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Advocates
  • For the Appellant: V.R. Venkitakrishnan
  • For the Respondent: 1st K. Narayanan
  • For the Respondent: 2 4
Judges
  • T.C Raghavan, J.
Acts
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
  • For the Appellant: V.R. Venkitakrishnan
  • For the Respondent: 1st K. Narayanan
  • For the Respondent: 2 4
Judges
  • T.C Raghavan, J.
Acts
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Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Karuppan alias Devarajan (hereafter "Devarajan") first married the 1st defendant and executed two mortgages in her favour. Later he married the 8th defendant (daughter of the 7th defendant) and begot the 9th defendant. Devarajan executed a will bequeathing his properties in moieties to the 8th and 9th defendants and the 7th defendant respectively, but a few months later cancelled that will and executed another will in which he bequeathed half his properties to the 8th and 9th defendants and the other half to the plaintiff. Devarajan died a few days after executing the later will.

Subsequent to his death, the plaintiff filed a suit for redemption of the two mortgages in favour of the 1st defendant. Both lower Courts decreed the suit for redemption. The 1st defendant (the appellant) appealed to the High Court and ultimately advanced a second appeal to the court giving this opinion.

Questions considered in the courts included (i) whether the 1st defendant was validly divorced (a question whose consideration the 1st defendant's counsel before the lower appellate Court agreed need not be pursued), (ii) whether Devarajan had the right to dispose of all his properties by will (lower appellate Court held he had that right subject to the 1st defendant's maintenance rights), (iii) whether the contested will (Ex. A-1) was validly attested as required by law, and (iv) whether the appellant was entitled to further value of improvements in the event of redemption.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the will (Ex. A-1) was validly attested in compliance with Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act (i.e., whether the attestation evidence satisfied the statutory requirements).
  2. Whether the Sub-Registrar (who registered the will) and the identifying witnesses at registration can be regarded as attesting witnesses for the purpose of the attestation requirement (in particular, whether the Sub-Registrar could be treated as an attesting witness).
  3. Whether the appellant (1st defendant) is entitled to compensation for improvements, including whether she may press a claim under Act XXIX of 1958 despite not having raised that plea before the lower appellate Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (1st defendant / her counsel)

  • The 1st defendant raised several objections to the plaintiff's suit for redemption (the opinion does not list each objection in detail).
  • Before the lower appellate Court the appellant's counsel appears to have agreed that the question of whether the 1st defendant was validly divorced need not be considered in the case.
  • The appellant contested the validity of the will's attestation — the primary contention at the High Court level being that the lower Courts should not have treated the Sub-Registrar as an attesting witness.
  • The appellant claimed entitlement to value of improvements under Act XXIX of 1958; however, she did not raise that plea in the lower appellate Court.

