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  • Government.3. Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
  • S. 3 of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1952,
  • S. 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
  • MAINTENANCE OF INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
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  • Government.3. Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
  • S. 3 of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1952,
  • S. 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
  • MAINTENANCE OF INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Two petitions arose from similar facts. The petitioners were employed by the Cochin Chamber of Commerce and Industry as Sworn Measurers and were charged with negligence and dereliction of duty. Following domestic enquiries they were dismissed. Their unions took up the matters (one union being the Cochin Commercial Employees' Association and the other the Mercantile Employees' Association, Calicut). The State Government, by a single order in each case (exhibit P3), informed the unions that it did not propose to refer the disputes for adjudication under S. 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The sole reason stated in exhibit P3 was: “As the management has taken action in accordance with the canons of natural justice, prima facie the action of the management is not mala fide.” The petitioners challenged the Government's decision and its stated reason for declining to refer.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Government's decision under S. 10(1) not to refer the disputes for adjudication is amenable to judicial review to the extent of examining the reasons recorded under S. 12(5).
  2. Whether the reason given in exhibit P3 — that the domestic enquiries were in accordance with natural justice and therefore prima facie not mala fide — was relevant and sufficient to justify refusal to refer under S. 10(1).
  3. What is the permissible scope of judicial scrutiny of a Government's subjective satisfaction where reasons are recorded under S. 12(5), particularly after (a) prior Supreme Court authorities and (b) the insertion of S. 11A enlarging tribunal powers.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The Government applied an irrelevant and extraneous reason in exhibit P3 — equating compliance with the principles of natural justice to absence of mala fides — which has no logical relation to the statutory question whether a reference should be made under S. 10(1).
  • Even if domestic enquiries complied with natural justice, mala fides could still exist; conversely, absence of procedural irregularity does not preclude other grounds of challenge (for example, unfair labour practice, victimization, or inadequacy of the punishment).
  • Because S. 11A (inserted on 15 December 1971) confers appellate power on Labour Courts/Tribunals to examine merits, a proper inquiry would have included whether the evidence at the domestic enquiry justified the management's conclusion and punishment.

Respondent / Government Counsel's Argument (as recorded)

