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  • For the Appellant: V. K. K. Menon V. Sankara Menon
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  • V.P Gopalan Nambiyar, J.
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  • For the Appellant: V. K. K. Menon V. Sankara Menon
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  • V.P Gopalan Nambiyar, J.
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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Application for Letters of Administration with Will Annexed (Late Maharaja of Cochin)

Factual and Procedural Background

The deceased, the late Maharaja of Cochin Sri Ramavarma (alias Rama Varma Pareekshit Thampuran), died on 12 November 1964. The petitioner is his widow and, under the Hindu Succession Act (by which the deceased was governed), the sole heir. The deceased executed a will dated 3 May 1952 that made two specific bequests (schedules A and B) and named the petitioner as a residuary legatee. The properties covered by the specific bequests were assigned to the respective legatees in 1954 with absolute ownership rights. The petitioner sought Letters of Administration with the will annexed in respect of the deceased's personal assets as identified in Annexure A to an affidavit of valuation.

A Caveat was entered by the present Maharaja of Cochin (the Caveator). The Caveator did not dispute the authenticity or due execution of the will, nor did he deny that the petitioner is the lawful heir or that the petitioner is entitled to administration in respect of properties covered by the will. The Caveator objected to grant of Letters of Administration in respect of the assets listed in Annexure A, contending that many or all of those items formed part of the Palleera Muthalpidi Estate or stanam of the Maharaja (that the deceased had only a life estate and lacked disposing power), or alternatively that the properties vested in a corporation sole attached to the rulership and thus passed intact to the successor.

On 15 January 1968 a list of issues was framed (items 1 to 18). On 30 January 1968 the Caveator filed CMP No. 1140 of 1968 seeking deletion of most issues except Nos. 4, 13 and 17. Counsel for both sides agreed many issues were unnecessary; accordingly Issues 1–3, 5–12, 14–16 and 18 were deleted. Evidence included examination of PW-1 and marking of the will as Ex. P-1. After argument, the court considered applicable authorities and statutory provisions and delivered findings on the remaining issues (4, 13 and 17), with directions for issuance of Letters of Administration subject to payment of fee and furnishing of security.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Are items 1 to 8 in Annexure A assets of the Palleera Muthalpidi Estate belonging to the Maharaja or are these items the private assets of the late Ramavarma (Pareekshit Thampuran) deceased?
  2. Whether the securities mentioned in Annexure A-I, the shares in Annexure A-II and the car in Annexure A-III were acquired by the deceased as private acquisitions with funds belonging to him and/or over which he had powers of disposal?
  3. If the items in Annexure A belonged to the Palleera Muthalpidi Estate, then is the petitioner entitled to Letters of Administration as prayed for?
  4. In respect of what assets, if any, in Annexure A is the petitioner entitled to get Letters of Administration?
  5. Are the funds administered by the Private Secretary to His Highness and any investments made by the Private Secretary in Banks or Securities the private properties of the Maharaja or do they belong to the Palleera Muthalpidi Estate?
  6. Has there been a merger of item No. 7 in Annexure A in the Palleera Muthalpidi Estate as contended by the respondent?
  7. Is the petitioner the sole heir of His Highness Ramavarma (Pareekshit Thampuran) deceased?
  8. Is the Maharaja of Cochin a Ruler as defined in Article 366(22) of the Constitution of India?
  9. Is not the Maharaja or Ruler of Cochin entitled to the personal privilege etc. granted by Article XVI of the Covenant of Integration between the States of Travancore and Cochin?
  10. Is the inheritance to and right of enjoyment of the Palleera Muthalpidi Estate a personal privilege or dignity as envisaged by the Covenant of Integration and guaranteed under Article 362 of the Constitution of India?
  11. Does the letter from the States Ministry dated 13-2-1954 evidence an act of State recognising the nature and incidents of the Palleera Muthalpidi Estate owned by the Ruler of Cochin?
  12. If the Palleera Muthalpidi Estate is held to be Stanam property, then is the respondent entitled to possession and management of the Estate under the provisions of the Kerala Act 28 of 1958? Are not the objections maintainable on that ground?
  13. Whether the objector, not being admittedly interested in the personal assets of the deceased, is entitled to oppose the petitioner?
  14. Whether the Maharaja of Cochin is a corporation sole and whether the Palleera Muthalpidi Estate is attached to such corporation sole?
  15. Whether the Palleera Muthalpidi Estate is Stanam property of the Ruler of Cochin; if so, does the stanam exist after the Hindu Succession Act and can the objector maintain the objection in the form put?
  16. Whether the Nithyachilavu Muthalpidi and the funds administered by the Private Secretary form part of the Palleera Muthalpidi Estate?
  17. What is the proper order as to costs?
  18. Whether the question of the objector’s adverse or paramount title to the assets mentioned in Annexure A to the petition can be gone into in these proceedings?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner is the lawful heir and residuary legatee under the deceased’s will and the Hindu Succession Act; she seeks Letters of Administration with the will annexed for the assets identified in Annexure A.
  • Annexure A properly forms part of the petition: statutory provisions of the Indian Succession Act (sections cited: 276(1)(d), 276(3), 278(1)(d), 278(2)) and section 55 of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 require specification and valuation by affidavit, and Part I of Schedule III provides for the disclosure of assets in Annexure A to the affidavit.
  • It was argued that the Caveator cannot set up a paramount title in these probate/administration proceedings and that a caveator must have some interest in the property of the deceased (reliance on Ss. 283(c) and 284(4) of the Indian Succession Act).
  • The petition alleges that the assets in Annexure A were property of the deceased; that allegation suffices for purposes of the petition and does not require adjudication of title in these proceedings.
  • Some of the assets (for example, Government Securities) require Letters of Administration for interest to be realised; therefore administration is necessary.

