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  • Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969, for short the Act.
  • Section 69 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act
  • Indian Income-tax Act, 1922
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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  • Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969, for short the Act.
  • Section 69 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act
  • Indian Income-tax Act, 1922
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant is the Trivandrum Co-operative District Wholesale Society Ltd., registered under the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969. The appellant sought to set aside two awards (Exts. P-1 and P-2) passed by the first respondent acting under Section 69 of the Act and the appellate decision (Ext. P-3) of the Kerala Co-operative Tribunal, Trivandrum (the second respondent).

Ext. P-1 arose from complaints by respondents 3 to 7 that their service had been wrongly terminated by the appellant; Ext. P-2 related to the same matter. The appellant had counter-claimed that respondents 3 to 7 had falsified accounts and were guilty of misappropriation and criminal breach of trust; that claim was rejected by the first respondent. The appellant’s appeal to the Co-operative Tribunal was dismissed (Ext. P-3).

The appellant filed an original petition under Article 226/227 challenging the concurrent factual findings of the Arbitrator (under Section 69) and the Tribunal. The learned Judge dismissed that petition on the ground that no grounds were made out to warrant interference with the concurrent findings of fact of the Arbitrator and the Tribunal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the first respondent (acting under Section 69 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969) had jurisdiction to decide the disputes between the appellant and respondents 3 to 7, or whether those disputes were industrial in nature and outside the Registrar's jurisdiction.
  2. Whether the appellant, having invited the Registrar to decide the matter and not having raised lack of jurisdiction before the Registrar or the Tribunal, can raise lack of jurisdiction for the first time in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution.
  3. Whether a distinction between patent and latent lack of jurisdiction justifies entertaining a jurisdictional challenge for the first time in writ proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The Registrar (first respondent) had no jurisdiction under Section 69 to decide the disputes because the disputes did not "touch the business, constitution, establishment or management of a society capable of being the subject of litigation" as defined in Section 2(i); rather, they were essentially industrial disputes not amenable to Section 69 proceedings.
  • The appellant relied on precedents (including Malabar Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. v. State of Kerala; Kerala State Handloom Weavers' Co-op Society Ltd. v. State of Kerala; and Kaloor Vadakkummury Service Co-op Society Ltd. v. Assistant Registrar) to support the submission that the Registrar lacked jurisdiction.
  • As an alternative submission, the appellant urged a distinction between latent and patent lack of jurisdiction: if the lack of jurisdiction was patent (obvious on the face of the record), the High Court may and should intervene even if the point was not raised below.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The appellant had invited the Registrar's decision by filing the plaint and had taken the chance of obtaining a favorable order; having failed to raise the objection to jurisdiction before the Registrar or before the Co-operative Tribunal, the appellant should not be permitted to raise the lack-of-jurisdiction point for the first time in Article 226 proceedings.
  • The respondents relied on a line of decisions of the High Court establishing that writ jurisdiction is discretionary and ordinarily not exercised where the petitioner submitted to the authority's jurisdiction and did not seek to challenge it before that authority.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Malabar Co-operative Central Bank Limited, Kozhikode v. State of Kerala, 1963 Ker LT 705 Cited by appellant to support submission that the Registrar had no jurisdiction under Section 69. The court noted the appellant relied on this authority and observed that the appellant could have relied on it if diligent; it did not find the lack of jurisdiction to be patent on the face of Section 69 alone.
Kerala State Handloom Weavers' Co-operative Society Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 1964 Ker LJ 175 Cited by appellant to support lack-of-jurisdiction contention. The court observed this decision could have been relied on by the appellant; failure to rely on it before the Registrar weakened the appellant's position.
