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Judgment Summary — Isaac, J. (Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954)

Factual and Procedural Background

These three matters, heard together, arise under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.

Calendar Revision No. 5 of 1967: The accused, a provision merchant, was charged in C.C. No. 72 of 1966 before the Additional First Class Magistrate, Nedumangad, under Section 16(1)(a)(i) read with Section 7 of the Act for selling adulterated compounded asafoetida on 5-9-1965 to the Food Inspector. The Magistrate found him guilty and sentenced him to simple imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 1,000. The accused appealed (Criminal Appeal No. 106 of 1966) to the Sessions Court, Trivandrum, where the 1st Additional Sessions Judge (by judgment dated 15 Feb 1967) allowed the appeal and acquitted the accused on the ground that the article sold was described as “compounded misky asafoetida” and standards had been prescribed only for “compounded asafoetida.” Notice in Calendar Revision was issued and the matter came before this Court.

Criminal Revision Petition No. 670 of 1966 and Calendar Revision No. 24 of 1967: These arise from C.C. No. 18 of 1966 in the Court of the Additional First Class Magistrate, Karunagapally, where two accused were charged under Section 16(1)(a)(i) read with Section 7 for selling adulterated compounded asafoetida on 22-9-1965. The Magistrate convicted both and imposed fines of Rs. 500 each. They appealed (Criminal Appeal No. 32 of 1966) to the Sessions Court, Quilon, which dismissed the appeal and confirmed conviction and sentence, noting that the minimum sentence under the Act was imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 1,000 but observing it had no power to enhance. Criminal Revision Petition No. 670 of 1966 followed; important questions of law were adjourned for Division Bench hearing.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an article described or branded as “compounded misky asafoetida” is different from “compounded asafoetida” for the purposes of the Act, and whether sale of the former can be prosecuted under standards prescribed for the latter.
  2. Whether a general authorization (notification Ext. P-2) issued by the State Government under Section 20(1) of the Act (issued before the 1964 amendment) authorizing Food Inspectors to institute prosecutions is valid and satisfies the requirements of Section 20(1).
  3. Whether, in the present cases, the person who analysed the samples qualified as a Public Analyst under the Act.
  4. Whether the Government had validly declared “local areas” for purposes of appointment of Food Inspectors under Section 2(vii) and Section 9(1) of the Act.
  5. Whether the procedure followed by the Food Inspector in sealing, dividing, and sending samples (including entrusting dispatch to a Panchayat Officer) complied with Sections 11 and the Rules (and whether the Public Analyst's report was admissible and properly certified).
  6. Whether the vendors were protected by Section 18(2) (i.e., by proof of purchase from a trader with a written warranty) and Rule 12-A — specifically, whether printed words on the label “Foremost Best Quality” amounted to a statutory warranty.
  7. Whether the sentences imposed by the Magistrate(s), being below the statutory minimum under Section 16(1), should be enhanced by this Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Accused's Arguments

  • The article sold was “compounded misky asafoetida” and not “compounded asafoetida”; therefore, standards prescribed for “compounded asafoetida” did not apply.
  • The State Government's authorization (Ext. P-2) under Section 20(1) was a general authorization issued before the 1964 amendment and was invalid because, it was contended, the authorization must be in favour of a particular person (i.e., a named person) under Section 20(1) as originally enacted.
  • The authorization in Ext. P-2 being issued before the amendment (Act 49 of 1964) did not fall under the amended wording and was therefore ineffective for instituting prosecution.
  • The person who analysed the samples was not validly appointed as a Public Analyst under the Act.
  • The Government had not declared “local areas” under Section 2(vii), so Food Inspectors could not validly have been appointed for the areas in question.
  • The Food Inspector did not himself send the sample, the memorandum in Form VII, and the specimen impression of the seal directly to the Public Analyst as required; instead he entrusted them to the Panchayat Officer, rendering the analysis and its report inadmissible.
  • The Public Analyst's report (Ext. P-9) did not state that the specimen impression of the seal had been compared with the seal on the packet, and hence the report was defective.
  • The vendor (accused) was entitled to protection under Section 18(2) if the vendor had a warranty from the trader in the prescribed form; reliance was placed on Rule 12-A and on the form/label on the packet as amounting to warranty.
  • After notice to show cause for enhancement of sentence, the accused argued that this was not a fit case for increasing punishment.

