.R. Siddhanti, AIR 1974 SC 1755 Non-joinder principle: employees likely to be affected by a writ challenging seniority were held to be, at most, proper parties and not necessary parties. The court observed this authority had been invoked by petitioners to justify non-joinder of Matsyafed/other exempted bodies but expressed doubt whether the principle in that case justified non-joinder of bodies directly affected by the reliefs sought here.
Orient Weaving Mills (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 98 Held that a notification under R. 8(1) of the Central Excise Rules exempting certain classes of persons (rather than classes of goods) is valid because exemption relates to goods coming within the description of excisable goods; the sub-rule is identically worded to S. 25(1) of the Customs Act. The court relied on this reasoning to indicate there is no legal hurdle in treating the notification under S. 25(1) as validly framed with reference to goods of a specified description and that this possibly explained why petitioners did not press an argument that the notification exempted only specified persons and not goods.
Liberty Oil Mills v. Union of India (Civil Appeal No. 1924/80 and connected appeals) Principle: although the State, when acting as a trader, ordinarily cannot claim favoured treatment, there may be clear and good reasons for departure from that norm; an exemption must satisfy the requirement that the Government was satisfied it was necessary in the public interest. The court invoked this observation to state that exemptions in favour of State trading bodies can be upheld if the Government was satisfied that exemption was necessary in the public interest; the notification itself records such satisfaction.
Hindustan Paper Corporation Ltd. v. Government of Kerala, AIR 1986 SC 1541 Held that a statutory provision empowering exemption in favour of Government companies and co-operative societies is not unconstitutional; preference to Government companies/cooperatives can be valid because they form a different class. The court applied the same yardstick to the present matter, noting there was no material on record to conclude that the impugned notification was not issued in public interest and referring to the authority for the proposition that preference to Government entities may be constitutionally sustainable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in the following analytical steps, based only on the content of the opinion:

  1. Non-joinder: The court considered the petitioners' reliance on G.M.S.C. Rly. for the proposition that non-joinder of affected parties might not be fatal. The court expressed doubt about the applicability of that precedent to the non-joinder of Matsyafed and other exempted bodies, since those bodies would be directly affected by a ruling setting aside the notification.
  2. Effect of absence of counter-affidavit: The court acknowledged that the absence of a counter-affidavit from the Government of India is a factor that benefits the petitioners. However, the court held that this advantage was insufficient, by itself, to negate the effect of the notification granting exemption to the Corporation.
  3. Statutory power and public interest satisfaction: The court identified S. 25(1) of the Customs Act as the statutory source of the exemption power. Under S. 25(1), exemption of "goods of any specified description" is permissible if the Central Government is satisfied it is necessary in the public interest. The court observed that the notification explicitly recorded that the Government was so satisfied.
  4. Precedential support for upholding exemptions to state bodies: The court relied on the reasoning in Orient Weaving Mills to note that a notification framed under a provision worded like S. 25(1) need not be invalid merely because it operates in relation to specified persons; the exemption can properly be viewed with reference to specified goods. The court also invoked Liberty Oil Mills to acknowledge that while the State normally cannot claim favoured treatment when entering trade, there can be clear and good reasons for a departure, and such exemptions stand if the Government's satisfaction of public interest is justified on the record. Finally, Hindustan Paper Corporation was cited for the proposition that preference to Government companies and co-operative societies need not be unconstitutional where they constitute a different class.
  5. Application to facts: The court observed that the notification's object could be seen as protecting State fisheries activities—whether by direct fitment of motors to fishing boats, by transfer through fishermen, or by sale to fishermen. The court found no material on the record sufficient to hold that the impugned notification was not in the public interest, despite the petitioners' contentions and the absence of a counter-affidavit.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Petitions dismissed.

Direct consequences and implications (as stated or justified in the opinion):

  • The original petitions challenging the notification dated 27-4-1988 were dismissed for the reasons stated by the court.
  • No costs were awarded.
  • Because the petitions were dismissed, the notification challenged in these proceedings remains effective as against these petitioners; the opinion notes that the primary beneficiaries of the exemption (such as Matsyafed and other State Corporations) were not impleaded and continue to be the practical beneficiaries of the exemption.