Kaloor Vadakkummury Service Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Assistant Registrar, Mukundapuram, 1973 Ker LT 523 Cited by appellant; recently rendered (a few days before Exts. P-1 and P-2). The court observed it was rendered shortly before the awards, but still concluded the case was not one in which it should interfere.
P.M John v. State, 1955 Ker LT 568 Principle that High Court should know what the tribunal says on jurisdiction and tribunal should be given opportunity to decide it first. The court cited the decision to support the view that jurisdictional objections not raised before the tribunal ordinarily cannot be raised first in writ proceedings.
Madhava Iyer Venkitasubramonia Iyer v. Catholic Bank of India Ltd., 1957 Ker LT 411 (AIR 1957 Ker 109) Refusal to exercise Article 226 where petitioner submitted to jurisdiction and took chance of obtaining order in his favour. Cited as authority for refusing writ jurisdiction where petitioner had submitted to the authority's jurisdiction.
Gopalan v. Central Road Traffic Board, Trivandrum, 1958 Ker LT 410 (AIR 1958 Ker 341) Same principle: submission to jurisdiction precludes later writ challenge. Used to reinforce the consistent line of High Court decisions declining jurisdiction where issue of jurisdiction was not raised below.
S.M. Rawther v. Agricultural I.T and S.T Officer, 1958 Ker LT 958 Adopts the view that submitting to the authority precludes later jurisdictional challenge in writs. Cited with other Kerala decisions as establishing consistent practice.
AIR 1927 Mad 130 (FB) (quoted with approval in AIR 1957 SC 397) Passage (via Coutts Trotter, C.J.) describing test whether applicant argued merits before the lower court and thereby submitted to its jurisdiction. The passage was cited (and noted as approved by the Supreme Court) to justify dismissal where applicant had elected to argue merits before the tribunal.
Ponkunnam Erattupetta Motor Service v. Regional Transport Authority, 1958 Ker LT 1034 Reference to AIR 1957 SC 397 and its principles on submission to jurisdiction. Cited as part of the chain of authority supporting the court's discretionary refusal to interfere.
Kumaraswamy Reddiar … v. Noordeen & Others, 1960 Ker LT 778 (AIR 1961 Ker 117) Ordinarily a petitioner is precluded from claiming writ relief if he failed to raise jurisdiction below unless a cogent explanation is furnished. The court quoted this as articulating that failure to raise jurisdiction requires a cogent affidavit explanation to succeed in a writ petition.
Kumaran v. Ist Addl. Income-Tax Officer, Kozhikode, 1960 Ker LT 1340 (AIR 1961 Ker 182) Categorical statement that a petition cannot succeed on jurisdictional grounds unless the ground was taken before the authority. Used by the court to support the established principle that neglecting to raise jurisdiction below amounts to absence of diligence.
Mariyan v. State of Kerala, 1965 Ker LT 1 Reiteration of the principle that a writ applicant who submitted to authority's jurisdiction cannot later challenge that jurisdiction. One of the judges of the present bench had earlier reiterated this principle; the court cited it as part of the consistent view.
Gandhinagar Motor Transport Society v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 Bom 202 Referred to with approval in several decisions regarding submission to jurisdiction and writ discretion. Cited as an earlier authority forming part of the jurisprudence on the subject.
S.C. Prashar v. Vasantsen Dwarkadas, AIR 1956 Bom 530 Distinguishes between patent and latent lack of jurisdiction and allows interference where lack is patent. The court acknowledged and discussed this distinction, and considered whether the lack of jurisdiction in the present case was patent; it concluded it was not patent on the face of Section 69.
Bodenham v. Ricketts, (1836) 6 N & M 170 Lord Denman’s reasoning that interference is warranted for the sake of the public where a case would otherwise become an unchallenged precedent. Quoted to support the rationale for interfering in cases of patent lack of jurisdiction, though the court found the present case did not require such interference.
Farquharson v. Morgan, (1894) 1 QB 552 English authority that interference is permissible where want of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the record. Cited as the leading English case on intervention for patent lack of jurisdiction; the court discussed this principle but found the present case did not demonstrate patent lack of jurisdiction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by summarizing the facts and the procedural posture: awards Exts. P-1 and P-2 by the Registrar under Section 69, appeal to the Co-operative Tribunal dismissed (Ext. P-3), and the appellant's challenge in the High Court. It reviewed Section 69 and the definition of "dispute" in Section 2(i) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969, which defines "dispute" as any matter touching the business, constitution, establishment or management of a society capable of being the subject of litigation, including claims for sums payable to or by a society.

