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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions contained in Order XLIII, Rule 1(c) of the CPC
  • Section 26-F of the Bengal Tenancy Act (Act 8 of 1885)
  • Section 19 of the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act,
  • Section 141 and Order IX, Rule 9 of the CPC, Harries,
  • Section 59 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act
  • provisions contained in Order XLIII, Rule 1(c)
  • LAND ACQUISITION ACT
  • Order 9, Rules 9 and 13 of the CPC.
  • Section 141 of the Code. Order 43
  • Order XLIII, Rule 1(a) of the CPC
  • O. IX, Rule 9 of the CPC,
  • Order 7, Rule 10
  • Order 9, Rule 9
  • O. 43, Rule 1.5.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions contained in Order XLIII, Rule 1(c) of the CPC
  • Section 26-F of the Bengal Tenancy Act (Act 8 of 1885)
  • Section 19 of the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act,
  • Section 141 and Order IX, Rule 9 of the CPC, Harries,
  • Section 59 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act
  • provisions contained in Order XLIII, Rule 1(c)
  • LAND ACQUISITION ACT
  • Order 9, Rules 9 and 13 of the CPC.
  • Section 141 of the Code. Order 43
  • Order XLIII, Rule 1(a) of the CPC
  • O. IX, Rule 9 of the CPC,
  • Order 7, Rule 10
  • Order 9, Rule 9
  • O. 43, Rule 1.5.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Revision in I.A. Nos. 4299 & 4300 of 1970 (L.A. No. 42 of 1967)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from a revision by the petitioner in I.A. Nos. 4299 and 4300 of 1970 in L.A. No. 42 of 1967 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Ernakulam. I.A. No. 4299 of 1970 sought condonation of delay in filing I.A. No. 4300 of 1970, which itself was a petition for restoration of L.A. No. 42 of 1967. The reference L.A. No. 42 of 1967 had been dismissed for default on 22-6-1970. The court below dismissed both I.A. Nos. 4299 and 4300, and the petitioner brought the present revision against those dismissals.

The petitioner contended that L.A. No. 42 of 1967 formed part of a large group of land acquisition reference cases relating to acquisition for the Cochin Division of F.A.C.T., which were expected to be tried together. The petitioner and her agent believed the case would be tried along with related reference cases and that a petition for joint trial (to try L.A. No. 42 along with L.A. No. 41 of 1967) had been placed before the court. The petitioner asserted there was no order rejecting that joint-trial petition on 22-6-1970; instead, contrary to expectations, L.A. No. 42 was called and dismissed for default on that date. The petitioner averred she remained unaware of the dismissal until 24-12-1970, after her counsel's clerk noticed a mistake on 20-12-1970 and informed her on 24-12-1970.

The petitioner also pointed out that other parties and the Government had acted on the assumption that L.A. No. 42 had been dealt with like the connected reference cases (including enhancement of compensation); a notice to receive compensation at an enhanced rate was issued to the petitioner under that assumption, unaware that L.A. No. 42 had been dismissed for default.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an appeal lies from an order dismissing an application for restoration of a reference (filed under Order IX, Rule 9 CPC) made in proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, or whether such an order is not appealable and revision is the correct remedy.
  2. Whether Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), and the application of procedural provisions of the CPC to proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act (via Section 59), can be taken to confer a substantive right of appeal where the special statute does not expressly provide such a right.
  3. Whether Order XLIII, Rule 1(c) of the CPC (and related provisions of Order XLIII) are applicable so as to render the order dismissing the restoration application appealable to the High Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Government Pleader's Arguments

  • Section 59 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act makes the procedure prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, so procedural provisions of the CPC govern these proceedings.
  • The order dismissing I.A. No. 4299 (an application under Order IX, Rule 9 CPC) is an order from which an appeal lies, and therefore a revision is not maintainable; an appeal should have been filed instead.
  • Relying on the Full Bench decision in P.D. Palakattumala Devaswom v. Ulahannan Pylee (1969 Ker LT 275 : AIR 1970 Ker 30 (FB)), an appeal lies to the High Court from orders of references made under the Land Acquisition Act; and the provisions of Order XLIII, Rule 1(c) are attracted by the facts of this case.

