Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Rules 10(3) and 12(2) of Order 26 of the present Code
  • Rule 12 (considered as similar to Rule 10)
  • provisions of Section 105(1) of the Code;
  • Code of 1859. Section 180 of Act 8/1859
  • Sec. 14 of the General Clauses Act,
  • Rules 11 and 12 of Order 26
  • Order 26 Rules 11 and 12,
  • Rules 10 and 12 of O. 26
  • Rules 10 and 12. Rule 14
  • Rule 10(3) of Order 26.
  • Sub-rule (3) of Rule 10
  • Rules 10(3) and 14(3)
  • Order 26 Rule 10(3)
  • Order 26 Rules 9
  • Rule 9 of O. 26
  • O. 26 Rule 14).
  • Rule 10(3).16.
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Rules 10(3) and 12(2) of Order 26 of the present Code
  • Rule 12 (considered as similar to Rule 10)
  • provisions of Section 105(1) of the Code;
  • Code of 1859. Section 180 of Act 8/1859
  • Sec. 14 of the General Clauses Act,
  • Rules 11 and 12 of Order 26
  • Order 26 Rules 11 and 12,
  • Rules 10 and 12 of O. 26
  • Rules 10 and 12. Rule 14
  • Rule 10(3) of Order 26.
  • Sub-rule (3) of Rule 10
  • Rules 10(3) and 14(3)
  • Order 26 Rule 10(3)
  • Order 26 Rules 9
  • Rule 9 of O. 26
  • O. 26 Rule 14).
  • Rule 10(3).16.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

"Manohar Clinic" (the petitioner) was originally classified as a consumer under class I(c) of the Electricity Board's tariff. After an X‑ray unit was installed, Officers of the Board re‑classified the connection as class IV(a). The petitioner lodged a complaint before the Chief Electrical Inspector and sought examination by the Electrical Inspector, Calicut. Meanwhile the petitioner instituted O.S. 641/79 before the Munsiff's Court, Kozhikode, seeking a declaration that retrospective demands based on the reclassification were illegal and of no effect.

In I.A. No. 1302 of 1980 the petitioner asked the trial court to appoint the Electrical Inspector, Calicut, as a Commissioner to report on correct classification and related technical matters (voltage, connected load, horse power, etc.). Despite opposition by Electricity Board officials, the Munsiff allowed the application.

The Electrical Inspector submitted a report on 24‑7‑1982 concluding that the connection was correctly classified as IV(a). The Inspector observed that class I(c) was for small consumers with connected load not exceeding 3 H.P. (approximately 3 KVA), whereas the X‑ray unit had a transformer (an accessory) whose rated capacity was 20 KVA.