The court recognized the appellant's contention that the matters concerned were industrial disputes not amenable to determination under Section 69 and that the Registrar therefore lacked jurisdiction. It accepted that counsel for the appellant was "well-founded" in the submission that the Registrar may have lacked jurisdiction.

However, the court then examined the procedural posture and the established jurisprudence of the High Court. It cited a long line of Kerala decisions (and supporting English and Bombay decisions) holding that the High Court ordinarily declines to exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when a petitioner submitted to the jurisdiction of the authority or tribunal and did not challenge the jurisdiction before that authority. The reasons given in those authorities include: the High Court is entitled to know the tribunal's view on jurisdiction, and the tribunal should have the opportunity to decide it; an applicant who argued the merits before the lower authority cannot later repudiate that authority's jurisdiction; and failure to raise jurisdictional objections below typically indicates absence of diligence.

The court acknowledged the distinction between latent and patent lack of jurisdiction, as articulated in S.C. Prashar and related authorities: where lack of jurisdiction is patent on the face of the record, the High Court may intervene despite the failure to raise the point below, to prevent an incorrect decision becoming precedent. The court discussed this doctrine and relevant English authorities (Bodenham v. Ricketts; Farquharson v. Morgan).

Applying these principles, the court found that it was difficult to say, from Section 69 alone, that the Registrar's lack of jurisdiction was patent. The words of Section 69 ("touching the business of the society") made it unclear that disputes of the sort here were necessarily outside the Registrar's jurisdiction. The court observed that earlier Kerala decisions (Malabar, Kerala State Handloom) existed that could have been relied upon by the appellant; the appellant's failure to rely upon them before the Registrar or to press the point below worsened its position. The recently rendered Kaloor Vadakkummury decision, while close in time to the awards, did not persuade the court to interfere.

The court also noted that the appellant offered no explanation (other than asserting the lack of jurisdiction was patent) for not raising the point before the Deputy Registrar or the Tribunal. Given the consistent practice of the High Court over two decades, and the absence of a convincing explanation, the court exercised its discretion against the appellant.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is dismissed. The High Court refused to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact entered by the Arbitrator under Section 69 and by the Kerala Co-operative Tribunal, thereby upholding Exts. P-1, P-2 and the appellate decision Ext. P-3.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the awards and the Tribunal's decision stand and are not set aside by this court.
  • The parties were directed to bear their respective costs.
  • The court's decision rests on discretionary refusal to entertain a jurisdictional challenge raised for the first time in writ proceedings when the petitioner had submitted to the authority's jurisdiction and failed to offer a satisfactory explanation for that omission. The opinion does not purport to establish a new legal precedent beyond reaffirming the existing line of authorities and the recognized patent-vs-latent distinction; the court specifically concluded that no interference was warranted in the present circumstances.

This summary is based exclusively on the text of the provided opinion; no information beyond that text has been added or inferred.

    Trivandrum Co-Operative District Wholesale Society Ltd. v. Deputy Registrar Of Co-Operative Societies Trivandrum

    1. This appeal, is by the Trivandrum Co-operative District Wholesale Society Ltd. registered under the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969, for short the Act. The appellant sought setting aside the two awards Exts. P-1 and P-2 passed by the first respondent purporting to act under Section 69 of the Act as well as the appellate decision by the Kerala Co-operative Tribunal, Trivandrum the second respondent (Ext. P-3). The award Ext. P-1 was passed on the complaint of respondents 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 that their service had been wrongly terminated by the appellant. The award Ext. P-2 related to the same matter. The appellant had claimed certain amounts from each of the respondents 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 on the ground that they had falsified accounts and had committed misappropriation and criminal breach of trust. This claim of the appellant had been rejected. The appeal taken by the appellant before the second respondent the Co-operative Tribunal was dismissed by Ext. P-3.

    2. The learned Judge who heard the original petition dismissed it by a short judgment reading as follows:—

    “No grounds are made out warranting any interference by this Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution with the concurrent findings of fact entered by the Arbitrator who decided the reference under Section 69 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act and by the Kerala Co-operative Tribunal that the petitioner Society had failed to prove by any acceptable evidence that respondents No. 3 to 7 were responsible for the theft of some terylene cloth which took place from the Society's shop on 27-9-1969, Dismissed.”

