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  • section 439 read with sections 433(e) and 434 of the Companies Act.2.
  • provisions of section 434(1)
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Citation Codes
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  • section 439 read with sections 433(e) and 434 of the Companies Act.2.
  • provisions of section 434(1)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a creditor's petition filed under section 439 read with sections 433(e) and 434 of the Companies Act. The petitioner supplied band saw and circular saw blades and other goods to the respondent company and claimed a debt of Rs. 1,167.43 (principal and interest) under the petitioner's ledger. A registered notice demanding payment was issued by the petitioner on 24 February 1973 and was accepted by the company on 28 February 1973. The petition alleges that, after the notice, the company paid Rs. 100 on 14 March 1973 and that the company had other substantial liabilities (including alleged arrears of employer's contributions to provident fund and E.S.I. and an alleged suit by Corporation Bank for recovery of a large sum), leading to the conclusion that the company was unable to pay its debts. The petition was filed on 16 August 1973.

The company filed a counter-affidavit (18 February 1974) disputing the quantum claimed and stating payments had been made that reduced the balance; it also denied that there were large arrears of E.S.I. and E.P.F. contributions and denied that the bank had instituted suit as alleged. The petitioner filed a reply-affidavit (26 March 1974) asserting the bank had instituted O.S. No. 94 of 1972 in the Sub-court, Kozhikode, for Rs. 68,704.39 (the opinion later records the exhibit showing Rs. 68,703.39) and asserting the company was not solvent and that revenue attachments were pending.

The company filed a further counter-affidavit (21 June 1974) denying a settled account and disputing the correctness of the interest claim, arguing that the notice might not be a valid statutory notice under section 434 because there was no contract to pay interest at 12%, and stating that payments made (total Rs. 240) and a tender by way of cheque (tendered to petitioner's counsel on 16 June 1974) showed its readiness to pay. No oral evidence was led. Documents were produced: Exhibits P-1 to P-3 by the petitioner (including a copy of the bank's plaint, petitioner's ledger showing a balance, and the notice of demand) and D-1 to D-4 by the company (receipts acknowledging payments of Rs. 100, Rs. 40, Rs. 50 and Rs. 50 respectively).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the admitted notice of demand and the non-payment (or partial payment) by the respondent-company, the company should be deemed unable to pay its debts within the meaning of section 434(1)(a) and consequently be wound up under section 433(e).
  2. Whether, even if the company is shown to be unable to pay its debts, the court should exercise its discretion under section 433 judicially and refuse to make a winding-up order on equitable grounds (i.e., whether the balance of equities tilts in favour of winding-up).
  3. Whether the company's tender of payment (by cheque) and the payments already made after the notice affect the propriety of granting a winding-up order.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner relied on the admitted statutory notice of demand and the respondent's non-payment to contend that the respondent must be deemed unable to pay its debts under section 434(1)(a), entitling the petitioner to a winding-up order.
  • Counsel for the petitioner invoked the principle (as stated in Palmer's Company Precedents and quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Harinagar Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. M.W. Pradhan) that a winding-up petition is a proper remedy and a form of equitable execution to enforce payment of a just debt.
  • The petitioner produced documentary evidence (ledger, demand notice, and a plaint showing a bank suit) to support its contention that the company is indebted and that there are other substantial liabilities suggesting insolvency.