Caveator's Arguments

  • The Caveator objected to grant of Letters of Administration in respect of assets in Annexure A, asserting that these belonged to the Palleera Muthalpidi Estate (stanam) of the Maharaja and that the deceased had only a life estate with no disposing power; on death those assets passed intact to the successor (the Caveator).
  • Alternatively, the Caveator contended the Maharaja is a corporation sole and the Palleera Muthalpidi Estate is attached to that corporation sole, so the assets do not belong to the deceased personally.
  • The Caveator argued that the petition was a device to obtain adjudication of title and that it was not appropriate for the testamentary court to decide issues of paramount title in grant proceedings.
  • He objected to the form of the petition and reliance on annexures, relying on sections of the Indian Succession Act (sections 232, 276 and 290 read with Schedule VII) to argue against annexure-based prayers for specific items.
  • The Caveator filed CMP No. 1140 seeking deletion of most issues as unnecessary; however, counsel ultimately agreed that many issues should be deleted.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
I.L.R. 19 Allahabad 458 Principle that testamentary courts should not try issues of title to property being dealt with by a will; such disputes are more appropriately decided in a regular suit (inconvenience, risk of not having proper parties, collusion concerns). The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that adjudication of title is generally inappropriate in probate/administration proceedings and that such disputes should be litigated in a regular suit.
Bai Parvathibai v. Raghunath Lakshman (AIR 1941 Bom. 60) Testamentary court's duty is to ensure due execution of the will and correct representative seeks grant; it is not the duty of the judge to decide title to property; a caveat based solely on alleged lack of disposing power should be dismissed and the caveator can pursue a regular suit for title or injunction/receiver if necessary. The court followed the principle and dismissed the caveat so far as it rested on the ground that the testator lacked disposing power over the Annexure A items; the court held the caveator not entitled to oppose the grant on that basis.
Debendra Prasad Sukul v. Surendra Prasad Sukul (54 Indian Cases 807) Review of High Court practices (Calcutta, Bombay) concerning grants: where petition alleges estate left by deceased, that allegation can suffice for the probate/administration petition without deciding title. The court cited this decision to support that an allegation in the petition that the deceased owned the assets is sufficient for purposes of issuing Letters of Administration and that detailed title examination is unnecessary in these proceedings.
3 C.W.N. 277 (Calcutta decision, Notes) Authority exemplifying the limited scope of inquiry by courts when probate/administration is sought. Referred to as part of the body of authority limiting the scope of enquiry in probate/administration matters and supporting sufficiency of petition allegations.
I.L.R. 23 Bombay 644 Observation by Jenkins, C.J.: a petition that alleges property in the deceased is sufficient and the same limitations on enquiry in probate apply to petitions for Letters of Administration. Used to support the court's conclusion that the petitioner's allegation of property in the deceased is adequate and that extended title adjudication is unnecessary here.
Saivid Abdullah Khan v. Saivid Basharat Hussain (42 Indian Cases 737) Illustrative case where Letters of Administration were refused because counsel agreed a grant was unnecessary. The court distinguished the present facts from this authority, noting the facts in that case (consent of counsel that grant unnecessary) did not apply here.
Prasanna Kumari Debi v. Ram Chandra Singha (17 Indian Cases 155) Grant refused where application was made nearly six years after death and appeared to be a device to obtain decision on contested title; no creditors/debts/estate needing administration. The court distinguished that case from the present one, observing that here administration was necessary (e.g., to realise interest on Government Securities) and there was no similar abuse of process.
Abhiram Das and Executor Jairam v. Gopal Dass (I.L.R. 17 Cal. 48) Authority cited in relation to the limits of contesting title in probate/administration proceedings. Referred to alongside Bai Parvathibai to support dismissal of caveat insofar as it challenged the testator’s disposing power over the Annexure A items.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by first identifying the nature of the petition and the scope of the Caveator's objection (challenge to entitlement to administration over assets listed in Annexure A on the ground that they formed part of stanam/Palleera Muthalpidi Estate or vested in a corporation sole). The court then considered which issues framed were necessary to resolve the petition; both parties agreed many issues were unnecessary and those were deleted, leaving Issues 4, 13 and 17 for determination.

