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  • Exceptions 1, 2 and 9 to Section 499. I.P.C
  • Section 198-B (3)(b). Subsection (3)
  • Sections 501 and 502. I.P.C
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  • Exceptions 1, 2 and 9 to Section 499. I.P.C
  • Section 198-B (3)(b). Subsection (3)
  • Sections 501 and 502. I.P.C
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant was the Editor, Printer and Publisher of the evening daily "Aswamedham." A criminal complaint was instituted by the Public Prosecutor pursuant to a sanction (Exhibit P-3) under Section 198-B(3)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, granted by P.W.4 (a Special Secretary) who was authorised by Government Order (Exhibit P-2). The complaint alleged that an article (Ext. P-1(a)) published in the issue dated 22-1-1970 was defamatory of Mr. Mohammad Koya (P.W.1), who was at that time the Home Minister.

In the trial before the Additional Sessions Judge, Trivandrum, the appellant was convicted under Sections 500 and 501 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to a fine of Rs.100 and, under Section 501, in default, simple imprisonment for two weeks (no separate sentence under Section 500). In the court below the appellant challenged the validity of the sanction (Ext. P-3) and claimed protection under Exceptions 1, 2 and 9 to Section 499 IPC. The trial court overruled these defences and convicted the appellant. The appellant appealed, primarily contending the invalidity of the sanction.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sanction (Exhibit P-3) under Section 198-B(3)(b) CrPC, granted by a Secretary to the Government authorised by the Government (and not by the Secretary to the Council of Ministers), was valid.
  2. Whether the sanctioning authority (P.W.4) applied his mind and exercised an independent judgment when granting the sanction, or whether the sanction was vitiated by following a superior's direction (specifically Exhibit P-16(a) by the Chief Minister).
  3. Whether the published article (Ext. P-1(a)) was protected by Exceptions 1, 2 and 9 to Section 499 IPC (i.e., whether the appellant was entitled to the statutory defences in respect of the alleged imputations).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The sanction (Ext. P-3) is invalid because Section 198-B(3)(b) permits the Secretary to the Council of Ministers (if any) alone to grant sanction, and not any Secretary even if authorised by the Government; emphasis placed on the phrase "if any."
  • Even if an authorised Secretary could grant sanction, P.W.4 did not apply his mind to all the materials before granting sanction and did not exercise independent judgment but merely obeyed or followed the direction of the Chief Minister (as indicated by Exhibit P-16(a)).
  • The appellant also claimed protection under Exceptions 1, 2 and 9 to Section 499 IPC (i.e., various qualified privileges and defences against defamation) — the trial court found against this claim.

Respondent / Prosecution's Position (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The prosecution relied on Exhibit P-3 as a valid, self-contained sanction that referred to the article (Ext. P-1(a)) and stated that, after consideration, the sanctioning authority was satisfied that the imputations were defamatory and constituted offences under Sections 501 and 502 IPC.
  • The prosecution produced evidence (including the deposition of P.W.4) that the sanctioning authority had considered the article and relevant files and had applied his mind to the facts constituting the offence.
  • The prosecution's case on the substance of the article was that the imputations were defamatory; the court examined documentary and oral evidence (for example the role of the Selection Board and the Inspector General of Police) and found lack of proof of bribery or ministerial influence on P.W.1.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Travancore Forward Bank Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 1958 Ker LT 537 (reference to 73 Commonwealth Law Reports 304) Interpretation principle: the word "or" and whether alternatives are mutually exclusive; construction of alternatives by reference to the whole provision to ascertain legislative intent. The court relied on this principle to interpret Section 198-B(3)(b) as permitting more than one officer to grant sanction (not making them mutually exclusive), rejecting the appellant's narrow reading.
Gokulchand Dwarkadas v. The King, AIR 1948 PC 82 (49 Cri LJ 261) Burden on prosecution to prove that a requisite and valid sanction has been accorded; sanctioning authority must give sanction with reference to the facts on which prosecution is based; such facts may appear on the face of the sanction or by extraneous evidence. The court applied this rule to hold that Exhibit P-3 (which referred to the article and stated consideration of facts) satisfied the requirement that the sanctioning authority considered the facts constituting the offence.
State of Rajasthan v. Tarachand Jain, (1973) 2 SCWR 262 (1973 Cri LJ 1396) Approval/authority for the principle that where the facts constituting the offence are referred to on the face of the sanction, separate evidence of presentation to the sanctioning authority may not be necessary. The court cited this approval to support the view that Exhibit P-3 being self-contained was adequate proof that the sanctioning authority considered the relevant facts.
Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1958) SCR 762 (1958 Cri LJ 265) Observation that the object of sanction provisions is that the authority giving sanction should be able to consider the evidence before it comes to a conclusion whether prosecution should be sanctioned. The court considered this observation but found it did not assist the appellant because P.W.4 had considered the vital article (Ext. P-1(a)) and other files which themselves constituted relevant evidence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a step-by-step analysis:

  1. Interpretation of Section 198-B(3)(b): The court rejected the appellant's narrow reading that only the Secretary to the Council of Ministers (if any) could grant the sanction. The court held that a fair reading shows that if there is a Secretary to the Council of Ministers he may grant the sanction without authorisation, and "any Secretary to the Government" may grant sanction if authorised by the Government. The court emphasised that the clause's object is to enlarge, not restrict, the classes of officers empowered to grant sanction and quoted authority on construing alternatives so they are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
  2. Validity of Exhibit P-3 and application of mind by P.W.4: The court stated the well-settled principle that prosecution bears the burden of proving a valid sanction, which involves proof that the sanctioning authority considered the facts on which prosecution would be based. Exhibit P-3 expressly referred to Ext. P-1(a), stated the defamatory imputations, and recorded that after careful consideration P.W.4 was satisfied the imputations were in respect of conduct in the discharge of public functions and constituted offences under Sections 501 and 502 IPC. The court found Exhibit P-3 self-contained and showing consideration of the relevant facts.
  3. Whether P.W.4 should have considered evidence beyond the article and files: The appellant's citation of Jaswant Singh to the effect that the sanctioning authority should consider evidence was considered, but the court held that P.W.4 had considered Ext. P-1(a) (the vital evidence) and other relevant files, which were themselves in evidence. Accordingly the objection that the sanctioning authority did not consider evidence did not succeed.
  4. Allegation that P.W.4 acted under the Chief Minister's direction (Exhibit P-16(a)): The court examined Exhibit P-16(a) and the Chief Minister's affidavit, finding that the note was not an order but an expression of opinion that prosecution would be necessary to clear the Minister's character. The court noted the file had been examined at the Law and Home Departments before reaching P.W.4 and concluded that Exhibit P-16(a) did not paralyse P.W.4's independent judgment or vitiate the sanction.
  5. Assessment of defamation and applicability of statutory exceptions: Although counsel did not challenge the trial court's finding that Ext. P-1(a) was defamatory, the court outlined the article's allegations — imputations of corruption in a Kaki cloth supply contract, exercise of influence at ministerial level, and alleged monetary gains passed to "proper quarters." The court reviewed the evidence which showed the Selection Board only made recommendations and had no power to reject; the Inspector General of Police (P.W.3) accepted the cloth based on an expert opinion (D.W.1) that slight variations in width can occur in manufacture. There was no evidence of bribery or ministerial influence on P.W.1. On that basis, the court agreed the appellant could not claim Exceptions 1, 2 and 9 to Section 499 IPC.

Holding and Implications

Final Holding: The court confirmed the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Sections 500 and 501 IPC and dismissed the appeal.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The appellant's conviction and sentence (fine of Rs.100 and in default two weeks' simple imprisonment under Section 501) are affirmed; the appeal is dismissed.
  • On broader precedent: The opinion applies and relies upon existing authorities concerning the construction of sanctioning provisions and the proof required to establish that a sanctioning authority applied its mind. The opinion does not state that it establishes any new legal principle beyond the application of these settled rules.

    Pachhalloor Noohu Accused v. Public Prosecutor .

    1. Appellant, who was the Editor, Printer and Publisher of an evening daily “Aswamedham” has been convicted under Sections 500 and 501. I.P.C and sentenced to a fine of Rupees 100/-, with a default sentence of simple imprisonment for two weeks under the latter Section (no separate sentence being awarded under the former count) by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. Trivandrum, on a complaint instituted by the Public Prosecutor, pursuant to a sanction Ext. P-3 granted under S. 198-B(3)(b) by P.W 4, Special Secretary to the Government of Kerala who was authorised by the order Ext. P-2 issued by the Government in that behalf. The substance of the complaint was that the appellant had committed the above offences by publishing a news item (Ext. P-1(a)) under the title.” (Original in Malayalam omitted).” In the issue of the paper (Ext. P-1) dated 22-1-1970, which was defamatory of Mr. Mohammad Kova (P.W 1) who was the then Home Minister. In the Court below, the appellant contested the validity of the sanction and claimed the protection of Exceptions 1, 2 and 9 to Section 499. I.P.C The learned Judge overruled these defences and finding Ext. P-1(a) to be defamatory of P.W 1 convicted the appellant.

