1. The petitioner-bank is a service co-operative society established under the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1959, for short, the Act.
2. After the coming into force of S. 80 of the Act, the petitioner adopted the staff pattern evidenced by exhibit M10(a) produced before the first respondent who by exhibit P6 award has declared that the second respondent is entitled to get reinstated in service as “salesman” with continuity of service and the benefit of back-wages with effect from 1 May 1977.
3. The facts relevant for deciding the issue arising for consideration in this original petition are these: While working as a commission agent, the second respondent was appointed as a salesman on a temporary basis, as is seen from exhibit P1. Exhibit P1 discloses that the appointment was subject to the approval of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, it is relevant to note here that at the time when the second respondent was appointed as saleman, he did not have the requisite qualification prescribed under rule 186 of the Co-operative Societies Rules, for short the rules, and, therefore, he was ineligible for being appointed as salesman. The petitioner, therefore, had approached the Registrar for sanction to appoint the second respondent as a salesman which, however, was turned down as is seen from exhibit P2.
4. The petitioner-society thereafter considered the impact of the above order refusing permission and resolved as is seen from exhibit P3 to terminate the service of the second respondent. The second respondent filed a revision before the Registrar against the order of termination, exhibit P3 The Registrar after considering the various contentions raised by the second respondent passed exhibit P4 order upholding the order of the Deputy Registrar that the appointment of the second respondent as salesman in the petitioner-bank is contrary to the express provisions contained in S. 80 of the Act. Aggrieved by exhibit P4 order the second respondent filed a revision before the Government. The Government by exhibit P5 order sustained the order terminating the service of the second respondent. Thereafter the second respondent got “the dispute” referred to the first respondent under S 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The first respondent after considering the various contentions raised by the parties has passed exhibit P6 award which is under challenge in this original petition.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned award exhibit P6 is not sustainable in law. Expanding this contention he submits:
6. The relationship between the petitioner and the second respondent under no circumstance can be said to be that of master and servant because the order appointing the second respondent as salesman was one passed contrary to the express provisions of S. 80 of the Act. Dilating on this point he submits that unless the relationship of master and servant exists the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act are not applicable and if that be the position, the question whether the termination of the service of the second respondent can be said to be retrenchment within the meaning of S. 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, does not arise for consideration. If it is not retrenchment, then S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act is not attracted, he submits.
7. That the petitioner-society has adopted the staff pattern prescribed under rule 188 is beyond challenge and, therefore, no appointment as salesman can be had unless the person recommended for appointment possesses S.S.L.C or its equivalent or a successful completion of the subordinate (Junior) Personnel Co-operative Training Course (Junior Diploma in Co-operation) as provided for under rule 186. An appointment bypassing the qualification prescribed under rule 186 can be had only if the society applies for and obtains the prior approval of the Registrar of Co operative Societies. (Vide second proviso to rule 188) It, therefore, follows that the appointments made without obtaining the prior approval of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, will be declared as appointments made without the authority of law and hence ab initio void. The contract of service in such cases can be terminated even without an enquiry. Here it is worth remembering that it is not the case of the second respondent that in such circumstances the appointment will only be voidable. For that matter, such a contention cannot be raised at all because these provisions as a matter of fact, prohibit the appointment of persons not possessing the prescribed qualification without the prior approval of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies.
8. I am fortified in this view by a Division Bench ruling of this Court in K.N Gopalan v. State Bank of Travancore [I.L.R 1980 (1) Ker. 81]. The petitioner in the said ruling secured employment without disclosing important facts which if disclosed will make him disqualified. The appointments in such cases, this Court, held, will be void and can be terminated without enquiry.
9. A question, however, would arise whether in such circumstances the termination of service will attract the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. To put it differently; if the service of such an appointee is terminated without complying with the provisions of S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, is he entitled to reinstatement and retrenchment compensation? He will not; because under law, the effect of the order sending him out will not be one terminating his services but will only be a declaration that he never had been appointed to that post. I would in this connection refer to a decision of this Court in Kunhikrishnan v. State Of Kerala [19???4 K.L.T 1066], wherein it has been stated thus:
“There was no dismissal or reduction in rank within the meaning of Art. 311 and, therefore, no enquiry as contemplated by that article was necessary. Assuming that the real reason why the service of the petitioner as Panchayat Executive Officer was purported to be terminated is that his character and antecedents were not found acceptable to the appointing authority, the real effect of the order was not to terminate the service of the petitioner as Panchayat Executive Officer, but only to declare that he has sever been appointed to that post. The rule regarding the character and antecedents of a person for appointment to the service is ready a rule laying down one of the qualifications of that person for appointment to the service. So, as the appointing authority was not satisfied about the character and antecedents of the petitioner, he was ineligible for being appointed to the service, which means that he had no qualification for being appointed to the service. Therefore, the order of reversion can only mean that the Government have finally decided that the petitioner was ineligible for appointment, it can not, therefore, be said that the petitioner's service as Panchayat Executive Officer was terminated by the impugned order as the appointment itself was void. In this view of the matter no question of the applicability of Art. 311 arises in the case.”