The petitioner then filed I.A. 2592/82 seeking to set aside the Inspector's report and to have an experienced Advocate appointed as a new Commissioner to report on the same matters. The Munsiff dismissed this application by order dated 17‑9‑1982. The petitioner filed the present revision against that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, under Order 26 Rules 9, 10 and 12 of the Code (and related statutory provisions), a court may set aside or "wipe out" the report of a Commissioner appointed for local inspection or account examination and appoint a fresh Commissioner instead of ordering only "further enquiry".
  2. Whether, in the particular facts of this case, there were sufficient grounds (procedural or substantive) to set aside the Electrical Inspector's report and to appoint an Advocate Commissioner in his place.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hydrose v. Govindankutty, 1981 Ker LT 360 : AIR 1982 Ker 49 Held that Order 26 Rule 10(3) is insufficient to empower the court to set aside a Commissioner's report; court may call for further enquiry or at most appoint a fresh commissioner whose report would also form part of evidence under Rule 10(2). The trial court relied on the principle in Hydrose to refuse the petitioner's request to set aside the Electrical Inspector's report. The revising judge considered Hydrose persuasive but noted that even if that precedent were disregarded, other independent reasons supported the dismissal.
Swami Premananda v. Swami Yogananda, 1985 Ker LJ 225 : AIR 1985 Ker 83 Division Bench decision contrasting with Hydrose; discussed scope of Order 26 Rules 11 and 12 (commissions to examine accounts) and treated Rule 12 as comparable to Rule 10 for purposes of discussion about second commissions/reports. The petitioner relied on this Division Bench decision to contend that Hydrose was not good law. The court considered the decision but held that even if Hydrose's reasoning were not followed, the Munsiff's order was supportable on other grounds. The judge also expressed the view that Swami Premananda had not adverted to some aspects of Hydrose.
Chandan Mull v. Chiman Lal, AIR 1940 PC 3 Emphasized the need for circumspection in interfering with a Commissioner's report; criticized mechanically setting aside first commissioner's report simply because a second report was obtained. The court cited the passage to support the proposition that courts should be cautious before setting aside commission reports and that mere ordering of a second commission does not automatically justify discarding the first report.
Syud Azim Ali Khan (1875) 23 Suth WR 93 Early authority concerning local investigation commissions and practice regarding treatment of commission reports in evidence. The opinion notes that the discussion in Swami Premananda started with this old decision but distinguishes the statutory context then (Code of 1859) from the present Code and cautions against reading broad practice remarks as statutory interpretation for later rules.
B.C. Ghose v. T.P. Ghose (1966) 70 Cal WN 266 Interpretative approach to commission rules; struck a different note regarding annulling or setting aside a first commission report when considering Rule 10(3). Used to show that not all decisions endorse the rigid rule that a second commission cannot be appointed unless the first report is set aside.
Lakshmi v. Ouseph Mariyam (1926) 42 Trav Co. LR 429 Followed Syud Azim Ali Khan and cautioned against successive commissions; part of line of authorities critical of issuing successive commissions for same purpose. Discussed as historical authority that helped form a practice in some High Courts, but the opinion points out that these decisions sometimes blurred distinctions between different rule provisions.
Ambi v. Kunhi Kavama, AIR 1929 Mad 661 Noted differences in phraseology between Order 26 Rules 10(3) and 14(3); held that Rule 10(3) permits only further enquiries by same commission, not issuance of new commission. Cited to show how Madras decisions recognized a textual difference between rules but nonetheless allowed in some extreme cases discarding the record—an approach the present opinion criticizes as evolving from practice rather than statute.
Shib Charan Sahu v. Sarada Prasad, AIR 1937 Pat 670 Observed problems that could arise if trial court could set aside the first commissioner's report, potentially preventing appellate scrutiny and complicating revision/review processes. Relied upon to illustrate procedural complications and appellate concerns that support caution in permitting blanket setting aside of commission reports.
Sivaraman v. Narayanan, 1986 Ker LT 578 : AIR 1987 Ker 156 Held that it would not be appropriate to rule that under no circumstances could a court issue a second commission without setting aside the first. Cited to show that later decisions of the Court recognized exceptions and did not endorse an absolute bar on second commissions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded along two main axes: (A) statutory construction of the relevant rules in Order 26 of the Code and (B) the facts and procedural history of this specific case.

A. Statutory construction and general principles

  • The court emphasised the textual distinction between different provisions of Order 26. Rules 10 and 12 both state that the report of the Commissioner "shall be evidence in the suit" and both speak only of directing "further enquiry" where the court is dissatisfied. By contrast, Rule 14 (dealing with commissioners appointed after a preliminary decree in partition suits) expressly empowers the court to confirm, vary or set aside a commission report and to issue a fresh commission.
  • Because Rules 10 and 12 make the commissioner's report part of the evidence, the court reasoned that there is no express statutory power in those provisions to set aside a report; the statutory remedy is to direct "further enquiry". A power to order further enquiry is conceptually different from a power to obliterate or wipe out what has already been admitted as evidence.
  • The court examined historical decisions and earlier Codes (including Section 181 of the 1859 Code) and observed that practice remarks in early cases (which cautioned against successive commissions) cannot be conflated with a statutory rule permitting a court to set aside a commission's report where the later Code's language differs.
  • The court accepted that in rare and extreme cases — particularly where an on‑the‑spot enquiry is essential and the first report is utterly useless — a second commission may

    Structured Summary of the Opinion

    Factual and Procedural Background

    "Manohar Clinic" (the petitioner) was originally classified as a consumer under class I(c) of the Electricity Board's tariff. After an X‑ray unit was installed, Officers of the Board re‑classified the connection as class IV(a). The petitioner lodged a complaint before the Chief Electrical Inspector and sought examination by the Electrical Inspector, Calicut. Meanwhile the petitioner instituted O.S. 641/79 before the Munsiff's Court, Kozhikode, seeking a declaration that retrospective demands based on the reclassification were illegal and of no effect.

