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  • Section 110B of The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
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  • Section 110B of The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On 17-4-1980 an autorikshaw carrying the appellant collided from behind with a K.S.R.T.C. bus (Registration No. KRT 9905) on M.G. Road, Trivandrum, when the bus suddenly stopped. The appellant sustained injuries. The appellant filed a claim petition seeking compensation under two heads: (1) pain and suffering, permanent disability and loss of earning capacity — Rs. 50,000; and (2) special damages — Rs. 10,000 (total claimed: Rs. 60,000).

The Tribunal found negligence on the part of both drivers (the bus driver and the autorikshaw driver) and awarded Rs. 9,800 as special damages and Rs. 20,000 under the first head (loss of earning capacity and related heads). The appellant appealed, dissatisfied with the amount awarded under the first head. The appeal challenges the portion of the compensation disallowed by the Tribunal under the first head.

Relevant factual details appearing in the opinion: at the time of the accident the appellant was 46 years old; he was a teacher receiving Rs. 718 per month and had an annual agricultural income of Rs. 10,000; the record showed overall earnings of Rs. 1,500 per month at the date of the accident. The medical/evidentiary findings recorded that the appellant had 100% disability for four months, 50% for two months, and a 12% permanent disability. The Tribunal had already compensated the periods of 100% and 50% disability under special damages; the remaining contest related to the 12% permanent disability.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Tribunal erred in awarding an inadequate amount for the appellant's loss of earning capacity and related heads under Section 110B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
  2. What methodology should be employed to quantify compensation for pecuniary loss (specifically the use of multiplicand and multiplier, and adjustments such as discount for lump-sum payment and deductions for collateral benefits).
  3. What multiplier (years of purchase) is appropriate in the appellant's case, taking into account life expectancy and post-superannuation income prospects.
  4. Whether the rate of interest awarded by the Tribunal on the compensation (6%) should be enhanced (the appellant sought interest at 12% from the date of filing).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant was dissatisfied with the Tribunal's award under the first head (loss of earning capacity and related heads) and appealed for a higher amount.
  • The appellant's counsel submitted that, following Supreme Court pronouncements, the life expectancy to be adopted can be fixed at 70 years (the appellant was 46 at the time of the accident), which would influence the multiplier to be applied.

The opinion does not provide a detailed account of the respondent's or insurer's specific arguments in opposition.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Kerala v. Vijayakumaran Nair, 1982 K.L.T 393 Illustrates that non-pecuniary losses (pain and suffering, loss of amenities, loss of expectation of life) are imponderable and must be awarded as a conventional sum rather than by precise calculation. The court relied on this authority to explain that non-pecuniary losses cannot be fixed with mathematical accuracy and thus must be awarded in conventional amounts based on circumstances.
Parry v. Cleaver, 1970 A.C. 1 Explains that wages (including sick pay and half pay) paid as of right during incapacity are to be taken into account in assessing damages; insurance receipts and pension are to be treated differently (insurance receipts are not deducted; pension treated like insurance). The court used this principle to justify deductions/exclusions for collateral benefits (wages, sick pay) and to clarify that insurance/pension moneys are not to be taken into account in assessing damages for the injury.
Fletcher v. Autocar and Transporters Ltd., 1968 (2) Q.B. 322 Establishes that a claimant's pre-accident wealth or social status should not increase the quantum of damages for non-pecuniary loss; similar injuries with similar results merit similar awards regardless of wealth. The court cited this passage to explain that the appellant's substantial and secured private income is irrelevant when assessing damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenities; damages under this head should be fair and reasonable irrespective of pre-accident wealth.
Jyotsna Dey v. State of Assam, 1987 (1) A.C.J. 172 Used for the proposition that life expectancy for a citizen may be fixed at 70 years in appropriate cases. The appellant's counsel relied on this authority to argue for a 70-year life expectancy; the court considered this when fixing the multiplier and related discounting considerations.
State Insurance Officer, Trivandrum v. Thankamma, 1981 A.C.J. 77 Used to support the proposition that a person with sufficient post-superannuation earning prospects may be expected to receive income for an additional period (referred to as ten years in the opinion). The court cited this authority (along with the next) when discussing the appropriate multiplier and the assumption that a person may have income for about ten years after superannuation, which influenced the court's choice of multiplier.
Vasanthy G. Kamath v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, 1981 A.C.J. 353 Also cited in support of the ten-year post-superannuation income expectation used in multiplier considerations. The court relied on these authorities in tandem to justify reasoning about post-retirement income prospects and in arriving at an appropriate multiplier after making a discount for lump-sum payment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by outlining the established structure of compensation under Section 110B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939: damages fall into pecuniary losses (loss of earnings and medical/other expenses) and non-pecuniary losses (pain and suffering, loss of amenities, loss of expectation of life). It emphasized that non-pecuniary losses are imponderable and must be awarded as conventional sums.

