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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
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Acts
  • Section 132(11) read with section 132(12) of the Income-tax Act
  • provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922),
  • counsel.5. Section 132(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961,
  • Sections 132(11) and 132(12) of the Income-tax Act
  • sub-section (1) or sub-section (1A), the Income-tax
  • section 132(11) and (12) of the Income-tax Act.
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • section 132(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
  • section 132A(1) of the Income-tax Act
  • section 132(5) of the Income-tax Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Section 132(11) read with section 132(12) of the Income-tax Act
  • provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922),
  • counsel.5. Section 132(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961,
  • Sections 132(11) and 132(12) of the Income-tax Act
  • sub-section (1) or sub-section (1A), the Income-tax
  • section 132(11) and (12) of the Income-tax Act.
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • section 132(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
  • section 132A(1) of the Income-tax Act
  • section 132(5) of the Income-tax Act
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — K.S. Paripoornan, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The original petition sought a writ of certiorari to quash Ex. P-20, an order dated 15 October 1985 passed under section 132(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The petitioner also sought a declaration that Rs. 1,50,000 seized on 4 July 1982 belonged to him and a direction restraining respondents Nos. 1 and 2 from implementing Ex. P-20 and to return the sum with interest.

On 4 July 1982 officers of the Special Customs Preventive Unit, Kanhangad, apprehended Shri K.K. Abdulkareem (third respondent) and Shri K. Hamza and recovered Rs. 40,000 and Rs. 1,10,000 respectively while they were travelling by bus. No prima facie case under the Customs Regulations emerged and the Enforcement Directorate handed the matter to the Income-tax Department. The money was taken over by the Income-tax Department under section 132A(1) on 27 June 1985.

The Income-tax Officer (first respondent) issued notices to Shri K.K. Abdulkareem, Shri K. Hamza and Shri P.M. Hasan (Ashraf Fabrics — uncle of the petitioner) calling for explanations; the three furnished explanations. The petitioner, P.M. Kunhabdulla Haji, also gave a statement. After considering the explanations and statements and the relationships and circumstances, the first respondent concluded that possession and ownership of the total sum of Rs. 1,50,000 vested with Shri K.K. Abdulkareem and treated the amount as part of his undisclosed income. A summary assessment for the financial year 1982–83 was made and Ex. P-20 dated 15 October 1985 under section 132(5) was passed; that order is the subject of the present petition.

The petitioner was represented before this court by Mr. S.A. Nagendran.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Ex. P-20, the order dated 15 October 1985 passed under section 132(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, should be quashed.
  2. Whether the sum of Rs. 1,50,000 seized on 4 July 1982 belongs to the petitioner and should be directed to be returned to him with interest.
  3. Whether the petitioner is precluded from seeking relief under Article 226 because an alternate efficacious remedy exists under sections 132(11) and 132(12) of the Income-tax Act, and whether the petitioner (a non-party to the original summary proceeding) can invoke the remedy under section 132(11).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The Rs. 1,50,000 seized on 4 July 1982 belonged to the petitioner. He had advanced a loan to M/s Ashraf Fabrics in 1980 and the balance of Rs. 1,50,000 was repaid on 14 June 1982 and kept at the petitioner's house in Kanhangad.
  • The petitioner instructed his wife Smt. Beefathumma to hand over the amount to Shri O.P. Ibrahimkutty (Fish Merchant, Payangadi). The petitioner left India on 16 June 1982 for Sharjah.
  • The petitioner's wife entrusted the money to her brother (Shri Abdulkareem) to deliver to Ibrahimkutty on 4 July 1982; Abdulkareem and his friend Hamza were travelling to Payangadi by bus to effect the delivery when the money was seized.
  • The order in Ex. P-20 is illegal because, despite statements supporting the petitioner's account, the Income-tax Officer accepted alleged contradictions and treated the money as forming part of the third respondent's undisclosed income; this finding is asserted to be patently illegal and the order should be annulled.

