Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The second appeal before the court was filed by the defendant; Sri P.M. Balasubramoniam appeared for the appellant in that second appeal. The dispute concerns possession of a shop building described in the plaint schedule. The plaint alleges that the property originally belonged to one Pokken (father of the plaintiff) and that under Pokken one Kumaran (brother of the defendant) was a lessee with a lease dated 1-3-1952 at a rent of Rs. 6 per month; there was no written agreement. After Pokken's death the defendant had attorney to the plaintiff's brother and later to the plaintiff when the property was allotted to her in partition. On 29-10-1968 the plaintiff issued Ext. A-3 notice to the defendant demanding surrender of the plaint schedule building with arrears of rent by 30-11-1968.

The central procedural question before the court was whether Ext. A-3 constituted a proper and valid termination of the defendant's tenancy in compliance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Evidence at trial included testimony by P.W.1 (the plaintiff's husband), who admitted lack of direct knowledge about the date of commencement of the tenancy; the defendant (D.W.1) gave differing dates (possession from his brother on 12-2-1952 and that the brother had tenancy rights as early as 12-2-1951). There was documentary evidence of rent receipts (Exts. B-7 and B-10) showing monthly payments at Rs. 6 per month for specified six-month periods, but those receipts did not establish the date of commencement of tenancy.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Ext. A-3 notice constituted a proper and valid termination of the defendant's tenancy in terms of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (counsel for the appellant: Sri P.M. Balasubramoniam)

  • Main point: Ext. A-3 did not validly terminate the defendant's tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • Even assuming, without conceding, that the tenancy commenced on 1-3-1952 as alleged in the plaint, the order of eviction passed by the trial court (and confirmed by the first appellate court) could not be sustained because Ext. A-3 was not a proper notice under Section 106.
  • One further contention raised was that the written statement pleaded that the building was being used for manufacture of medicine and therefore, under the earlier part of Section 106, the defendant (in that pleading) would be entitled to six months' notice to vacate. (The court noted it was unnecessary to decide this point in the second appeal because it had already found Ext. A-3 invalid as a monthly tenancy notice.)

Respondent's Arguments (counsel for the respondent: Shri P.P. Ananthanaravana Iyer)