Revision Petitioner's Arguments

  • Reliance on the Full Bench decision (P.D. Palakattumala) is misplaced because that decision distinguished between 'proceedings' and 'suits'; in the absence of a specific statutory provision conferring a substantive right of appeal, appeal must be to the High Court irrespective of valuation (i.e., cannot be implied by procedure).
  • Section 141 of the CPC (applicable to procedural aspects) cannot be applied to create substantive rights of appeal not specifically conferred by statute; an appeal can arise only from orders made appealable by statute.
  • Proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act arising out of references under Section 20 are to be regarded as proceedings of a civil nature (as per the Full Bench decision cited by the petitioner), but that procedural assimilation does not create a substantive right of appeal where the special statute does not confer one.
  • Cited decisions (including Madras and Calcutta High Court authorities) showing that the application of CPC procedure by a special statute does not automatically make every order passed therein appealable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
P.D. Palakattumala Devaswom v. Ulahannan Pylee, 1969 Ker LT 275 : AIR 1970 Ker 30 (Full Bench) The Full Bench took the view that an appeal lies to the High Court from orders of references made under the Land Acquisition Act. The Government Pleader relied on this decision to argue that an appeal (and not revision) was the proper remedy. The court found such reliance misplaced in the circumstances, distinguishing the present matter and ultimately holding that an appeal does not lie from the dismissal for default of the restoration application.
Venkata Reddi v. Ramabrahman, AIR 1953 Mad 417 Considered scope of Order XLIII, Rule 1(a) CPC in relation to orders under Section 19 of the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act; observed that Section 141/CPC application to proceedings does not make all orders appealable. Quoted for the proposition that the right of appeal under procedural provisions cannot be extended to matters other than suits merely because the Code's mode of trial is made applicable; used to support that procedural application does not create substantive appeal rights.
Birendranath v. Monorama Devi, AIR 1948 Cal 77 Held that Section 141 of the CPC speaks of procedure; a right of appeal is substantive and not a procedural right; therefore Section 141 cannot be used to confer substantive appeal rights where none are given. Applied to support the view that an appeal cannot be inferred from Section 141 and that an order dismissing such an application would not be appealable merely because procedural provisions are made applicable.
Habibar Rahaman v. Saidannessa Bibi, AIR 1924 Cal 327 (Division Bench) Held that proceedings governed by Section 141 are not suits and that merely because the Code regulates proceedings does not make the orders passed therein appealable. Relied upon as authority for the proposition that regulation by the CPC does not automatically create a right of appeal; used to reinforce the conclusion that procedural assimilation does not confer substantive appeal rights.
Fakhrunnessa Begum v. District Judge of 24 Parganas, (1920) ILR 47 Cal 592 : AIR 1920 Cal 129 Discussed the nature of proceedings as not being suits but proceedings governed by Section 141 CPC; illustrated that orders in such proceedings are not necessarily appealable. Quoted within the discussion of Habibar Rahaman to support the principle that application of the CPC's procedural provisions does not render orders appealable as if they were suits.
Gaja v. Mohd. Farukh, AIR 1961 All 561 Held that an appeal is a substantive right and cannot be inferred by implication from Section 141 of the CPC; Order 43 does not provide for an appeal from an order dismissing for default an application for restoration under Order IX, Rules 9 and 13 CPC. Adopted to buttress the conclusion that no appeal lay from dismissal for default of the application for restoration under the CPC rules made applicable by procedure; supported the view that revision was competent.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first recited the preliminary objection raised by the Government Pleader: that because Section 59 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act makes the procedure of the CPC applicable, an order dismissing the application (I.A. No. 4299), being an order on an application under Order IX, Rule 9 of the CPC, was appealable and thus a revision petition was not maintainable. The Government Pleader relied on the Full Bench decision in P.D. Palakattumala Devaswom v. Ulahannan Pylee and invoked provisions of Order XLIII, Rule 1(c) CPC.