The court analysed the law on the scope of inquiry in testamentary/administration proceedings. It relied on several authorities (including I.L.R. 19 Allahabad 458 and Bai Parvathibai v. Raghunath Lakshman) establishing that courts administering wills or granting letters of administration do not generally adjudicate disputes of title to property; such disputes are more properly decided in a regular suit. The court stressed practical reasons for this approach — uncertainty as to whether all proper parties are before the court and risk of collusion — and noted that a caveator who wishes to challenge title has available remedies in a suit (including interlocutory relief such as injunction or receiver).

Having established that principle, the court turned to the petition itself. The petition had alleged that the assets in Annexure A were property of the deceased. The court held that, following the cited authorities and the practice of the High Courts reviewed in the Debendra Prasad Sukul decision, that allegation is sufficient for the purposes of a petition seeking Letters of Administration. The court also noted statutory provisions (provisions of the Indian Succession Act cited by the petitioner and section 55 of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 along with Part I of Schedule III) requiring specification and valuation of estate assets, and observed that Annexure A was not alien to the scope of the petition.

The court rejected the Caveator's objection that there was no need for administration. It noted that this objection had not been pleaded and that some assets (such as Government Securities) could not be dealt with or yield interest without an administrator. The court distinguished authorities where grants were refused on procedural or abuse grounds (e.g., long delay combined with absence of necessity) from the present case where administration was shown to be necessary.

On the question whether the Caveator, not being interested in the deceased's personal assets, could oppose the grant, the court concluded (relying on Bai Parvathibai and related authority) that a caveator cannot sustain an objection in these proceedings merely by asserting the testator had no disposing power over the assets; such pleas should be resolved in appropriate suits. Consequently the caveat was dismissed to the extent it rested on such grounds.

Holding and Implications

The court recorded its findings on the three issues remaining for determination and gave directions. The core rulings are as follows:

Holding:

  • Issue No. 4: The petitioner is entitled to Letters of Administration in respect of the assets mentioned in Annexure A to the affidavit of valuation. The petition's allegation that those assets were property of the deceased sufficed for the purposes of the petition.
  • Issue No. 13: The Caveator, not being one interested in the personal assets of the deceased, is not entitled to oppose the grant of Letters of Administration to the petitioner. The caveat based on the ground that the testator had no disposing power over the items in Annexure A was dismissed.
  • Issue No. 17: The petitioner's costs shall come out of the estate of the deceased; the Caveator will bear his own costs.

Consequent directions: Letters of Administration (with will annexed as prayed) shall issue to the petitioner upon payment of the requisite court fee and on furnishing security.

Implications: The decision resolves the petition by granting administration in respect of Annexure A assets and dismissing the caveat insofar as it sought to deny the petitioner administration on title grounds. The court did not undertake a substantive adjudication of title to the disputed assets; rather, it applied established authorities to confine the present proceedings to the proper role of a testamentary court. The opinion does not purport to establish a novel legal principle beyond applying existing authorities and the statutory provisions cited.

Show full summary ...