  • Counsel P. K. Kurian contended that if there are multiple potential reasons for a Government decision, and the Government properly considers one such reason (here, absence of mala fides), the decision must be upheld even if other reasons were not considered.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kandan Textile, Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal (High Court of Madras) [1949 L.L.J 875] Illustrated pre-amendment view that Government decision whether to refer was amenable to judicial review and courts could examine existence/apprehension of industrial dispute when S.10(1) began with “where any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended.” Referred to show the pre-amendment judicial approach and the vagueness that prompted later amendment.
Raju's Cafe v. Industrial Tribunal [1951 I L.L.J 219] Another pre-amendment authority reflecting judicial scrutiny of Government decisions under original text of S.10(1). Cited with other pre-amendment cases to demonstrate earlier judicial practice.
T.D. Ramayya Pantulu v. Kutty and Rao (Engineers) Ltd. [1949 L.L.J 13] Pre-amendment case cited as part of authorities holding Government decision was reviewable under the original wording. Used to demonstrate the history of judicial review before amendment to S.10(1).
United Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Uttar Pradesh Bank Employees' Union [1952-II L.L.J 577] Pointed out vagueness in the original phrase “any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended”. Referenced as motivating the legislative amendment to S.10(1) to make the Government's opinion explicit.
State of Madras v. C.P. Sarathy [1953-I L.L.J 174] Considered the scope of S.10(1) and stated the law on the issue. Cited to show Supreme Court treatment of S.10(1) prior to amendment and development of law.
State of Bombay v. Krishnan [1960-II L.L.J 592] Interpreted S.12(5): although Government orders are administrative and reasons may not be fully justiciable on merits, courts can interfere where reasons are extraneous or irrelevant; Government must act bona fide and consider relevant facts. Used as the leading authority to establish that reasons recorded under S.12(5) can be examined for relevancy and that extraneous reasons justify issuing a writ of mandamus.
Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay [A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1617] Reiterated limits of judicial review of Government reasons under S.10(1) read with S.12(5): court is not an appellate authority but may intervene if reasons show irrelevant or foreign considerations. Applied to emphasize that while courts will not reassess the propriety of reasons, manifestly irrelevant considerations in the stated reasons can justify interference.
Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal [(1975) 2 SCC 81 : A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 550] Enumerated grounds on which judicial review of a subjective satisfaction is permissible (e.g., failure to apply mind, dishonesty, dictation, wrong test, need for rationally probative material, regard to matters required by statute). Adopted as a guiding framework for testing the validity of a Government's recorded reasons and whether subjective satisfaction can be scrutinized.
S. Partap Singh v. State of Punjab [A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 72] Illustrative authority concerning the requirement that grounds for satisfaction be relevant and connected to the statutory purpose. Referred to in elaboration of the requirement that materials grounding satisfaction must be of rational probative value.
Sharpe v. Wakefield [1891 A.C. 173] Famous statement on discretionary powers: they must be exercised according to rules of reason and justice, not private opinion — i.e., not arbitrary or fanciful. Quoted to support the proposition that discretion must be legal, regular and reasonable, and that courts may intervene where discretion is exercised arbitrarily.
Kottayam Plywood Workers' Union v. Government of Kerala [1962 I L.L.J 344] Example where Government's solitary reliance on bona fide purpose (for retrenchment) was held insufficient because it did not show consideration of workmen's pleaded grounds; Government failed to consider relevant facts. Relied upon as precedent where a similar sole-reason approach by Government was found to be inadequate and warranted interference.
Workmen of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Company of India (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. India (Pvt.) Ltd. [1973-I L.L.N 278] Interpreted S.11A: conferred appellate-type power on Labour Courts/Tribunals to examine merits of domestic enquiry and, where discharge/dismissal was unjustified, set aside and award relief including reinstatement or lesser punishment. Quoted to show the enlarged scope of tribunal review post-insertion of S.11A, relevant to assessing what would have been considered had there been a reference.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a stepwise legal analysis, constrained throughout to the material and authorities set out in the opinion:

  1. Statutory framework and history: The court observed that S.10(1) was amended (by S.3 of the 1952 Amendment) to change the opening words so that the provision now depends on the Government's opinion that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. This history explains why judicial review principles developed.
  2. Duty to record reasons: Under S.12(5) the Government must record and communicate reasons where it decides not to refer on report of conciliation proceedings. Thus the reasons in exhibit P3 were properly subject to scrutiny when the order was challenged.
  3. Precedent-supplied limits of review: Citing State of Bombay v. Krishnan and Bombay Union of Journalists, the court reiterated that while the Government's order is administrative and courts are not appellate over the adequacy or propriety of reasons, they can issue writs if reasons are extraneous, irrelevant, or show the Government took into account foreign considerations. The court emphasised that the Government may consider expediency but must act bona fide and consider only relevant facts, not act in a punitive spirit.
  4. Contemporary standards of review: The court adopted the Khudiram Das formulation of grounds on which a subjective satisfaction can be challenged (failure to apply mind; dishonesty; dictation; self-disabling rules; wrong test; need for rationally probative material; statutory matters to be considered). The court stressed that materials grounding satisfaction must be relevant and rationally probative.
  5. Application to the facts: The Government's exhibit P3 relied solely on the proposition that because the management complied with natural justice the action was prima facie not mala fide. The court held that (a) absence of mala fides is not the only relevant consideration and (b) compliance with procedural fairness (natural justice) does not logically establish absence of mala fides nor preclude other valid challenges to dismissal (such as victimization, unfair labour practice, irregularity of proceedings, or merit-based error that S.11A would allow a tribunal to consider).
  6. Relevance test and wrong test: The court concluded that equating observance of natural justice with absence of mala fides and treating absence of mala fides as the sole ground for refusal to refer was to apply a wrong and irrational test. The reasons given in exhibit P3 were not shown to relate intelligibly to the decision reached.
  7. Consideration of opposing argument: The court recorded respondent counsel's contention that consideration of one valid reason could sustain the order even if other reasons were not addressed. The court rejected that approach where the reason relied on is not a relevant or adequate ground for the statutory decision.
  8. Conclusion on relief: Because the recorded reasons were inadequate and not supported by the facts in the order, the court found that interference was warranted and, accordingly, quashed exhibit P3 and directed the Government to reconsider afresh, complying with S.12(5) by recording legally relevant reasons if it again declines to refer.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The original petitions were allowed; the Government's orders (exhibit P3) in both cases were quashed. The Government is directed to reconsider the question of reference under S.10(1) afresh and, if it again decides no reference is called for, to record and communicate reasons in accordance with S.12(5) of the Act. Parties were ordered to suffer costs.

