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  • provisions of the Probation of Offenders' Act, 1958 (for short the Act) or the provisions of S. 360 of the Code,
  • provisions of the Probation of Offenders' Act, 1958, or the Children Act, 1960,
  • Act 18 of 1923. Act 37 of 1923 inserted sub-s. (1A) in S. 562
  • PROBATION OF OFFENDERS ACT
  • GENERAL CLAUSES ACT
  • S. 8(1) of the General Clauses' Act, 1897.
  • Act to S. 562 of the Code of 1898
  • S. 8(1) of the General Clauses Act
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citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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Acts
  • provisions of the Probation of Offenders' Act, 1958 (for short the Act) or the provisions of S. 360 of the Code,
  • provisions of the Probation of Offenders' Act, 1958, or the Children Act, 1960,
  • Act 18 of 1923. Act 37 of 1923 inserted sub-s. (1A) in S. 562
  • PROBATION OF OFFENDERS ACT
  • GENERAL CLAUSES ACT
  • S. 8(1) of the General Clauses' Act, 1897.
  • Act to S. 562 of the Code of 1898
  • S. 8(1) of the General Clauses Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Respondents were tried before the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Neyyattinkara in C.C. 133 of 1981 on charges under Sections 341, 324 and 326 IPC read with Section 34 IPC. They were convicted and each sentenced to simple imprisonment for three months under Section 326 read with Section 34 IPC, and to simple imprisonment for 15 days under Section 341 IPC, the two sentences to run concurrently; no separate sentence was imposed under Section 324 IPC. On appeal, the First Additional Sessions Judge, Trivandrum, reduced the conviction under Section 326 IPC to one under Section 325 IPC, maintained the other conviction, set aside the sentences imposed and remanded the case for the Magistrate's consideration of the applicability of Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the Code).

The High Court took the matter in revision because of uncertainty whether Section 360 of the Code was applicable in Kerala, given the Probation of Offenders' Act, 1958 (the Act). Notice was given to the respondents and the Public Prosecutor; respondents did not appear. The Public Prosecutor was heard.

On the factual matrix: Pws. 1 and 2 (sisters) and the first respondent shared property. Pw.2 sought a share from the first respondent; a dispute ensued. On 14-1-1981, the two respondents allegedly entered the hall occupied by Pw.2. The second respondent is said to have wrongfully restrained Pw.1; the first respondent allegedly beat Pw.1 and Pw.2 with an iron rod, causing serious injuries. Pws.1 and 2 were admitted to Medical College Hospital, Trivandrum; wound certificates were issued (Exts. P1 and P2). An FIR (Ext. P6) was registered initially against unknown persons, later re-registered and expanded to include the two respondents. Investigation was completed and charge was laid.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in the State of Kerala (where the Probation of Offenders' Act, 1958 was brought into force), Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is applicable, or whether the provisions of the Probation of Offenders' Act supplant or exclude Section 360 in that State.
  2. How Section 19 of the Probation of Offenders' Act (which refers to Section 562 of the Code of 1898) is to be construed in light of the repeal of the Code of 1898 and the re-enactment of corresponding provisions (notably Section 360) in the Code of 1973, applying Section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act, 1897.
  3. Whether the Sessions Judge erred in remanding the case to the Magistrate to consider the applicability of Section 360 of the Code instead of deciding the question himself.

Arguments of the Parties

Prosecution's Case (summarized from the opinion)

  • Pws. 1 and 2 sustained injuries, evidenced by medical testimony and wound certificates (Exts. P1 and P2).
  • Pws. 1 and 2 gave consistent accounts of being assaulted by the respondents; their evidence is corroborated by Pw.4 (their uncle).
  • Investigation and FIR formalities were carried out (initial registration, transfer, re-registration and scene inspection), and the police submitted a report to include counts under Ss. 341, 326 and 34 IPC and to name the two respondents as accused.