    Madhavi Alias Ammu v. His Highness Sree Rama Varma

    1. This is an application for Letter of Administration with the will annexed in respect of the assets and estate of the late Maharaja of Cochin, Sri Ramavarma, alias Rama Varma Pareekshit Thampuran, who died on the 12th November 1964, at the Hill Palace, Trippunithura, within the jurisdiction of this court. The petitioner is the widow of the deceased. The deceased left no son or daughter or other lineal discendants or mother, and the petitioner is the sole heir of the deceased under the Hindu Succession Act by which he was governed. The deceased executed a will dated 3rd May 1952 under which he made two specific bequests of the properties described in schedules A and B of the will in favour respectively, of the petitioner and the widow of a deceased nephew, who was formerly the Palace Controller. The properties covered by these schedules in the will were later assigned to the legatees under documents dated 8-4-1954 and 29-4-1954 with rights of absolute ownership and immediate enjoyment. The will constituted the petitioner a residuary legatee of all other properties undisposed of by the testator at the time of his death. The personal assets of the deceased in respect of which Letters of Administration have been prayed for, are particularly described in Annexure A of the affidavit of valuation. Letters of Administration are prayed for in respect of this said assets. A Caveat has been entered by the present Maharaja of Cochin. That the petitioner is the lawful heir of the deceased is not denied. That the petitioner is entitled to Letters of Administration with the will annexed in respect of the properties and assets covered by the will, is also not disputed. But on behalf of the Caveator, objection has been raised to the grant of Letters of Administration in respect of the assets mentioned in Annexure A to the affidavit. The Caveator's objection is that these belonged to the Stanam of the late Maharaja of Cochin, that the Maharaja had only a life estate in these assets but no disposing power, and that the Caveator as the successor in stanam of the late Maharaja is entitled to succeed to, and to deal with, these assets which form part of what has been described as the Palleera Muthalpidi Estate. Alternatively it is contended that the Maharaja of Cochin is a corporation sole, that the properties vested in the corporation sole and that the Palleera Muthalpidi Estate of which the assets in Annexure A form but a part is attached to the rulership of Cochin. It has been stated that on the demise of the Maharaja, the Palleera Muthalpidi Estate descended in-tact to the successor. The Caveator has not disputed either the authenticity or the due execution of the will.

    2. The following issues, were framed on 15-1-1968, after perusal of the draft issues submitted by counsel on either side, and after discussion with the counsel

    1. Are items 1 to 8 in Annexure A assets of the Palleera Muthalpidi Estate belonging to the Maharaja of Ruler of Cochin as contended for by the respondent or are these or any of these items the private assets of the late Ramavarma (Pareekshit Thampuran) deceased?

    2. Whether the securities mentioned in Annexure A-I the shares in Annexure A-II and the car in Annexure A-III were acquired by deceased husband of petitioner as his private acquisitions with funds belonging to him and or over which he had powers of disposal?

    3. If the items in Annexure A belonged to the Palleera Muthalpidi estate, then is the petitioner entitled to Letters of Administration as prayed for?

    4. In respect of what all assets, if any, in Annexure A is the petitioner entitled get Letters of Administration?

    5. Are the funds administered by the Private Secretary to His Highness the Maharaja of Cochin and any investments made by the Private Secretary in Banks or Securities the private properties of the Maharaja as contended for by the petitioner or do they belong to the Palleera Muthalpidi Estate as contended for by the respondent?

    6. Has there been a merger of item No. 7 in the Annexure A in the Palleera Muthalpidi Estate as contended for by the respondent?

    7. Is the petitioner the sole heir of his Highness Ramavarma (Pareekshit Thampuran) deceased?

    8. Is the Maharaja of Cochin a Ruler as defined in Article 366(22) of the Constitution of India?

    9. Is not the Maharaja or Ruler of Cochin entitled to the personal privilege etc. granted by Article XVI of the Covenant of Integration between the States of Travancore and Cochin?

    10. Is the inheritance to and right of enjoyment of the Palleera Muthalpidi Estate a personal privilege or dignity as envisaged by the Covenant of Integration and guaranteed under Article 362 of the Constitution of India?

    11. Does the letter from the States Ministry dated 13-2-1954 evidence an act of State recognising the nature and incidents of the Palleera Muthalpidi Estate owned by the Ruler of Cochin?

    12. If the Palleera Muthalpidi Estate is held to be Stanam property, then is not the respondent entitled to possession and management of the Estate under the provisions of the Kerala Act 28 of 1958? Are not the objections maintainable even on that ground?

    13. Whether the objector, not being admittedly interested in the personal assets of the deceased is entitled to the petitioner?

    14. Whether the Maharaja of Cochin is a corporation sole and whether the Palleera Muthalpidi Estate is attached to such corporation sole?