The revision petitioner’s counsel countered that the Full Bench decision had been misapplied, emphasizing the distinction between 'proceedings' and 'suits.' The petitioner argued that Section 141 of the CPC concerns procedure only and cannot be stretched to confer substantive rights of appeal where the special statute (here, the Land Acquisition Act) does not expressly grant them. An appeal, the counsel argued, arises only from those orders made appealable by statute; procedural assimilation does not create substantive appeal rights.

The court examined authorities from several High Courts (Madras, Calcutta, Allahabad, and Allahabad) which consistently treated Section 141 as governing procedure but held that a substantive right of appeal could not be inferred from it. The cited decisions made clear that while the CPC's procedural modes may be made applicable to special statutory proceedings, that does not mean every order passed therein becomes an order from which an appeal lies. The court specifically noted precedents that: (a) interpret Order XLIII provisions narrowly; (b) recognize Section 141 as procedural only; and (c) hold that Order 43 does not provide for an appeal from an order dismissing for default an application for restoration under Order IX, Rules 9 and 13 CPC.

Applying these authorities and principles to the facts, the court concluded that the enabling provision (Section 141 of the CPC) could not be stretched to govern substantive rights of appeal under the Land Acquisition Act. Consequently, an appeal does not lie from an order dismissing an application for restoration of a reference dismissed for default under the Land Acquisition Act, and therefore revision is a competent remedy in the present case.

On the merits of the restoration application, the court found that the dismissal for default had arisen out of a bona fide mistake relating to the expectation of a joint trial; the petitioner and others had a bona fide belief that L.A. No. 42 would be tried with connected references. There was no evidence that the petitioner knew of the dismissal prior to 24-12-1970, and there was no laches in moving for restoration after discovery of the mistake. The court concluded that the lower court erred in refusing to condone the delay and in refusing the restoration petition.

Holding and Implications

Holding: REVISION ALLOWED.

Direct orders given by the court:

  • The revision is allowed; the court below is directed to restore the reference (L.A. No. 42 of 1967) to the file and to dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible.
  • There will be no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case.

Implications (as stated in the opinion):

  • The court held that Section 141 of the CPC, being an enabling provision relating to procedure, cannot be extended to create a substantive right of appeal in respect of orders (such as dismissal for default of an application for restoration) under the Land Acquisition Act where the special statute does not confer such a right.
  • Consequently, an appeal does not lie from an order dismissing an application for restoration of a reference dismissed for default under the Land Acquisition Act; revision is a competent remedy in such circumstances.
  • The decision directs the immediate practical effect for the parties: restoration and fresh disposal of the reference; the Court did not order costs against the petitioner.

Petition allowed. (As recorded in the opinion.)

    Kallianikutty Amma v. The State Of Kerala .

    1. This is a revision by the petitioner in I.A Nos. 4299 and 4300 of 1970 in L.A No. 42 of 1967 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Emakulam. I.A No. 4299 of 1970 was one for condoning the delay in filing I.A No. 4300 of 1970 which is a petition for restoration of L.A No. 42 of 1967 which was dismissed for default on 22-6-1970. The court below dismissed both the petitions; hence this revision. The learned Counsel for the revision petitioner submits that L.A No. 42 of 1967 was one of the many land acquisition reference cases arising out of acquisition of land for the Cochin Division of F.A.C.T, awaiting enquiry, and that the petitioner as well as her agent were under the bona fide belief that this case would come for evidence and enquiry along with the other reference cases only. In fact, it is averred, a petition was filed by petitioner's counsel for trial of L.A No. 42 of 1967 along with L.A No. 41 of 1967 in which he was appearing. No order rejecting the petition was, according to the petitioner, pronounced on 22-6-1970, on which date the petition for joint trial was made. However, contrary to the hopes and belief of the petitioner's counsel, L.A No. 42 of 1967 happened to be called and dismissed on 22-6-1970 itself which fact the petitioner was not aware of till 24-12-1970. The clerk of the petitioner's advocate noticed the mistake on 20-12-1970 and reported it to her on 24-12-1970, and that is how she came to know about the dismissal of the reference. It is further submitted that all parties concerned had taken it for granted that L.A No. 42 of 1967 also was included in the series of cases, numbering about one thousand, for joint trial, so much so that even the Government had taken it for granted that enhancement of compensation, as in the case of other connected reference cases, was ordered in L.A No. 42 of 1967 also, and on that assumption a notice to receive compensation at the enhanced rate was, as a matter of fact, issued to the petitioner, not knowing that in this particular case no enhancement was ordered, but it was dismissed for default.