Implications:

  • The decision requires the Government to record reasons that are relevant, intelligible and connected to the statutory question; reasons that are extraneous or that apply a wrong test may attract judicial interference.
  • The opinion emphasizes that compliance with natural justice alone does not conclusively demonstrate absence of mala fides nor exhaust the relevant inquiries for deciding to refer a dispute; other substantive and procedural grounds may be relevant and must be considered where appropriate.
  • The court applied existing authorities and did not purport to lay down a novel doctrinal rule; it ordered a fresh administrative decision consistent with the law as explained in precedent.
  • If the Government again declines to refer, it must ensure the recorded reasons meet the legal standards set out in the opinion (i.e., bona fide consideration, relevance, and a rational nexus between reasons and conclusion).

This summary has been prepared strictly on the basis of the text of the provided opinion. No information beyond that opinion has been inferred or introduced.

    Workmen Of Cochin Chamber Of Commerce v. State Of Kerala

    JUDGMENT

    1. In these two cases similar questions arise for decision. The petitioners in these cases were employed by the Cochin Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Cochin, as Sworn Measures. They were charged with negligence and dereliction of duty and after enquiry they were dismissed from service. Their cases were taken up by their unions, one of them by the Cochin Commercial Employees' Association, Cochin 1, and the other by the Mercantile Employees' Association, Calicut. The Government ultimately, by exhibit P 3 order in both these cases informed the parties that they do not propose to refer the matter for adjudication. The ground stated was:

    “As the management has taken action in accordance with the canons of natural justice, prima facie the action of the management is not mala fide.”

    This was the sole ground. The State Government was under a duty to communicate the reasons for not making a reference under S. 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and evidently it was such reason that was communicated by exhibit P3 in both these cases.

    2. In both these petitions the challenge is to this decision of the Government by which they informed the unions that they do not propose to refer the dispute for adjudication. The ground on which attack is made to this order is that the reason mentioned in exhibit P 3 is irrelevant and extraneous and has no relation to the decision to be reached by the Government.

    3. Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (referred to hereinafter as the Act), as originally enacted, opened with the words

    “where any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended.”

    It was subsequently amended by S. 3 of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1952, to read as it appears in the section now as

    “Where the appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended.”

    As the section originally stood the Courts had taken the view that the decision of the Government as to whether reference was to be made or not was amenable to judicial review and the Court can even look into the question whether the industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. It was so decided by the High Court of Madras in Kandan Textile, Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal [1949 L.L.J 875]. Raju's Cafe v. Industrial Tribunal [1951 I L.L.J 219] and T.D Ramayya Pantulu v. Kutty and Rao (Engineers), Ltd. [1949 L.L.J 13]. The vagueness of the term “any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended” was pointed out by the Supreme Court in United Commercial Bank, Ltd. v. Uttar Pradesh Bank Employees' Union [1952-II L.L.J 577], by Chandrasekhara Iyer, J. Later the Supreme Court considered the scope of the section in State of Madras v. C.P Sarathy [1953-I L.L.J 174], and stated the law on the question. The amendment was evidently intended to remove the vagueness pointed out by the Supreme Court in United Commercial Bank case (vide supra).