    In I.A. No. 1302 of 1980 the petitioner asked the trial court to appoint the Electrical Inspector, Calicut, as a Commissioner to report on correct classification and related technical matters (voltage, connected load, horse power, etc.). Despite opposition by Electricity Board officials, the Munsiff allowed the application.

    The Electrical Inspector submitted a report on 24‑7‑1982 concluding that the connection was correctly classified as IV(a). The Inspector observed that class I(c) was for small consumers with connected load not exceeding 3 H.P. (approximately 3 KVA), whereas the X‑ray unit had a transformer (an accessory) whose rated capacity was 20 KVA.

    The petitioner then filed I.A. 2592/82 seeking to set aside the Inspector's report and to have an experienced Advocate appointed as a new Commissioner to report on the same matters. The Munsiff dismissed this application by order dated 17‑9‑1982. The petitioner filed the present revision against that dismissal.

    Legal Issues Presented

    1. Whether, under Order 26 Rules 9, 10 and 12 of the Code (and related statutory provisions), a court may set aside or "wipe out" the report of a Commissioner appointed for local inspection or account examination and appoint a fresh Commissioner instead of ordering only "further enquiry".
    2. Whether, in the particular facts of this case, there were sufficient grounds (procedural or substantive) to set aside the Electrical Inspector's report and to appoint an Advocate Commissioner in his place.

    Arguments of the Parties

    The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

    Table of Precedents Cited

    Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
    Hydrose v. Govindankutty, 1981 Ker LT 360 : AIR 1982 Ker 49 Held that Order 26 Rule 10(3) is insufficient to empower the court to set aside a Commissioner's report; court may call for further enquiry or at most appoint a fresh commissioner whose report would also form part of evidence under Rule 10(2). The trial court relied on the principle in Hydrose to refuse the petitioner's request to set aside the Electrical Inspector's report. The revising judge considered Hydrose persuasive but noted that even if that precedent were disregarded, other independent reasons supported the dismissal.
    Swami Premananda v. Swami Yogananda, 1985 Ker LJ 225 : AIR 1985 Ker 83 Division Bench decision contrasting with Hydrose; discussed scope of Order 26 Rules 11 and 12 (commissions to examine accounts) and treated Rule 12 as comparable to Rule 10 for purposes of discussion about second commissions/reports. The petitioner relied on this Division Bench decision to contend that Hydrose was not good law. The court considered the decision but held that even if Hydrose's reasoning were not followed, the Munsiff's order was supportable on other grounds. The judge also expressed the view that Swami Premananda had not adverted to some aspects of Hydrose.
    Chandan Mull v. Chiman Lal, AIR 1940 PC 3 Emphasized the need for circumspection in interfering with a Commissioner's report; criticized mechanically setting aside first commissioner's report simply because a second report was obtained. The court cited the passage to support the proposition that courts should be cautious before setting aside commission reports and that mere ordering of a second commission does not automatically justify discarding the first report.
    Syud Azim Ali Khan (1875) 23 Suth WR 93 Early authority concerning local investigation commissions and practice regarding treatment of commission reports in evidence. The opinion notes that the discussion in Swami Premananda started with this old decision but distinguishes the statutory context then (Code of 1859) from the present Code and cautions against reading broad practice remarks as statutory interpretation for later rules.
    B.C. Ghose v. T.P. Ghose (1966) 70 Cal WN 266 Interpretative approach to commission rules; struck a different note regarding annulling or setting aside a first commission report when considering Rule 10(3). Used to show that not all decisions endorse the rigid rule that a second commission cannot be appointed unless the first report is set aside.
    Lakshmi v. Ouseph Mariyam (1926) 42 Trav Co. LR 429 Followed Syud Azim Ali Khan and cautioned against successive commissions; part of line of authorities critical of issuing successive commissions for same purpose. Discussed as historical authority that helped form a practice in some High Courts, but the opinion points out that these decisions sometimes blurred distinctions between different rule provisions.
    Ambi v. Kunhi Kavama, AIR 1929 Mad 661 Noted differences in phraseology between Order 26 Rules 10(3) and 14(3); held that Rule 10(3) permits only further enquiries by same commission, not issuance of new commission. Cited to show how Madras decisions recognized a textual difference between rules but nonetheless allowed in some extreme cases discarding the record—an approach the present opinion criticizes as evolving from practice rather than statute.
    Shib Charan Sahu v. Sarada Prasad, AIR 1937 Pat 670 Observed problems that could arise if trial court could set aside the first commissioner's report, potentially preventing appellate scrutiny and complicating revision/review processes. Relied upon to illustrate procedural complications and appellate concerns that support caution in permitting blanket setting aside of commission reports.
    Sivaraman v. Narayanan, 1986 Ker LT 578 : AIR 1987 Ker 156 Held that it would not be appropriate to rule that under no circumstances could a court issue a second commission without setting aside the first. Cited to show that later decisions of the Court recognized exceptions and did not endorse an absolute bar on second commissions.