Prosecution / State Position (as reflected in the record)

  • The Food Inspector testified to purchasing the specified packets after giving notice, dividing the sample into three parts, sealing them, giving one part to the seller, producing one in Court, and sending the third part to the Public Analyst along with the memorandum and specimen impression of the seal (though he entrusted dispatch to the Panchayat Officer).
  • The Public Analyst produced Ext. P-9 in Form III, stating receipt of a properly sealed and packed sample and that the seal was intact and unbroken; the prosecution relied on that report and conceded (as recorded) that under Section 13(5) Ext. P-9 could be used as evidence of the facts stated therein without examining the Public Analyst in person.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Municipal Health Officer and Food Inspector, Kozhikode v. Arthala Tea Estate Co., AIR 1961 Ker 84 Validity of a general authorization made by the State/local authority under provisions comparable to Section 20(1); purpose of enabling delegation so that authorities need not consider each individual prosecution. The Court followed the view that general authorisations are permissible and that requiring consideration of each individual case would be unworkable; this decision supported the validity of Ext. P-2.
State of Mysore v. Danjaya, AIR 1963 Mys 157 Support for the proposition that general authorization to persons holding a particular office is valid under a similar statutory scheme. The Court referred to and followed this decision as reinforcement for upholding general authorisations.
M.J. Powell (Applicant) v. The Municipal Board of Mussoorie (Opposite Party), (1900) ILR 22 All 123 (Full Bench) Explanation of the two-fold purpose behind provisions requiring municipal oversight of prosecutions: (1) to exclude frivolous prosecutions by irresponsible persons, and (2) to enable the Municipal Board to delegate prosecution functions. The Court cited the Full Bench to show legislative intent that municipal authorities may assign prosecution functions and thus to justify general authorisations to act.
State of Bombay v. Parshottam Kanaiyalal, AIR 1961 SC 1 Consideration of whether written consent to institute a prosecution under Section 20(1) must be in favour of a named person. The Court observed that the Supreme Court had said naming was not a requirement; however, the Court here held that the particular observations cited were not helpful for the point under contention and did not alter the conclusion upholding general authorisation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed the various contentions in turn and applied statutory text, rules, and precedent strictly as reflected in the record.

1. "Compounded misky asafoetida" vs "compounded asafoetida":

The Court noted that neither counsel could explain the meaning of “misky” nor could the Court trace the word to any language. The Court concluded that “misky” is apparently a trade name or brand coined by the manufacturer and that the addition of that word does not change the nature of the article. The label identifying a particular brand does not make the article different in substance; therefore compounded misky asafoetida remains compounded asafoetida for purposes of the Act.

2. Validity of the general authorization (Ext. P-2) under Section 20(1):

The Court examined Section 20(1) as originally enacted and as substituted by Act 49 of 1964. The 1964 amendment explicitly introduced the words “by general or special order” indicating that general authorisations are adequate. The principal contention was that an authorisation issued before the amendment (Ext. P-2, dated 7-9-1959) was invalid because, it was argued, prior to amendment the authorization had to be to a particular person.

The Court relied on prior decisions (Kozhikode; State of Mysore; the Full Bench in M.J. Powell) holding that the object of such provisions includes enabling a government or local authority to assign prosecutorial function to agents or officers without considering each case individually. The Court further invoked Section 15 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which permits appointments or authorisations to be made by name or by virtue of office unless expressly provided otherwise. On that basis the Court held that a general authorisation to persons holding a particular office is permissible and that Ext. P-2 was effective. The Court also reasoned that Section 20(1) simply requires that prosecution be instituted by one of the authorities or persons mentioned; the timing or the specific statutory provision under which the authorisation was given is not material to maintainability.

3. Appointment of the Public Analyst and local-area declarations:

The Court noted extant notifications: Ext. P-2 (28-1-1963) appointing Shri P. Janardana Ayar as Public Analyst under the Act; and a government notification dated 14-7-1955 declaring all Panchayat areas as “local areas” for the purposes of the Act. These notifications defeated the accused's contentions that the analyst was not appointed and that local areas had not been declared.

