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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
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Case Number
Advocates
  • For the Appellant: V. Bhaskaran Nambiyar
Judges
  • Bhaskaran
  • Balakrishna Menon, JJ.
Acts
  • Ss. 3 and 11 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 (Central)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
  • For the Appellant: V. Bhaskaran Nambiyar
Judges
  • Bhaskaran
  • Balakrishna Menon, JJ.
Acts
  • Ss. 3 and 11 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 (Central)
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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, Sri T.A. Rajendran, editor of the weekly "Navab" (published from Trichur), filed O.P. No. 3555 of 1982 under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petition sought (a) production of the records connected with an inquiry into an allegation of bribery of the 4th respondent (Sri Karunakaran, Chief Minister of Kerala) — the subject matter of the "Navab" photostat case; (b) records in connection with allegations against the 5th and 6th respondents in the Rajan murder case; (c) a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the 1st and 2nd respondents (the Home Secretary, Government of India, and the Chief Secretary, Government of Kerala) to appoint a Commission of Inquiry under Ss. 3 and 11 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952; and (d) a mandamus directing the 3rd respondent (Director of Vigilance Investigation, Kerala) to submit the inquiry proceedings made by him.

The learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition. The appellant filed the present writ appeal challenging that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether this Court should issue a writ of mandamus compelling the appropriate government(s) to appoint a Commission of Inquiry under Sections 3 and 11 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, in relation to the allegations published in the "Navab" dated 1-4-1972.
  2. Whether the petitioner had any cause of action to invoke relief in respect of the Rajan murder case based on the averments in the writ petition.
  3. Whether the petitioner satisfied the preconditions for issuance of a writ of mandamus (in particular, whether there was an earlier specific request to the relevant authorities and a refusal) and whether the delay in invoking the writ jurisdiction was justifiable.
  4. How Sections 3 and 11 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 apply to the facts before the Court, including the scope of executive discretion under Section 3(1).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Sri A.X. Varghese, counsel)

  • Pressed that the learned single Judge's reasons for refusing mandamus were unsustainable.
  • Relied on precedent: cited Supreme Court decisions State of J. & K. v. Bakhsi Gulam Mohammed (AIR 1967 SC 122) and Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Mr. Justice S.R. Tendolkar (AIR 1958 SC 538), and Division Bench rulings of this Court in Eachara Varier v. Secretary to the Ministry of Home Affairs (1977 Ker LT 335) and Eachara Varier v. Home Secretary (1977 Ker LT 526), to support the case for compelling appointment of a Commission or for the relief sought.

Respondents' Arguments (Sri V. Bhaskaran Nambiar, Advocate General)

  • If any relief were available to the appellant, it was to approach the Government in terms of G.O. Ms. No. 386/Home dated 20-12-1969 rather than the Court directly.
  • The appellant approached the Court without regard to the recognized limitations on the writ jurisdiction.
  • Procedural history showing administrative steps: after receipt of the representation dated 27-6-1978 (Ext. JP-1) addressed to the Governor, the 3rd respondent (on 9-10-1978) asked the appellant to produce evidence in support of his allegations; the appellant met the 3rd respondent on 3-11-1978 and submitted evidence.
  • The Government, after considering the materials collected and the 3rd respondent's conclusions, found no basis for the allegations in Ext. P-1 and no case for action, as reflected by proceedings dated 29-3-1979.
  • The appellant then remained inactive until making a further representation on 9-12-1981 (Ext. P-3) and thereafter delayed more than five months before invoking the writ jurisdiction, constituting an inordinate and unjustifiable delay.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of J. & K. v. Bakhsi Gulam Mohammed, AIR 1967 SC 122 Cases concerned with appointment of a Commission under the Commissions of Inquiry Act where the Government, in its opinion, considered such appointment necessary. The Court found this decision did not advance the appellant's case because it involved situations where the Government itself thought it necessary to appoint a Commission; it was not a case where the Court compelled the Government to order an inquiry under the Act.
Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Mr. Justice S.R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538 Supreme Court decision concerning appointment of Commissions under the Act (referred to by appellant's counsel). The Court held that this precedent likewise did not assist the appellant, as it related to Government-initiated appointments rather than compulsion by the Court to order an inquiry.
Eachara Varier v. Secretary to the Ministry of Home Affairs, 1977 Ker LT 335 (1978 Cri LJ 86) Division Bench ruling of this Court (cited by appellant). The Court observed that the Division Bench rulings relied on do not relate to the issue of a writ of mandamus or to the provisions of the Commissions of Inquiry Act and therefore were of no assistance to the appellant.
Eachara Varier v. Home Secretary, 1977 Ker LT 526 Division Bench ruling of this Court (cited by appellant). The Court noted this decision also did not concern mandamus or the Act's provisions and thus did not help the appellant's case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court affirmed and elaborated the single Judge's conclusions through the following analytical steps (as set out in the opinion):

