Bhaskaran, A.C.J:— The first respondent, the widow of one Sri Burno, filed an application, W.C.C No. 356 of 1978, before the respondent, the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Ernakulam, claiming compensation under S. 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (the Act), from the appellant, on the allegation that her husband who was a headload worker, in the employment of the appellant, died on 2 May, 1974, due to an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. That the first respondent's husband was an employee under the appellant who was during the material time a shipping, clearing and forwarding agent at Cochin, and that he (the first respondent's husband) died on 2 May, 1974, are facts admitted by the appellant. The only question that required decision by the second respondent was whether the death of the first respondent's husband was due to an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.
2. The second respondent-Commissioner had initially passed orders dismissing the application. This Court, however, in appeal, set aside that order and remanded the matter to the second respondent-Commissioner for fresh disposal according to law, and in the light of the observations contained in that judgment. The second respondent-Commissioner, after the remand, having allowed the application as prayed for, this appeal has been preferred by the employer, who figured as the opposite party in the application before the second respondent. At the time when the appeal was admitted, this Court had allowed the first respondent to withdraw Rs. 5,000 out of the sum of Rs. 10,000 deposited by the appellant towards the compensation allowed in favour of the first respondent by the second respondent.
3. On the side of the applicant, before the Commissioner, WW1 to WW5 were examined and the medical certificate, exhibit W1 marked. On the side of the opposite party, OW1 to OW4 were examined and exhibits O1 to 04 were marked. The most important piece of evidence in the case was that of the coworker of the husband of the first respondent herein. According to him, on 2 May, 1974, there was urgent shipment and the first respondent's husband was carrying the cashew boxes even forgoing his lunch interval; it was a very hot day; and the workman who was already suffering from heart disease fell down while on work. Following this he died.
4. The object behind the legislation being protection to the weaker section with a view to do social justice, the provisions of the Act have to be interpreted liberally, so that other things being equal, the leaning of the Court has to be towards the person for whose benefit the legislation is made. Bearing this principle in mind, the expression “accident” found in Sub-sec. (1) of S. 3 of the Act has to be understood as meaning a mishap or untoward event, not expected or designed. In other words, the basic and indispensable ingredient of the accident is the unexpectation. In this case, the workman who was already suffering from heart disease, as disclosed by the oral evidence of the coworker of the first respondent's husband, and exhibit W1 medical certificate, when he was subjected to over-exertion, there was a sudden deterioration of his health which proved to be fatal. But for this overexertion, which he was not able to bear in the state of health in which he was then, the death, following his fall while carrying the cashew boxes, would not have occurred. In this way, there is a causal connection between the employment and his death in the unexpected way. This could certainly be considered to be an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, which would entitle the dependant-legal heir to claim compensation.
5. The principles to be followed in deciding employer's liability for compensation for accident arising out of and in the course of employment have been well-settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in M. Meckenzie v. I.M Issak, [(1969) 2 SCC 607 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 1906], to which reference has been made in the order appealed against. The facts of that case in brief have been stated in the last paragraph (Para. 12) of the decision at page 1912 of the report which read as follows:
“What are the facts found in the present case? Shaikh Hassan Ibrahim was employed as a deck-hand, a sea-man of category II on the ship. The medical log book of the ship showed that on 13 December, 1961, Shaikh Hassan complained of pain in the chest and was, therefore, examined, but nothing abnormal was detected clinically. The Medical Officer on board the ship prescribed some tablets for Shaikh Hassan and he reported fit for work on the next day. On 15th, however, he complained of insomnia and pain in the chest for which the Medical Officer prescribed sedative tablets. The official log book of the ship shows that on the 16th when the ship was in the Persian Gulf, Shaikh Hassan was seen near the bridge of the ship at about 2.20 A.M He was sent back but at 3 A.M he was seen on the Tween Deck when he told a seaman on duty that he was going to bed. At 6.15 A.M he was found missing and a search was undertaken. The dead body, however, was not found either on that day or later on.”
5. On the facts narrated above, the Supreme Court held:
“The evidence does not show that it was a stormy night. The Commissioner made a local inspection of the ship and saw the position of the bridge and deck and found that there was a bulwark more than 3½ feet. Nobody saw the missing seaman at the so-called place of accident. The Additional Commissioner held that there was no material for holding that the death of the seaman took place on account of an accident which arose out of his employment. In our opinion, the Additional Commissioner did not commit any error of law in reaching his finding and the High Court was not justified in reversing it.”
The observations of the Additional Commissioner, on the nature of the evidence that was available in that case, as quoted by the Supreme Court in Para. 3 of the judgment at pages 1907 and 1908 of the report, are as follows:
“Now in the present case what is the evidence before me? It is argued on behalf of the applicant that I must presume that the man fell down accidentally. From which place did he fall down? How did he fall down? At what time he fell down? Why was he at the time at the place from which he fell down? All these questions, it is impossible to answer.”
6. The facts of the case decided by the Supreme Court, as aforementioned, could be clearly distinguished from the facts of the present case. In the Supreme Court case, there was no evidence as to what the real cause of the disappearance of the workman was. There was no causal connection established between his having been found missing and the fact that he was having a history of heart ailment. In this case, in the light of the evidence gatherable from the deposition of the coworker, examined before the Commissioner, and exhibit W1 medical certificate which showed that the workman was treated in the Gautham Hospital, Panayappally, earlier, it is fairly clear that the workman was a person having heart disease; and any arduous work for long periods in the hot weather, without allowing him time even for taking food, would have contributed to the aggravation of the disease, resulting in the acceleration of death. Due to over-exertion for a long time which a person who was having heart disease could not have withstood, he fell down, and that resulted in his death, which might not have happened otherwise. There is certainly an element of causal connection between this incident and his death. The second respondent-Commissioner, in our view, has decided the matter correctly when he took the view that the death of the workman was due to accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.
7. The result, therefore, is that the appeal fails and is dismissed; however, in the circumstances of the case, without any order as to costs.