Respondents' / Defence Case (summarized from the opinion)

  • Respondents denied the allegations and claimed that Pw.4, his sons, Pws. 1 and 2 and their husbands came to the respondents' house and attempted to throw household articles out; the second respondent obstructed them and called for help; when the first respondent came, he too was allegedly assaulted and injured.
  • Dw.1 gave evidence supporting the defence version; the defence suggested that the respondents were the injured parties rather than the assailants.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India ((1979) 2 SCC 529 : AIR 1979 SC 798) Authority for applying Section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act: where a statute merely references a provision of another enactment, the reference should be read as referring to the provision as it stands from time to time (i.e., after repeal/re-enactment), unless a different intention appears. The court relied on this decision to support its conclusion that the reference in Section 19 of the Probation Act to Section 562 of the Code of 1898 must be construed as a reference to Section 360 of the Code (1973) after repeal and re-enactment, applying Section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act.
Beepathumma v. Special Deputy Tahsildar (1982 KLT. 130) Followed the principle in Mahindra & Mahindra regarding application of Section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act to references to repealed/re-enacted provisions. The court noted that this Court had followed the Mahindra principle in Beepathumma, and treated that decision as fortifying the present conclusion that references to Section 562 (Code of 1898) should be read as references to Section 360 (Code of 1973).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed two main strands of reasoning: (A) factual sufficiency supporting conviction; and (B) statutory construction concerning the interplay between Section 360 of the Code (1973) and the Probation of Offenders' Act (1958).

A. Factual and evidential analysis (convictions)

  • The court found no error in the findings of the two lower courts accepting the prosecution's case. The medical evidence (doctor's testimony and wound certificates Exts. P1 and P2) established that Pws. 1 and 2 sustained injuries.
  • Pw.4 corroborated the account of Pws. 1 and 2. Other eyewitnesses (Pws. 3 and 10) turned hostile; Dw.1 was found to be an interested witness supporting the first respondent and not reliable.
  • On these bases, the court held that convictions under Sections 325, 341 and 324 IPC read with Section 34 IPC could not be interfered with.

B. Statutory construction: whether Section 360 of the Code applies in Kerala where the Probation Act is in force

  1. Historical statutory background:
    • The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 contained Section 562, conferring power to release certain convicted offenders on probation or admonition; Section 562 was amended by earlier Acts noted in the opinion.
    • The Probation of Offenders' Act, 1958 was designed to cover the wider area of offender reformation and was brought into force in Kerala by notification in 1958. Section 19 of the Act provided that, subject to Section 18, Section 562 of the Code (1898) shall cease to apply in areas where the Act is brought into force.
    • The Code of 1898 was repealed and re-enacted as the Code of 1973, which came into force on 1-4-1974; Section 360 of the Code (1973) is broadly parallel to Section 562 of the Code of 1898 (with differences).
  2. Application of Section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act, 1897:
    • Section 8(1) provides that where a former enactment is repealed and re-enacted (with or without modification), references in other enactments to the repealed provision shall, unless a different intention appears, be construed as references to the re-enacted provision.
    • Applying Section 8(1), the court reasoned that the reference in Section 19 of the Probation Act to Section 562 of the Code of 1898 should be read as a reference to Section 360 of the Code (1973), unless a different intention appears.
  3. Conclusion from construction and practical incompatibility:
    • The court emphasised important substantive differences between Section 360 of the Code and the Probation Act (scope, age and gender limitations in Section 360, absence in Section 360 of probation officer roles, and provisions like Section 12 of the Act removing disqualification attaching to conviction when dealt with under the Act).
    • The court found that permitting both Section 360 and the Probation Act to operate concurrently in the same area would lead to anomalous results given these significant differences.
    • Therefore, by applying Section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act and construing Section 19 of the Probation Act accordingly, the court held that in Kerala (where the Probation Act had been brought into force) Section 360 of the Code is wholly inapplicable and only the Probation Act's provisions can be applied.
  4. Procedural propriety:
    • The court criticised the Sessions Judge's decision to remand the matter to the Magistrate to consider Section 360 of the Code, observing that the Sessions Judge should have considered the question himself, especially given the case's long pendency and the Sessions Judge's power to call for a probation officer's report if necessary.

Holding and Implications

Holding:
The court set aside in part the Judgment in Criminal Appeal No. 61 of 1982 to the extent that it directed remand of the case and directed the Magistrate to consider the applicability of Section 360 of the Code. The High Court held that, in Kerala where the Probation of Offenders' Act, 1958 has been brought into force, Section 360 of the Code is wholly inapplicable and only the provisions of the Probation of Offenders' Act may be applied.

Direct consequences and procedural directions:

  • The convictions under Sections 325, 341 and 324 IPC read with Section 34 IPC were affirmed and not interfered with.
  • The direction of the Sessions Judge to remand the matter for the Magistrate's consideration of Section 360 could not stand; the Sessions Court was directed to take back the case on file and decide whether the Probation Act's provisions are to be invoked and, if so, proceed accordingly; if not, dispose of the criminal appeal in accordance with law.
  • The criminal reference was answered by setting aside the remand direction and by remitting the matter back to the Sessions Court to proceed under the Probation Act if appropriate.