  • Relied on recitals in Exts. B-7 and B-10 (rent receipts) to infer that the tenancy commenced on 1-3-1952 as alleged in the plaint, rather than on dates contended by the defendant (12-2-1951 or 12-2-1952).
  • Relied on precedent (Venkatagopal v. Rangappa) to argue that payment of rent in a particular form and at a certain rate for years is presumptive evidence of an agreed mode and rate of payment and, inferentially, aspects of the parties' arrangement.
  • Argued that in the case of holding over after expiry of the original term, the need for compliance with Section 106 with reference to the original tenancy may not arise (i.e., suggested the requirements might differ where holding over occurs).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Venkatagopal v. Rangappa ((1884) ILR 7 Mad 365) Payment of rent in a particular form at a certain rate for a number of years is presumptive evidence both of a contract to pay in that form/at that rate and that parties agreed the payment arrangement would continue so long as landlord-tenant relation subsists. The court held this creates only a rebuttable presumption about the mode/rate of payment and is not helpful to determine the date of commencement of the tenancy in the instant case.
Sarada v. Kumaran (1969 Ker LT 133) Illustrates that, in view of Supreme Court decisions, termination of the lease is necessary before filing a petition for eviction. The court relied on this authority (and the Supreme Court cases cited therein) to support the proposition that termination is necessary before seeking eviction relief.
Abbasbhai v. Gulamnabi (AIR 1964 SC 1341); Mangilal v. Sugan Chand (AIR 1965 SC 101); Manuiendra v. Purnedu (AIR 1967 SC 1419) Supreme Court authorities cited for the principle that a lease must be terminated before an eviction petition is maintainable. Cited (via Sarada v. Kumaran) to reinforce the legal requirement of termination prior to eviction proceedings under the applicable law.
Manju Bala v. Prodosh Ranian (AIR 1971 Assam & Naga 97) Explains timing requirements for termination under Section 106: a monthly tenancy must be terminated to expire with the end of the day immediately preceding the commencement date of the tenancy and vacant possession can be demanded the next day. The court relied on this decision to explain how a monthly tenancy must be terminated (by reference to the day-month cycle) and that the notice should specify termination by the correct day with demand for vacant possession accordingly.
Mulla, Transfer of Property Act (illustration, Fourth Edition) Illustration that a notice framed as a request accompanied by a threat (instead of a valid termination notice) is not a valid notice under the Act. The court quoted the illustration to show examples of invalid notices and to support the conclusion that mere requests or threats do not satisfy Section 106 requirements.
V. Kamalaksha Pai v. Keshava Bhatta (AIR 1972 Ker 110; 1971 Ker LJ 538) Observation that, unless special circumstances exist, courts may adopt a liberal construction of notices under Section 106 to give effect to the intention rather than defeat relief for minor inaccuracies, provided the recipient is not misled or prejudiced. The court acknowledged this principle but emphasized the context and limits of liberal construction; it noted that in the present case the plaintiff had specific evidential burdens which were not satisfied.
Firm Srinivas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad (AIR 1951 SC 177) Where a demand is based on the defendant's own plea, the defendant cannot be surprised and evidence on such facts need not be adduced when they were expressly admitted by the defendant in pleadings. The court observed this principle but held it was not available to the plaintiff because the plaintiff did not give the defendant an option or rely effectively on the defendant's pleaded admissions.
Mohamed Kani v. Meeran Kuniu (AIR 1972 Ker 63; 1971 Ker LT 704) Where there is clear proof of holding over after the expiry of the original term, Section 106 operates and a notice to suit is necessary. The court cited this authority to reject the respondent's contention that holding over might avoid the need for compliance with Section 106; the court held Section 106 requirements still apply.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through the following analytical steps, based on the material in the record and the legal authorities cited:

  1. Identification of the central factual dispute: the date of commencement of the tenancy was contested. The plaint alleged a lease dated 1-3-1952 in favour of Kumaran; P.W.1 admitted lack of direct knowledge and said the allegation was based on information from the defendant, but the defendant did not confirm the plaint's date and instead recalled different dates (possession received from Kumaran on 12-2-1952 and that Kumaran had rights as early as 12-2-1951).
  2. Evaluation of documentary evidence: Exts. B-7 and B-10 (rent receipts) established that rent was paid at Rs. 6 per month on a monthly basis during specified periods, but the court found these receipts did not establish the date of commencement of the tenancy — the most relevant fact for assessing the sufficiency of Ext. A-3.
  3. Assessment of presumptions from case law: the court accepted the principle from Venkatagopal that regular payments can create a presumptive inference about payment mode/rate, but held that such a presumption is rebuttable and does not determine the commencement date of tenancy.
  4. Legal requirement for termination: relying on Sarada (and the Supreme Court decisions cited therein), the court reiterated that termination of the lease is necessary before filing an eviction petition and that compliance with Section 106 is mandatory when applicable.
  5. Examination of the form and content of Ext. A-3: the court analysed whether Ext. A-3 validly terminated the tenancy in accordance with Section 106 and related jurisprudence (including the timing rule illustrated in Manju Bala). The court noted that when parties disputed the commencement date, the plaintiff should have either proven the pleaded commencement date (1-3-1952) and demonstrated valid termination of that tenancy, or treated the defendant's earlier asserted date (12-2-1952) and given a notice terminating that tenancy in accordance with Section 106.
  6. On the adequacy of Ext. A-3 the court found that the plaintiff failed to prove the tenancy commenced on 1-3-1952 and also failed to give the defendant an alternative definite date to vacate (i.e., no option was given in Ext. A-3 to accommodate the defendant's version). The plaintiff therefore "courted the difficulty" by asserting the 1-3-1952 date and failing to prove it.
  7. The court considered but did not decide the separate contention about the building's use for manufacture of medicine and the possible entitlement to six months' notice, because it was unnecessary to address that point once Ext. A-3 was held invalid as a monthly tenancy notice.
  8. The court also rejected the respondent's submission that holding over might avoid Section 106 compliance, citing Mohamed Kani to show that where holding over is proved, Section 106 still operates and a notice to suit is required.
  9. Conclusion from the analysis: Ext. A-3 was not a proper notice terminating the defendant's tenancy under Section 106.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that Ext. A-3 was not a proper notice terminating the defendant's tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, and accordingly allowed the second appeal.