4. Procedure for sampling, sealing and dispatch; admissibility of Public Analyst's report:

The Court recited the statutory procedure in Section 11 and the relevant Rules (Rules 14–22, especially Rules 17 and 18) which contemplate dispatch by registered post, railway parcel, air freight, or by hand in a sealed packet, with a separate memorandum and specimen impression of the seal sent to the Public Analyst. The Court accepted the Food Inspector's evidence that he divided the sample into three parts, sealed packets in the accused’s presence, gave one part to the accused, produced one part in Court, and sent the third part for analysis together with the memorandum and specimen impression (the actual posting being entrusted to the Panchayat Officer). The Court held that entrustment to the Panchayat Officer for registered posting did not vitiate the procedure; similarly, simple entrustment to a peon for registration at the post office would not vitiate it.

The Court further relied on Rule 7 of the Rules which prescribes duties of the Public Analyst, including comparison of the seal on container and outer cover with the specimen impression. The Court reasoned that official acts are presumed to be regularly performed, and that when a Public Analyst furnishes a Form III report stating the seal was intact and unbroken, it must be taken that he compared the seals and found them intact. The prescribed form of report (Ext. P-9 in Form III) must be read in light of Rule 7; accordingly the challenge that the report did not explicitly state comparison with the specimen impression was rejected.

5. Vendor protection under Section 18(2) and Rule 12-A:

The accused argued that label matter on the package amounted to a warranty within the proviso to Rule 12-A. The Court examined the label (M.O. II) which stated “Foremost Best Quality Compounded Misky Asafoetida” and held that such words do not indicate the nature, substance or quality of the article in the statutory sense. Instead, the Court observed that the words were a false representation about an adulterated article and did not satisfy the statutory requirement for a warranty that would attract protection under Section 18(2).

6. Sentencing and enhancement:

The Court noted that the minimum punishment for the offence under Section 16(1)(a)(i) read with Section 7 is imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 1,000. Where a subordinate court imposed a sentence below the statutory minimum, the High Court considered it its duty to correct such error to avoid disparity and encourage subordinate courts to comply with statutory minimum sentences. Accordingly, the Court ordered enhancement/confirmation of sentences to meet the statutory minimum in the cases before it.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court made the notices absolute and rendered the following rulings:

  • The acquittal by the Sessions Court of Trivandrum in Criminal Appeal No. 106 of 1966 is set aside; the conviction and sentence originally passed by the Additional First Class Magistrate, Nedumangad in C.C. No. 72 of 1966 are confirmed.
  • The convictions of the two accused in C.C. No. 18 of 1966 on the file of the Additional First Class Magistrate, Karunagapally are confirmed; each accused is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000, failing which to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of two months.
  • Accordingly, the notices in the Calendar Revision cases are made absolute, and the Criminal Revision Petition is dismissed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The convictions in the cases before the Court stand confirmed and statutory minimum sentences imposed (six months' simple imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000, with default imprisonment clauses). The Sessions Court acquittal in one case was overturned.
  • Procedure and statutory interpretation: The Court validated (i) the concept that brand names or trade names appended to an article do not change the legal character of the article for purposes of the Act; (ii) the validity of general authorisations by State/local authorities (including those issued before the 1964 amendment) for persons holding particular offices to institute prosecutions under Section 20(1); (iii) the procedural sufficiency of the Public Analyst's Form III report read with Rule 7 and the presumption of regularity in official acts; and (iv) that entrustment of dispatch to an agent (e.g., Panchayat Officer) does not vitiate the prescribed routing for samples if the statutory safeguards are observed.
  • No new precedent was expressly declared by the Court beyond its application of existing decisions and statutory construction; the Court mainly applied and followed prior authorities and statutory rules to the facts presented and corrected sentences where subordinate courts had imposed punishments below the statutory minimum.

Order pronounced: "Orders accordingly." (Court's formal conclusion and disposal noted.)

    Subbayyan Muthukomaran, v. State Of Kerala And Others,

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Isaac, J.:— These three cases arise under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). They raise common questions; and hence they were heard jointly, and are being disposed of by this single judgment.