    4. Though the order of the Government Under S. 10 (1) is an administrative order, S. 12(5) imposes a duty on the Government in cases coming to its notice on report of conciliation proceedings to record and communicate reasons where the Government decides not to refer. In such cases the reasons indicated in the order of the Government may call for examination when the order is under challenge. It is not necessary to discuss this question in detail, for the section has received interpretation by the Supreme Court in a number of decisions. In the leading case on the subject, State of Bombay v. Krishnan [1960-II L.L.J 592], at page 602, Gajendragadkar, J., discussing the scope of S. 12(5) said thus:

    “The order passed by the Government under S. 12 (5) may be an administrative order and the reasons recorded by it may not be justiciable in the sense that their propriety, adequacy or satisfactory character may not be open to judicial scrutiny; in that sense it would be correct to say that the Court hearing a petition for mandamus is not sitting in appeal over the decision of the Government; nevertheless if the Court is satisfied that the reasons given by the Government for refusing to make a reference are extraneous and not germane, then the Court can issue, and would be justified in issuing, a writ of mandamus even in respect of such an administrative order.”

    Again the learned Judge said at page 603 thus:

    “Though considerations of expediency cannot be excluded when Government considers whether or not it should exercise its power to make a reference, it would not be open to the Government to introduce and rely upon wholly irrelevant or extraneous considerations under the guise of expediency. It may for instance be open to the Government in considering the question of expediency to enquire whether the dispute raises a claim which is very stale, or which is opposed to the provisions of the Act, or is inconsistent with any agreement between the parties, and if the Government comes to the conclusion that the dispute suffers from infirmities of this character, it may refuse to make the reference. But even in dealing with the question as to whether it would be expedient or not to make the reference Government must not act in a punitive spirit but must consider the question fairly and reasonably and take into account only relevant facts and circumstances.”

    As to the scope of examination by the Government in this matter, the learned Judge observed:

    “The problem which the Government has to consider while acting under S. 12(5) (a) is whether there is a case for reference. This expression means that Government must first consider whether a prima facie case for reference has been made on the merits. If the Government comes to the conclusion that a prima facie case for reference has been made, then it would be open to the Government also to consider whether there are any other relevant or material facts which would justify its refusal to make a reference. The question as to whether a case for reference has been made out can be answered in the light of all the relevant circumstances which would have a bearing on the merits of a case as well as on the incidental question as to whether a reference should nevertheless be made or not. A discretion to consider all relevant facts which is conferred on the Government by S. 10(1) could be exercised by the Government even in dealing with cases under S. 12(5) provided of course the said discretion is exercised bona fide, its final decision is based on a consideration of relevant facts and circumstances, and the second part of S. 12(5) is complied with.”

    In the case of Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay [A.I.R 1964 S.C 1617], this question was further examined by the Supreme Court and Gajendragadkar, J., speaking for the Bench said thus at page 1622 of the report:

    “Besides, in dealing with this contention it is necessary to remember that in entertaining an application for a writ of mandamus against an order made by the appropriate Government under S. 10(1) read with S. 12(5), the Court is not sitting in appeal over the order and is not entitled to consider the propriety or the satisfactory character of the reasons given by the said Government. It would be idle to suggest that in giving reasons to a party for refusing to make a reference under S. 12(5), the appropriate Government has to write an elaborate order indicating exhaustively all the reasons that weighed in its mind in refusing to make a reference. It is no doubt desirable that the party concerned should be told clearly and precisely the reasons why no reference is made, because the object of S. 12(5) appears to be to require the appropriate Government to state its reasons for refusing to make a reference, so that the reasons should stand public scrutiny; but that does not mean that a party challenging the validity of the Government's decision not to make a reference can require the Court in writ proceedings to examine the propriety or correctness of the said reasons. If it appears that the reasons given show that the appropriate Government took into account a consideration which was irrelevant or foreign that, no doubt, may justify the claim for a writ of mandamus. But the argument that of the pleas raised by the appellants two have been considered and not the third, would not necessarily entitle the party to claim a writ under Art. 226.”