    Court's Reasoning and Analysis

    The court's reasoning rested on statutory construction of Order 26 (Rules 9, 10, 12 and 14) and on the specific facts of the case. The analysis can be summarized in the following steps:

    1. Textual distinction between rules

    • Rules 10 and 12 declare that the commissioner's report "shall be evidence in the suit" and only provide for "further enquiry" where the court is dissatisfied. They do not expressly provide for setting aside or wiping out a commissioner's report.
    • By contrast, Rule 14 (partition matters after a preliminary decree) does not automatically make the report evidence and explicitly empowers the court to confirm, vary or set aside a commission report and to appoint a new commissioner.
    • The court emphasized that the difference in language between these provisions is significant and cannot be ignored in construing their scope and effect.

    2. Consequence of making the report "evidence"

    • If the statute requires that a commissioner's report "shall be evidence", the court queried how a tribunal could legitimately set aside or erase that evidence unless the statute also authorised such a power. Rules 10 and 12 permit further enquiry but stop short of authorising annulment of an earlier report.
    • The court drew a distinction between ordering additional enquiries (collecting more evidence) and obliterating earlier evidence; the former is authorised by Rules 10 and 12, the latter is not evidently authorised by those rules.

    3. Precedent and practice

    • The court reviewed historical authorities and High Court decisions that had, over time, developed a practice or rule that a second commission could not be appointed unless the first report was set aside. The judge was critical of the way that practice hardened into a rule “without support from the statute.”
    • Recognising conflicting authorities, the court observed that some decisions (including its own in Hydrose) supported a restrictive view while other benches (e.g., Swami Premananda DB) took a different approach. The judge noted that Swami Premananda did not discuss Hydrose's reasoning and that judicial discipline requires following a Division Bench, but the judge preserved the right to point out what he considered omissions in that decision.

    4. Practical and factual considerations in the present case

    • On the facts, the Inspector's report contained a key factual finding (the transformer's rated capacity of 20 KVA) which the petitioner did not appear to dispute. Because that was a foundational fact relevant to tariff classification, the court observed that the petitioner's inferences could be tested by adducing tariff provisions and other evidence or by examining the Inspector in court.
    • The Munsiff had also found that the petitioner had failed, despite opportunities and court directions, to produce necessary records that would assist the Inspector. That failure weighed against setting aside the report.
    • The court saw no basis to assume an Advocate Commissioner would produce a materially better report on the technical issues than the Electrical Inspector.
    • Finally, the court pointed out that the petitioner had not requested remittal of the report to the Commissioner for rectification of alleged defects; that remedy would have been appropriate if defects were claimed.

    Holding and Implications

    Holding: The revision is DISMISSED. The trial court's order dismissing I.A. 2592/82 (which sought to set aside the Electrical Inspector's report and appoint an Advocate Commissioner) is upheld. No costs were awarded.

    Implications:

    • The direct effect is that the Electrical Inspector's report stands as part of the evidence in the suit and the petitioner's application for substitution of an Advocate Commissioner (and setting aside the Inspector's report) is denied on both procedural and substantive grounds.
    • The opinion reiterates a cautious approach to disturbing commission reports received under Order 26 Rules 10 and 12: the statutory language makes those reports evidence and contemplates "further enquiry" rather than wholesale setting aside. The court acknowledged, however, that in rare and extreme circumstances a second commission may be appropriate without formally "wiping out" the first report.
    • No new broad precedent was proclaimed beyond the court's application of statutory construction and its assessment of the facts in this case; the judgment primarily affirms the Munsiff's exercise of discretion and underscores procedural remedies (such as remittal for rectification or adducing additional evidence) available to parties who challenge a commissioner's report.