    2. The principal contention of the appellant was directed against the validity of the sanction Ext. P-3.

    3. The first limb of this contention was based upon the language of Section 198-B (3)(b). Subsection (3) provides that no complaint under sub-section (1) shall be made by the Public Prosecutor except with the previous sanction of the authorities specified in clauses (a) to (c) depending upon the persons mentioned in sub-section (1) against whom the offences under Chapter XXI of the Indian Penal Code (Defamation) are committed. So far as relevant clause (b) provides that in the case of a Minister of a State Government, the sanction contemplated by sub-sec. (3) must be that of the Secretary to the Council of Ministers, if any, or of any Secretary to the Government authorised in this behalf by the Government concerned. In the present case the sanction Ext. P-3 was granted not by the Secretary to the Council of Ministers (who is the Chief Secretary) but by the Special Secretary (P.W 4) who was authorised by the Government Order Ext. P-2 in that behalf. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that if there is any Secretary to the Council of Ministers, as there was one in Kerala, he alone could accord the sanction and not any Secretary even if the latter is authorised in that behalf by the Government. In aid of this contention counsel placed emphasis on the expression “if any”. I find it impossible to accept this contention either on the language of the clause or on its legislative intent. No provision of law was placed before me which makes it mandatory that the Council of Ministers should have a Secretary. That apart, what a fair reading of the clause means is that if there is a Secretary to the Council of Ministers he or any Secretary to the Government, might grant the sanction, the former without any authorisation and the latter under an authorisation by the Government in that behalf. The object of the provision is to confer the power of granting sanction on more officers than one and not to make them mutually exclusive or to restrict the power to one officer—that is plain from the clause. As to the use of the word ‘or’ in clause, the following passage from the judgment of Latham, C.J, in 73 Commonwealth Law Reports 304 (313) followed in Travancore Forward Bank Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 1958 Ker LT 537. is worth reproduction:

    “When the word ‘or’ is used in relation to two or more alternatives, it is not necessarily the case that the alternatives are mutually exclusive. The question as to whether they are mutually exclusive or not must be determined by applying the general rule that words should be construed to ascertain the intention of the provision in question to be collected from the whole of its terms.”

    4. The object and purport of cl. (b) is to enlarge the classes of officers who could grant the sanction and not to make them mutually exclusive. The reasons are obvious. The Secretary to the Council of Ministers might be away or he might be too busy or he might be related to the defamed Minister concerned or antagonistic to the accused. In the former two cases, if no one else could accord the sanction, it might happen that a clear case could not be brought before a Court of law within the period of six months prescribed by sub-section (4). In the latter cases the sanction issued by him carries the obvious risk of being challenged as vitiated by bias or mala fides. What the clause seeks to do is to eliminate these contingencies by conferring power on more functionaries than one. The appellant's contention which makes them mutually exclusive will only negative the intention of the provision besides being against the plain language of the clause. That contention must be rejected. Exhibit P-3 is not liable to challenge on the ground that it was granted only by a Secretary (P.W 4) although authorised in that behalf and not by the Secretary to the Council of Ministers.

    5. Even so counsel argued that Ext. P-3 is invalid for two reasons — that P.W 4 did not apply his mind to all the materials before granting the sanction and second that he did not exercise his independent judgment but only obeyed the direction of the Chief Minister (D.W 2). It is well settled that the burden of proving that a requisite and valid sanction has been accorded rests on the prosecution and such burden involves proof that the sanctioning authority had given the sanction with reference to the facts on which the proposed prosecution was to be based, facts which might appear on the face of the sanction or might be proved by extraneous evidence. The leading case on this point is Gokulchand Dwarkadas v. The King, AIR 1948 PC 82 : (49 Cri LJ 261) which has been approved by the Supreme Court in a number of decisions one of the latest being The State of Rajasthan v. Tarachand Jain, (1973) 2 SCWR 262 : (1973 Cri LJ 1396). Ext. P-3 expressly refers to the article Ext. P-1(a), and proceeds to say that it has made imputations which are defamatory of P.W 1, that after careful consideration P.W 4 was satisfied that the said imputations were made against P.W 1 in respect of his conduct in the discharge of his public functions intending to harm or knowing or having reason to believe that the said imputations would harm the reputation of P.W 1 and that the said imputations constituted offences punishable under Sections 501 and 502. I.P.C It then winds up by according sanction to the Public Prosecutor. Trivandrum to file the complaint Exhibit P-3 is self-contained and clearly shows that the sanction was accorded after considering Ext. P-1(a) and its defamatory tendency; in other words the facts constituting the offences. As pointed out in (1973) 2 SCWR 262 at p. 276 : (1973 Cri LJ 1396 at p. 1404) where the facts constituting the offence have been referred to on the face of the sanction it was not necessary to lead separate evidence to show that the relevant facts were placed before the sanctioning authority. Even so P.W 4 has deposed that he considered all the relevant facts and files before granting the sanction. Counsel for the appellant however contended that it was not enough for P.W 4 to study Ext. P-1(a) and the files but he ought to have considered the evidence as well. In support of this contention he quoted Jaswant Singh v. State Of Punjab , (1958) SCR 762 : (1958 Cri LJ 265), where it was observed that

    “The object of the provision for sanctions is that the authority giving the sanction should be able to consider for itself the evidence before it comes to a conclusion that the prosecution in the circumstances be sanctioned or forbidden.”