  1. Scope of relief sought: The Court accepted the single Judge's view that the relief sought by the petitioner was confined to the allegations contained in the "Navab" issue dated 1-4-1972, and that the petition contained little to show any cause of action in respect of the Rajan case.
  2. Statutory construction of Section 3(1) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952: The Court analyzed Section 3(1) and concluded that appointment of a Commission arises only when (a) the appropriate Government is of the opinion that such appointment is necessary, or (b) it is compelled to do so by a resolution of the Lok Sabha or the State Legislative Assembly. The phrase "if it is of opinion" indicates that, except when compelled by a legislative resolution, the Government has discretion to appoint or not to appoint a Commission.
  3. Inapplicability of Section 11: On the facts as pleaded, the averments did not demonstrate how Section 11 would apply; the Court considered Section 11 to have no relevance in this context.
  4. Mandamus preconditions and delay: The Court reiterated the well-established principle that it will generally be slow to issue a mandamus to compel performance of an administrative duty unless the petitioner pleads and proves that a specific earlier request was made to the authority and that the request was refused. The petition contained no pleadings or evidence of an earlier demand to respondents 1 and 2, nor of a refusal. This absence, together with the long and unjustifiable delay by the petitioner in approaching the Court, weighed strongly against granting the extraordinary relief of mandamus.
  5. Precedents relied upon: After reviewing the authorities cited by the appellant, the Court found that the Supreme Court decisions related to instances where the Government itself deemed appointment of a Commission necessary and were not cases where the Court compelled a Government to order an inquiry. The Division Bench decisions cited did not relate to writs of mandamus or to the provisions of the Act; hence neither set of authorities aided the appellant.
  6. Conclusion from analysis: Given the statutory discretion under Section 3(1), the lack of pleading/evidence of prior request and refusal, the irrelevant or inapposite nature of the precedents relied upon, and the inordinate delay, the Court found no basis to grant the mandamus sought and agreed with the learned single Judge's dismissal of the petition.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court dismissed the writ appeal (it agreed with the single Judge's dismissal of the writ petition). The Court also declined the appellant's request for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution, stating that no substantial question of law of general importance deserving consideration by the Supreme Court arose; accordingly, leave to appeal was refused.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus compelling appointment of a Commission of Inquiry under Sections 3 and 11 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, was not granted; no production order for the inquiry records was made.
  • The Court emphasized executive discretion under Section 3(1) and confirmed that mandamus will not ordinarily be used to override that discretion unless the petitioner shows the necessary preconditions (a prior specific request and refusal and absence of undue delay).
  • The opinion does not purport to establish any novel principle of law; the Court specifically found that the precedents relied upon did not justify compulsion of the Government to appoint a Commission and therefore no new precedent was set beyond the application of established principles summarised above.
  • Administrative direction included: a carbon copy of the judgment may be supplied to the Advocate General free of charge and to the appellant's counsel on usual terms if applied for.

Appeal dismissed. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court refused.

Show full summary ...

    Rajendran v. Home Secretary .

    Bhaskaran, J.:— The appellant, Sri T.A Rajendran, stated to be the editor of ‘Navab’, a weekly published from Trichur, filed O.P No. 3555 of 1982 under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India “to call for the entire records in connection with the inquiry into the allegation of bribery of the 4th respondent (Sri Karunakaran, Chief Minister of Kerala) which is the subject matter of the ‘Navab’ photostat case and the records in connection with the allegations against the 5th and 6th respondents (Sri V.N Rajan, Director, Institute of Criminology and Forensic Science, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi and Sri Jayaram Padikkal, Dy. Director, Vigilance Investigation, Kerala, Trivandrum respectively) in Rajan murder case and to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus or any appropriate writ to direct the 1st and 2nd respondents (the Home Secretary, Government of India, New Delhi, and the Chief Secretary, Government of Kerala, Trivandrum) for appointing a commission of inquiry as contemplated under Ss. 3 and 11 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 (Central) into the allegations levelled against respondents Nos. 4, 5 and 6 and to issue a writ of mandamus directing the 3rd respondent (The Director of Vigilance Investigation, Kerala, Trivandrum) to submit the entire inquiry proceedings made by him so far and that writ petition having been dismissed by the learned single Judge this writ appeal has been filed by the appellant-petitioner.

    2. For the reasons stated in para 3 of the judgment under appeal the learned single Judge took it that “the only matter in respect of which the petitioner seeks the relief is what is connected with the allegation contained in the ‘Navab’ dated 1-4-1972”. In the averments made in the writ petition there is hardly anything to show that the petitioner had any cause of action with respect to Rajan case. In fact, we fail to see what bearing the publication of the news item in the petitioner's weekly ‘Navab’ dated 1-4-1972 has on the Rajan case. Agreeing with the reasoning of the learned single Judge, we also take it that the relief that the petitioner seeks in the writ petition is confined to the one relating to the allegations contained in the issue of ‘Navab’ dated 1-4-1972.

    3. The learned single Judge found inter alia that there was total failure on the part of the appellant-petitioner to call upon respondents 1 and 2 to order an enquiry under the Act and that the petitioner could not at such distance of time, justifiably invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to issue a writ of mandamus to compel the Government to appoint a Commission to inquire into the allegation under S. 3 or S. 11 of the Act.