    Disposition

    Revision dismissed. No costs.

    Dr. P. Subramoniam v. K.S.E Board And Others

    1. “Manohar Clinic” belonging to the petitioner was originally classified as a consumer of electrical energy, appropriate to class 1(c) of the Electricity Board's Tariff. Sometime after an X-ray unit was installed in the clinic, the Officers of the Board re-classified it as class IV(a). It appears that the petitioner filed some complaint before the Chief Electrical Inspector, and the matter was being got examined through the Electrical Inspector, Calicut. In the meanwhile, the petitioner filed O.S 641/79 before the Munsiff's Court of Kozhikode for a declaration that the demand for payment of electrical charges, with retrospective effect, on the basis of the reclassification, was illegal and of no effect. In I.A No. 1302 of 1980 the petitioner wanted the court to appoint the Electrical Inspector, Calicut as a Commissioner in the suit for reporting about correct classification and the tariff applicable to his electrical connection, as also about the “voltage, connected load, horse power etc.” The application was opposed by the Officials of the Electricity Board; but the court apparently thought that the dispute involved something in respect of which a report from an expert would be useful “Evidence should not be shut out”, said the Court and the I.A was accordingly allowed.

    2. The Electrical Inspector submitted his report to the court on 24-7-82, stating that though the parties had failed to make available some documents which would have been of assistance in making the required report, despite notice, a few relevant papers had in the meanwhile been obtained in connection with the enquiry ordered by the Chief Electrical Inspector, and that he was in a position to report on their basis that the connection was correctly classified as IV(a). According to the Inspector, Class I(c) was appropriate to small consumers with a connected load not exceeding “3 H.P corresponding to 3 KVA, but the X-ray unit in the petitioner's hospital had a transformer, an accessory to the unit, whose rated capacity itself was 20 KVA.

    3. The report was thus against the petitioner. It is not clear whether any objection was filed to this report or whether the Commissioner was examined; but on 16-8-82 the petitioner filed another I.A 2592/82 praying that the Inspector's report be set aside and that an experienced Advocate be appointed as a new Commissioner to report on the same matters. The court below dismissed the said I.A by order dated 17-9-1982, and hence the present revision.

    4. The I.A was dismissed, so far I could see, for four reasons:—

    (i) in Hydrose v. Govindankutty 1981 Ker LT 360 : (AIR 1982 Ker 49) this Court had held that Order 26 Rule 10(3) was insufficient to clothe the court with power to set aside the report of a Commissioner appointed under Rule 9: the Court could only call for a further report from the same commissioner, or at the most, appoint a fresh commissioner whose report would also form part of the evidence in the case, under Rule 10(2). There was therefore no question of granting the request for setting aside the Inspector's report. And there was no request a tall to remit the report to him for further enquiry:

    (ii) on the merits also, there were no grounds to set aside the report because despite grant of sufficient opportunities by the Inspector, and even directions from the Court, the plaintiff had failed to submit all the necessary records;

    (iii) there was no reason to assume that an Advocate Commissioner would be able to submit a better report on the subject, than the Electrical Inspector, and

    (iv) the points the petitioner wanted to prove could be proved by other evidence.

    5. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the view taken in Hydrose (AIR 1982 Ker 49) (by me) has not met with the approval of a subsequent Division Bench decision of this Court, reported in Swami Premananda v. Swami Yogananda 1985 Ker LJ 225 : (AIR 1985 Ker 83), and that itself will be sufficient ground to set aside the order of the Munsiff herein. I cannot agree, because even if reason No. (i) were to fail, the order could well be supported by reasons Nos. (ii) to (iv). The learned Munsiff, as already noticed, was careful enough to observe:

    “Even on merits there are no sufficient grounds to set aside the report ………. If there is any defect in the report, the petitioner should have prayed to remit the same for rectification of those mistakes.”