    2. In Calendar Revision No. 5 of 1967, the accused, a provision merchant, was charged by the Food Inspector of Nedumangad Panchayat in the Court of the Additional First Class Magistrate, Nedumangad, in C.C No. 72 of 1966 for an offence under Section 16(1)(a)(i) read with Section 7 of the Act. The complaint against him was that, on 5-9-1965 he sold adulterated compounded asafoetida to the Food Inspector. The accused was found guilty of the said offence; and he was sentenced by the learned Magistrate to suffer simple imprisonment for 6 months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000. The accused filed Criminal Appeal No. 106 of 1966 in the Sessions Court of Trivandrum; and the learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge, by his judgment dated 15th February 1967, allowed the appeal and acquitted the accused on the ground that what was sold to the Food Inspector was “compounded misky asafoetida” and not “compounded asafoetida”, and that standards have been grescribed only for the latter, and not for be former. Our learned brother Velu Pillai, J., issued notice in Calendar Revision on 8-3-1967, and that is how this matter has come before this Court. The case was first heard by Sadasivan, J., who considered that the question whether compounded misky asafoetida is the same as compounded asafoetida is an important one, not covered by any authority; and he adjourned the case for being heard and decided by a Division Bench.

    3. Criminal Revision Petition No. 670 of 1966 and Calendar Revision No. 24 of 1967 arise out of a complaint which the Food Inspector, Chavara Panchayat, filed in the Court of the Additional 1st Class Magistrate, Karunagapally as C.C No. 18 of 1966, oharging the two accused persons in that case with the offence, under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Act read with Section 7. The accusation against them was that, on 22-9-1965, the second accused, who was in charge of the grocery shop run by the first accused, sold adulterated compounded asafoetida to the Food Inspector. Both of them were found guilty by the learned Magistrate, who took a lenient view of the offence, and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of Rs. 500.

    4. They filed Criminal Appeal No. 32 of 1966 in the Sessions Court of Quilon. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, who heard the appeal, dismissed it, and confirmed the conviction and sentence. He also pointed out that the minimum sentence provided for the offence was imprisonment for 6 months and a fine of Rs. 1000, and that the trial Court acted illegally in awarding a lesser sentence. He, however, dropped the matter there, observing that he had no power to enhance the sentence. The accused filed Criminal Revision Petition No. 670 of 1966 against their conviction and sentence. When the case came before our learned brother Sadasivan, J., it was contended on behalf of the accused that the authorisation of the Food Inspector by the State Government under Section 20(1) of the Act to institute the prosecution was granted before that Section was amended by Act 49 of 1964, and that such an authorisation was not sufficient to institute the complaint. Our learned brother considered it as important question; and he adjourned the case for being heard by a Division Bench. On hearing the learned counsel for the accused, we took the view that the accused were rightly convicted; we, therefore, ordered notice to show cause why the sentence awarded to them should not be enhanced, as they were below the minimum punishment fixed under the Act. Accordingly, Calendar Revision No. 24 of 1967 was taken up against the accused.

    5. We shall now consider the various points raised by the learned counsel in these cases. The contention that “compounded misky asafoetida” is not “compounded asafoetida” was raised before us also by the learned counsel for the accused in Criminal Revision Petition No. 670 of 1966. In our view, there is no substance in this contention. None of the learned counsel was able to tell us what “misky” means, and whether such a word occurs in any language. We have not also been able to trace this word to any language. It is, therefore, apparently a word coined by the manufacturer as a trade mark for the article. The use of such a word along with the name of the article cannot make any difference in the article. It can only denote or identify a particular manufacture. Compounded misky asafoetida does not cease to be, or become something different from, compounded asafoetida, by addition of the word misky to it. It appears that what is sold as compounded misky asafoetida is a well known brand of compounded asafoetida; and when the Food Inspector asked for and purchased compounded misky asafoetida, it only means that he purchased that particular brand of the compounded asafoetida, which the accused were storing and selling.

    6. We shall now consider the objection raised to the maintainability of the prosecution instituted in Criminal Revision Petition No. 670 of 1966, based on Section 20 of the Act. Sub-section (1) of this Section alone is relevant; and before it was amended by the Prevention of Food Adulteration (Amendment) Act, 49 of 1964, it read as follows:—

    “20.(1) No prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of the State Government or a local authority or a person authorised in this behalf by the State Government or local authority:

    Provided that a prosecution for an offence under this Act may be instituted by a purchaser referred to in Sec. 12, if he produces in Court a copy of the report of the Public Analyst along with the complaint”.