Respondent-Company's Arguments

  • The company disputed the correctness of the petitioner's claimed amount, asserted there had been no settlement of accounts, and said the ledger figure was lower (Rs. 1,087.43 as of November 13, 1972) and that various payments had been made which the petitioner had not credited.
  • The company stated it had made payments after the notice (receipts for Rs. 100, Rs. 40, Rs. 50, and Rs. 50) and contended that after such payments the balance was substantially less (the counter-affidavit calculated balances such as Rs. 847.43 or Rs. 927.43 in different places), and further contended there was no contractual stipulation to pay interest at 12% so that the statutory notice under section 434 might be invalid.
  • The company maintained that it was solvent, that it regularly paid statutory contributions, that the bank had not in fact filed suit (contrary to petitioner's assertion), and that it was prepared to pay the balance in a lump — including a formal tender (cheque) of the full balance to petitioner's counsel on 16 June 1974 which, the company said, was not accepted.
  • The company suggested the petition was motivated by improper purposes and should be denied on equitable grounds if the court exercised its discretion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Palmer's Company Precedents, Part II (1960 edition) (quoted) States that "A winding-up petition is a perfectly proper remedy for enforcing payment of a just debt" — characterises winding-up as a mode of execution. The court noted the passage and that it was quoted with approval by the Supreme Court, but treated it as subject to the further limitation that propriety governs exercise of the power; the court did not regard this authority as making winding-up an automatic remedy irrespective of equitable considerations.
Harinagar Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. M.W. Pradhan [1966] 36 Comp Cas 426, 430 SC Affirmed the Palmer passage but held that while winding-up is a form of equitable execution, it is not the normal alternative to ordinary debt recovery; propriety affects exercise of the power, not the existence of the power. The court relied on this Supreme Court observation to emphasise that even where statutory criteria under section 434 are met, the exercise of the court's discretion under section 433 must consider propriety and equity; thus the petitioner is not entitled to an automatic order merely because a debt exists and notice was served.
Aluminium Corporation of India v. Lakshmi Ratan Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. (cited) Explained that inability to pay does not necessarily entitle the court to wind up; discretion under section 433 must be exercised judicially and the balance of equities must tilt appreciably in favour of winding-up for an order to be made as a matter of right. The court applied this principle directly: it held that although the statutory provisions (section 434(1)) determine when section 433(e) requirements are deemed fulfilled, they do not mandate a winding-up order; thus equitable considerations (including the company's offers to pay) justified refusing the winding-up order in this case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court started from the acknowledged legal position that a winding-up petition is a competent remedy to enforce payment of a just debt but emphasised, following the Supreme Court authorities quoted in the opinion, that such a remedy is not a mechanical substitute for ordinary debt recovery procedures. The court relied on the principle that the power to wind up under section 433 is discretionary and must be exercised judicially; section 434(1) determines when the statutory preconditions are satisfied but does not compel the making of a winding-up order.

The court examined the factual matrix and documentary evidence: the petitioner's ledger and notice; the company's receipts acknowledging payments of Rs. 100, Rs. 40, Rs. 50 and Rs. 50; and the company's repeated offers to pay the balance, including an uncontroverted assertion that a cheque for the full balance was tendered to the petitioner's counsel on 16 June 1974. The court recorded that counsel for the company repeatedly stated at hearings that he had the money and was prepared to pay it to the petitioner's counsel, but that the petitioner's counsel said his instructions were not to receive it.

Applying the cited precedents, the court reasoned that even if the petitioner had been originally justified in bringing the petition, the persistence of the petitioner in seeking winding-up when the company had repeatedly offered to pay showed iniquitous motives and provided strong equitable grounds to refuse the relief. Because the company had both made payments after the notice and tendered the balance (a fact not contested), the company could not properly be characterised as unable to pay the petitioner's debt for the purposes of exercising the court's winding-up power in favour of the petitioner.

The court also addressed the petitioner's reliance on the bank's plaint (Exhibit P-1) and observed that the bank had not intervened to support the petition; the court therefore would not allow the petitioner to derive advantage from that separate debt (and from uncertainty about the bank's position or the company's defence) to sustain the winding-up petition. The court treated the bank suit as not providing a "vicarious boost" to the petitioner's claim in the circumstances.

Holding and Implications

Holding: DISMISSED — The petition for winding-up is dismissed.

Consequences and immediate effects:

  • The petition is dismissed with costs. The court awarded costs including an advocate's fee of Rs. 250 against the petitioner.
  • The direct effect is that no winding-up order is made against the respondent-company on the petitioner's application.

The opinion applies and reiterates existing principles about the court's discretion under section 433 and the limited role of section 434(1) in determining when statutory preconditions are met; it does not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond applying those established principles to the facts before the court.

    Jugalkishore Benarsidas v. South India Saw Mills (P.) Ltd.

    Balagangadharan Nair, J.:— This is a creditor's petition under section 439 read with sections 433(e) and 434 of the Companies Act.

    2. The averments in the petition are briefly the following: The respondent-company's principal business is to run a saw mill and carry on trade in timber. In respect of the supply of band saw and circular saw blades and other goods made by the petitioner, the company was indebted to the petitioner in a sum of Rs. 1,167.43 on account of principal and interest under the ledger maintained by the petitioner. On February 24, 1973, the petitioner issued a registered notice demanding payment of this debt and it was accepted by the company on February 28, 1973. Thereafter, the company paid the petitioner Rs. 100 on March 14, 1973. The petitioner understands that large amounts are due by the company by way of arrears of employer's share of contribution of provident fund sums as well as employer's share of E.S.I payable to the Employees' State Insurance Corporation. It is also understood that a suit had been filed by the Corporation Bank Ltd., Calicut, against the company for recovery of a sum of Rs. 62,449.22 and interest and costs. It is thus manifest that the company is unable to pay its debts. The petition was filed on August 16, 1973.

