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citation codes
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  • Rule 2 of Schedule II of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1961
  • S. 222 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1961, provision
  • rule 16 of Schedule II of the Income Tax Act
  • Order XXXIV, rule 5, of the Code,
  • provision in sub-rule (2).
  • provision in Rule 16(I),
  • Rule 2. Rule 16(2)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Rule 2 of Schedule II of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1961
  • S. 222 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1961, provision
  • rule 16 of Schedule II of the Income Tax Act
  • Order XXXIV, rule 5, of the Code,
  • provision in sub-rule (2).
  • provision in Rule 16(I),
  • Rule 2. Rule 16(2)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The third respondent acquired possession of a stage carriage vehicle under Ext. P-2, a hire-purchase styled agreement, under which the petitioner (a financier) let the vehicle to the third respondent for a 24-month term commencing 9 June 1973. The hirer was required to pay instalments specified in the agreement, keep the vehicle in sole custody, and refrain from selling, pledging or otherwise dealing with it without the petitioner's prior written consent. The agreement provided that on default by the hirer the petitioner could determine the hire, forfeit instalments previously paid, and seize and retake possession of the vehicle. Only on payment of all amounts in the schedule would the vehicle become the hirer’s absolute property. The agreement also permitted registration of the vehicle in the hirer's name on condition that the hirer would transfer registration to the petitioner when required, especially upon breach.

The third respondent defaulted on instalment payments. The petitioner seized the vehicle; on the day of seizure Rs. 19,375 was due by way of arrears (plus incidental charges). After seizure, the petitioner applied to the Regional Transport Officer (RTO, the first respondent) for a tax clearance certificate and for cancellation of the original registration in the third respondent's name and issuance of a fresh certificate in the petitioner’s name. The RTO effectively refused these requests because the Tax Recovery Officer (TRO, the second respondent) raised objection on the ground that the third respondent had outstanding income-tax arrears.

The petitioner filed the present original petition seeking quashing of the RTO's proceedings that denied the transfer and clearance and seeking a writ of mandamus directing the RTO to issue the tax clearance certificate, cancel the original registration, and issue a fresh registration certificate in the petitioner’s name.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Regional Transport Officer was justified in refusing to issue a tax clearance certificate and in refusing to cancel the original registration and issue a fresh certificate in the petitioner’s name because of the third respondent's outstanding income-tax arrears.
  2. Whether the revenue's claim (in respect of income-tax arrears) can override or have priority over the petitioner's rights in respect of the vehicle arising from the hire-purchase agreement (i.e., whether the petitioner’s prior secured right/security in the vehicle prevails over the State's claim).
  3. Whether, in light of the hire-purchase agreement and the petitioner's seizure/possession, the petitioner is entitled to the reliefs sought (tax clearance certificate and registration transfer).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. V.R. Venkitakrishnan, relied on the Supreme Court decision in K.L. Johar and Co. v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer (AIR 1965 SC 1082) to contend that the financier (the petitioner) is the real owner under agreements of this type and that the clauses permitting retaking possession indicate that property did not pass to the hirer at the outset.
  • The petitioner asserted entitlement to have registration transferred and to receive a tax clearance certificate, based on the rights created by Ext. P-2 and its seizure of the vehicle following default.