The opinion does not set out a separate, detailed narrative of the respondents' legal submissions to this court; the Income-tax Officer's reasoning in Ex. P-20 is recorded and considered in the court's analysis.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gita Devi Dhurka v. ITO, [1977] Tax LR 722 Referenced in relation to the sufficiency and availability of alternate remedies under earlier law; it was a decision of the Madras High Court decided before amendment of sections 132(11) and (12). The court distinguished this decision on the facts and timing (pre-amendment) and held that it has no application to the instant case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the scope and effect of section 132(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, observing that the provision empowers the Income-tax Officer to make a summary estimate of undisclosed income "to the best of his judgment" on available materials, after affording the person concerned an opportunity of being heard and making prescribed enquiries within 120 days of seizure.

The court noted the factual sequence: the money was physically seized from Shri K.K. Abdulkareem and Shri K. Hamza while they were travelling; proceedings were initiated against the person from whose custody the money was seized (the "person concerned"), and in view of the statutory presumption in section 132(4A) of the Act the Income-tax Officer gave notice to the third respondent and made the order under section 132(5).

On procedure, the court found prima facie nothing illegal or improper in the manner the Income-tax Officer conducted the enquiry: notices were issued and opportunity given to the person from whose custody the money was seized; statements of the petitioner and others were recorded; the officer evaluated the various explanations and, on appreciation of facts and circumstances, concluded that the amount formed part of the third respondent's undisclosed income.

The court emphasized that the petitioner did not contend that the finding was based on no material or was perverse. Given that Ex. P-20 is a summary order and that the finding was an assessment based on available materials and appreciation of circumstances, the court held that such a finding is not ordinarily open to challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution. The court also observed that the summary order is subject to review in a regular assessment where fuller materials may be considered.

More fundamentally, the court analysed sections 132(11) and 132(12), which provide an alternate statutory remedy: any person objecting to an order under subsection (5) may, within thirty days, apply to the Commissioner stating reasons and requesting relief; the Commissioner or Board may thereafter, after hearing, pass such orders as deemed fit. The court described the Commissioner's power under these provisions as "very wide" and held that the petitioner can ventilate grievances by applying to the Commissioner.

The petitioner argued he was not a party to the Ex. P-20 proceeding and therefore could not invoke section 132(11). The court rejected this contention, holding that section 132(11) is available to "any person" objecting to an order under section 132(5), not restricted to the person from whom amounts were recovered. The court interpreted the thirty-day period for strangers as running from knowledge of the order, whereas for a person named in the order it runs from communication of the order.

Applying these legal principles, and distinguishing the Madras High Court decision in Gita Devi Dhurka (on grounds of facts and the pre-amendment context), the court concluded there was no warrant to exercise the discretionary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 in the present matter.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The original petition is dismissed in limine.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • The Ex. P-20 order dated 15 October 1985 under section 132(5) of the Income-tax Act stands and is not quashed by this court.
  • The petitioner is directed to pursue the statutory remedy under sections 132(11) and 132(12) (by making an application to the Commissioner within the prescribed period) to seek appropriate relief; the court holds that remedy to be equally efficacious and available to the petitioner even though he was not the person from whose custody the money was seized.
  • The court noted that the summary assessment is reviewable in a regular assessment based on fuller materials; the decision in this petition does not amount to the setting of new legal precedent beyond the interpretation and application of the statutory scheme in the facts of this case.

There is no indication in the opinion that the court intended to establish a broader binding precedent; rather it applied existing statutory provisions and distinguished an earlier case on its facts and timing.

    P.M Kunhabdulla Haji v. Income-Tax Officer And Others

    K.S Paripoornan, J.:— The original petition is filed for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash Ex. P-20 order dated October 15, 1985, passed by the first respondent under section 132(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. There is also a prayer for the issue of an appropriate writ or direction to declare that the amount of Rs. 1,50,000 seized on July 4, 1982, belongs to the petitioner and to direct respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to forbear from giving effect to exhibit P-20 and directing the respondents to return the amount of Rs. 1,50,000 with interest due thereon to the petitioner.