    7. Ext. P-2 is a notification No. 39559/59.H.L.(B)4 dated 7-9-1959 issued by the Government of Kerala under Section 20(1) of the Act; and it reads:—

    “In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 (Central Act 37 of 1954) and in supersession of all previous notifications on the subject, the Government of Kerala hereby authorises the Food Inspectors appointed under the said Act to institute prosecutions for offences under the Act”.

    8. It was contended that the authorisation under Section 20(1) of the Act must be one in favour of a particular person, and that Ext. P-2, being only a general authorisation, does not satisfy the requirement of the Section. It was also submitted that it was evident from Section 20(1) of the Act, as amended by Act 49 of 1964, that the above is the correct position.

    9. By Act 49 of 1964, the following was substituted for Section 20(1):

    “20(1). No prosecution for an offence under this Act snail be instituted except by, or with the written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority or a person authorised in this behalf, by a general or special order, by the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority.

    Provided that a prosecution for an offeree under this Act may be instituted by a purchaser referred to in Sec. 12, if he produces in Court a copy of the report of the Public Analyst along with the complaint”.

    10. The substituted provision introduced the words “by general or special order” into the Section, according to which it is enough if the authorisation of the Food Inspector to institute a complaint is by a general or special order. It was submitted that the position was the contrary, before the above amendment, and that Ext. P-2 being an authorisation given before the amendment, would not fall under the amended Section and was, therefore, invalid.

    11. The question whether a general authorisation was valid under Section 20(1) of the Act, before its amendment by Act 49 of 1964, came up for consideration before our learned brother Raman Nayar, J., in Municipal Health Officer and Food Inspector, Kozhikode v. Arthala Tea Estate Co., AIR 1961 Ker 84, and the learned Judge said:

    “It is obvious that the very object of the second clause is to enable the State Government and local authorities to appoint some other person to exercise on their behalf the discretion vested in them by the first clause since, if the State Government or the local authorities had to consider each particular case and determine whether a prosecution should be launched or not, the section would become altogether unworkable having regard to the large number of offences that are committed. And that very object would be defeated by the interpretation sought to be placed on the clause.”

    12. This decision was followed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Mysore in State of Mysore v. Danjaya, AIR 1963 Mys 157. Dealing with a similar statutory provision, a Full Bench of six Judges of the High Court of Allahabad, in M.J Powell…(Applicant); v. The Municipal Board Of Mussoorie…(Opposite Party).*, (1900) ILR 22 All 123 (FB), said:

    “It is clear that the section was enacted with a two-fold purpose. The object was, in the first place, to exclude prosecutions for what may be called municipal offences from the interference of irresponsible persons, and to secure that such prosecutions should have the guarantee of the responsibility of the Municipal Board. A further object, in my opinion, was to relieve the Municipal Board of the necessity of itself dealing with each individual case of prosecution for a municipal offence, and to enable it to assign that particular function to some other person or persons”.

    13. We respectfully agree with the view expressed in the above decisions. Section 15 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, places the matter almost beyond controversy. This Section reads:

    “Where, by any Central Act or Regulation, a power to appoint any person to fill any office or execute any function is con furred, then, unless it is otherwise expressly provided, any such appointment, if it is made after the commencement of this Act, may be made either by name or by virtue or office”.

    14. We are unable to see why an authorisation to institute prosecutions under Section 20(1) of the Act cannot be given by the authorities empowered thereunder generally in favour of persons holding a particular office. A general authority to act in all cases or in a class of cases is a familiar form of authorisation to an agent of an officer. Reliance was made by the learned counsel for the accused on certain observations contained in the decision of the Supreme Court in State Of Bombay v. Parshottam Kanaiyalal , AIR 1961 SC 1. In that case, the question before the Court was whether under Section 20(1) of the Act, the written consent to institute a prosecution should be in favour of a named person. The Court said that this was not one of the requirements of the Section. The observations made in that context in the above decision cannot be of any help in this case.