    15. Whether the Palleera Muthalpidi Estate is Stanam property of the Ruler of Cochin. If so does the stanam exist after the Hindu Succession Act and whether the objector can maintain the objection in the form put or ward in the objection.

    16. Whether the Nithyachilavu Muthalpidi and the funds administered by the Private Secretary form part of the Palleera Muthalpidi Estate?

    17. What is the proper order as to costs?

    18. Whether the question of the objector’ adverse or paramount title to the assets mentioned in Annexure A to the petition can be gone into in these proceedings?

    3. On 30-1-1968, CMP. No. 1140 of 1968 was filed by the Caveator praying that all issues except Issues 4, 13 and 17 are unnecessary and may be deleted. Arguments on the above CMP. and on the main petition itself, were then addressed by the counsel. Pw. 1 was examined on the side of the petitioner and the will was marked as Ex. P-1

    4. There was really on controversy between the counsel that the issues sought to be deleted by CMP. No. 1140 of 1953 are unnecessary for the purpose of this petition for Letters of Administration. Counsel for the petitioner and for the Caveator were agreed that these issues should be deleted. Issues 1 to 3, 5 to 12, 14 to 16 and 18 are accordingly deleted and do not therefore call for further consideration.

    5. The Caveator has no objection to grant of Letters of Administration to the petitioner as legal representative of the deceased and in respect of his assets and estate, as on intestacy; nor even to the grant of Letters of Administration with the will annexed, in respect of the properties covered by the will, provided this Court finds, that an administration of the estate is necessary. The objection, as already noticed, is in respect of the grant of Letters of Administration specifically related to assets in Annexure A of the affidavit of the valuation. According to the Caveator the items in Annexure A — or atleast many of them — were part of the Palleera Muthalpidi Estate of the Maharaja of Cochin and the grant of Letters of Administration in respect of them to the petitioner would place the petitioner in a position of vantage and subject the Caveator to a corresponding disadvantage. It was contended that this application for Letters of Administration was a device to obtain an adjudication from this Court in regard to the title of the properties covered by Annexure A, and that it was not the province of this Court in these proceedings to embark on such investigation or to pronounce on the question of title. It was contended again with respect to sections 232, 276 and 290 of the Indian Succession Act read with schedule VII that there was no provision for filing any Annexure to the petition and praying for Letters of Administration in respect of the items' covered by the Annexure.

    6. That it is not usual in these proceedings to decide the question of title in respect of the property dealt with by the will is a proposition that is not disputed. As early as in I.L.R 19 Allahabad 458 it was observed:

    “It has been contended that where an application for probate of a will is contested and it is alleged that the property dealt with by the will was not of the testator or was not property over which the testator had a power of testamentary disposal, it is the duty of the court to try an issue raising this question. All we can say is that it would be exceedingly inconvenient if Courts in this country had to try such issues. A court could never be quite sure that it had got the proper parties before it. It would be difficult always to be sure that there was no collusion in the case. It is much safer in the interests of the public that issues as to the title to property should be decided in a regular suit, and not on an application for a grant of probate”.

    7. Counsel for the petitioner contended that it was not open to the Caveators to set up a title paramount to that of the deceased and that the Caveator should be a person having some interest in the property of the deceased. He relied on Ss. 283 (c) and 284(4) of the Indian Succession Act. The Caveator rejoined that he was neither disqualified to be a Caveator, nor was he setting up any pleas of paramount title. His plea in effect was that the deceased had only a life state but no transmissible proprietorship in the properties mentioned in Annexure A, and that on his death the said properties descended on him. In Bai Parvathibai v. Raghunath Lakshman (AIR. 1941 Bom. 60) Kania J. (as he then was) observed:

    ‘In my opinion a testamentary Court dealing with the question of issuing a grant of probate is concerned to see whether the will is duly executed as required by law by a testator of sound and disposing states of mind. In case of grant of letters of Administration the Court has to see that the person properly entitled to represent the estate of the deceased according to the Succession Act has come to Court and is given the grant. It is no part of the duty of the testamentary Judge to consider the question of title to property S. 211, Succession Act expressly provides that the issue of probate or letters of administration does not vest in the executor or administrator as the case may be, the property which is cliamed to belong to a joint family of which the deceased was a member. In my opinion a caveat cannot be sustained on the mere ground that the property which is attempted to be disposed of by the deceased by the will or in respect of which Letters of Administration are asked for 18 joint family estate. I understand that to be the uniform practice on the testamentary side, and I see no reason to differ from it. In my opinion, this practice is based on sound reason. The caveat in this case which is based on this ground alone therefore dismissed. This is not likely to prejudice in any way the caveator because he has the right to file a suit to establish his title to the property, and if adequate grounds are made out, to obtain the appointment of a receiver or an injunction against the administrator.’