Implications (direct effects):

  • The second appeal is allowed.
  • The judgment and decree of the courts below insofar as they relate to recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property are set aside.
  • The decrees of the courts below insofar as they relate to arrears of rent will stand.
  • The plaintiff is at liberty to institute proper proceedings at a later stage, if so advised, in due compliance with the requirements of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • There will be no order as to costs.
  • Leave to appeal was granted and the appeal was allowed.

    Madhavan Vydiar v. Janaki .

    1. Sri P.M Balasubramoniam the learned counsel for the appellant in the second appeal filed by the defendant, has stressed in his argument mainly one point; and that relates to a question of law pertaining to suit notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act The relevant portion of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act reads as follows:—

    “…………and a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days' notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy.

    xxxxx”

    2. The plaintiff's case, briefly stated, is as follows:— One Pokken, father of the plaintiff, was the owner of the property in which the plaint schedule shop building is situate. Under the said Pokken one Kumaran, brother of the defendant, was a lessee, the date of lease being 1-3-1952 and the rate of rent being Rs. 6/- per month. There is no written agreement with respect to the lease. After the death of Pokken the defendant had attorney to the plaintiff's brother, and later to the plaintiff, when the property in question was allotted to her in partition. On 29-10-1968 the plaintiff issued Ext. A-3 notice to the defendant demanding surrender of the plaint schedule building with arrears of rent by 30-11-1968. To quote the actual words used—

    “Athukondu 1968 November 30-am theevathikkakathu 1-5-1967 muthalkkulla vaatakayum palisavumee notice chilavu 12 Ka 50 Paisavum ente kakshikku kotuthum etuppa utava theertha ente kakshikku ozhinijikotuthum laksva ora-karam karvam theerkendathanennum veezhcha varuthival aavaka nivarthikalk-kayi ente kakshi wavaharanpetunna-thanennum…………”

    3. The question is whether in and by Ext. A-3 notice there has been a proper and valid termination of the defendant's tenancy. P.W I is the husband of the plaintiff. He has admitted in the witness box that he had no direct knowledge about the date on which the tenancy commenced though in the plaint it has been stated that the lease in favour of Kumaran was on 1-3-1952. The allegation in the plaint, according to P.W 1, was based on information furnished by the defendant. However, unfortunately for the plaintiff, the defendant neither in his written statement nor in his evidence as D.W 1 supported this assertion of P.W 1; all that the defendant could remember was that he got possession of the building from his brother Kumaran on 12-2-1952. According to him, his brother had tenancy right even as early as 12-2-1951. There is evidence in this case that even prior to 1-3-1952 either Kumaran or the defendant was in possession of the building. The plaintiff has not alleged or proved that this tenancy started prior to 1-3-1952 has been terminated and a new tenancy has been commenced between the parties on and from 1-3-1952. No reliable material has been placed before the Court to take the view that the tenancy in question started on 1-3-1952 as alleged in the plaint. In other words, the tenancy of the date 1-3-1952 set up by the plaintiff has not been proved.