For pecuniary loss (loss of earning capacity and other gains) the court set out a methodological approach: determine a multiplicand (annual net loss) and multiply it by a multiplier (years of purchase), then make necessary adjustments (deductions for taxation, collateral benefits, and a discount to reflect lump-sum payment). The court explained the components of the multiplicand and multiplier in detail:

  • Multiplicand: the diminution in annual earnings — starting with claimant's earnings at the date of the accident, less the amount the claimant can earn in future; for salaried employees pay structure simplifies the calculation, but for self-employed or unemployed persons the calculation may be complex or conjectural; deductions for income tax and other liabilities must be made.
  • Multiplier: based on the anticipated number of years the disability will last, requiring medical evidence; courts must avoid simple multiplication without discount because that would overcompensate (lump-sum discount is customary, albeit somewhat arbitrary).
  • Collateral benefits: wages paid as of right during incapacity, sick pay, etc., are to be taken into account (deducted); insurance receipts and pension moneys are not to be deducted in the same way as wages.

The court illustrated the arithmetic of multiplicand and multiplier with examples (including an example using a 12% permanent disability) and then applied the principles to the appellant's case:

  • Verified factual inputs: appellant's earnings (evidence showed Rs. 1,500 per month), age (46), and the percentage of permanent disability (12%). Periods of total and partial disability already compensated as special damages by the Tribunal were not to be re-awarded under the first head.
  • Considered life expectancy arguments: appellant's counsel invoked authorities fixing life expectancy at 70 years; the court also considered authorities regarding post-superannuation income prospects (ten years).
  • Having regard to the above and applying a lump-sum discount, the court fixed the multiplier at 20 (after considering a 70-year life expectancy concept and the ten-year post-retirement income notion).
  • On the basis of the multiplicand (as computed from the record) multiplied by 20, the court calculated the compensation under the loss of earnings head as Rs. 32,800 (the opinion states: "damages calculated on the basis of the multiplicand by 20 years of purchase value would be Rs. 32,800/-").
  • The court then assessed non-pecuniary losses (pain and suffering and loss of amenities) and, observing that these must be fair and reasonable and are essentially conjectural, awarded Rs. 7,000 for these heads (citing the principle that pre-accident wealth is irrelevant to this assessment).
  • Combining these two numbers produced a net figure of Rs. 39,800, which the court rounded off to Rs. 40,000. The court observed that the Tribunal had only awarded Rs. 20,000 under the first head and therefore concluded the appellant was entitled to an additional Rs. 20,000 under the head “loss of earnings and other gains”.
  • On the question of interest, the court held that the appellant was entitled to interest at 12% on the total amount of damages from the date of filing of the claim until realisation; this direction set aside the Tribunal's order awarding only 6% interest.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated in the judgment. The court recalculated compensation for the appellant's permanent disability and related heads, fixed the appropriate multiplier at 20, awarded Rs. 32,800 for loss of earnings and other gains and Rs. 7,000 for non-pecuniary losses (net Rs. 39,800, rounded to Rs. 40,000), declared that the appellant is entitled to an additional Rs. 20,000 under the first head over the amount awarded by the Tribunal, and directed interest at 12% on the total amount of compensation from the date of filing until realisation. The Tribunal's direction awarding interest at 6% was set aside. The appeal was allowed to the extent indicated and there were no costs.

Implications: The direct effect is an increased award to the appellant (the opinion quantifies the recalculated amounts and grants 12% interest). The court applied and reiterated established principles for calculating pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages (multiplicand/multiplier method, deductions for collateral benefits, and the need for discounting lump-sum awards). The opinion does not purport to create a new legal precedent but applies existing authorities and principles to the facts before the court.

    M.D Chacko v. N. Sreedharan & Others

    Radhakrishna Menon, J.:— Not satisfied with the amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the claimant has come up in appeal.

    2. On 17-4-1980 the autorikshaw in which the appellant was travelling collided with a K.S.R.T.C bus bearing Registration No. KRT 9905, going along the M.G Road at Trivandrum from North to South, from behind when the bus suddenly stopped. In that accident the appellant suffered injuries. The claim petition of the appellant which is a sequel to the accident, contains claims falling under two different heads. They are: (1) pain and suffering, permanent disability and loss of earning capacity; compensation claimed, Rs. 50,000/- (2) special damages; compensation claimed, Rs. 10,000/-. Thus a total compensation of Rs. 60,000/- was claimed. The Tribunal was of the view that the drivers of both the bus as also the autorikshaw were negligent and consequently awarded a sum of Rs. 9800/- as special damages and a sum of Rs. 20,000/- towards the compensation falling under the first count. The appeal is against the disallowed part of the compensation claimed under the first head.