Broader legal implication identified in the opinion:

  • By statutory construction using Section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act, the opinion holds that, in States (or parts thereof) where the Probation of Offenders' Act has been brought into force (as in Kerala), Section 360 of the Code (1973) does not apply; only the Probation Act's provisions can be applied in those areas. The court regarded co-existence of Section 360 and the Probation Act in the same area as leading to anomalous results, and therefore rejected such co-existence.

Note: This summary is prepared strictly from the information contained in the provided opinion. No material beyond that opinion has been relied upon or introduced.

    State Of Kerala v. Chellappan George & Another

    1. Respondents herein were tried by the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Neyyattinkara in C.C 133 of 1981 on charge for offences under Ss. 341, 324 and 326 IPC. read with S. 34 IPC. and convicted and each sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for three months under S. 326 read with S. 34 IPC. and simple imprisonment for 15 days under S. 341 IPC. No separate sentence has been imposed under S. 324 IPC. The two sentences were directed to run concurrently. In appeal, the learned First Addl. Sessions Judge, Trivandrum, reduced the conviction, under S. 326 IPC. to one under S. 325 IPC., maintained the conviction on the other count, set aside the sentences imposed and remanded the case for consideration of application of S. 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short ‘the Code’). When the calendar was received by this Court, it was felt that the provisions of S. 360 of the Code may not be applicable in this State. The case was taken on calendar revision and notice given to the learned Public Prosecutor and the respondents. Respondents have not put in appearance. I have heard the learned Public Prosecutor. Pws. 1 and 2 are sisters of the first respondent. The latter's wife is the second respondent. Pws. 1, 2 and the first respondent have a common property containing a house in portions of which Pw. 1 and the first respondent have been residing. Pw. 2 has been residing elsewhere with her husband. It appears, Pw. 2 was claiming a share of the property from the first respondent. On the morning of 14-1-1981, Pw. 2 visited Pw. 1. Pw. 1 also was pressing the first respondent to give a share to Pw. 2 and for that reason, he bore a grudge against them. At about 8.30 a.m, the two respondents went to the hall-room in the occupation of Pw. 2. The second respondent wrongfully restrained Pw. 1. The first respondent beat Pw. 1 with an iron rod on the head and legs (causing fracture of the skull, left ear and left knee). When Pw. 2 interfered, he beat her with the iron rod on the head as well as over the knees. Pws. 1 and 2 were taken to the Medical College Hospital, Trivandrum and admitted there at 10.30 a.m by Medical Officer in charge, Pw. 5, who issued wound certificates, Exts. P1 and P2. Pw. 5 did not notice the injuries on the knees and legs since those parts of the body were covered by dress. It appears, Pws. 1 and 2 were unconscious and were not in a position to talk. Intimation was sent to the Medical College Police Station and as seen in Ext. P4, it was received at 2 p.m Pw. 9, Head Constable of Police proceeded to the hospital and finding that Pws. 1 and 2 were not in a position to give any information, went back to the police station and on the basis of the intimation, registered a case as Crime No. 31.TR/81 under Ext. P6 F.I.R for an offence under S. 324 I.P.C against unknown person or persons. He prepared body notes, Exts. P7 and P8. The case was transferred to the Neyyattinkara Police Station within whose jurisdiction the occurrence had taken place. Pw. 7, Head Constable of that station re-registered the case under Ext. P5 F.I.R On 16-1-1981, he questioned Pws. 1 and 2 and others and inspected the scene and prepared Ext. P4, scene mahazar attested by Pw. 6 and submitted report to Court to include Ss. 341, 326 and 34 IPC. and to incorporate the names of the two respondents as accused. The Sub Inspector of Police, Pw. 8, completed the investigation and laid the charge.

    2. Respondents denied their guilt. Prosecution examined 10 witnesses and marked Exts. P1 to P8. The defence examined one witness. The stand taken by the respondents before the trial court was that Pw. 4, his sons, Pws. 1 and 2 and their husbands came to the house and attempted to throw the household articles of the respondents out of the house and were obstructed by the second respondent. Hearing her cries, first respondent came there. He was also assaulted and injured. This version was attempted to be supported by Dw. 1. The trial court however accepted the prosecution case as true and rejected the defence case.