    15. It was rightly conceded by the learned counsel for the accused that Section 20(1), as it now stands, does not require a special authorisation or an authorisation of any officer by name. It was not disputed that the authorisation, Ext. P-2 in this case, satisfies the requirements of the amended Section. The contention was that Ext. P-2 was issued before the amendment, and that it was, therefore, invalid. In our opinion, this is a wrong way of looking at the matter. What stands in the way of a Court taking cognizance of an offence under the Act is Section 20(1); and what the Court has, therefore, to see is only whether the prosecution has been instituted by any one of the authorities or persons mentioned in the said Section. In this case, the complaint is admittedly by such a person. When was the authorisation given in favour of the complainant, or under what provision of law was it given is not a relevant consideration under the Section. In any view of the matter, the objection raised by the learned counsel to the maintainability of the prosecution cannot stand.

    16. Various other contentions were also raised by the learned counsel for the accused in these cases. One was that the person who analysed the article of food was not a person appointed as a Public Analyst under the Act. The person, who analysed the samples in these cases is one Shri P. Janardana Ayar. Ext. P-2 in Criminal Revision Petition No. 670 of 1966 is a notification dated 28-1-1963 issued by the Government of Kerala, appointing him as a Public Analyst under the Act. This contention has therefore, no substance.

    17. The next contention was that the Government have not declared by notification under Section 2(vii) “local areas” for the purposes of the Act, that a Food Inspector can be appointed under Section 9(1) of the Act only for such local areas as may be assigned to them, and that, therefore, the appointments of the complainants in these cases as Food Inspectors are invalid. This is again a contention which should not have been advanced, in view of the fact that the Government have actually issued a notification No. H.L 5-26137/54.D11 dated 14th July 1955 declaring all Panchayat areas as local areas. This notification is at page 291 of the Statutory Rules and Notifications of Travancore-Cochin, 1955; and it reads:

    “Under Section 2(vii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (Central Act 37 of 1954) Government are pleased to declare the following areas as ‘local areas’ for the purposes of the said Act.

    (1) The area comprised within the City of Trivandrum.

    (2) All Municipal areas.

    (3) All Panchayat areas.”

    18. It was also contended by the learned counsel for the accused that it was not enough that the Article sold is an article of food; but it must have been sold as an article of food. It was submitted that there was evidence in this case that compounded asafoetida can be used as a drug, and that there was no evidence that the sales were made as articles of food. These are all contentions contrary to the clear provisions of the Act. That compounded asafoetida is “food” as defined in Section 2(v) of the Act admits of no doubt; and it was also not disputed. Then the only question is whether the accused sold it, and if they did, they are guilty under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Act, read with Section 7.

    19. Some special contentions were raised by the learned counsel who appeared for the accused in Criminal Revision Petition No. 670 of 1966, after the issue of notice for enhancing their punishment. In the first place, the learned counsel contended that according to the evidence of the Food Inspector, the sample for analysis, and a copy of the memorandum which is to accompany the sample and the specimen impression of the seal, used to seal the packet of the sample were entrusted by him to the Panchayat Officer for being sent to the Public Analyst, that, under the relevant provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder, the Food Inspector was bound to send them direct, and that, therefore, the result of the chemical analysis was inadmissible.

    20. The relevant provisions of the Act are sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 11; and they read:—

    ‘11. Procedure to be followed by Food Inspectors.

    (1) When a Food Inspector takes a sample of food for analysis, he shall —

    (a) give notice in writing then and there of his intention to have it so analysed to the person from whom he has taken the sample;

    (b) except in special cases provided by rules under this Act, separate the samples then and there into three parts and mark and seal or fasten up each part in such a manner as its nature permits;

    (c)(i) deliver one of the parts to the person from whom the sample has been taken; and

    (ii) send another part for analysis to the Public Analyst; and

    (iii) retain the third part dor production in case any legal proceedings are taken or for analysis by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory under sub-section (3) of Section 13, as the case may be.

    (2)……….

    (3) When a sample of any article of food is taken under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Sec. 10, the Food Inspector shall send a sample of it in accordance with the rules prescribed for sampling in the Public Analyst for the local area concerned”.

    21. Rules 14 to 22 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) deal with sealing, fastening and despatch of samples. Rules 17 and 18 read as follows:—

    “17. Containers of samples how to be sent to the Public Analyst — The container of samples for analysis shall be sent to the Public Analyst by registered post or railway parcel or air freight, or by hand in a sealed packet, enclosed together with a memorandum in Form VII in an outer cover addressed to the Public Analyst.