Respondent (Tax Recovery Officer)'s Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The Tax Recovery Officer stated by affidavit that the third respondent owed Rs. 8,137 plus interest as per revenue recovery certificates (details by assessment year and dates of service of demand notice under Rule 2 of Schedule II of the Income Tax Act were provided).
  • The Tax Recovery Officer contended that, in substance, the hire-purchase transaction amounted to a loan secured by the vehicle and that, to all intents and purposes under the terms of the agreement, the possessor (the third respondent) was the owner.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
K.L. Johar and Co. v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, AIR 1965 SC 1082 Authority for the proposition that, in typical hire-purchase/financing arrangements, the financier may be treated as the real owner and clauses permitting retaking possession indicate property did not pass to the hirer. The court noted that the petitioner’s counsel relied on this decision and acknowledged the force of the comparison. The court observed that the features identified in K.L. Johar (power to retake possession, transfer only on full payment, etc.) were present in Ext. P-2, but the court stated it need not rely on that decision to dispose of the petition because it could resolve the case on the basis that a security had been created in the petitioner's favour.
State of Madras v. Cheldian Syriyan Bank Ltd., 1960 KLJ 853 States the principle that when the claims of the State and of a subject are equal in degree, the State's (Crown's) claim prevails; but this priority does not extend where the subject has a prior secured right. The court invoked this principle to explain that where a prior secured right exists in favour of a subject (here, the petitioner), the State's claim will not prevail over that secured right.
A decision reported at AIR 1940 Madras 703 (Madras High Court; Justice Wadsworth) Discussion on preferential claims of a mortgagee and the limits of that preference vis-à-vis the Crown; observation that the Crown's claim is paramount only as among unsecured creditors. The court quoted the passage to illustrate the limits of a mortgagee's preferential claim and to show that the Crown’s priority is not absolute when a secured interest exists.
ILR 1957 A.P. 505 (Andhra Pradesh High Court; Chief Justice Subha Rao) Explains that upon appointment of a receiver in a mortgage action, the mortgagor is deprived of possession and creditors without prior security cannot claim preference over sums required to discharge mortgage debts; thus the State (as an unsecured creditor) cannot claim priority in such circumstances. The court relied on this reasoning to support the proposition that where there is a prior secured right over property, the State cannot claim priority over amounts realized in respect of that security.
Suraj Prasad Gupta v. Chartered Bank, 83 TTR 494 (Allahabad High Court) Held that Rule 16 of Schedule II must be strictly construed and does not, by necessary implication, deny the legal rights of a mortgagee; attachment can be effected only after a demand notice under Rule 2; private transfers may be protected where no attachment has been made. The court referenced this case to support its view that the procedural provisions in Schedule II (Rule 16) should not be read as overriding substantive legal rights of secured creditors and to justify treating the petitioner’s prior security as prevailing against the revenue in the present circumstances.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by examination of the terms of Ext. P-2 and the legal framework for tax recovery. It identified key contract clauses: clause 5 (right of the owner to seize, retake possession and sue on default), clause 6 (vehicle becomes hirer’s absolute property only upon payment of the entire amount), and clause 8 (registration may be in hirer’s name but must be transferred to the owner upon demand or breach). These features, the court observed, create at least a security interest in favour of the petitioner even if, for some purposes, the hirer appears as the registered holder.

The court then addressed the revenue's recovery powers under section 222 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (which provides statutory modes of recovery through the Tax Recovery Officer) and Schedule II (which sets out rules including Rule 16 concerning notice and the effect of attachment and restrictions on private alienation). The court emphasized that Schedule II contains procedural rules and does not, in the absence of explicit statutory provision, abrogate substantive rights of secured creditors.

Applying established precedents, the court explained the governing principle: where competing claims of equal degree exist, the Crown (State) has priority; however, that priority does not displace a prior secured right held by a subject. The court relied on the cited authorities to illustrate that a prior mortgagee or secured creditor's rights are not defeated simply by the revenue's procedural recovery steps, and Rule 16 must be strictly construed so as not to deny legal rights of a mortgagee.

The court also noted procedural requirements in Schedule II (attachment follows service of a demand notice under Rule 2) and the distinction between restrictions imposed after attachment and those arising merely from notice. While the court observed that issues might arise in borderline situations (for example, when private transfers occur without attachment), it expressly stated that it need not give a final opinion on those finer questions in this case because the petitioner had a prior security and had seized and retaken possession of the vehicle.

On that basis the court concluded that the petitioner's seizure and retaking of possession could not be questioned by the revenue and that the petitioner's claims in respect of the vehicle prevailed over the State’s claim in the present facts.