    3. Before we go into the merits of the ??? set up in the appeal we would like to refer to certain well established principles pertaining to the entitlement ??? person physically injured in a road accident for compensation falling under Section 110B of The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. He can claim compensation under two heads, “pecuniary losses” and “non-pecuniary losses”. “Pecuniary losses” consist of two separate items: (1) ‘the loss of earnings and other gains’ which he could have made had he not been injured and (2) the medical and other expenses, he had to meet as a result of the injury. It is seen from judicial pronouncement that the ‘non-pecuniary losses’ have been sub-divided into three items. (1) pain and suffering; (2) loss of amenities of life and (3) loss of expectation of life. Compensation under the head “non-pecuniary losses” cannot precisely or with mathematical accuracy, be fixed “because, as far as money goes, the loss is imponderable and any amount awarded must be in the nature of a conventional sum”. (See State of Kerala v. Vijayakumaran Nair, 1982 K.L.T 393).

    4. We shall now consider the claimfalling under the sub-head “loss of earning capacity and other gains”. On a perusal of the award it could be seen that the basis for fixing the quantum under this head is nothing but the feeling of what is fair. Is this the correct way of fixing the quantum? is the question, we have before us. This question, apparently simple, is not that easy to decide. A probe into the common law of England is in dispensible* because the law in this regard has not so far been codified. The oft-quoted general principle settled by Judicial pronouncements namely that, the victim is entitled to such a sap, as will make good the financial loss which he has suffered, shall be borne in mind while searching for an answer to this question. It is therefore necessary to find out a methodology to determine the quantum. A satisfactory method that can be adopted in this regard is by arriving at a multiplicand and multiplying this by the multiplier and then making adjustments and variations for elements like inflation and taxation etc.

    5. In the calculation of the multiplicand, the basic factor to be taken into account is the dimunition in annual earnings. The starting point in the calculation in this regard is the amount that the claimant was earning at the time of the accident or would have earned at the date of the accident, had he not been injured. From this, the amount he is capable of earning in, the future is deducted. However, if total incapacity is the result of the injury then nothing, falls to be deducted. To determine the earning of the claimant per annum in the case of a salaried employee there shall not be any difficulty because the pay/wage structure provides the basis. In the case of a self-employed, the calculation may rather complex. The claimant falling under this category appear shall establish his earnings with clear and convincing evidence. But in the case of an unemployed, calculation would bristle with difficulties. In such cases the calculation will be conjectural. The courts would have to estimate his prospects of gaining employment in the future and at what level, and assess the earnings accordingly. And the situation is different if the claimant was not working, because supported by a relative, as in 4 the case of an injured child, wife etc. In the case of a child incapacitated for life, the court is bound to make what is called a “guesstimate” of how will the child, if injured, would have fared as an earner on attaining adulthood. The status of family of which the child is a member is a relevant factor. Similarly in the case of the dependants or the relatives the calculation of the loss of earnings necessarily depends upon the evidence such claimants produce in regard to their prospects of their getting employment in future. Adjustments for variations in annual earnings or loss also require to be taken into account in calculating the multiplicand. For instance the amount which the claimant was earning at the relevant time may not be the amount which he would have continued to earn in the ???. May be that the claimant's earnings would have increased over the years as he prospered in his carrier. May be that his earnings might get diminished in the future due to old age, as, when he was in an occupation with a height of unemployment etc. After determining the annual earnings adopting the procedure mentioned above the income tax and other liabilities whether it be statutory or otherwise, require to be deducted. The balance thus arrived at is the multiplicand. The period of years of the claimant's disability is the basic factor that should be taken into account in the calculation of the multiplier. The starting point in this regard, therefore is the number of years that it is anticipated, the claimant's disability will last. The calculation requires medical testimony. The medical report as far as possible must be based on an examination of the claimant as near as possible to the time of the trial. Having understood the principle regarding the calculation of ‘multiplicand’ and the ‘multiplier’ thus, we have to consider an incidental question, namely will the court be justified in multiplying the ‘multiplicand’ if the claimant's annual loss by the number of years during which his incapacity is expected to last? The answer is No; because this, would clearly overcompensate the claimant ‘as it would put the future loss into his hands long before he would otherwise receive them, and would enable him to enjoy the interest accruing in the intervening period’. To avoid such happenings the courts have, though the same is more a haphazard approach, been making a somewhat arbitrary deduction, in the multiplier' to be applied to the figure of annual loss. This process is known as discount for lumpsum' payment. Similarly some of the collateral benefits the claimant gets, are also to be deducted from the annual loss. For instance if it is established that when a claimant is paid wages as of right by his employer during incapacity, the said payment shall be taken into account in the damages assessment. (See Parry v. Cleaver, 1970 A.C 1). So is the cast with wages, sick pay and half pay, though the moneys received under the insurance policy are not to be taken into account in assessing the damages for the injury covered by the policy. Pension money is also treated on par with the insurance money for the purpose of assessing the damages. Similarly gratuitous payments, privately conferred as a mark of sympathy and assistance are also not taken into account while assessing damages.