    3. On going through the evidence in the case, I do not think the two courts below have committed any error in accepting the prosecution case as true. That Pws. 1 and 2 had sustained injuries is clear from the evidence of the doctor, Pw. 9 and the wound certificates, Exts. P1 and P2. They have stated in what manner they sustained injuries. Their version is supported by their uncle, examined as Pw. 4. He had gone to the house to see Pw. 1. The other eyewitnesses examined are Pws. 3 and 10. They turned hostile and stated that they had not seen the occurrence. Dw. 1 is obviously a person interested in the first respondent. His evidence does not inspire any confidence. The two courts below were right in acting on the evidence of Pws. 1, 2 and 4 corroborated by the medical evidence and circumstances of the case. The conviction under Ss. 325, 341 and 324 IPC. read with S. 34 IPC. cannot be interfered with.

    4. The learned Magistrate did not consider the application of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders' Act, 1958 (for short ‘the Act’) or the provisions of S. 360 of the Code, obviously because he convicted the respondents under S. 326 IPC. read with S. 34 IPC. But since this conviction was reduced to one under S. 325 IPC. by the learned Sessions Judge, the question of application of the provisions of the Act or S. 360 of the Code naturally arose before him. The learned Sessions Judge, instead of considering the matter himself, chose to send back the case for fresh consideration.

    5. It could be that the provisions of S. 360 of the Code co-exist with the provisions of the Act, in which case either provision could be invoked by a criminal court or it could be that the provisions of the Act must be deemed to be superseded by S. 360 of the Code or vice versa. It is necessary to know what exactly is the legal position.

    6. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (for short ‘the Code of 1898’) contained a provision in S. 562 conferring power on courts to release certain convicted offenders on probation of good conduct in stead of sentencing to punishment. This section underwent some changes under Act 18 of 1923. Act 37 of 1923 inserted sub-s. (1A) in S. 562 conferring power on criminal courts, in appropriate cases mentioned therein, to release convicted offenders on admonition. The Code of 1898 came into force on 1-7-1898 and extended to the whole of India except Part B States. This provision was amended by Act 1 of 1951 to say that the Code extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The Act came into force on 16-5-1958 and extended to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Sub-section (3) of S. 1 of the Act provided that the Act shall come into force in a State on such date as the State Government may, by notification in the official gazette, appoint, and different dates may be appointed for different parts of the State. There is no dispute that the Kerala State Government issued such a notification in 1958. The result is that in view of the notification in 1958, the provisions of the Act came into force in Kerala State.

    7. The Act is intended to cover the whole area of reformation of offenders. The Act is intended to provide for the release of offenders on probation or on due admonition or for matters connected therewith. Naturally, the Act contained several provisions which did not find a place in the Code of 1898. The scope of the Act is certainly wider than the provisions of the Code of 1898. S. 562 of the Code of 1898 and the provisions of the Act could not co-exist. Thus S. 19 of the Act provided that “Subject to the provisions of S. 18, S. 562 of the Code (that is the Code of 1898) shall cease to apply to the States or parts thereof in which this Act is brought into force.” It is unnecessary for the purpose of this case to consider the impact of the provisions of S. 18 of the Act. This discussion is confined to matters not covered by S. 18 of the Act and therefore that provision can be ignored for the present purpose. There could be no ambiguity in regard to the result of S. 19 of the Act and that is, if in any State or part of a State the Act has been brought into force, S. 562 of the Code of 1898 shall cease to apply. With the coming into force of the Act in the State of Kerala, S. 19 of the Act automatically came into operation and from that moment, the provisions of the Act are applicable in Kerala State and not the provisions of S. 562 of the Code of 1898. This conclusion appears to be free from any controversy.

    8. The Code of 1898 has been repealed by the Code of 1973. The Code came into force on 1-4-1974. It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Obviously, with effect from 1-4-1974 the provisions of the Code govern the criminal procedure and not the provisions of the Code of 1898. S. 360 of the Code is a provision similar to S. 562 of the Code of 1898. Of course, there are some differences between the two provisions. But broadly speaking, it can be said that S. 360 of the Code is a provision parallel to S. 562 of the Code of 1898. Sub-s. (10) of S. 360 of the Code states “Nothing in this section shall affect the provisions of the Probation of Offenders' Act, 1958, or the Children Act, 1960, or any other law for the time being in force for the treatment, training or rehabilitation of youthful offenders.” S. 361 of the Code states that where in any case the Court could have dealt with an accused person under S. 360 or under the provisions of the Act (or some other statutes mentioned therein) but has not done so, it shall record in its judgment the special reasons for not having done so. This may indicate that the Legislature has contemplated a situation where the provisions of S. 360 of the Code as well as the provisions of the Act could co-exist. They could certainly co-exist but not in the same area.