    4. Sri A.X Varghese, the counsel for the appellant, submitted that the reasons stated by the learned single Judge declining to issue a writ of mandamus as prayed for are not sustainable. In support of his contentions he cited the decisions of the Supreme Court in State of J. & K. v. Bakhsi Gulam Mohammed (AIR 1967 SC 122) and Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Mr. Justice S.R Tendolkar* (AIR 1958 SC 538); and the Division Bench rulings of this Court in Eachara Varier v. Secretary to the Ministry of Home Affairs (1977 Ker LT 335): (1978 Cri LJ 86); and Eachara Varier v. Home Secretary (1977 Ker LT 526).

    5. Sri V. Bhaskaran Nambiar, Advocate General, submitted that if at all the appellant-petitioner was entitled to anything, that was to approach the Government in terms of G.O Ms. No. 386.Home dated 20-12-1969. He also argued that the appellant-petitioner approached this Court without bearing in mind the limitations on the writ jurisdiction of this Court. He also pointed out that after the; receipt of Ext. JP-1 representation dated 27-6-1978 addressed to the Governor, the 3rd respondent had on 9-10-1978 written to the appellant-petitioner to produce before him evidence relied upon by him in support of his allegations; and in response to that communication the appellant-petitioner had actually met the 3rd respondent on 3-11-1978 and submitted his evidence. According to bird, the Government on a careful, consideration of the entire matter, including the material collected and the conclusions reached by the 3rd respondent, found that there was no basis in the allegations made by the petitioner and that there was no case made out for any action with respect to the allegations contained in Ext. P-1, which facts could be seen from the proceedings dated 29-3-1979. As contended by the Advocate General and found by the learned single Judge, the appellant-petitioner, after he met the 3rd respondent and produced evidence relied on by him on 3-11-1978, appears to have gone into a long slumber, until Ext. P-3 representation dated 9-12-1981, addressed to the Governor was submitted. Even thereafter, he took over five months to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court.

    6. Section 3(1) of the Act reads as follows:—

    “Appointment of Commission: (1) The appropriate Government may, if it is of opinion that it is necessary so to do, and shall, if a resolution in this behalf is passed by the House of the People or, as the case may be, the Legislative Assembly of the State, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint a Commission of Inquiry for the purpose of making an inquiry into any definite matter of public importance and performing such functions and within such time as may be specified in the notification, and the Commission so appointed shall make the inquiry and perform the functions accordingly.”

    (Proviso omitted)

    On a careful analysis of the terms in the above sub-section, it appears to us that the question of appointment of a Commission would arise only if, in the opinion of the Government, it is found necessary to appoint one or when the Government is compelled to do so as a result of the resolution passed in that behalf, either by the Lok Sabha or by the Legislative Assembly of the State concerned. The expression “if it is of opinion” used in the sub-section makes it abundantly clear that, unless compelled by the Lok Sabha or the Legislative Assembly of the State concerned, the Government has the discretion to appoint or not to appoint a Commission in terms of Sec. 3 of the Act, depending upon its opinion. The averments in the writ petition do not show how the provisions of the Act, in terms of S. 11 of the Act, would apply to the facts of the case. In our opinion S. 11 has no relevance to the context.

    7. It is a well established principle that the Court normally would be slow to issue writ of mandamus to compel any person or authority, eharged with the duty to perform any act, to do such act unless it is satisfied on the pleading and the evidence in support thereof that the party seeking that relief had earlier made a specific request in that behalf to such person or authority, and that person or authority had declined or refused to comply with that request. The absence of pleadings, much less evidence, that there was such an earlier demand to and refusal by respondents 1 and 2 to order an inquiry into the allegations made by the appellant-petitioner is an additional reason why this Court could not have granted the relief sought by the appellant-petitioner besides the long and unjustifiable delay in invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court.

    8. We have gone through the decisions cited by Shri Vargbese; and we find little in them to advance the case of the appellant-petitioner. The Supreme Court decisions referred to were concerned with the appointment of Commission under the Act by the Government, as the Government in its opinion thought that the appointment of such a Commission was necessary. They are not cases where the Court compelled the Government to order inquiry in terms of the Act into the allegations made. The Division Bench cases of this Court relied on by Sri Varghese do not relate either to the issue of writ of mandamus or anything relating to the provisions of the Act; those decisions also are, therefore, of no help to the appellant-petitioner.

    9. For the foregoing reasons, in respectful agreement with the decision of the learned single Judge, we dismiss this writ appeal.

    Dismissed.

    Immediately after the judgment was pronounced, the counsel for the appellant submitted that leave may be granted under Article 133(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution. Inasmuch as no substantial question of law of general importance deserving to be decided by the Supreme Court is involved in this case, we do not consider that leave to appeal should be granted; accordingly the request is declined.

    Leave refused.

    Carbon copy of the judgment may be granted to the Advocate General free of charge and to the counsel for the appellant on usual terms if applied for in that behalf.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Rajendran v. Home Secretary .
    (Jun 4, 1982)