Holding and Implications

Holding:
Original petition disposed of; Ext. P-1 quashed.

Directions and immediate consequences (as ordered by the court, stated in the opinion):

  • The court quashed Ext. P-1 (the RTO proceeding that had denied the petitioner's request).
  • The court directed the first respondent (Regional Transport Officer) to issue a tax clearance certificate in respect of the Fargo bus bearing Registration No. K.L.F 1469.
  • The court directed the first respondent to cancel the original registration certificate issued in the name of the third respondent and to issue a fresh registration certificate in the name of the petitioner.
  • The Original Petition is disposed of and there is no order as to costs.

Implications: The decision resolves the dispute between the petitioner and the revenue as to the vehicle in question by upholding the petitioner's prior security and possession and ordering transfer of registration and issuance of a tax clearance certificate. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new or broad precedent beyond the resolution of these parties' rights on the facts before the court; the court expressly decided the matter on the basis that a prior secured right existed in the petitioner and therefore the revenue could not prevail in the present circumstances.

    Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. Regional Transport Officer

    JUDGMENT

    1. The third respondent got possession of a stage carriage vehicle as per Ext. P-2 agreement styled as a hire purchase agreement. In accordance with Ext. P-2 agreement the petitioner, who is carrying on business as financiers, were to let and the third respondent to take, on hire, the motor vehicle together with the equipment and accessories for a term of 24 calendar months from 9th June 1973 subject to determination as mentioned below. The hirer was to pay the owners (petitioner) by way of rent, the sum mentioned in the second schedule to the agreement on the dates therein mentioned, He was to keep the vehicle in sole custody. He could not sell, assign, pledge, charge, underlet, lend or otherwise part with the possession, custody or benificial interest of the said vehicle without the previous written consent of the petitioner. If the hirer fails to pay any of the instalments within the stipulated time whether legally demanded or not, becomes insolvent or attempts to pledge or sell or otherwise alienate or transfer the vehicle, etc., then the rights of the hirer shall forthwith be determined ipso facto without any notice to the hirer and all the instalments previously paid by the hirer shall be forfeited to the petitioner, who shall thereupon be entitled to seize, remove and retake possession of the vehicle with its accessories. Only upon the hirer paying the entire amount specified in the schedule the said vehicle will become the sole and absolute property of the hirer. As per the agreement itself the petitioner had agreed to permit the hirer to have the registration of the vehicle in his name provided that he should transfer the registration in the name of the petitioner whenever required to do so by them and especially when the hirer commits breach of any of the conditions of the agreement and the petitioner was obliged to seize the vehicle. What happened in this case was that, the third respondent defaulted payment of the instalments in accordance with the agreement. The petitioner seized the vehicle. On that day an amount of Rs. 19,375 was due from the third respondent to the petitioner byway of arrears of hire money besides other amounts by way of incidental charges, etc. After the seizure of the vehicle and taking possession of the same, the petitioner made an application to the Regional Transport Officer, the first respondent, requiring him to issue a tax clearance certificate in respect of the vehicle. Another application was also filed for cancellation of the original registration certificate issued in the name of the third respondent and for the issue of a fresh registration certificate in the name of the petitioner. This application was, in effect, rejected by the first respondent on the ground that, the Tax Recovery Officer, (Income tax) the second respondent had raised objection in regard to the transfer of the vehicle to anybody as the registered owner, the third respondent, had not cleared the income tax arrears due from him. Therefore, the application for duplicate registration certificate of transfer of the ownership could not be considered.

    2. In these circumstances, the petitioner has approached this court for quashing the proceedings of the first respondent, which denies the petitioner's request for fresh registration certificate and tax clearance certificate, and, also for the issue of a writ of mandamus for commanding the first respondent to issue the Tax Clearance Certificate in respect of Fargo bus bearing registration No. K.L.F 1469 and to cancel the original registration certificate in respect of the above bus and issued in the name of the third respondent and further direct the first respondent to issue a fresh Registration Certificate in the name of the petitioner.