    3. The appellant had taken the contention in the original petition that the first respondent had no jurisdiction to decide the question that arose before the first respondent on the “plaints” that were filed before the first respondent. The contention was that the disputes that could be settled under Section 69 of the Act must relate to a matter touching the business, constitution, establishment or management of a society capable of being the subject of litigation. This contention was elaborated by saying that the matter in dispute between the appellant and the respondents 3 onwards was not one which could be the subject of litigation in ordinary civil courts, that the disputes in essence and in substance were industrial disputes. Such a contention had not been taken before the first respondent. In fact the appellant also had invited the decision of the first respondent by the plaint that it filed. It is averred in the original petition that such a contention was raised before the Tribunal, the second respondent; but this also does not appear from the records and the point was not elaborated at the time of arguments. The Tribunal did not consider the question. In the original petition the point has been taken; but the learned Judge has not dealt with it. The only point urged before us was the lack of jurisdiction of the first respondent to deal with the disputes that arose.

    4. We shall read Section 69 as well as the definition of the term ‘dispute’ in Section 2 (i) of the Act.

    “69. Disputes to be referred to Registrar:— (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the tame being in force, if a dispute arises:

    (a) among members, past members and persons claiming through members, past members and deceased members; or

    (b) Between a member, past member or person claiming through a member, past member or deceased member and the society, its committee or any officer, agent or employee of the society; or

    (c) between the society or its committee and any past committee, any officer, agent or employee, or any past officer, past agent or past employee or the nominee, heirs or legal representatives of any deceased officer, deceased agent, or deceased employee of the society; or

    (d) between the society and any other society; or

    (e) Between a society and the members of a society affiliated to it; or

    (f) between the society and a person other than a member of the society who has been granted a loan by the society or with whom the society has or had business transactions or any person claiming through such a person; or

    (g) between the society and a surety of a member, past member, deceased member or employee or a person other than a member who has been granted a loan by the society whether such a surety is or is not a member of the society; or

    (h) between the society and a creditor for of the society,

    5. such dispute shall be referred to the Registrar for decision; and no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proceeding in respect of such dispute.

    (2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), the following shall also be deemed to be disputes, namely:—

    (a) a claim by the society for any debt or demand due to it from a member or the nominees heirs or legal representatives of a deceased member, whether such debt or demand be admitted or not;

    (b) a claim by a surety against the principal debtor where the society has recovered from the surety any amount in respect of any debt or demand due to it from the principal debtor as a result of the default of the principal debtor whether such debt or demand is admitted or not;

    (c) any dispute arising in connection the election of the Board of Management or any officer of the Society.

    Explanation:— A dispute arising at any stage of an election commencing from the convening of the general body meeting for the election shall be deemed to be a dispute arising in connection with the election.

    (3) No dispute arising in connection with the election of the Board of Management or an officer of the Society shall be entertained by the Registrar unless it is referred to him within one month am the date of the election.

    (4) If any question arises whether a dispute referred to the Registrar under this section is a dispute as defined in clause (i) of Section 2 the decision thereon of the Registrar shall be final.”

    “Section 2 (i) “dispute” means any matter touching the business, constitution, establishment or management of a society capable of being the subject of litigation and includes a claim in respect of any sum payable to or by a society, whether such claim be admitted or not.”

    6. Counsel for the appellant relied on the decisions of this court in Malabar Co-operative Central Bank Limited, Kozhikode v. State of Kerala, 1963 Ker LT 705, Kerala State Handloom Weavers' Co-operative Society Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 1964 Ker LJ 175 and Kaloor Vadakkummury Service Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Assistant Registrar, Mukundapuram, 1973 Ker LT 523 in support of his submission that the first respondent had no jurisdiction to determine the questions that were dealt with by him in Exts. P-1 and P-2. Counsel for the appellant seems to us to be well-founded in this submission. But on behalf of the respondents it has been urged that having invited the decision from the first respondent and having taken the chance of the decision being in its favour and rot having raised such a point before the first respondent or even the second respondent the appellant should not be permitted to raise this point in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution for the first time and request this court in the exercise of a special jurisdiction to set aside the awards on the ground if want of jurisdiction.