    6. To easily understand the above principle we shall give an illustration: If the earnings of the claimant per month after all deduction is ‘a’ then that should be multiplied by 12 to get at the annual earnings. Thus ‘a’ × 12 will be the annual earnings. This will be the annual earnings in the case of total disablement. In the case of partial disablement the annual earnings will be ‘a’ × 12 = the annual earnings × the percentage of permanent disability by 100. In otherwords if the monthly earnings is Rs. 2000/- and the permanent disability is 12%, the multiplicand will be Rs. 2000 × 12 × = Rs. 2880/-. This Rs. 2880/- will be the multiplicand.

    7. This multiplicand must be multiplied by the multiplier. If the multiplier calculated, following the procedure indicated above, is 24 (assuming life expectancy is 70 years-this is approved by the Supreme Court) the compensation amount under this head will be Rs. 69,120/-.

    8. We shall now consider the question whether the appellant has been awarded adequate compensation. The facts relevant in this context are: That the appellant is a teacher receiving a sum of Rs. 718/- as salary is not disputed. He is also having an annual agricultural income of Rs. 10,000/-. The evidence available on record would show that the appellant in any event, at the date of the accident has been earning Rs. 1500/- per month. It is also established that the disability was 100% for four months, 50% for two months and 12% permanent. Of the above items of disabilities the disability of 100% for four months and 50% for two months have already been considered and compensation awarded under the head ‘special damages’. The dispute that survives for consideration is the one pertaining to the 12% permanent disability suffered by the appellant.

    9. Coming to the computation of the damages under this head it is necessary first to fix the life expectancy of the victim. The claimant at the time of the accident was 46 years old. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that going by judicial pronouncements of the Apex Court, the life expectancy of a citizen of this country can be fixed at 70 years. (See Jyotsna Dey v. State of Assam, 1987 (1) A.C.J 172). The appellant at the time of the accident was keeping good health and as such the counsel submits, he can expect to live in any event, upto 70 years. If that be the position the multiplier shall be 26. Any person who will be having sufficient earning after superannuation can expect to get sufficient income for a period of, going again by the Supreme Court ruling, ten years. (See State Insurance Officer, Trivandrum v. Thankamma, 1981 A.C.J 77 and Vasanthy G. Kamath… v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation…., 1981 A.C.J 353). Taking all these aspects into account, particularly the discount for him sum payment, we are of the view that the multiplier can be fixed at 20. The damages calculated on the basis of the multiplicand by 20 years of purchase value would be Rs. 32,800/-.

    10. Coming to the claim for compensation for plain and suffering and loss of amenities of life falling under the category ‘non-pecuniary losses’: It is next to impossibility to give any guidance in this regard because the amount of compensation varies as it does with particular injury. In otherwords the assessment of damages under this head should necessarily]be conjectural. However the fact that the injured has had at the time of the accident substantial and secured private income is irrelevant to the assessment of damages under this head. Why it is said so because, as observed by Diplock L.J in Fletcher v. Autocar and Transporters Ltd. (1968 (2) Q.B 322) “high though his deprivation ranks, I cannot think that it ranks any higher because the plaintiff, before the accident, was a rich man. Had an ordinary working man, who like the plaintiff had led before the accident a full, active and useful life in his own sphere, sustained the same injuries with the same physical and mental results, he would in my view have been entitled to monetary compensation of the same order as the plaintiff for the transformation of his life into a passive, empty and useless existence.” Compensation awarded under this head shall therefore be fair and reasonable. Such compensation is “an acknowledgment of regret for having caused a hurt that is imponderable rather than a compensation properly so called”. Compensation under this head therefore can be fixed, taking into account the facts and circumstances of the case, at Rs. 7000/-. The net amount thus will be Rs. 39,800/-. For convenience we round it off at Rs. 40,000/-. The Tribunal has awarded only Rs. 20,000/-. In the light of our discussion above the appellant is entitled to get Rs. 20,000/- more as damages under the head ‘loss of earnings and other gains’. The appellant is entitled to get interest at 12% on the total amount of damages from the date of the filing of the claim till realisation. However the Tribunal has allowed only 6%. The said direction therefore is set aside and it is declared that the appellant is entitled to get interest at 12% on the total amount of compensation from the date of the filing of the claim petition till realisation.

    11. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. No costs.

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    Comments

    M.D Chacko v. N. Sreedharan & Others
    (Oct 26, 1989)