    2. Mr. Augustine, the learned Government Pleader, has raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the civil revision petition. His contention is that by virtue of Section 59 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act the procedure prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure, as far as be, has been made applicable to proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act, and the dismissal of I.A No. 4299 of 1970 inasmuch as it is an order on an application filed under O. IX, Rule 9 of the CPC, it is appealable, no revision could be maintained, and an appeal alone should have been filed. It is also pointed out that under Section 106 of the CPC where an appeal from an order is allowed, it shall lie to the Court to which an appeal would lie from the decree in the suit in which such an order was made. It is also argued that it is because of this enabling provision to file an appeal that the Full Bench of this Court in P.D Palakattumala Devaswom v. Ulahannan Pylee, 1969 Ker LT 275 : (AIR 1970 Ker 30) (FB) took the view that an appeal lies to the High Court from orders of references made under the Land Acquisition Act, According to the learned Counsel the provisions contained in Order XLIII, Rule 1(c) of the CPC are attracted to the facts of this case.

    3. The learned Counsel appearing for the revision petitioner submits that reliance by the learned Government Pleader on the Full Bench decision of this Court in 1969 Ker LT 275 is rather misplaced, as the Full Bench made a distinction between the ‘proceedings’ on the one hand and the ‘suit’ on the other. In the absence of specific provision in the Act conferring the substantive right of appeal, the appeal has to be filed in the High Court irrespective of the valuation of the subject-matter. What is to be underlined, according to the learned Counsel, is that the provisions of Section 141 of the CPC, cannot be applied except to procedural matters, and it cannot be invoked in cases where the right of appeal is a substantive right conferred specifically by a statute. An appeal could arise only from such orders as are made appealable specifically by the statute, and that cannot be extended to other orders that may be passed in the course of the enquiry during the pendency of the proceedings in which such appealable order is passed. The proceeding under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act arising out of references under Section 20 are to be deemed to be proceedings of a civil nature as referred to in the Full Bench decision of this Court in 1969 Ker LT 275. The Madras High Court had occasion in Venkata Reddi v. Ramabrahman, AIR 1953 Mad 417 to consider the scope of the application of Order XLIII, Rule 1(a) of the CPC with respect to orders passed under Section 19 of the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act, There the contention was that Section 25-A of the Act was wide enough to authorise an appeal against an order under Section 19 for presentation to the proper Court on the ground of want of jurisdiction in the court to which it is presented. In the said case Raghava Rao, J., held—

    “…………… The interpretation to be placed upon the language in Order 43, R. 1(a) is, in my opinion, this namely, that if under Order 7, Rule 10 an order for the return of a plaint has been made, that will certainly be appealable. I am inclined to think that the right of appeal under that provision cannot stand attracted to orders made in connection with matters other than suits or plaints merely because of Section 141 of the CPC which can only imply and involve that the mode of trial laid down by the Code in regard to suits will be available in the case of all original petitions as well. ………………”