    3. On February 18, 1974, the company's manager filed a counter-affidavit to the following effect: The company was having dealings with the petitioner from 1959. The petitioner's ledger produced in the case would show that the actual amount outstanding on November 13, 1972, was only Rs. 1,087.43. There was no settlement of accounts and the company had been making payments for several of the items purchased. After receipt of the notice, the company paid Rs. 40 also on March 19, 1973, besides the Rs. 100 admitted in the petition, for some of the items purchased. The petitioner has not, however, given credit to the payment of Rs. 40. The company has also paid Rs. 50 on October 3, 1973, and another Rs. 50 on December 29, 1973. After these payments, the balance due to the petitioner would only be Rs. 847.43 It was not correct to say that large amounts are due from the company by way of arrears of E.S.I and E.P.F contributions. The company is regularly making such payments as and when they become due. The allegation that the respondent has many other debts is wrong. The Corporation Bank, Calicut, had not filed any suit or taken any other proceeding against the company in any court for realising a sum of Rs. 61,449.22. Although the company has dealings with the bank, the bank had no occasion to bring any suit against the company. The financial position of the company is very sound and it is very solvent and the petitioner has been moved by some improper motives to file the petition without any merits. The company has no intention either to evade or avoid payment; in fact the company is prepared to pay the balance due to the petitioner in a lump.

    4. To this the petitioner filed a reply-affidavit on March 26, 1974, that the payments mentioned in the counter-affidavit which have not been given in the affidavit were subsequent to the petition. The Corporation Bank, Kozhikode, had filed O.S No. 94 of 1972 on the file of the Sub-court, Kozhikode, for Rs. 68,704.39 against the company for recovery of a debt and the statement to the contrary in the counter-affidavit of the company is false. The affidavit proceeded to say that the financial position of the company is not at all solvent and that there are a number of attachments pending against the company, effected by officers for the revenue recovery collections in the Taluk Office, Kozhikode.

    5. On June 21, 1974, the company through its manager filed a further counter-affidavit by way of reply. It said that there had been no settlement of its accounts with the petitioner, that the company does not admit the correctness of the amount demanded, that there was no stipulation to pay interest at 12% and that in the circumstances the notice of demand was not a valid notice under section 434 attracting the presumption under that section. The acceptance of Rs. 240 by the petitioner after receipt of the notice should in the circumstances be deemed to be a composition of the demand. Even on the basis of the petitioner's demand the balance amount, after payment of Rs. 240, was only Rs. 927,43. This amount was tendered to the petitioner's counsel by a cheque drawn in his name on June 16, 1974, but it was not accepted. Despite its dispute about the claim, this tender was made lest the winding-up petition should harm the company's reputation.

    6. No oral evidence was given by either party but they have produced certain documents—exhibits P-1 to P-3 on behalf of the petitioner and exhibits D-1 to D-4 on behalf of the company. Exhibit P-1 is a copy of the plaint in O.S No. 94 of 1972 of the Sub-court, Kozhikode, instituted by the Corporation Bank Ltd. against the company and its directors for recovery of Rs. 68,703.39, being the balance due under a loan of Rs. 75,000, granted on August 8, 1968. Exhibit P-2 is a copy of the petitioner's ledger for 1971–1972 in the name of the company, showing a balance of Rs. 1,087.43 and exhibit P-3 is a copy of the notice issued by the petitioner to the company demanding the above amount with interest at 12% and Rs. 1.85, being the cost of issuing the notice. Exhibits D-1 to D-4 are receipts issued by the petitioner to the company acknowledging receipt of Rs. 100 on March 14, 1973, Rs. 40 on March 19, 1973, Rs. 50 on October 3, 1973, and Rs. 50 on December 29, 1973, respectively.