    2. On July 4, 1982, the officers of the Special Customs Preventive Unit, Kanhangad, apprehended the third respondent—Shri K.K Abdulkareem —and Shri K. Hamza and recovered a sum of Rs. 40,000 and Rs. 1,10,000 from them, respectively. They were proceeding to Kuttiangadi from Kanhangad by bus. No prima facie case under the Customs Regulations was disclosed. The Enforcement Directorate made over the case to the Income-tax Department for investigation. The money was taken over by the Department under section 132A(1) of the Income-tax Act on June 27, 1985. The first respondent—Income-tax Officer—issued notices to the third respondent.—Shri K.K Abdulkareem—Shri K. Hamza and Shri P.M Hasan (Ashraf Fabrics, Kanhangad) (uncle of the petitioner) calling for explanation regarding the nature of possession and source of acquisition of the monies. They furnished their explanations. Apart from the above three persons, the petitioner—P.M Kunhabdulla Haji—also gave a statement before the first respondent. After considering the various explanations and the statements of the parties, the first respondent held that the possession and ownership of the total sum of Rs. 1,50,000 vested with Shri K.K Abdulkareem and the source of acquisition and nature of possession of money seized have to be considered in his hands. After considering the statements of Shri Abdulkareem, Shri K. Hamza, Shri P.M Hassan (uncle of the petitioner) and P.M Kunhabdulla Haji (petitioner herein) and the relationship between the parties and the nature of possession of the money seized from K.K Abdulkareem (3rd respondent herein) and his friend, Shri K. Hamza, it was found that the explanations offered by the third respondent and Hamza are not satisfactory and that the amount should be treated as only part of his undisclosed income. Since the amount was seized on July 4, 1982, on the basis of the materials on record, a summary assessment was made for the financial year 1982–83. This order (exhibit P-20) dated October 15, 1985, passed under section 132(5) of the Income-tax Act is in challenge in this original petition.

    3. I heard counsel for the petitioner, Mr. S.A Nagendran. It is the petitioner's case that the amount seized from the third respondent— Abdulkareem—and Shri K. Hamza belongs to him. Briefly stated, the plea of the petitioner is that he had given a loan to M/s. Ashraf Fabrics, Kanhangad, in 1980. While the petitioner was in India, M/s. Ashraf Fabrics returned the balance of the loan Rs. 1,50,000, on June 14, 1982. It was kept in the house of the petitioner in Kanhangad. The petitioner instructed his wife, Smt. Beefathumma, to give the said amount to Shri O.P Ibrahimkutty, Fish Merchant, Payangadi. Thereafter, he left India for Sharjah on June 16, 1982. The petitioner's wife entrusted the amount of Rs. 1,50,000 to her brother, Shri Abdulkareem, to hand over the amount to Shri O.P Ibrahimkutty on July 4, 1982. The third respondent along with his friend, Shri K. Hamza, proceeded to Payangadi by bus to hand over the amount to Ibrahimkutty and on the way the amount was seized by the Special Customs Preventive Unit. The amount really belongs to the petitioner.

    4. It has been so stated before the first respondent by all concerned. Even so, holding that there are contradictions in the various statements furnished by the parties, the first respondent held that the money seized belongs to the third respondent. This is patently illegal. Exhibit P-20 order suffers from serious infirmity and deserves to be annulled. So runs the argument of petitioner's counsel.

    5. section 132(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in so far as it is relevant for the purpose of this case, is as follows:

    “Where any money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing (hereafter in this section and in sections 132A and 132B referred to as the assets) is seized under sub-section (1) or sub-section (1A), the Income-tax Officer, after affording a reasonable opportunity to the person concerned of being heard and making such enquiry as may be prescribed, shall, within one hundred and twenty days of the seizure, make an order, with the previous approval of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner,—

    (i) estimating the undisclosed income (including the income from the undisclosed property) in a summary manner to the best of his judgment on the basis of such materials as are available with him;

    (ii) calculating the amount of tax on the income so estimated in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), or this Act.”