    The question was about the connected load of the petitioner's installation and the classification to be made on that basis, in terms of the Tariff; and the Inspector had found that even the transformer forming an accessory to the X-ray unit alone, had a rated capacity of 20 KVA. It does not appear that the petitioner had any case that this part of the report was inaccurate, and so long as this basic fact or factor was not in dispute, his inferences or conclusions could have been tested by producing the Tariff and examining him, or by adducing other evidence. There was no material at all before the court to think that under the circumstances, an Advocate Commissioner could have done anything more.

    6. The revision could and should be dismissed in the above view; and I see nothing in Swami Premananda 1985 Ker LJ 225 : (AIR 1985 Ker 83) to suggest that the report of a Commission once submitted before a court should be set aside and a new commission appointed, for the mere asking. On the other hand, almost all the decisions relied on by their Lordships of the Division Bench seem to have taken the opposite view. The question dealt with by the Bench was whether the mere circumstance that the trial court had chosen to get a second commission report was sufficient reason to set aside or ignore the first, and the answer given was that it was not. It was said:

    “We have no hesitation to hold that the court be low acted illegally and totally in excess of jurisdiction is mechanically setting aside the first Commissioner's report for the sole reason that a second Commissioner's report was ordered and obtained by the court……”

    The passage seen extracted in paragraph (8) of the judgment from Chandan Mull v. Chiman Lal AIR 1940 PC 3 also shows that the intention was to emphasise the need for being extremely circumspect, in interfering with the report of a Commissioner.

    7. Before parting with the case, however, I think I should point out that the Division Bench (in Swami Premananda) (AIR 1985 Ker 83) has not referred at all to my decision in Hydrose 1981 Ker LT 360 : (AIR 1982 Ker 49) and indicated how and why the reasoning therein could be overlooked ordiffered from. Judicial discipline requires me to follow the D.B and that is what I have already done, by ignoring the reasoning of the court below based on Hydrose but holding that its conclusion could be justified on the rest of the reasoning. But that does not mean that I should desist from expressing my humble opinion that some relevant aspects of the question had not been brought to the notice of their Lordships of the Division Bench, before the decision was rendered.

    8. Premananda 1985 Ker LJ 225 : (AIR 1985 Ker 83) was a case arising under Order 26 Rules 11 and 12, dealing with commissions to examine accounts, while Hydrose 1981 Ker LT 360 : (AIR 1982 Ker 49) had arisen under Order 26 Rules 9 and 10, dealing with Commissions for local inspection. Rule 10(2) provides that the report of the Commissioner and the evidence taken by him shall be evidence in the suit (even without examining the Commissioner), though it is permissible to examine him in open court “touching on any matters referred to him or mentioned in his report……..”. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 10 further provides that where the court is dissatisfied with the proceedings of the Commissioner, it may direct such further enquiry to be made as it shall think fit. Rule 12(2) also provides for treating the proceedings and the report of the Commissioner as evidence in the suit and empowers the court, where it is dissatisfied with these, to direct further enquiry. Even ignoring the difference that Rule 10(3) refers to dissatisfaction with the proceedings of the Commissioner, and Rule 12(2), to dissatisfaction with the proceedings and report of the Commissioner, two things seem to be important from the stand point of statutory construction:—

    (i) both the rules insist that the report of the commissioner “shall be evidence in the suit”;

    and (ii) both speak of” only “further enquiry”.

    Now, if the mandate of the statute is that the report of the Commissioner shall be treated as evidence in the suit, how can any court set it aside or wipe it out unless it is authorised to do that also, by the statute? As already noticed, Rules 10 and 12 do not authorise the court to set aside a commission report which it is required to treat as evidence: the rules only permit the ordering of “further enquiry” where the report already received is unsatisfactory. A power to order further enquiry into a matter is entirely different from a power to set aside or wipe out that which has already become part of the evidence in the suit as a result of the initial enquiry and the mandate of the statute.