    8. Reference may also be made to the decision of the Patna High Court in Debendra Prasad Sukul v. Surendra Prasad Sukul (54 Indian Cases 807). The decisions of the Calcutta, Bombay and Allahabad High Courts and the practice followed by them in regard to the grant of Letters of Administration were there reviewed. Adverting to the contention raised that before a grant can be made it must be shown in the first place that there is an estate left by the deceased, the learned Judges observed:

    ‘Undoubtedly, this contention is correct but in my view that question must be decided as it has been held by the Calcutta High Court and Bombay High Court upon the allegation made in the petition.’

    9. The Calcutta decision referred to is 3 C.W.N 277 (Notes), and the Bombay decision is I.L.R 23 Bombay 644. In the Bombay case, Jenkins, C.J observed:

    “The petition, however, alleges property in the deceased, and the reasons operating to limit the scope of the enquiry when probate is sought are equally applicable to a petition for Letters of Administration.”

    10. In the present case, the petitioner has, as already noticed, alleged that the assets mentioned in Annexure A to the petition form part of the personal assets of the deceased Following the principle of the above decisions, I hold that this allegation is sufficient for the purpose of this petition.

    11. Petitioner's counsel was also at pains to explain that Annexure A to the petition was not altogether foreign to its scope. He referred to the provision of Ss. 276(1)(d), 276(3), 278(1)(d) and 278(2) of the Indian Succession Act. These enjoin a specification by the assets in respect of which the grant is prayed for. Besides, the petitioner's counsel referred to section 55 of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 and to Part I of Schedule III therein. Under section 55 of the Act an application for the grant of Letters of Administration shall be accompanied by an affidavit of valuation of the estate in the form set forth in Part I of Schedule III. Part I of Schedule II provides for the disclosure of assets in Annexure A to the affidavit. In the light of these provisions, and of the authorities to which my attention has been drawn I do not see any force in the objections raised by the Caveator to the prayer for grant of Letters of Administration in respect of the assets specified in Annexure to the petition. No question of adjudication of title in respect of the assets in Annexure A arises in these proceedings. The Caveator is in no way prejudiced by the grant.

    12. The objection that there is no need for any administration of the estate and therefore no grant of Letters of Administration is called for, is without force. As the petitioner's counsel pointed out, this objection was not pleaded by the Caveator. For the petitioner, it was stated that some of the assets specified in Annexure A are Government Securities and no interest is realisable in respect of them, without the grant of the Letters of Administration. The cases cited by the Caveator's counsel where Letters of Administration were refused, are distinguishable. Saivid Abdullah Khan v. Saivid Basharat Hussain (42 Indian Cases 737) proceeded on agreement by counsel that it was unnecessary to grant Letters of Administration. In Prasanna Kumari Debi v. Ram Chandra Singha (17 Indian Cases 155) the grant was sought for nearly six years after the death of the deceased and the court was satisfied that it was a transparent device to obtain a decision on a contested question of title. Besides there were no creditors to be paid, no debts to be collected, and no estate which stood in need of administration. The position here disclosed is different. In the result I record my findings on issues 4, 13 and 17 which are the only issues arising for determination, as follows:

    Issue No. 4. The petitioner is entitled to Letters of Administration in respect of the assets mentioned in Annexure A to the affidavit of valuation. The petition alleges property in the deceased in respect of those assets and that is sufficient for the purposes of this petition.

    Issue No. 13. The Caveator not being one interested in the personal assets of the deceased, is not entitled to oppose the grant of Letters of Administration to the petitioner. Following the principle of the decision in Bai Parvatibai… v. Raghunath Lakshman…Caveator. (AIR. 1941 Bom. 60) and, as was done in that case, the Caveat which is sought to be sustained on the ground that the testator had no disposing power over the time in Annexure A is dismissed. (See also the decision in Abhiram Das and Executor Jairam v. Gopal Dass (I.L.R 17 Cal. 48).

    Issue No. 17. The petitioner's costs will come out of the estate of the deceased. The Caveator will bear his own costs.

    13. Letters of Administration will issue to the petitioner all prayed for on payment of the requisite court fee and on furnishing security.

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    Madhavi Alias Ammu v. His Highness Sree Rama Varma
    (Apr 3, 1968)