    3. The Tax Recovery Officer has filed a counter affidavit in the matter. Therein it is stated that, an amount of Rs. 8,137 plus interest is due from the third respondent, as per revenue recovery certificates received from the Income tax Officer, Ernakulam. The details for arrears with the date of service of demand notice, issued under Rule 2 of Schedule II of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1961 is given hereunder.

    Sl. No. Asst. year Amount certified Date of service of ITOP-I under Rule 2 (Demand notice served by the T.R.O) 1. 1963-1964 3,623 24-4-1967 2. 1969-1970 1,062 24-11-1971 3. 1970-1971 1,171 8-1-1972 4. 1971-1972 2,281 21-6-1973 8,137

    4. According to the Tax Recovery Officer, the defaulter, to all intents and purposes, even under the terms of the agreement, is the owner, under the hire purchase agreement, Ext. P-2. The transaction evidenced by Ext. P-2 is indeed one of loan to be repaid in twenty-four regular instalments spread over a period of twenty-four months and the agreement really amounted only to giving of security of the bus for the loan advanced by the petitioner. He points out that, the possessor of the vehicle, under the hire purchase agreement, the third respondent, is the owner.

    5. Mr. V.R Venkitakrishnan, learned counsel for the petitioner, placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in K.L Johar and Co. v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer AIR. 1965 SC. 1082 contended that, the petitioner is the real owner of the vehicle. It was a case of a financing firm having its main business to advance money to persons who intended to purchase motor vehicles but were themselves not in a position to find ready money to pay the price. The firm entered into hire purchase agreement with the purchaser. The Supreme Court pointed out in that case that, the agreement therein showed that the financier was the owner of the vehicle and the intending purchaser was merely a hirer thereunder. The clauses in the agreement give power to the financier, as in this case, to retake possession of the vehicle and determine the agreement. The Supreme Court pointed out in that case that if the property in the vehicle had passed to the intending purchaser at the time of the hire purchase agreement it would not have been open to the financing company to take possession of the vehicle or to insist on payment of arrears or to become entitled to everything that had been paid upto that day. Under the law all that the, financing company would have been entitled to was to realise the loan he had given by filing a suit and then attaching and selling the vehicle. These clauses which allow the company to seize the vehicle and retake possession were clear indications of the fact that there was no sale by the dealer to the person who wanted to purchase the vehicle at the time of the hire purchase agreement, and that at the time the sale was by the dealer to the financing company. In that case also some of the clauses in the agreement therein gave an option to the person who wanted to purchase the vehicle to do so by exercising his option under the conditions mentioned therein. The Supreme Court pointed out that, if the intending purchaser had already become the owner when the agreement had entered into as such the clauses would not have been included in the agreement.

    6. In the present case, clause 5 of the agreement states that, on default by the hirer the owner can seize, remove and retake possession of the vehicle and sue for all the instalments due and for damages for breach of the agreement and for all the costs of retaking of possession of the said vehicle and all costs occasioned by the hirer's default. Clause 6 would show that, only upon the hirer paying the entire amounts due under the agreement the said vehicle shall become the sole and the absoulte property of the hirer. In regard to the registration of the vehicle, though it is in the hirer's name, clause 8 of the agreement states that, the owners—the financing company—agree to permit the hirer to have the registration of the vehicle in his name provided that the hirer shall transfer the registration in the name of the owners whenever required to do so by them and especially when the hirer commits breach of any of the conditions of the agreement. In the case that I referred to above, the Supreme Court had also indicated that, the distinguishing feature of a typical hire-purchase agreement is that the property does not pass when the agreement is made but only passes when the option is finally exercised after complying with all the terms of the agreement. Mr. V.R Venkatakrishnan, learned counsel for the petitioner points out that, that feature is clearly there in Ext. P-2 agreement.