    4. Reliance is placed by Shri P.P Ananthanaravana Iyer, the learned counsel for the respondent, on the recitals in Exts. B-7 and B-10 for drawing an inference that the tenancy must have commenced on the 1st of March 1952 as alleged in the plaint, not on 12-2-1951 or 12-2-1952 as contended by the defendant. Ext. B-7 is & receipt evidencing payment of rent of Rs. 36/- for six months from 1-11-1966 to 30-4-1967 at the rate of Rs. 6/- per month. Ext. B-10 is a receipt for payment of rent at the rate of Rs. 6/-. per month for six months from 1-11-1967 to 30-4-1968. All that these receipts can establish is that the rent was at the rate of Rs. 6/- per month and that during the relevant period rent was paid on a monthly basis commencing from the first day of the month and ending with the last day of the month. This does not however, throw any light on the date of commencement of the tenancy which is the most relevant factor while considering the validity and sufficiency of Ex. A-3 notice.

    5. Sri Ananthanaravana Iver has also placed reliance on the decision reported in Venkatagopal v. Rangappa, (1884) ILR 7 Mad 365 where a Full Bench of the Madras High Court has held as follows:—

    “Payment of rent in a particular form at a certain rate for a number of years is not only presumptive evidence of the existence of a contract to payment in that form or at that rate for those years, but is also presumptive evidence that the parties have agreed that it is obligatory on the one party to pay and the other to receive rent in that form and at that rate, so long as the relation of landlord and tenant may continue.”

    6. This, I find, would only go to show that there may arise a presumption (which, of course, is a rebuttable one) that the Parties had been paying and receiving rent on a monthly basis as agreed to between them. It is not helpful to draw any inference as to the date of commencement of tenancy.

    7. The counsel for the appellant submits that even assuming, without conceding, that the tenancy commenced from 1-3-1952 as is contended by the plaintiff, the order of eviction passed by the trial court and confirmed by the first appellate court, cannot sustain, as Ext. A-3 is not a proper notice terminating the tenancy in terms of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. In Sarada v. Kumaran, 1969 Ker LT 133. Krishnamoorthy Iyer, J. has observed as follows:—

    “In view of the decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Abbasbhai v. Gulamnabi (AIR 1964 SC 1341) Mangilal v. Sugan Chand, AIR 1965 SC 101 and Manuiendra v. Purnedu (AIR 1967 SC 1419) a termination of the lease is necessary before the filing of a petition for eviction.”

    8. The learned counsel for the respondent points out that though in the earlier portion of the notice it has been stated that the surrender was to be made before 30-11-1968, in the later portion what has been stated is as follows:—

    “Ningalute kutivavma ee notice moolam 30-11-1968- am theeyathiyotukooti avasanippichirikkunnu enntun ninsale ethinal ariyichirikkunnu”.

    9. I do not think that even if this portion is read along with the earlier portion matters will improve much for the respondent. The correct position seems to be that the tenancy has to be terminated either on the day on which the monthly tenancy commenced or at the end of the day preceding that date with a further stipulation that vacant possession of the building has to be given on the next day. This is the view that has been taken in Manju Bala v. Prodosh Ranian, AIR 1971 Assam & Naga 97, wherein it has been observed as follow:—

    “Hence the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act in the instant case will have to terminate the tenancy by the and of the 20th by demanding vacant possession on 21st of the month. By Ext. 6 the tenancy was terminated and vacant Possession was demanded by the end of 21st Falgoon 1370 B.S Since the tenancy commenced on 21st of the Bengali month, it ended on 20th of the next month. Hence the notice should have terminated the tenancy by the end of 20th Falgoon and vacant possession should have been demanded by the end of 20th Falgoon or on 21st Falgoon………”.

    10. While considering the question of termination of tenancy it is profitable to note the illustration given at page 619 of Mulla's Transfer of Property Act, Fourth Edition—

    “A let a house to B on the 1st of July. On the 11th of December of the same year. A gave notice to B as follows: ‘if the house you occupy is not vacated within a month from this date I will file a suit against you for ejectment as well as for recovery of rent at an enhanced rate’. This was not a valid notice but merely a request to vacate accompanied by a threat”:

    11. In V. Kamalakshs Pai v. Keshava Bhatta, 1971 Ker LJ 538 : (AIR 1972 Ker 110) Krishna Iver, J. has observed as follows:

    “Granting a landlord-tenant relationship between the parties and further granting that both the leases are capable of being terminated by notice to emit, unless there are special circumstances, we may construe the provisions regarding the determination of the lease by a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act liberally so as to relate to the only case out of the two that subsists. The rule has been to make lame and inaccurate notices sensible where the recipient cannot have been misled as to the intention of the giver (Mulla. Transfer of Property Act (5th Edn.) p. 666). A liberal construction is out upon a notice to suit so that it is not defeated by minor errors. In the present case, there is no circumstance which may reasonably mislead the defendant or prejudice him if Ext. A-2 is accepted as a lease that bound the plaintiff and the defendant in jural relationship.”

    12. The context in which the observation quoted above was made could be understood from the following sentences immediately preceding it:

    “A notice has been sent in this case and no finding, nor even an issue, that the lease has not been terminated validly has been made. But the specific contention is that what was terminated was the supposed lease created by Ext. A-1 while what is required if the relief on the alternative lease pleaded by the defendant ought to be granted is the termination of the earlier lease”.

    13. In the instant case the position is this: In Ext. A-3 notice the plaintiff stated that the tenancy commenced on 1-3-1952. The defendant in Ext. A-5 reply stated that the tenancy was on 12-2-1952. In these circumstances the plaintiff should have proved that the tenancy commented on 1-3-52 and that it has been terminated by a valid notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, or should have treated the date of commencement of the tenancy as 12-2-1952 as put forward by the defendant in his reply notice and terminated the tenancy by a notice in terms of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. If the plaintiff thought that the date of commencement of the tenancy as put forward by the defendant was not acceptable to her she could have in Ext. A-3 notice at least given an option to the defendant to vacate of another definite date if according to the defendant the tenancy did not terminate on the 30th November, 1968. The plaintiff courted the difficulty by asserting that the tenancy commenced on 1-3-1952 and failing to prove it. She also gave no option to the defendant to vacate on a definite date on which, as per the defendant's assertion, the tenancy would end. It has been observed by the Supreme Court in Firm Srinivas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad, AIR 1951 SC 177.

    “A demand of the plaintiff based on the defendant's own plea cannot possibly be regarded with surprise by the latter and no question of adducing evidence on these facts would arise when they were expressly admitted by the defendant in his pleadings”.

    14. The benefit of such a view is not available to the plaintiff because she did not choose to give the option to the defendant placing reliance on his admission or assertion.

    15. The learned counsel for the respondent argues that in the case of holding over, the need for compliance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act with reference to the original tenancy may not arise. This does not appear to be the correct position in law. In Mohamed Kani v. Meeran Kuniu, 1971 Ker LT 704 : (AIR 1972 Ker 63) Moidu, J. has observed as follows:—

    “In a case where there is clear proof of holding over after the expiry of the original term contained in the lease the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act would operate and a notice to suit is absolutely necessary.”

    16. Considering all these aspects of the matter I have no hesitation in holding that Ext. A-3 is not a proper notice terminating the tenancy of the defendant.

    17. One other contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is that there has been pleading in the written statement that the building was being used for the purpose of manufacturing medicine and as such, in terms of the earlier Part of the provisions contained in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act the defendant was entitled to get six months' notice for vacating the premises. The correctness of this assertion is disputed by the learned counsel for the respondent. I do not however, think that it is necessary to so into this matter in this second anneal, in view of the fact that I have already taken the view that even treating it as a monthly tenancy the termination of the tenancy in and by Ext. A-3 is not proper and valid. The second appeal is therefore, allowed and the judement and decree of the courts below in so far as they relate to recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property are set aside. The decrees of the courts below in so far as they relate to the arrears of rent will stand. Needless to say. Plaintiff will be at liberty to institute proper proceedings at a later stage, if she is so advised, in due compliance with the requirements of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs Leave to appeal granted.

    18. Appeal allowed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Madhavan Vydiar v. Janaki .
    (Mar 2, 1973)