    5. In a case where power is exercised by the Government under S. 10(1), if the Government is of the opinion that no reference need be made, the satisfaction reached by the Government, even if it be subjective, is open to examination to the extent of scrutinizing the reasons indicated in the order under S. 12(5) to see whether they are irrelevant or extraneous.

    6. The question as to how far judicial review of a decision reached by the Government on its subjective satisfaction is permissible arose for an exhaustive consideration by the Supreme Court of India in the recent case reported in Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal [(1975) 2 SCC 81 : A.I.R 1975 S.C 550]. The question there concerned the satisfaction of a detaining authority under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act. Dealing with the grounds on which a judicial review would be possible the Court enumerated the following as available grounds:

    (1) Where the authority has not applied its mind.

    (2) The power is exercised dishonestly or for an improper purpose.

    (3) The power is exercised under the dictation of another person and not independently.

    (4) Where the authority has disabled itself from applying its mind to the facts of any individual case by self-created rules of policy or in any other manner.

    (5) Where the satisfaction of the authority is based on application of a wrong test or the misconstruction of a statute. Where this happens, the satisfaction of the authority would not be in respect of the thing in regard to which it is required to be satisfied.

    (6) The satisfaction must be grounded on materials which are of rationally probative value.

    (7) If there are to be found in the statute expressly or by implication matters which the authority ought to have regard to, then, in exercising the power, the authority must have regard to those matters.

    Ground 6 was further elaborated in the judgment of the learned Judge thus:

    “The grounds on which the satisfaction is based must be such as a rational human being can consider connected with the fact in respect of which the satisfaction is to be reached. They must be relevant to the subject-matter of the inquiry and must not be extraneous to the scope and purpose of the statute. If the authority has taken into account, it may even be with the best of intention, as a relevant factor something which it could not properly take into account in deciding whether or not to exercise the power or the manner or extent to which it should be exercised, the exercise of the power would be bad. S. Partap Singh v. State Of Punjab. [A.I.R 1964 S.C 72.]”

    7. The Supreme Court considered a further ground on which subjective satisfaction reached by the authority can be successfully challenged and it observed that this ground is of late becoming increasingly important. Reference was made to the following passage in Sharpe v. Wakefield [1891 A.C 173 at 179]:

    “… When it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authorities … that something is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion … according to law and not humour. It is to be, not arbitrary, vague, fanciful, but legal and regular.”

    The Supreme Court took the view that the power of the Court to interfere in such a case is not as an appellate authority to override a decision taken by the statutory authority, but as a judicial authority, which is concerned, and concerned only, to see whether the statutory authority has contravened the law by acting in excess of the power which the Legislature has confided in it. As to the scope of this power the Court observed:

    “It is true that this ground in a sense tends to blur the dividing line between the subjective satisfaction and objective determination but the dividing line is very much there howsoever faint or delicate it may be, the Courts have never failed to recognize it.”

    8. It would appear from the order of Government, exhibit P3, that it takes the view that absence of mala fides is the only question that is relevant in refusing to make a reference. May be the dismissal of an employee is not mala fide. But it may be bad for several other reasons. To assume that no mala fides is shown and, therefore, there is no scope for referring the dispute would certainly be to apply a wrong test. In a case before this Court, in Kottayam Plywood Workers' Union v. Government of Kerala [1962 I L.L.J 344], the petitioner sought the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the State Government to refer the dispute between the petitioner and the management for adjudication. The order of the Government in that case read:

    “From the reports received it is seen, that the retrenchment is for bona fide purposes. The case is, therefore, not a fit one for adjudication.”

    The case of the workman was that there was no need for retrenchment as they could have been given alternate employment. They further took the stand that the employer had contravened the provisions of the Act in effecting retrenchment. The order of the Government refusing to refer based solely upon the reason that the retrenchment was for a bona fide purpose was found to be bad. Since the order did not show that the grounds on which retrenchment was questioned by the workmen were considered, but on the other hand indicated that it considered the question of bona fides when that question was not raised and had solely based its decision on the ground of bona fides the Court found that the order called for interference. The Court took the view that the State Government had failed to consider the relevant facts before passing the impugned order.