8. It, therefore, follows that the relationship between the petitioner and the second respondent brought about by exhibit P1 is not the relationship of master and servant and hence the petitioner is not entitled to the protection provided for under the industrial Disputes Act.
9. It is true that ail retrenchment is termination of service; but the vice versa is not always true. Only terminations which are the result of the exercises of volition by the master would fall within the meaning of S. 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act. If the termination is consequent upon orders passed by superior authorities constituted under the statute under which the employer is functioning, such termination will not partake of the character of retrenchment within the meaning of S. 2(oo). In such cases the employee whose services have been terminated, is not entitled to the benefit of S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. Vide C.V.A Hydrose and Son v. Joseph Sanjon [1967 K.L.T 975].
10. Learned counsel for the second respondent, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of India [1980 — II L.L.N 170], however, submits that the termination of the services of the second respondent, spells retrenchment. He submits that the expression “for any reason whatsoever,” in the definition of the word retrenchment, under S. 2(oo) is very wide and, therefore, whatever be the reason for the termination of the services of the second respondent, the said termination, inasmuch as it is in violation of the provision contained in S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, must be declared to be bad in law. That the second respondent has been working under the petitioner for more than 240 days is not in dispute. In fact the petitioner admits it. He, therefore, submits that the conditions precedent that are necessary to enable the second respondent to claim the benefit of S. 25-F, do exist in this case and, therefore, the impugned award may be declared void.
11. In order to appreciate this line of approach to the issue it is necessary to consider the scope of Ss. 25-F and 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Section 2(oo) suggests that the person who claims the benefit of S. 25-F must be one, validly appointed in the service of the employer. The service must be capable of being continued until any of the events envisaged under Cls. (a) to (c) of S. 2(oo) happens. In short the person who claims the benefit of S. 25-F shall establish that he is in the service of the employer having been appointed validly. It should be remembered that it is the contract of service that is terminated. A service cannot be terminated unless it is capable of being continued. The Supreme Court has held so in Workman of Bangalore Woollen, cotton and Silk Mills Company, Ltd. v. Bangalore Woollen Cotton and Silk Mills Company, Ltd. [A.I.R 1962 S.C 1363]
12. Having understood the law thus, we will consider the scope of the expression capable of being continued in service, in S. 2(00). “Capable of being continued” suggests that the employee should have entered the service under a valid contract of service which cannot be terminated without compling with the provisions of S. 25-F. The workman in order to avail of the benefits of S. 25-F should, therefore, establishment he has the right to continue in service and that the laid service has been terminated without complying with the provisions of S. 25-F.
13. It is in this backdrop the scope of the dictum of the Supreme Court in Santosh Gupta case [1980—II L.L.N 170] (vide supra), has to be considered. In the said decision the Supreme Court has referred to an earlier decision, in State Bank of India v. N. Sundaranony [1976 - II L.L.N 5], where the Supreme Court while considering the scope of S. 2(oo), has indicated that the order of termination which would attract the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act is the result of the exercise of volition by the employer. This is what the Supreme Court has said:
“… True, the section speaks of retrenchment by the employer and it is urged that some act of volition by the employer to bring about the termination is essential to attract S. 25-F and automatic extinguishment of service by effuxtion of time cannot be sufficient…”
When I refer to this passage I shall not be understood to have said that the Supreme Court has finally spoken on this aspect. Whatever that be, it can be seen from Santosh Gupta case (vide supra), that the Supreme Court had no occasion to consider the case of a workman whose appointment indisputably was void ab Initio. The contents of the relevant provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act positively indicate that the workman who is entitled to the benefits of the said enactment, must be one who came into the service under a valid order of appointment. His service must be capable of being continued unless any of the events contemplated under Cls. (a) to (c) of S. 2(oo) exist.
14. The facts available on record would show that the order appointing the petitioner as salesman was ab initio void and if that be so it cannot be said that the second respondent is a workman entitled to the benefits of S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The award directing reinstatement of the second respondent into service with back-wages, therefore, is not sustainable in law. Exhibit P6, therefore, is liable to be quashed. 1 accordingly quash exhibit P6.
15. In the peculiar circumstances of the case I am of the view that the payments made by the petitioner to the second respondent under directions of this Court shall be refunded and in case the second respondent fails to refund the same, the petitioner can recover it from the second respondent.
16. Original petition is allowed. In the circumstances of the case no order as to costs.