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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
  • For the Appellant: T. V. Prabhakaran and Mary Dias, Advocates.
  • For the Respondent: Public Prosecutor.
Judges
  • Khalid, J.
Acts
  • Public Analyst. Rule 9A reads as follows:9-A. Local (Health) Authority
  • Rule 9A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules.
  • S. 11(3) as well as Rule 7(3) and Rule 17(a)
  • S. 11(3), Rules 7(3) and 17(a) and (b). Rule 9A
  • sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of S. 10,
  • sub-rule (3) of Rule 7,
  • S. 13(2) and Rule 9A
  • Rule 17(b)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
  • For the Appellant: T. V. Prabhakaran and Mary Dias, Advocates.
  • For the Respondent: Public Prosecutor.
Judges
  • Khalid, J.
Acts
  • Public Analyst. Rule 9A reads as follows:9-A. Local (Health) Authority
  • Rule 9A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules.
  • S. 11(3) as well as Rule 7(3) and Rule 17(a)
  • S. 11(3), Rules 7(3) and 17(a) and (b). Rule 9A
  • sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of S. 10,
  • sub-rule (3) of Rule 7,
  • S. 13(2) and Rule 9A
  • Rule 17(b)
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner (accused) was charged in C.C. No. 255 of 1977 before the Additional Judicial I Class Magistrate, Ernakulam, after a Food Inspector purchased 675 ml of milk from him on 14-11-1977 for sampling and analysis. The sample tested adulterated (containing not less than 9% added water). Following trial in which the prosecution examined one witness and marked Exhibits P1–P8, and the petitioner examined one witness, the trial Magistrate convicted the petitioner and sentenced him to six months' simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000. The petitioner appealed to the Sessions Court, Ernakulam, which, by judgment in Crl. A. No. 10 of 1979, confirmed the conviction and sentence. The petitioner then filed the present Criminal Revision Petition.

The original grounds in the revision petition alleged irregularities in sampling by the Food Inspector, failure to comply with Section 13 of the Act, and that the conviction was based on evidence that was not wholly acceptable. Subsequently, the petitioner filed Crl. M.P. No. 1111 of 1981 to raise an additional ground under Rule 9A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, namely an inordinate delay in forwarding a copy of the Public Analyst's report (Form III) to the accused. The court allowed this additional ground to be raised.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether non-compliance with Rule 9A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules — specifically, an inordinate delay in forwarding a copy of the Public Analyst's report (Form III) to the accused after institution of prosecution — vitiates the prosecution.
  2. Whether the originally raised grounds (alleged irregularities in sampling, failure to comply with S.13 of the Act, and contention that conviction relied on unacceptable evidence) warranted interference with the conviction and sentence.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • There were irregularities in the sampling procedure undertaken by the Food Inspector.
  • The Food Inspector failed to comply with Section 13 of the Act.
  • The conviction was founded on evidence that was not wholly acceptable.
  • By way of Crl. M.P. No. 1111 of 1981, an additional ground was raised: Rule 9A had been violated because there was an inordinate delay in forwarding a copy of the Public Analyst's report (Form III) to the accused after institution of prosecution.

The opinion does not set out detailed or opposing submissions by the respondent in the record provided.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Crl. Appeal No. 464 of 1979 (Kader, J.) The requirement of Rule 9A that the Local (Health) Authority forward a copy of the Public Analyst's report immediately after institution of prosecution; the case involved a 14-day delay. The court cited Kader, J.'s conclusion that a 14-day delay violated the statutory mandate of Rule 9A and upheld acquittal in that case. The present court respectfully agreed with that principle and relied on it to support the conclusion that non-compliance with Rule 9A vitiates prosecution.
Perumal v. Kumbakonam Municipality, 1981 Crl. L.J. 1366 (Sathar Sayeed, J., Madras High Court) Late forwarding of the Public Analyst's report (period of 2 months and 14 days) rendered the prosecution bad; courts should not countenance laxity or negligence in sending the report. The court relied on the reasoning in Perumal to reinforce that substantial delay in sending the Public Analyst's report to the accused undermines the prosecution; after referring to the dictionary meaning of "immediately," the Madras High Court held the prosecution bad, a conclusion the present court found persuasive.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the statutory and regulatory text and the chronology of events to determine whether the delay violated Rule 9A and whether such violation vitiated the prosecution.