    9. It is not as if those who framed the Code were unware of the distinction between the approaches in Rules 10 and 12 of O. 26 on the one hand, and in Rule 14, on the other. While the Commissioners contemplated in the first two rules are those appointed during the trial of a suit, the Commissioner in Rule 14 is one appointed after the passing of a preliminary decree in a partition suit, though, technically, it may be said that the passing of a preliminary decree does not have the effect of terminating the suit. That is perhaps why, unlike Rules 10 and 12. Rule 14 does not insist that the report of the Commissioner shall a utomatically form part of the evidence in the suit; and that also may be the reason why rule 14 confers specific power on the court to confirm, vary or set aside a commission report and also to issue a new commission. At any rate, while Rule 14 specifically contemplates the setting aside of a commission report and the appointment of a new commissioner, Rules 10 and 12 only speak of ordering “further enquiry”. The difference in language is not minor; and unless one is prepared to totally ignore the importance of language in construing statutory provisions, it is difficult to say that the power conferred under Rules 10 and 12 is similar to the one under Rule 14.

    10. The word “further” means “additional or “going beyond what exists”; and when Rules 10 and 12 refer to further enquiry, what is evidently intended is to collect and bring on record something in addition to what has already been brought in earlier. The intention could not have been to wipe the slate clean and start afresh.

    11. In Swami Premananda (AIR 1985 Ker 83), the discussion on the scope of Rule 12 (considered as similar to Rule 10) starts with the observation that the matter had become fairly clear even “110 years ago” by the decision in Syud Azim Ali Khan (1875) 23 Suth WR 93. That decision was rendered at a time when what was in force was the Code of 1859. Section 180 of Act 8/1859 dealt with “Commission for local investigation” and though it provided, for the treating of the report of the Commission as evidence in the suit, and also for examination of the Commission under certain circumstances, it had not made any provision as to what was to be done when the report was found to be unsatisfactory. In other words, there was no provision corresponding to Rule 10(3) of Order 26. Appointment of commissions “to investigate and adjust accounts” (corresponding to Rules 11 and 12 of Order 26 of the present Code) was the subject-matter of Section 181; and the last part of the Section was in the following terms:—

    “The proceedings of the commission shall be received in evidence in the case, unless the court may have reason to be dissatisfied with them, in which case the court shall make such further enquiry as may be requisite, and shall pass such ultimate judgment or order as may appear to it to be right and proper in the circumstances of the case.”

    And there was no provision at all in the 1859 Code for issue of Commissions in partition matters (like the one in O. 26 Rule 14). The decision in Syud Azim Ali Khan was one dealing with the report of a Commissioner appointed under Section 180, for local investigation; it was not concerned even with the “further enquiry” in Section 181. The very general remark that a second enquiry could not be ordered without absolutely quashing and annulling the proceedings of the first, was therefore not an interpretation of the provisions of Section 181; it was at the most an attempt to caution against misuse of power under Section 180, as a measure of practice. Can such remarks about practice be authority for the construction of a provision introduced into the statute years later? That was perhaps why P.B Mukherji J. (as he then was), who could not easily be assumed to have been unaware of the decision in Syud Azim Ali Khan, had struck an entirely different note (as regards annulling, quashing, setting aside or wiping out) in B.C Ghose v. T.P Ghose (1966) 70 Cal WN 266. As a measure of construing Rule 10(3) his Lordship was not in favour of the view that a second commissioner could not be appointed at all, without setting aside the report of the first Commissioner.

    12. It may perhaps be useful to notice that Sec. 181 of the 1959 Code had conferred some discretion on the Court not to treat the Commissioner's proceedings as evidence, if it was dissatisfied about the proceedings; the language of Rules 10(3) and 12(2) of Order 26 of the present Code is different.

    13. Another decision relied on in Swami Premananda (AIR 1985 Ker 83) is the one reported in Lakshmi v. Ouseph Mariyam (1926) 42 Trav Co. LR 429. That had only followed the view taken in Syud Azim Ali Khan, and a few decisions of the Madras High Court which too had deprecated the practice of issuing successive commissions on the same matter and for the same purpose, at ruinous costs for the parties. However, even the said decisions had noticed (vide for example Ambi v. Kunhi Kavama AIR 1929 Mad 661 the difference in phraseology between Rules 10(3) and 14(3) and held that what could be done under the former was only to direct further enquiries by the same commission, and not the issuance of a new commission. It was however observed that in extreme cases where the report of a Commissioner was found to be wholly unsatisfactory, the court could “discard the whole record and start afresh”. As I had had occasion to point out in Hydrose 1981 Ker LT 360 : (AIR 1982 Ker 49) this latter remark did little justice to the distinction between Rules 10(3) and 14(3) which their Lordships themselves had earlier highlighted. And if you go through the subsequent decisions of the Madras High Court on the subject, you will find that it was this “discarding” and “starting afresh” which, in course of time, was converted into the inviolable rule — without any support from the statute — that a second commission could not issue, unless the first is “wiped out”.