    7. Though there is much force in what Mr. Venkatakrishnan contends, I do not think, I need go as far as that, for allowing this original petition. Admittedly, it is as per Ext. P-2 that the third respondent gets possession of the vehicle and, according to the Tax Recovery Officer, he becomes the owner of the vehicle. But then by that agreement itself, at least a security is created over the vehicle in favour of the petitioner in respect of the amounts advanced by him if the transaction is taken to be a purchase in favour of the third respondent. If that be so, then the revenue cannot have a superior right over the claim of the petitioner in regard to the vehicle. It is only whenever the right of the crown and the right of a subject with respect to the payment of a debt of equal degree come into competition, the Crown's right prevails. The principle postulates that, when the claims of the State and of the subject are equal in degree the former should prevail, see the decision reported in State of Madras v. Cheldian Syriyan Bank Ltd. 1960 KLJ. 853. In this decision Justice M.S Menon, as he then was, pointed out that, if a mortgagee has a lien over the funds collected by a receiver appointed at his instance, then it will not be possible to say that the rights of the mortgagee and of the State in the funds in question are equal in degree. The existance of a lien in favour of the mortgagee will militate against the equality of the rival claims and thus negative the right of the State to a preferential payment.

    8. There, his Lordship pointed out to a decision of the Madras High Court reported in AIR. 1940 Madras 703 wherein Justice Wadsworth had said:

    “The preferential claim of the mortgagee to the profits in the hands of the receiver is not based on any substantive rights to those profits which the terms of the mortgage do not warrant, but is merely granted by way of an equitable relief to the mortgagee against the consequences of the delay in enforcing his legal remedy. If it is conceded that a mortgagee has no charge over the rents in the hands of the receiver, it is difficult to see bow he can have a preferential claim as against the Crown. His preferential claim as against simple creditors has been recognised, but not, so far as I am aware, on any other grounds than as an equity which is recognised in his favour as a diligent creditor trying to enforce his legal remedy. As against all the unsecured creditors the claim of the crown is paramount.”

    (emphasis supplied).

    9. The statement which 1 hive underlined that, ‘as against all the unsecured creditors the claim of the Crown is paramount’, Justice M.S Menon points out, is apparently not a precise statement of the rule concerned. The rule only postulates that when the claims of the State and of the subject are equal in degree the former should prevail. In that connection the learned Judge referred to a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court ILR 1957 A.P 505, where Chief Justice Subha Rao, as he then was said:

    “An appointment of a receiver in a mortgage action to collect rents of the mortgaged property and deposit the same to the credit of the suit is one of the equitable modes of proceeding against the mortgaged property itself. On the making of that order, the mortgagor is deprived of his right to possession and in collect the rents. Thereafter neither the mortgagor nor persons claiming under him such as a purchaser or a mortgagee of the equity of redemption can have a higher right than the mortgagor himself. So too, none of the creditors who have no prior mortgage or security over the property, can claim to have a right to the amounts realised in so far as the said amounts were necessary to discharge the mortgage debts for, in the case of unsecured creditors, they can only claim that amount in the shoes of the mortgagor and when the mortgagor himself has no right, a fortiori they will have none. Whatever privileged position the Crown occupies, in a competition inters among unsecured creditors it is settled law that the Crown is not a secured creditor and, therefore, it can only claim just like any other unsecured creditor and as the mortgagor lost the right to possession and to collect the rent, to the extent, indicated above, the State also cannot claim any priority in the sums collected by the receiver”

    10. Therefore, if, in a case where a person has got a prior secured right over the property, the State's claim will not prevail.

    11. It might be noted that, under S. 222 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1961, provision is made for recovery of tax by proceedings taken by the Tax Recovery Officer.