The opinion does not set out any broader or novel constitutional principle beyond applying existing authorities; it does not record the setting of a new precedent or larger policy pronouncement beyond the disposition as above.

Order copy language in the opinion: "For the aforesaid reasons, I dismiss these original petitions. No costs. Issue carbon copy on usual terms. Petitions dismissed."

    George Joseph Fernandez And Others v. Government Of India, And Another

    1. Petitioners are trading in “Outboard Motors” which they import from foreign countries and sell to users in India. Outboard motors are used for fitment with fishing boats and hence their consumers are the fishermen operating such boats for fishing operations. Duty is levied on such outboard motors under the Customs Act at the time of clearance when they reach Indian Ports. The Government of India, in exercise of power under S. 25(1) of the Customs Act, issued notification dt. 27-4-1988 exempting outboard motors imported into India by “any State Fisheries Corporation” from customs duty leviable in excess of the amount calculated at the rate of twenty five per cent ad valorem and also from the whole of the additional duty thereon payable under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. The said notification is challenged in these original petitions on the ground that the exemption so granted is discriminatory, arbitrary and hence illegal. According to the petitioners, the classification envisaged in the notification as between the State Fisheries Corporations on the, one hand and other importers on the other is violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution.

    2. As per the import policy enunciated by the Government, outboard motor is an item allowed for import by all persons under open general licence. However, customs duty was imposed on the article at different rates during different years. Exemption under S. 25(1) granted to the outboard motors imported by the State Fisheries Corporation (for short ‘the Corporation’) varied in percentage from year to year. In 1987 when the duty was fixed at 45% (basic duty) plus 40% (auxiliary duty), the Corporation was to pay duty only at the rate of 40% + 25% + 10% (additional C.V duty). In a revision made during the same year when the total duty was fixed at 90%, the rate applicable to the Corporation was 80%. But by notification dt. 27-4-1988 when the rate of duty was fixed at 90%, the Corporation was to pay only a basic duty of 25%. Of course, the margin was slightly reduced by notification dt. 1-3-1989, when the total duty for all importers was fixed at 80%, the Corporation needs pay only 35%.

    3. Though there is no Fisheries Corporation as such in the State of Kerala, a State level Apex Federation was formed which is called “Matsyafed” which made some imports of outboard motors to be sold to fishermen. The result is that Matsyafed can now sell outboard motors at a far reduced price when compared with the price offered by the petitioners and other similarly situated traders. Hence it became difficult for the petitioners to compete with Matsyafed in the matter of sale of outboard motors. It was in the aforesaid background that petitioners approached this Court praying for appropriate reliefs.

    4. It is contended that the consequence of the huge difference in the rate of customs duty payable by the Corporation or Federation vis-a-vis the rate of duty payable by other persons, they are practically ousted from the trading field and hence the petitioners are discriminated against without any rational basis having no nexus with the object sought to be achieved. It is also contended that no public interest is sought to be achieved by exempting the Corporation or Federation in such a large measure. The Corporation does not form a class by itself and there is no rhyme or reason for discriminating the petitioners and the Corporation or Federation in the matter of customs duty, contended the petitioners.

    5. No counter has been filed on behalf of the respondents. Government of India is the first respondent in the original petitions and the other respondent is the Collector of Customs, Cochin. The benefit of the exemption primarily enures to Matsyafed and other Corporations of different States, but none of them is made a party in these proceedings. The non-joinder of any of those bodies is sought to be justified on the ground that the reliefs claimed in the original petitions are only intended to benefit the petitioners and not to affect such exempted parties. Reference was made to the decision in G.M.S.C Rly. v. A.V.R Siddhanti, (AIR 1974 SC 1755) in support thereof. That was a case for issuing a writ of mandamus directing the Secretary of the Railway Board to fix the inter se seniority of the petitioners. A contention was raised by the respondents in the said case that employees who were likely to be affected by the decision in the case were not made parties and hence their non-joinder would be fatal to the maintainability of the petition. The Supreme Court has held that since no list or order fixing seniority of the petitioners vis-a-vis any particular individual was being challenged, the employees who were likely to be affected were, at the most, only proper parties and not necessary parties. I doubt whether the said principle is of any justification for the non-joinder of Matsyafed or other bodies which will be directly affected by granting the reliefs prayed for in these original petitions.