    7. There is a catena of decisions of this court in which the view has been taken that if the question of jurisdiction had not been taken before the authority or the tribunal, the contention should not be allowed to be raised for the first time in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. The earliest decision on the subject brought to our notice is in P.M John v. State, 1955 Ker LT 568. The court declined jurisdiction on the following grounds:—

    “The High Court is entitled to know what the tribunal has to say on the question of jurisdiction which the petitioner wants to agitate before the court. Besides, the tribunal which is brought before the court should itself be given an opportunity to decide that it has no jurisdiction before the High Court is called upon to give its decision.”

    8. Justice P.T Raman Nayar as he then was in Madhava Iyer Venkitasubramonia Iyer v. Catholic Bank of India Ltd., 1957 Ker LT 411 : (AIR 1957 Ker 109) refused to exercise the special powers under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground that “the petitioner submitted to their jurisdiction and took the chance of obtaining an order in his favour. Therefore he cannot be heard to raise the objection before the High Court” In Gopalan v. Central Road Traffic Board, Trivandrum, 1958 Ker LT 410 : (AIR 1958 Ker 341) the same view has been taken by Vaidialingam J. in S.M Rawther v. Agricultural I.T and S.T Officer, 1958 Ker LT 958. M.S Menon J. as he then was relied on the observations of Coutts Trotter, C.J in AIR 1927 Mad 130 (FB) which was cited with approval before the Supreme Court in AIR 1957 SC 397 (412). The passage from the Chief Justice's judgment runs thus:—

    “the test that they lay down is whether the applicant armed with a point either of law or fact, which would oust the jurisdiction of the lower court has elected to argue a case on its merits before that court. If so he has submitted himself to a jurisdiction which he cannot be allowed afterwards to seek to repudiate. We are of opinion that the applicant has so conducted himself as to prelude this Court from exercising a discretionary jurisdiction in his favour. The petition will, therefore, be dismissed with taxed costs.”

    9. Varadaraja Iyengar J. in Ponkunnam Erattupetta Motor Service v. Regional Transport Authority, Kottayam, 1958 Ker LT 1034 has also referred to the decision in AIR 1957 SC 397. A Division Bench of this Court in Kumaraswamy Reddiar…* v. Noordeen & Others…, 1960 Ker LT 778 : (AIR 1961 Ker 117) expressed the view:

    “Ordinarily such a conduct would preclude the petitioner from claiming the writ unless a cogent explanation is furnished by stating the necessary facts upon affidavit which should satisfy the court that the failure to raise the objection relating to jurisdiction was not deliberate or that the petitioner had no knowledge of facts on which the objection could be based.”

    10. Another Division Bench of this Court consisting of Chief Justice Ansari and Justice Madhavan Nair in Kumaran v. Ist Addl. Income-Tax Officer, Kozbiknde, 1960 Ker LT 1340 : (AIR 1961 Ker 182) was more categorical.

    “It is well-established that a petition cannot succeed on the ground against the jurisdiction of the authority, whose order he is challenging unless he has taken the ground before the authority making the order. Such failure amounts to absence of diligence on the part of the petition.”

    11. One of us in Mariyan v. State of Kerala, 1965 Ker LT 1 reiterated the view as follows:—

    “The principle is that the High Court refuses to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a writ applicant who sat on the fence, took the chance of the decision before that authority and then turned round and challenged the jurisdiction of the authority.”