    9. Section 11 A of the Act was introduced in Act by an amendment which came into force on 15 December 1971. That section conferred powers of an appellate nature on the Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals. The scope of the power under S. 11 A has been considered by the Supreme Court in Workmen of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Company of India (Private) Ltd. v. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Company India (Private), Ltd. [1973-I L.L.N 278]. This section makes a change in the law by conferring on the Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals appellate power which enables it to examine a case on the merits and if satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified, set aside such order and direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give such other relief to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment. Exhibit P 3 in both these cases are passed subsequent to the commencement of operation of S. 11 A of the Act and, therefore, S. 11 A would have applied to any enquiry before a Labour Court, or Tribunal in case there had been a reference. It is, therefore, said for the petitioners in these cases that one of the relevant questions to be considered would have been whether evidence recorded at the domestic enquiry would have justified the conclusion reached by the management and further whether in the circumstances of the case the punishment would be merited. These would have been open to consideration and would have been relevant in the event of a reference. It is also said that apart from the question of mala fide of the management in dismissing the workmen there may be other pleas available by way of challenge to an order dismissing the workmen. Even before S. 11 A found its place in the Act there were grounds recognized in law for interference with the punishment imposed upon the workmen by the management after enquiry. Grounds of victimization or unfair labour practice were grounds so recognized as available in law. The irregularity of the proceedings by which the ultimate punishment was imposed in the domestic enquiry was also a ground for examination. Evidently, the Government in exhibit P 3 order seems to have considered only whether action had been taken in accordance with the principles of natural justice and found that it had been so taken and the Government thereupon has come to the conclusion that prima facie the action was not mala fide. It is pointed out by the petitioners' counsel that the fact that the proceedings have bean taken in accordance with the principles of natural justice has absolutely no relevance to the finding or conclusion that there is no mala fides. Mala fides is not related to proceedings being in accordance with a proper procedure. Proceedings may be in accordance with rules or requirements of the principles of natural justice. But nevertheless they can be mala fide. Proceedings may not be in accordance with rules and may violate the canons of natural justice. That need not render them mala fide. These two have no relation with each other. The Government by saying that since the proceedings have been taken in accordance with the principles of natural justice prima facie it is not mala fide has made a very irrational approach and its approach has further been quite irrational in saying that since there is no mala fides no reference is to be made as if that is the sole ground on which reference could be made. It is particularly so when the scope of an enquiry before an Industrial Tribunal has considerably been enlarged by reason of S. 11 A of the Act. I am in agreement with learned counsel for the petitioners that the order of the Government shows that the Government has chosen to apply a wrong test and the approach is quite irrational. The reasons stated by it are not supported by the facts stated in the very order and the reasons do not lead to the conclusion or decision that there need be no reference.

    10. Learned counsel Sri P.K Kurian no doubt attempted very vehemently to show that if there be several reasons and the Government consider one only of the reasons, even so its decision must be upheld. In other words, if mala fides could be one of the reasons for challenging an order of termination of services and that has been considered by the Government and the Government is prima facie satisfied of the absence of mala fides the fact that other reasons have not been considered may not be material. What should be the reasons to be considered will vary from case to case. It is the reason relevant for the case which calls for consideration and if there is no such consideration the Government cannot seek to uphold its order which is based upon material not relevant to the issue.

    11. Of course, I do realize the difficulty of the Government in stating a proper reason in every case. But when the statutory requirement of S. 12(5) is that the reasons should be recorded and communicated, what is required to be recorded is not some reason or other but reasons which have relevance to the conclusion reached by the Government, which, adjudged by the normal test of cause and effect, are intelligible.

    12. In the result the original petitions are allowed, exhibit P3 in both the cases are quashed, the Government is directed to go into the matter afresh and decide the question of reference under S. 10(1) of the Act. Reasons under S. 12(5) of the Act will be recorded and communicated in accordance with law in the event Government feels no reference is called for. Parties are directed to suffer costs.

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    Workmen Of Cochin Chamber Of Commerce v. State Of Kerala
    (Oct 19, 1975)