    6. It is evident that this section empowers the Income-tax Officer to estimate the undisclosed income of the person concerned in a summary manner to the best of his judgment. Admittedly, the amount was seized from the third respondent—K.K Abdulkareem—and Shri K. Hamza, who accompanied him, while they were travelling by bus. Proceedings were initiated against the third respondent. Prima facie, the person from whose custody or possession the money has been seized is the “person concerned” who should be given an opportunity of being heard in the enquiry under section 132(5) of the Act in view of section 132(4A) of the Act and the presumption enacted therein. The Income-tax Officer, in view of the presumption enacted in section 132(4A) of the Act, gave notice to the third respondent and passed the order under section 132(5) of the Act. Prima facie, there is nothing illegal or improper in the procedure adopted by the Income-tax Officer. After affording sufficient opportunity to the third respondent and Hamza from whom the amounts were seized and also after recording the statement of the petitioner and others and on an analysis of the various facts and circumstances, the first respondent in exhibit P-20 order found that the amount formed part of the undisclosed income of the third respondent. Such a finding was arrived at on an appreciation of various facts and circumstances. It is not the case of the petitioner that the said finding is based on no material or is otherwise perverse. The finding so arrived at is not ordinarily open to challenge in these proceedings under article 226 of the Constitution of India. As stated, the order passed under section 132(5) of the Act is only a summary one and the matter is reviewable in the regular assessment on the basis of proper materials. In my opinion, exhibit P-20 is not open to any challenge, at this stage, in these proceedings.

    7. The original petition should fail on a more fundamental ground. Section 132(11) read with section 132(12) of the Income-tax Act provides an equally efficacious alternate remedy to the petitioner to make an application before the Commissioner of Income-tax stating his objections and requesting for appropriate relief. Sections 132(11) and 132(12) of the Income-tax Act are as follows:

    “(11) If any person objects for any reason to an order made under sub-section (5), he may, within thirty days of the date of such order, make an application to the Commissioner stating therein the reasons for such objection and requesting for appropriate relief in the matter.

    (12) On receipt of the application under sub-section (10) the Board, or on receipt of the application under sub-section (11) the Commissioner, may, after giving the applicant an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders as it or he thinks fit.”

    8. The power vested in the Commissioner under section 132(11) read with section 132(12) of the Act is very wide and the petitioner can ventilate his grievances, if any, in an application which can be filed before the Commissioner.

    9. Counsel for the petitioner stated that the petitioner was not a party to exhibit P-20 proceedings. So, he cannot invoke section 132(11) of the Act and file an application before the Commissioner. This contention is without substance. Any person objecting to an order passed under section 132(5) of the Act, for any reason, can invoke section 132(11) of the Act. It is not confined to the person from whom the amounts were recovered or the person against whom an order under section 132(5) was passed. Even if a copy of the order passed under section 132(5) was not served on the petitioner, it is open to “any person” to file an application under section 132(11) of the Act within thirty days from the date of such order, which means, thirty days from the date of the communication of such order. It is so as against the person who was a party to the proceeding and against whom an order under section 132(5) was passed “eo nomine”. In the case of strangers, prima facie it appears, that 30 days from the date of such order may mean, 30 days from the date of knowledge of such order, so far as the person who files an application under section 132(11) is concerned. For these reasons, I hold that there is no warrant to exercise the discretionary jurisdiction of this court under article 226 of the Constitution of India. I repel the contention of the petitioner that the remedy provided under section 132(11) of the Act is not an equally efficacious remedy. The decision of the Madras High Court in Gita Devi Dhurka v. ITO, [1977] Tax LR 722, turned on the particular facts of that case. It was also before the amendment of section 132(11) and (12) of the Income-tax Act. On facts, the said decision has no application to the instant case.

    10. There is no merit in this original petition. It is dismissed in limine.

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    P.M Kunhabdulla Haji v. Income-Tax Officer And Others
    (Jan 6, 1986)