Key elements of the analysis:

  • The court contrasted Rule 9A (introduced 4-1-1977) with earlier Rule 9-J and with S.11(3), Rule 7(3) and Rule 17(a) & (b). It observed that whereas S.11(3) and Rules 17(a) & (b) use the word "immediately" followed by qualifying language ("but not later than the succeeding working day"), Rule 9A uses "immediately" in an absolute, unqualified form. The court treated this difference in wording as intentional and significant.
  • Rule 9A requires the Local (Health) Authority, "immediately after the institution of prosecution," to forward a copy of the Public Analyst's report in Form III by registered post or by hand to the person from whom the sample was taken (and simultaneously to any other person whose particulars are disclosed under S.14A).
  • The court emphasized the importance of the timing safeguards in S.11(3) and Rule 17 to prevent tampering and to provide prompt notice so that the accused can pursue remedies expeditiously. It concluded Rule 9A imposes an even more stringent obligation.
  • The specific facts: detection of the alleged offence on 14-11-1977; sample sent for analysis on 21-11-1977; complaint filed on 13-12-1977; the Public Analyst's report was despatched only on 25-2-1978 — a delay of approximately 74 days after institution of prosecution. The court treated this as clear non-compliance with Rule 9A.
  • The court interpreted the word "immediately" in Rule 9A to connote absence of any intervening interval of time. Given the large delay and the text of the rule, the court concluded that the Food Inspector and Local Health Authority had taken their own time in despatching the report, in gross violation of the rule.
  • The court relied on precedent (Kader J. and Perumal) holding that delays in sending the Public Analyst's report contrary to Rule 9A render the prosecution bad, and it found the present case even stronger because of the 74-day delay.
  • Finally, the court reflected on the Act's creation of absolute liability for food adulteration offences and the need for authorities to scrupulously follow procedural safeguards; the court warned that laxity in procedure can render otherwise proper prosecutions fruitless.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The court concluded that Rule 9A was not complied with in this case due to a delay of about 74 days in forwarding the Public Analyst's report to the accused. For that reason, the court held that the entire prosecution was vitiated and therefore quashed the conviction and sentence and allowed the Criminal Revision Petition.

Immediate consequences: The conviction and sentence imposed on the petitioner by the trial Magistrate and confirmed by the Sessions Court were quashed; the revision petition was allowed. The opinion does not state any further orders beyond quashing the conviction and sentence and allowing the petition.

Broader implications: The court emphasized that Rule 9A's requirement to forward the Public Analyst's report "immediately" is to be strictly complied with, and that delays can render prosecutions bad. The opinion reiterated the need for food authorities to follow statutory and procedural safeguards strictly because offences under the Act impose absolute liability. The opinion does not state that it was laying down a new legal principle beyond its application of existing Rule 9A and cited precedents.

Disposition in the opinion: "Allowed." (The court expressly quashed the conviction and sentence and allowed the Criminal Revision Petition.)

Show full summary ...

    Krishnankutty Nair v. Food Inspector

    1. The accused in C.C No. 255 of 1977 before the Additional Judicial I Class Magistrate, Ernakularn, is the petitioner. On 14-11-1977 at about 12.30 p.m when he was taking cow's milk to the Chottanikkara Milk Co-operative Society, the Food Inspector, the respondent herein, purchased from him 675 ml. of milk for the purpose of sampling and analysis. On analysis the milk was found to be adulterated containing not less than 9% of added water. The petitioner was put on trial. He denied the charge. Prosecution examined one witness on its side and marked Exts. P1 to P8. The petitioner examined one witness on his side. After trial, the trial Magistrate found the petitioner guilty of the offence with which he was charged and convicted him and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/-. Aggrieved by this judgment, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Sessions Court, Ernakularn. The I Additional Sessions Judge, Ernakulam, by his judgment in Crl. A. No. 10 of 1979, confirmed the conviction and sentence. Hence this revision. The revision petition as originally filed was grounded on the irregularities committed by the Food Inspector in sampling, in hi” failure to comply with S. 13 of the Act and also on the ground that conviction was based on evidence which was not wholly accepteble. The petitioner has now filed Crl. M.P No. 1111 of 1981 raising an additional ground. This ground is based on Rule 9A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules. The case put forward is that there was inordinate delay in forwarding the copy of the report of the result of the analysis in Form III to the accused. I have allowed this petition.