    4. The Calcutta High Court had occasion to consider the applicability of the provisions contained in Order XLIII, Rule 1(c) while dealing with the question whether an order on a petition for setting aside an order passed under Section 26-F of the Bengal Tenancy Act (Act 8 of 1885) is appealable. After referring to the scope of Section 141 and Order IX, Rule 9 of the CPC, Harries, C.J, held:— Birendranath v. Monorama Devi, AIR 1948 Cal 77—

    “(8) It is to be observed that Sec. 141 speaks of procedure. What is made applicable to all proceedings in a Court of Civil jurisdiction is the procedure provided in the Code with regard to suits. Now, a right of appeal is admittedly a substantive right and not a procedural right. Section 141 does not deal with substantive rights and therefore Courts have held that though Order 9, Rule 9 is made applicable to applications other than suits no appeal would lie from a dismissal of such an application under O. 43, Rule 1.”

    5. In yet another decision of the Calcutta High Court in Habibar Rahaman v. Saidannessa Bibi, AIR 1924 Cal 327, a Division Bench consisting of Mookerjee, J., and Panton, J., has held as follows:

    “It is well settled in this Court ……… that mutawallis may be authorised to execute leases of this description, by the District Judge, who, for this purpose, is competent to discharge the functions of a Khazi under the Mahomedan law. The nature of the proceedings was considered in Fakhrunnessa Begum v. District Judge of 24 Parganas, ((1920) ILR 47 Cal 592) : (AIR 1920 Cal 129), where it was pointed out that the proceeding is not a suit but merely a proceeding governed by Section 141 of the CPC. The fact that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure regulate the proceedings does not make the order which may be passed therein appealable ………………”

    6. In Gaja v. Mohd. Farukh, (AIR 1961 All 561) the observation of J.D Sharma, J. is as follows:

    “………An appeal is a substantive right and not a mere matter of procedure and unless it is conferred by Order 43 of the CPC, it cannot be inferred by implication from Section 141 of the Code. Order 43 does not provide for an appeal from an order dismissing for default an application for restoration of an application under Order 9, Rules 9 and 13 of the CPC. No appeal therefore lay from the order of the Munsiff dismissing the application dated 3rd September, 1956.”

    7. No doubt, this case decided by the Allahabad High Court was one of dismissal of an application for restoration of an application for setting aside the ex parte decree. In such matters also, even though Section 141 of the CPC would govern the procedure, that would not necessarily mean that a right of appeal is available to the aggrieved party.

    8. Considering the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act it does not appear to be the intention of the legislature to confer a right on the party aggrieved by an order of dismissed of a petition for restoration of a proceeding to file an appeal from such an order. As has already been said, the enabling provision, namely Section 141 of the CPC, which has relation only to procedural matters, cannot be stretched to govern substantive right of appeal which has been or has to be specifically conferred by the special statute are the Land Acquisition Act, as in the present case. I am, therefore, of the view that an appeal does not lie from an order dismissing an application for restoration of a reference under the Land Acquisition Act dismissed for default and therefore the revision is competent.

    9. As the dismissal for default appears to have arisen out of a bona fide mistake concerning the order that was passed on an application for joint trial of L.A No. 42 of 1967 along with L.A No. 41 of 1967, in the context that the Court had already conceived the idea of having a joint trial with rasped to all the references relating to the acquisition of land for the Cochin Division of F.A.C.T, I think, the party should not be subjected to undue hardship. Even the conduct of the Government lends support to the pleading of bona fide belief urged by the revision petitioner. There is nothing to show that the revision petitioner was aware of the dismissal of the reference case before 24-12-1970, and thereafter there had not been any laches on the part of the petitioner in moving for the restoration of the case. I, therefore, hold that the Court below was wrong in not condoning the delay for which reasonable explanation has been offered, and in not allowing the petition for restoration of the reference. In the result, the revision is allowed and the Court below is directed to restore the reference to file and dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.

    10. Petition allowed.

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    Comments

    Kallianikutty Amma v. The State Of Kerala .
    (Sep 20, 1973)