    14. The last part of Sec. 181 (of the 1859 Code) had perhaps indicated what a Court was ultimately expected to do when the report submitted by a Commission was found to be unsatisfactory: it could direct further enquiries to be held, and then proceed to pass “such ultimate judgment or order” as was right and proper “in the circumstances of the case.” This was apparently why the Patna and other High Courts have been taking the view that a commission report is but one piece of evidence in a case, that there could, in appropriate cases, be other pieces also, and that all such pieces of evidence are to be evaluated at the time when the Court is to pass “ultimate judgment” in the suit.

    15. A question was raised at the hearing as to what could be done when the local investigation report submitted by a Commissioner is found to be absolutely useless, if it were to be held that a new commission would be possible only in partition matters, under Rule 14(3). Decisions of the Patna. Calcutta, Punjab and Orissa High Courts indicate that where the result of an on-the-spot enquiry is essential, a second commission could be appointed, in those rare cases where such a step is found necessary, without setting aside the first report. Velu Pillai J. of this Court was also of this view. In Hydrose (AIR 982 Ker 49), I too had observed, for what it was worth, that even though a power to issue a second commission could not be found in Rule 10(3) such power “could be traced to the well-known principle that the power to issue a commission is not exhausted with the first exercise thereof”. Rule 9 of O. 26 empowers a court to issue a commission for local investigation when it deems it to be requisite for elucidating a matter in dispute; and this conferment of power, read in the light of Sec. 14 of the General Clauses Act, enables it to issue a second commission, if the elucidation obtained as a result of the first report turns out to be unsatisfactory. The question then is not whether a second commission could be appointed at all: it is whether the report of the first could or should be set aside before another could be thought of, and whether such a principle emerges from a construction of Rule 10(3).

    16. In Shib Charan Sahu v. Sarada Prasad AIR 1937 Pat 670 Courtney Terrel C.J had adverted to the situation where, if the trial court were granted the power to set aside the report of the first commission, the appellate court would be prevented from looking into it, despite the provisions of Section 105(1) of the Code; and the matter must evidently, become more complicated, when the setting aside is upheld by the High Court in a revision filed before it under Sec. 115. In fact, a more or less similar situation had arisen in Swami Premananda (AIR 1985 Ker 83) and their Lordships of the Division Bench had to adopt, if I may say so with respect, the peculiar approach of suggesting that even the decision of the High Court (in C.R.P No. 41 of 1975 involved in that case) was wholly without jurisdiction.

    17. No doubt, the Madras, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka High Courts have been taking the view that without setting aside the first commission report, no second commission can issue. The source of all these authorities appear to be a very early decision of the Madras High Court making some observation about the “practice” of the Munsiffs of Malabar, issuing one commission after another, or even simultaneous commissions without applying their mind to the needs of the situations or the nature of their power under the relevant rule. No one can approve of such a procedure. As I had pointed out in Hydrose (AIR 1982 Ker 49) to recognise a power in the court to issue a second commission, without setting aside the report of the first, is “not to hand over to the alcoholic the key of the distillery but only” to distinguish a matter of practice from a matter of law”. As Lord Reid has said, one should have regard to common sense, legal principle and public policy “in that order”, in regions like the present; and “the first two criteria are unlikely to leave much scope for the application of the third”. In other words one should not place matters of policy or practice at the forefront, and relegate to the background the reach and range of the language of a statute, while construing it. It is only necessary to add that even after noticing Swami Premananda (AIR 1985 Ker 83) a later decision of this Court in Sivaraman v. Narayanan 1986 Ker LT 578 : (AIR 1987 Ker 156) had observed that it would not be appropriate to hold that under no circumstances could a court issue a second commission, without setting aside the report of the first.

    Revision dismissed. No costs.

    Revision dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Dr. P. Subramoniam v. K.S.E Board And Others
    (Feb 11, 1987)