    9. The question which arises for consideration is in what manner S. 19 of the Act is to be construed in the light of the repeal of the Code of 1898 by the Code. The answer to this question is found in S. 8(1) of the General Clauses' Act, 1897. This provision states that where the General Clauses Act or any Central Act or regulation made after the commencement of the General Clauses Act, repeals and re-enacts with or without modification any provision of a former enactment, then references in any other enactment or in any instrument to the provision so repealed shall, unless a different intention appears, be construed as references to the provision so re-enacted. The Code of 1898 has been repealed and has been re-enacted in the Code (of 1973) with certain modifications. The modifications are brought about in S. 562 of the Code of 1898 and also other provisions with which we are not concerned. S. 19 of the Act makes reference to S. 562 of the Code of 1898. When there is a repeal and an re-enactment with or without modification of any provision, the reference in the Act to S. 562 of the Code of 1898 must be construed as a reference to S. 360 of the Code, unless a different intention appears. This seems to be the clear result of applying S. 8(1) of the General Clauses Act to the present controversy.

    10. I am not able to find anything in the provisions of the Act or the Code to indicate that an intention contrary to what is laid down in S. 8(1) of the General Clauses Act was ever in the contemplation of the Legislature. This could only be so since the co-existence of S. 360 of the Code and the provisions of the Act in any given area in a State or any part of the country would lead to anomalous results. That is because of the difference in the provisions of the two statutes. It is unnecessary for me to refer in detail to these differences. Suffice to mention the differences in two important matters. S. 360 of the Code relates only to persons not under 21 years of age convicted for an offence punishable with fine only or with imprisonment for a term of seven years or less, to any person under 21 years of age or any woman convicted of an offence not punishable with sentence of death or imprisonment for life. The scope of S. 4 of the Act is much wider. It applies to any person found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life. S. 360 of the Code does not provide for any role for probation officers in assisting the courts in relation to supervision and other matters while the Act does make such a provision. While S. 12 of the Act states that the person found guilty of an offence and dealt with under Ss. 3 or 4 of the Act shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attached to conviction of an offence under such law, the Code does not contain any parallel provision. Two statutes with such significant differences could not be intended to co-exist at the same time in the same area. Such co-existence would lead to anomalous results. The intention to retain the provisions of S. 360 of the Code and the provisions of the Act as applicable at the same time in a given area cannot be gathered from the provisions of S. 360 or any other provision of the Code. Therefore by virtue of S. 8(1) of the General Clauses Act, I have to hold that in the State of Kerala where the provisions of the Act have been brought into force, the provisions of S. 360 of the Code are wholly inapplicable.

    11. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider S. 8(1) of the General Clauses Act in Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India ((1979) 2 SCC 529 : AIR. 1979 SC. 798). The Court held that if there is a mere reference to a provision of one statute in any other statute without incorporation, then, unless a different intention clearly appears, S. 8(1) of the General Clauses Act would apply and the reference would be considered as a reference to the provision as would be in force from time to time in the former statute. This decision has been followed by this Court in Beepathumma v. Special Deputy Tahsildar (1982 KLT. 130). These decisions fortify the view taken by me that on the repeal of the Code of 1898 and the re-enactment of the Code, reference in S. 19 of the Act to S. 562 of the Code of 1898 must be construed as reference to S. 360 of the Code. That being so, by the operation of S. 19 of the Act, in so far as the State of Kerala is concerned (since the provisions of the Act have been brought into force in the entire State in 1958) the provisions of S. 360 of the Code must be deemed to have been rendered inapplicable. Only the provisions of the Act can be applied in this State. In this view the direction given by the learned Sessions Judge to the learned Magistrate to consider the applicability of the provisions of S. 360 of the Code cannot stand. The case started in 1981. I do not think it was appropriate on the part of the learned Sessions Judge to send back the case to the Magistrate for consideration of the question. In view of the facts of the case and its pendency for a lone time, the learned Sessions Judge could himself have considered the question of the application of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act. Undoubtedly, he has the power to call for the report of the Probation Officer if he deems it necessary.

    12. In the result, the Judgment in Crl. Appeal No. 61 of 1982 is set aside in part to the extent it directs remand of the case and directs the Magistrate to consider the applicability of S. 360 of the Code. The Sessions Court will take back the case on file and consider whether the provisions of the Probation Act are to be invoked in the case and if so/and if not, dispose of the Crl. Appeal in accordance with law. The criminal reference is thus answered.

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    State Of Kerala v. Chellappan George & Another
    (Aug 19, 1983)