    12. That section reads:

    “222. Certificate to Tax Recovery Officer.— (1) When an assessee is in default or is deemed to be in default in making a payment of tax, the Income Tax Officer may forward to the Tax Recovery Officer a certificate under his signature specifying the amount of arrears due from the assessee and the Tax Recovery Officer on receipt of such certificate, shall proceed to recover from such assessee the amounts specified therein by one or more of the modes mentioned below, in accordance with the rules laid down in the Second Schedule:

    (a) attachment and sale of the assessee's movable property;

    (b) attachment and sale of the assessee's immovable property;

    (c) arrest of the assessee and his detention in prison;

    (d) appointing a receiver for the management of the assessee's movable and immovable properties.

    (Explanation omitted)

    (2) The Income Tax Officer may issue a certificate under sub-section (1) notwithstanding that proceedings for recovery of the arrear by any other mode have been taken.”

    13. In the Income Tax Act itself there is no substantive provision for superseding or overriding the claims or rights of a secured creditor of the assessee. It is Schedule II mentioned in section 222 that contains statutory rules, in accordance with which the modes of recovery mentioned in that section have to be exercised. This relates to procedure only, and, does not deal with substantive rights. Schedule II, rule 16, under the heading “private alienation to be void in certain cases” provides as follows:

    “16. Private alienation to be void in certain cases. (1) Where a notice has been served on a defaulter under rule 2, the defaulter or his representative in interest shall not be competent to mortgage, charge, lease or otherwise deal with any property belonging to him except with the permission of the Tax Recovery Officer, nor shall any civil court issue any process against such property in execution of a decree for the payment of money.

    (2) Where an attachment has been made under this schedule any private transfer or delivery of the property attached or of any interest therein and any payment to the defaulter of any debt, dividend or other moneys contrary to such attachment shall be void as against all claims enforceable under the attachment.

    14. The provision for recovery of tax by any of the modes specified under section 222, and which is provided in detail in Schedule II, cannot, in the absence of any specific statutory provision, take away the rights of any party in whose favour the security has already been created. This is so held by the Allahabad High Court in Suraj Prasad Gupta v. Chartered Bank 83 TTR. 494. That case was originally heard by a Division Bench consisted of S.N Dwivedi and Hari Swarup, JJ., and, on difference of opinion by a third Judge, Justice Kirty. Justice Kirty, agreeing with Justice Dwivedi, held that, nothing can be read in rule 16 of Schedule II of the Income Tax Act which may have the effect of denying the legal right of a mortgagee or a mortgagee in whose favour a decree for sale under Order XXXIV, rule 5, of the Code, has been passed and that rule 16 must be strictly construed and no extended or wide meaning can be given to the language of rule 16(1). It might be noted that, an attachment can be effected only after a demand notice had been served on the defaulter under Rule 2. Rule 16(2) says that, where an attachment has been made any private transfer or delivery of the property attached or of any interest therein etc., shall be void as against all claims enforceable under the attachment. If that be so, it could well be contended that, the provision in Rule 16(I), which says that, after receipt of a notice, the defaulter shall not be competent to mortgage, charge, lease etc., except with the permission of the Tax Recovery Officer, will not make such transfer void as against the claims of the revenue as such. Otherwise there was no purpose for a specific provision in sub-rule (2). It may be that in cases where no attachment has been made and private transfer has been made to a bona fide transferree for value, he would be protected I do not think, I need give a final opinion on this question because, in any view of the case, as a person who has got prior security over the vehicle, the petitioners' seizure and retaking possession of the vehicle, could not in any way, be questioned by the revenue. In the light of the agreement the claims of the petitioner, under which the third respondent got the vehicle, shall prevail over the State, and, the petitioner is entitled to get the registration certificate transferred in its name and also to get clearance certificate from the Regional Transport Authority. Therefore, I quash Ext. P-1 and direct the first respondent to issue tax clearance certificate in respect of Fargo bus bearing Registration No. K.L.F 1469 and to cancel the original registration certificate in respect of the above bus and issued in the name of the third respondent. I further direct the first respondent to issue a fresh registration certificate in the name of the petitioner.

    15. The Original Petition is disposed of as above. There will be no order as to costs.

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    Comments

    Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. Regional Transport Officer
    (Mar 9, 1978)