    6. Be that as it may, the question whether the classification made by the notification is bad in law can be considered de hors the non-joinder of the affected parties. Learned counsel for the petitioners made an endeavour to have maximum leverage from the absence of counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Union of India. He contended that the burden is on the Government to support the classification with facts and data and the absence of even a counter-affidavit puts the Government at a very disadvantageous position. No doubt, the absence of counter-affidavit from the first respondent is a factor which will enure to the advantage of the petitioners. But the advantage gained by the petitioners therefrom is not enough to set at naught the effect or result of the notification as per which exemption was granted to the Corporation.

    7. Power to make the exemption has been conferred on the Government by S. 25 of the Customs Act. Such exemption can be made if the Central Government is satisfied that it is necessary in the public interest so to do. The exemption envisaged should be in respect of “goods of any specified description” from the whole or any part of duty of customs leviable thereon. It was not contended that Government cannot exempt goods imported by the Corporation in exercise of the power conferred by S. 25(1). A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has held in Orient Weaving Mills (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (AIR 1963 SC 98) that a notification issued under R. 8(1) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 is not bad in so far as they exempt certain classes of persons and not classes of goods from excise duty because the exemption in such cases would be with reference to such goods as come within the description of excisable goods. The said sub-rule is worded identically with S. 25(1) of the Customs Act. This might be the reason which dissuaded the learned counsel for the petitioners from contending that the notification does not exempt specified goods but only specified persons or bodies.

    8. Learned counsel for the petitioners invited my attention to the following observation made by another Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in a recent judgment in Liberty Oil Mills v. Union of India (in Civil Appeal No. 1924/80 and connected appeals):

    “It is true that the State dons the robes of a trader which it enters the field of commercial activities and ordinarily it can claim no favoured treatment”.

    However, the Supreme Court added that there may be clear and good reason for making a departure and upheld the exemption granted by the Government of India for State Trading Corporation in regard to the rate of customs duty levied on the import of edible oils. If the exemption has to stand legal scrutiny, it must pass the test whether the Government was satisfied that its grant was necessary in public interest. The notification says that the Central Government was satisfied that it is necessary in the public interest so to do. Evidently the object is to protect the interest of State Fisheries activities whether the Corporation uses outboard motors by fitting them to boats used for fishing operations directly or through fishermen or even by sale of such goods to fishermen. There is no legal hurdle in presuming that the Government was satisfied of the public interest involved since the Government so expressed in the notification; itself. Of course, the party who challenges the vice of the notification can establish that notwithstanding the statement in the notification there is no occasion or ground for the Government to have such satisfaction. In Hindustan Paper Corporation Ltd. v. Government of Kerala, (AIR 1986 SC 1541), the Supreme Court considered the validity of S. 6 of the Kerala Forest Produce (Fixation of Selling Price) Act, 1978 which empowered the Government to exempt the sale of any forest produce to any company owned by the Government or to any co-operative society registered under the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969. It was held that the provision granting exemption in favour of Government companies and the co-operative societies is not unconstitutional. Venkataramiah, J. (as his Lordship then was) observed in the judgment as follows (at p. 1546):

    “Thus it cannot be said that the provision is either arbitrary or unreasonable even though the Government industries may be rivals in trade to the industries in the private sector. The preference shown to Government, companies under S. 6 of the Act cannot be considered to be discriminatory as they stand in a different class altogether and the classification made between Government companies and others for the purposes of the Act is a valid one. Same is the case with the Cl. (b) which gives power under S. 6 of the Act to the Government to exempt sales of forest produce in favour of co-operative societies up to the limit mentioned therein”.

    9. Though learned counsel for the petitioners contended, particularly in the absence of any counter-affidavit, that the Government have not succeeded in showing that the notification was issued in public interest, there is no material on record to hold that the impugned notification was not in public interest. The same yardstick was adopted by the Supreme Court in Hindustan Paper Corporation's case (cited supra) for repelling the argument that the notification impugned in that case was not made in public interest.

    For the aforesaid reasons, I dismiss these original petitions. No costs.

    Issue carbon copy on usual terms.

    Petitions dismissed.

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    Comments

    George Joseph Fernandez And Others v. Government Of India, And Another
    (Jul 25, 1989)