    2. I am not impressed with the submissions made by the petitioner's learned counsel on the grounds originally raised in the petition. However, the new ground deserves consideration. I allowed it to be raised because it vitally affects the case on hand. For a proper appreciation of the rigidity of this Rule it has to be read and more profitably juxtaposed with S. 11(3), Rules 7(3) and 17(a) and (b). Rule 9A was introduced with effect from 4-1-1977. Before the introduction of this rule the rule that held the field was Rule 9-J. As per that Rule a copy of the report of the Public Analyst had to be sent to the accused within 10 days from the date of receipt of the report from the Public Analyst. Rule 9A reads as follows:

    “9-A. Local (Health) Authority to send report to person concerned.—The Local (Health) Authority shall immediately after the institution of prosecution forward a copy of the report of the result of analysis in form III delivered to him under sub-rule (3) of Rule 7, by registered post or by hand, as may be appropriate, to the person from whom the sample of the article was taken by the Food Inspector, and simultaneously also to the person, if any, whose name, address and other particulars has been disclosed under S. 14A of the Act:

    3. This has to be read along with S. 13(2). The mandate contained in S. 13(2) and Rule 9A on the Local Health Authority is to forward a copy of the report of the result of analysis by registered post immediately. S. 11(3) as well as Rule 7(3) and Rule 17(a) and (b) can be usefully read in this context:

    “11. (3) When a sample of any article of food or adulterant is taken under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of S. 10, the food inspector shall, by the immediately succeeding working day, send a sample of the article of food or adulterant or both, as the case may be, in accordance with the rules prescribed for sampling to the public analyst for the local area concerned.”

    “7. (3) The public analyst shall, within a period of forty-five days from the date of receipt of any sample for analysis, deliver to the Local (Health) Authority a report of the result of such analysis in Form III:

    Provided that where any such sample does not conform to the provisions of the Act or these rules, the public analyst shall deliver four copies of such report to the said Authority:

    Provided further that the public analyst shall forward a copy of such report also to the person who purchased an article of food and forwarded the same to him for analysis under S. 12 of the Act.”

    “17. Manner of despatching containers of samples.—The containers of the samples shall be despatched in the following manner, namely:—

    (a) The sealed container of one part of the sample for analysis and a memorandum in Form VII shall be sent in a sealed packet to the public analyst immediately but not later than the succeeding working day by any suitable means.

    (b) The sealed containers of the remaining two parts of the sample and two copies of the memoranda in Form VII shall be sent in a sealed packet to the Local (Health) Authority immediately but not later than the succeeding working day by any suitable means:

    Provided that in the case of a sample of food which has been taken from container bearing Agmark seal, the memorandum in Form VII shall contain the following additional information, namely:—

    (a) Grade

    (b) Agmark label No./Batch No.

    (c) Name of packing station.”

    (emphasis supplied)

    4. An examination of the words used in the above provisions brings in sharp focus the intention of the legislature and the rule-making authority in wording Rule 9A differently. In S. 11(3) and R. 17(a) & (b) the word “immediately” is followed by qualifying words; words that soften the rigidity of the word “immediately”. Not so Rule 9A. Here the word “immediately” is used in an absolute form. S. II(3) requires the Food Inspector to send the sample taken by him by the immediately succeeding working day. Rule 17(a) requires the sealed container and a memorandum in Form VII to be sent in a sealed packet to the Public Analyst immediately but not later than the succeeding working day by any suitable means and Rule 17(b) requires the sealed containers of the remaining two parts to be sent to the Local (Health) Authority immediately but not later than the succeeding working day by any suitable means. These are important safeguards given to the accused so that unscrupulous officers are not allowed to tamper with the samples taken nor with the containers in which the food articles are packed.