    18. Memorandum and impression of seal to be sent separately by post — A copy of the memorandum and a specimen impression of the seal used to seal the packet shall be sent to the Public Analyst separately by post”

    22. The Food Inspector deposed that he purchased from the second accused 19 packets of compounded misky asafoetida, weighing 600 grams, after giving notice to the seller in Form VI, that he divided it into three parts, put each part into a paper packet, fastened them with labels and affixed seals thereto, and that he gave one part to the second accused, produced the second part in Court, and forwarded the third part to the Public Analyst along with a memo randum in Form VII, and a specimen impression of the seal used. He further stated that he entrusted the part of the sample to be sent to the Public Analyst and the memorandum and the specimen impression of the seal to the Panchayat Officer, who sent them by registered post. Ext. P-8 is the office copy of the memorandum; and Ext P-9 is the report of the Public Analyst. The contention that, unless these things were sent by the Food Inspector direct to the Public Analyst, the whole action taken by him would be vitiated, is rather a desperate one. If his entrustment to Panchayat Officer for sending these things to the Public Analyst is bad, it would be also be if he entrusted them with his peon to go to the Post Office and register them for despatch. In fact, he submitted that it would be so; and that the Food Inspector must himself go to the Post Office and register these things for despatch. We ape really unable to see any substance in these submissions.

    23. After the article is registered, it is handled by the employees of the Postal Department until it is delivered in the office of the Public Analyst. After that, it is handled by the employees in the office of the Public Analyst who may not himself analyse it, but cause it to be analysed. The whole safely in the procedure hes in preparing samples, packing them and sealing them in the presence of the accused and in giving one part of the sample to the accused and sending another part to the Court, so that these two parts can be got analysed subsequently, if the acceptability of the Public Analyst's report is questioned.

    24. The learned counsel also contended that there was no evidence in this case that a sample was sent to the Public Analyst along with the prescribed memorandum and a specimen impression of the seal. This is another contention devoid of any substance. Ext. P-9, the report of the Public Analyst, is in Form III, which is prescribed under the rules. It states, among other things, that the Public Analyst received from the Food Inspector a sample of compounded misky asafoetida marked G. 2/65 for analysis, properly sealed and packed, and that he found the seal intact and unbroken. It is this sample which he analysed. Ext. P-8, the copy of the memorandum in Form VII shows that the serial number of the sample sent for analysis is No. C.2/65. Whether this is part of the sample purchased from the accused can be verified also from the part of the sample produced in the Court and marked as M.O 1, as well as from part of the sample delivered to the second accused. Therefore, Ext. P-9 would clearly prove that it is part of the sample purchased from the second accused that was sent for analysis to the Public Analyst, and which he caused to be analysed. It was conceded by his learned counsel that, under Section 13(5) of the Act, Ext. P-9 can be used as evidence of the facts stated therein, without examining the Public Analyst to prove it. But it was contended that Ext. P-9 stated only that the seal was found intact and unbroken, that it does not state that the Public Analyst compared the specimen impression of the seal with the seal on the packet of the sample, and hence the report cannot be acted upon.

    25. Now it is a well-established proposition of law that official acts would be presumed to have been regularly performed. Rule 7 of the rules prescribes the duties of the Public Analyst; and the rule reads;

    “7. Duties of Public Analyst.—(1) On receipt of a package containing a sample for analysis from Food Inspector or any other person, the Public Analyst or an officer authorised by him shall compare the seal on the container and the outer cover with specimen impression received separately and shall note the condition of the seals thereon.

    (2) The Public Analyst shall cause to be analysed such samples of food as may be ??? to him by the Food Inspector or by any other person under the Act.

    (3) After the analysis has been compiled he shall, forthwith supply to the person concerned a report in Form III of the result of such analysis.”

    26. It will, accordingly, be presumed that a Public Analyst, who caused a sample sent by a Food Inspector to be analysed and furnished a report in Form III, compared the seal on the container and the outer cover with the specimen impression received by him, before the analysis was made. If on comparison he found that the seal was not intact, he would not have caused the sample to be analysed, but he would have returned it to the Food Inspector reporting the matter. Ext. P-9 states that the seal was found intact and unbroken.