    6. This observation will hardly avail the appellant for P.W 4 considered not only Ext. P-1(a) which is the vital evidence in the case but also other relevant files which have themselves come into the case as evidence. I reject this part of the contention.

    7. The next limb of the argument is based upon the note “sanction may be accorded to Drosecute the Daily”. Exhibit P-16(a) made by the Chief Minister in the file Ext. P-16. This note was made on 28-2-1970 and the sanction Exhibit p-3 issued by P.W 4 was 12-6-1970. It was argued that in the face of Exhibit P-16(a) made by the Chief Minister, there was no question of P.W 4, a Secretary considering the question of sanction independently or exercising his free judgment. That the sanctioning authority must consider the facts and exercise his independent judgment in deciding to grant or withhold the sanction is undoubted; a sanction granted under the direction or dictate of a superior, which paralyses his independence, stands vitiated. The question here is whether Ext. P-3 is so vitiated. Ext. P-16(a) does not read like an order or direction to prosecute the appellant: had that been the intention the language would have been different in form and content. The matter is out beyond doubt by the Chief Minister himself who swears that when he read Exhibit P-1 it appeared to be defamatory and that he felt that a prosecution was necessary to clear the character of the Minister. He proceeds to say that he only recorded that opinion and did not mean it to be an order. That this was only an expression of opinion is further made apparent by the circumstance that the matter was examined at the Law and Home Departments before the entire file reached P.W 4. I am not satisfied that Exhibit P-16(a) was an order or a direction to issue the sanction or that it had in any manner paralysed the independent judgment of P.W 4. I reject this contention.

    8. Counsel did not challenge the finding of the Court below that Ext. P-1(a) is defamatory of P.W 1 and that the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of Exceptions (1). (21 and (91 to S. 499. I.P.C I shall nevertheless briefly indicate the nature of the article and the evidence to show that the findings are correct. The article starts with the title quoted above and states that the full details of a case of corruption have come to light involving the Police Minister C.M Mohammad Koya in the purchase of Kaki cloth for the State Police. The article also contains the photograph of P.W 1. It then proceeds to say:

    “The Sivakami Textiles had contracted to supply 400 bales of Kaki cloth 80 centimetres wide for the use of the Special Armed Police, that despite this contract they began supplying cloth of 60 centimetres width, that on this account they had amassed 5 lakhs of rupees, besides their usual trade profits. Although there were auotations by others the Sivakami Textiles were able to get the contract by exercising influences at the ministerial level and supply cloth of lesser width. The Selection Board to whose attention this was brought detected the grave corruption and resolved to reject their supplies. The Sivakami Textiles thereupon decided to spend a part of the huge amount they had amassed. They met the Minister-in-charge of the Police Department. In no time the Selection Board's decision was ignored and opportunity was open to the Sivakami Textiles to make gains. It is said that a Part of the gains so made has reached the proper quarters through the League leader. Complaints have sprung from all quarters that the Government which includes Minister Kova who is denying the legitimate amenities of the ordinary police man is causing loss to the tune of lakhs to the exchequer.”

    9. That in substance is the article complained against. There cannot be any doubt that the article which ascribes corruption is highly defamatory of P.W 1. The evidence in the case shows that the Selection Board has no power to reject the cloth but can only make recommendations and then the final decision is to be taken by the Inspector General of Police. The Inspector General of Police P.W 3 has given evidence that he decided to accept the cloth in view of the expert opinion of D.W 1 who in Principal of the Central Polytechnic, that slight variations in the width of cloth is possible during manufacture. It is thus patent that P.W 1 had nothing to do with the acceptance of the cloth supplied by the Sivakami Textiles and it was P.W 3 who decided to accept it, despite the slight variation in the width. As to the alleged payment of bribe or the exercise of influence either on P.W 1 or at the ministerial level there is absolutely no evidence. I find that the learned Judge rightly held that the appellant could not claim the protection of Exceptions 1, 2 and 9 and that he is guilty of the offences.

    10. I confirm the conviction and sentence of the appellant and dismiss the appeal.

    11. Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Pachhalloor Noohu Accused v. Public Prosecutor .
    (Aug 12, 1974)