    5. Now about Rule 9-A. It is useful to note that this Rule mandates the Local (Health) Authority fo forward a copy immediately after the institution of the prosecution. The word ‘immediately’ in this Rule is not qualified by any other words enabling the Local Health Authority to take its own time in forwarding a copy. This can be by registered post or by hand. The object of the rule-making authority in imposing this rigour is to enable the accused to pursue his remedies in expedition once he gets a copy of the report of the result of the analysis. A comparison of Rule 9A with the above provisions leads to the conclusion that the rigour imposed by Rule 9-A is more stringent than the rigour imposed by the other Sections.

    6. It is against the background that the facts of this case have to be considered. It is not disputed that the detection of crime in this case was on 14-11-1977, that the sample was sent for analysis on 21-11-1977, that the complaint was filed on 13-12-1977 and the report of the result of the analysis despatched only on 25-2-1978, causing a delay of nearly 74 days. It is clear that Rule 9A has not been complied with in this case. For this reason, in my judgment the entire prosecution has to fail. The word ‘immediate’ postulates the absence of any supervening period. That word connotes occurring or doing without separation by an interval of space or time. Reliance on these dictionary meanings may lead to unhappy results sometimes. But in this case the Food Inspector has taken his own time in despatching the report of the result of the analysis in gross violation of the rule which has rendered the prosecution bad.

    7. Kader, J. in Crl. Appeal No. 464 of 1979 had occasion to consider the scope of this rule. In that case the complaint was filed in Court on 15-11-1977 and the copy of the report of the Public Analyst was forwarded on 29-11-1977, i.e 14 days after the institution of the prosecution against the accused. The learned Judge felt that the expiry of 14 days violated the statutory mandate contained in Rule 9-A and therefore upheld the acquittal of the accused and dismissed the appeal. 1 respectfully agree with the principle laid down therein. In Perumal v. Kumbakonam Municipality (1981 Crl. L.J 1366) Sathar Sayeed, J. of the Madras High Court had to consider a similar case. In that case the complaint was filed on 15-6-1977, but the report of the result of the analysis was forwarded only on 29-8-1977, after a period of 2 months and 14 days. The learned Judge held:

    “The Court should not countenance with favour the laxity or negligance in cases where the report of the Public Analyst is sent very late to the party from whom the article of food is seized. Courts should also see that there does not occur any delay, ………………………………………………………………

    8. After referring to the Dictionary meaning of the word ‘immediately’, the learned Judge upheld the plea that the prosecution had been rendered bad on account of the non-compliance with the mandate contained in Rule 9-A.

    9. The case on hand is stronger than the two cases mentioned above. In this case the delay is of 74 days. There is a clear violation of the Rule 9-A. For this reason I hold that the entire prosecution has been vitiated.

    10. In implementing the provisions of the Food Adulteration Act-implementation by experience is trying and convicting milk vendors and petty shop keepers—it is necessary to scrutinies the procedure adopted by the food authorities carefully. The Act creates an absolute liability. Unlike offences under the general law, the prosecution is not called upon to prove mens rea to establish the crime. In rare cases courts may receive evidence from the side of the accused to establish absence of mens rea. But invariably detection or crime carries with it the establishment of an offence. That being so, it is highly necessary to see that the authorities invested with the powers under the Act and the Rules, scrupulously and religiously adhere to the procedure laid down, so that prosecutions are not rendered fruitless on account of the non-compliance with the statutory requirements. I quash the conviction and sentence entered against the petitioner and allow this Criminal Revision Petition.

    11. Allowed.

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    Comments

    Krishnankutty Nair v. Food Inspector
    (Nov 13, 1981)