    27. It was contended that it does not say that the seal on the container and the outer cover was the same as the specimen impression, and that, therefore, the report was defective. Now the report is in Form III, which is prescribed under Rule 7. It has, therefore, to be read and understood in the light of the provisions contained in the said rule. When the Public Analyst is required by the rule to compare the seal on the container and the outer cover with the specimen impression, and note the condition of the seal thereon, a certification by him that he found the seal intact means that, on comparison, he found the seal on the container and the outer cover untouched and unimpaired. The objection taken to the prescribed form of the Public Analyst's report under Rule 7 of the rules cannot, therefore, be sustained.

    28. Lastly, a contention was raised by the learned counsel that the accused in these cases were protected by Section 18(2) of the Act, which reads as follows:—

    “(2) A vendor shall not be deemed to have committed an offence pertaining to the sale of any adulterated or misbranded article of food if he proves—

    (a) that he purchased the article of food—

    (i) in a case where licence is prescribed for the sale thereof, from a duly licensed manufacturer, distributor, or dealer;

    (ii) in any other case, from any manufacturer, distributor, or dealer,

    with a written warranty in the prescribed form; and

    (b) that the article of food while in his possession was properly stored and that he sold it in the same state as he purchased it.”

    29. For the purposes of invoking the above provision, reliance was placed on Rule 12-A of the rules. This rule reads:

    “Every trader selling an article of food to a vendor shall, if the vendor so requires, deliver to the vendor a warranty, in Form VI-A:

    Provided that no warranty in such form shall be necessary if the label on the article of food for the cash memo delivered by the trader to the vendor in respect of that article contains a warranty certifying that the food contained in the package or container or mentioned in the cash memo is the same in nature, substance and quality as demanded by the vendor.

    Explanation.—The term ‘trader’ shall mean an importer, manufacturer, wholesale dealer or an authorised agent of such importer, manufacturer or wholesale dealer.”

    30. M.O II is the label on the carton in which “compounded misky asafoetida” is sold. It contains the following matter printed:—

    “Foremost Best Quality Compounded Misky Asafoetida.”

    31. It is contended that the above matter amounts to a warranty “that the food contained in the packet is the same in nature, substance and quality as demanded by the vendor” within the meaning of the proviso in Rule 12-A. The argument is hardly statable. The words “Foremost Best Quality” do not indicate anything about “the nature, substance or quality” of the article. As it is, it is a false representation about an adulterated article of food.

    32. It was not disputed before us that, if the prosecution has succeeded to establish the charge against the accused in these cases, they are guilty of the offence under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Act read with Section 7, and that the minimum punishment provided for the said offence is imprisonment for 6 months and a fine of Rs. 1,000. It was however, contended by the learned counsel in Criminal Revision Petition No. 670 of 1966 that this was not a fit case for enhancing the punishment. We are unable to accede to this argument if an inferior Court has imposed a sentence below the minimum prescribed by the law, it is the duty of this Court to correct the error. Otherwise, it is not only that an accused person would escape without adequate punishment, which would cause discrimination between persons found guilty of the same offence, but it would also lead to create a feeling in the subordinate Courts that they can with impunity disregard the statutory provision, and impose a punishment below the minimum prescribed for an offence. We do not know what persuaded the learned Magistrate to disregard the imperative provision contained in Section 16(1) of the Act, and impose on the accused a much lesser penalty than the minimum fixed under that section. In the result, we set aside the acquittal of the accused by the Sessions Court of Trivandrum in Criminal Appeal No. 106 of 1966; and confirm the conviction and the sentence passed against him by the Additional First Class Magistrate, Nedumangad in C.C No. 72 of 1966. We also confirm the conviction of the two accused in C.C No. 18 of 1966 on the file of the Additional First-Class Magistrate, Karunagapally, for the offence under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Act read with Section 7 thereof; and each of the accused in the said case is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months, and also to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000 each, failing which to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of two months each. Accordingly, the notices issued in the Calendar Revision Cases are made absolute, and the Criminal Revision Petition is dismissed.

    TVN/DVC

    33. Orders accordingly.

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    Subbayyan Muthukomaran, v. State Of Kerala And Others,
    (Jan 3, 1968)