    7. Counsel for the petitioner strongly contended that in view of the admitted notice of demand and the non-payment of the debt, the company should be deemed to be unable to pay its debts within section 434(1)(a) and this entitles the petitioner to an order for winding-up the company. In support of this contention counsel relied upon the following passage from Palmer's Company Precedents, Part II, 1960 edition (page 25), which was quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Harinagar Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. M.W Pradhan [1966] 36 Comp Cas 426, 430 SC.:

    “A winding-up petition is a perfectly proper remedy for enforcing payment of a just debt. It is the mode of execution which the court gives to a creditor against a company unable to pay its debts.”

    8. The Supreme Court, however, proceeded to observe:

    “It is true that ‘a winding-up order is not a normal alternative in the case of a company to the ordinary procedure for the realisation of the debts due to it’; but nonetheless it is a form of equitable execution. Propriety does not affect the power but only its exercise.”

    9. It is thus clear that although a winding-up petition is a proper remedy and a mode of execution against a company unable to pay its debts it is not an alternative to the ordinary procedure for the realisation of the debts due by the company. It is also mainfest that even where the power to wind up exists, its exercise is governed by considerations of propriety. In Aluminium Corporation of India v. Lakshmi Ratan Cotton Mills Co. Ltd., which arose on a creditor's petition to wind-up the respondent-company, it was held:

    “The fact that the company is unable to pay its debts, does not necessarily entitle the court to order winding-up of the company as the discretion to pass such an order, even in the case of the inability of a company to pay its debts, is by section 433 vested in the court.

    But the discretion has to be exercised judicially. This means that it is only where the balance of equities is shown by a petitioner to tilt appreciably in favour of a winding-up order that it will be made ex debito justitiae. It is in this special sense that a petitioner relying on grounds contained in section 433 can get a winding-up order as a matter of right. It is issued as a matter of right when the proved contents of the right produce a compelling effect. It is not granted mechanically as a matter of course on proof of certain facts. In other words, equitable considerations have a decisive effect even when the power to wind-up a company is invoked under a clause of section 433 other than the general just and equitable clause (f). The provisions of section 434(1) determine when the requirements of section 433(e) will be deemed to be fulfilled, but they do not lay down when a winding-up order must necessarily be passed. It is true that a creditor is not bound to wait and give time to the company beyond the time prescribed after the statutory notice, before filing his petition. But the court may, if there are sufficient counter-balancing equitable grounds, deny an immediate winding-up order, or, in appropriate cases, even refuse it altogether in spite of the proved inability of a company to pay its debts. Exercise of such discretionary power must necessarily be governed by justice and equity” (Head Note).

    10. That being the legal position, I cannot accept the broad contention that the petitioner is absolutely entitled to an order winding up the company ex debito justitiae on the mere plea that a balance of Rs. 927.43, out of the original claim of Rs. 1,167.43, is due from the company—apart from the company's plea that there has been no settlement of accounts and no contract to pay interest. Subsequent to the receipt of notice, the company has paid Rs. 240 to the petitioner—Rs. 140, before and Rs. 100, after the petition. The company's counter-affidavit dated June 21, 1964, asserts that a cheque for the full balance was tendered to the petitioner's counsel on June 16, 1974. This was not contested.

    11. At every date of hearing, counsel for the company submitted that he had the money with him and was prepared to pay it to the petitioner's counsel but the latter represented that his instruction was not to receive it. Even in the first counter-affidavit, the company offered to pay the amount in a lump. In this situation the company can scarcely be said to be unable to pay the petitioner's debt and in the face of the company's repeated offer to pay off the debt, the petitioner's conduct in persisting in the attempts to have the company wound-up underlines that it is an eminently fit case in which this court should not exercise its power in favour of the petitioner. I am satisfied that the petitioner, even if originally justified in bringing the petition, is persisting in its prosecution, with iniquitous motives and should be denied relief.

    12. It was, however, said that despite the company's offer to pay the petitioner, the debt in exhibit P-1 suit is outstanding and that would spell inability to pay its debts justifying a winding up. The bank which has filed that suit has not intervened to support the petition and it is not known what the company's defence to that suit is, or whether the company is unable to pay that debt, even if the debt is fully due, or whether the bank is willing to accommodate the company. In the circumstances, the petitioner cannot claim a vicarious boost from that debt and it will be of no avail to sustain the petition.

    13. I dismiss the petition with costs, including advocate's fee of Rs. 250.

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    Comments

    Jugalkishore Benarsidas v. South India Saw Mills (P.) Ltd.
    (Aug 8, 1974)