    12. It is thus clear that this court has been for nearly two decades declining jurisdiction when the lack of jurisdiction of a Tribunal or authority was not taken before that Tribunal or authority but was urged for the first time in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. The exercise of a writ jurisdiction being discretionary in nature this court ordinarily must exercise its discretion against those who take the chant of a decision and were not diligent enough to urge the lack of jurisdiction of a Tribunal or authority before the Tribunal or authority itself. But it has been contended by counsel on behalf of the appellant that there is a clear distinction between a latent lack of jurisdiction and a patent lack of jurisdiction. Based on this distinction the argument ran as follows. A latent lack of jurisdiction can itself arise when the lack of jurisdiction has to be spelt out on the basis of certain facts which may or may not be known to the writ applicant. If he knew the facts at the time he took the chance of the decision before the Tribunal and did not disclose those facts and did not raise the point of jurisdiction before the Tribunal but took it for the first time in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution this court should certainly decline jurisdiction. But if on the other hand, the lack of jurisdiction was not latent in that manner but was a patent one the fact that he knew about the lack of jurisdiction when he took the chance of the decision before the Tribunal did not matter and this court would be entitled to and even might find it necessary to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 and declining jurisdiction would help the creation of a precedent that a certain Tribunal has jurisdiction to deal with matters which it dealt with, when in reality it had none. In cases where there was really no jurisdiction and the lack of it was patent this court ought to interfere.

    13. The decision of Chief Justice Chagla in Gandhinagar Motor Transport Society v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 Bom 202 was referred to with approval in most of the decisions of this court. But in a later decision in S.C Prashar v. Vasantsen Dwarkadas, AIR 1956 Bom 530 the learned Chief Justice drew the distinction between a case of patent lack of jurisdiction and latent lack of jurisdiction and interfered in a case arising under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 on the ground that the Income-tax Officer who issued notice under Section 34 of that Act had patently no jurisdiction to do so and that such lack of jurisdiction was apparent on the face of the records and on a reading of the section Counsel for the appellant has pressed the acceptance of the principle of the decision in S.C Prashar v. Vasantsen Dwarkadas, AIR 1956 Bom 530.

    14. And Lord Denman in ‘Bodenham v. Ricketts’, (1836) 6 N and M 170 rested the reasoning in support of interference where there was patent lack of jurisdiction thus:

    “to be for the sake of the public ‘lest the case might become a precedent if allowed to stand without impeachment’.”

    15. The leading English Case that has decided that interference can be had in the case of patent lack of jurisdiction is that in Farquharson v. Morgan, (1894) 1 QB 552. Lord Halsbury stated:

    “It is a want of jurisdiction of which the court is informed by the proceedings before it and which the Judge should have observed, and of which he himself should leave taken notice.”

    16. The decisions of this court already referred to have not, as we understand the decisions, laid down as a rule of law that this court cannot interfere when there is lack of jurisdiction. All that has been laid down is that the discretion will not be exercised in favour of an a applicant who did not raise it before the Tribunal or authority and had taken the chances of a decision. We may add that in a given case a petitioner may be able to explain why he was not able to raise the want of jurisdiction before the Tribunal or authority and if this court is satisfied that the explanation is valid and acceptable this court will interferes. Excepting raising the contention that the lack of jurisdiction is a patent one no explanation has been offered by the appellant. If he was vigilant he could have raised the objection before the Deputy Registrar. He has, we think, precluded himself from raising it now by his conduct.

    17. This view is in accordance with the consistent view that this court has taken for two decades. We may add that it is difficult to say in all cases whether lack of jurisdiction is latent or patent. By reading Section 69 of the Act alone it is not at all clear that matters relating to disputes which can be tried by an industrial tribunal cannot be dealt with by the Registrar. The words used in the section are “touching the business of the society” or relating to the business of the society. It is difficult to say that the matters in these disputes with which we are concerned did not touch the business of the society. In that sense the lack of jurisdiction of the first respondent was not patent. But there were two decisions of this court in Malabar Co-operative Central Bank Limited, Kozhikode v. State of Kerala, 1963 Ker LT 705 and Kerala State Handloom Weavers' Co-operative Society Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 1964 Ker LJ 175 which could have been relied on by the appellant, if he had been diligent. If he was aware of these decisions and still had not taken the point his position is worse. The decision in Kaloor Vadakkummury Service Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Assistant Registrar, Mukundapuram, 1973 Ker LT 523 was no doubt rendered only a few days before Exts. P-1 and P-2 awards were passed. But we are not satisfied that considering all aspects this is a case in which we should interfere.

    18. We dismiss this appeal and direct the parties to bear their respective costs.

    19. Appeal dismissed.

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