Plaintiff / Respondent

  • The plaintiff relied on the testimony of the Sub-Registrar (Pw. 1) who deposed that Devarajan acknowledged execution of the will and signed in his presence, that the Sub-Registrar made the registration endorsement and signed in the presence of Devarajan, and that the identifying witnesses signed in the presence of Devarajan and the Sub-Registrar.
  • The plaintiff called Pw. 3 as one attesting witness; however Pw. 3 deposed he did not see Devarajan sign the will and attested the will at the request of the plaintiff after being satisfied that the signature resembled Devarajan's; he did not attest in Devarajan's presence. The plaintiff explained the other attesting witness was not called because that witness was a teacher in a school run by the 1st defendant and was considered unlikely to give fair evidence. The plaintiff also levelled a similar complaint about Pw. 3.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Veerappa Chettiar v. Subrahmany Ayyar, AIR 1929 Mad 1 (FB) Held that signatures of the registering officer and of identifying witnesses affixed to the registration endorsement were sufficient attestation under the Transfer of Property Act. Cited as an example of High Court authority taking the view that registering officers/identifying witnesses can constitute attesting witnesses; used to show a line of authorities favourable to such qualification.
Radha Mohun Dutt v. Nripendra Nath Nandy, AIR 1928 Cal 154 Expressed the same opinion as above regarding registering officer/identifying witnesses as attesting witnesses. Placed among decisions supporting the proposition that registration-endorsement signatures can satisfy attestation requirements.
Thakurdas v. Topandas, AIR 1929 Sind 217 Held that a writer of a mortgage who deposed about executant's admission and the Sub-Registrar who authenticated after acknowledgment were attesting witnesses under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act. Included as part of the line of decisions treating Sub-Registrar/identifying witnesses as attesting witnesses.
Sarada Prasad Tej v. Triguna Charan Ray, AIR 1922 Pat 402 Division Bench held that the Sub-Registrar before whom the testatrix admitted execution of a will was an attesting witness. Cited as supporting the proposition specifically in the context of a will that the Sub-Registrar can be an attesting witness.
Ganpatrao Yadorao v. Nagorao Vinayakrao, AIR 1940 Nag 382 Expressed view that a Sub-Registrar who signed a will after executant's acknowledgment was an attesting witness. Used to demonstrate multiple High Courts taking the view that the Sub-Registrar may be an attesting witness for wills.
Smt. Umrao v. Bakshi Gopal Bux, AIR 1957 Raj 180 Rajasthan High Court held similarly regarding a will (Sub-Registrar qualifying). Cited among authorities endorsing the Sub-Registrar-as-attesting-witness position.
Makhan Mal v. Mst. Pritam Devi, AIR 1961 Punj 411 Punjab High Court Division Bench gave the same opinion regarding a will. Counted in the roster of High Court decisions supporting qualification of the Sub-Registrar as an attesting witness for wills.
Earnest Bento Souza v. Francis Souza, AIR 1958 Cal 440 Calcutta High Court Division Bench reiterated same opinion regarding a will. Also relied upon as part of the view favourable to treating the Sub-Registrar as an attesting witness in wills.
Lachman Singh v. Surendra Bahadur Singha, AIR 1932 All 527 (FB) Full Bench (Allahabad) held that signatures of the Sub-Registrar and identifying witnesses were not sufficient attestation for purposes of the Transfer of Property Act. Presented as principal contrary authority; Mukerji, J.'s reasoning in this case was examined and used as a "clue" to distinguishing documents requiring compulsory registration from wills (which need not be registered).
Thimmavva Dundappa v. Channava Appaya, AIR 1948 Bom 322 Bombay Division Bench held similarly that Sub-Registrar's endorsement and identifying witness signatures at registration could not be regarded as attesting witnesses (in context of Transfer of Property Act). Cited as part of the opposing line of authority which the court considered and distinguished for wills.
Ma Thein Shin v. Ma Ngwe Nu, AIR 1939 Rang. 211 Rangoon High Court held Sub-Registrar and identifying witnesses at registration were not attesting witnesses under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act. Included in the list of authorities taking the contrary view; used to illustrate the division of judicial opinion.
Mt. Chandrani Kuar v. Lala Sheo Nath, AIR 1931 Oudh 146 Chief Court of Oudh held that signatures of the Sub-Registrar or identifying witnesses on registration endorsement could not constitute them as attesting witnesses (case under Transfer of Property Act). Cited among the courts declining to treat registration endorsements as attestation for deeds that require registration.
Shiam Sundar Singh v. Jagannath Singh, AIR 1927 PC 248 (Privy Council) Privy Council: in the facts there, sons signed a will "to express consent only" and were held not to be attesting witnesses. Referred to on the question of intention to attest and to illustrate that some endorsements/signatures may not be given with intent to attest; limited by the opinion to cases where registration is essential or to particular facts.
Surendra Bahadur Singh v. Behari Singly, AIR 1939 PC 117 (Privy Council) Observation that endorsements made at the time of registration are relevant to registration only (applies where registration is an essential requirement). Cited to support the proposition that some Privy Council observations limit the relevance of registration endorsements to cases where registration is mandatory.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first examined the attestation evidence for the contested will against the statutory attestation requirements. Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act requires a will to be attested by two or more witnesses, each of whom has seen the testator sign or affix his mark and who sign in the presence of the testator. Pw. 3 (one attesting witness called by the plaintiff) deposed that he did not see Devarajan sign the will and that he attested at the plaintiff's request after being satisfied that the signature resembled Devarajan's; he did not attest in Devarajan's presence. That evidence did not satisfy Section 63.

The court then turned to the procedural provisions in the Evidence Act: Section 68 requires that where a document is required by law to be attested, at least one attesting witness must be called if available; Section 71 permits proving execution by other evidence if an attesting witness denies or does not recollect execution. In the present case, the statutory requirement of calling at least one attesting witness was met (Pw. 3 was called), but Pw. 3's testimony did not establish compliance with Section 63 and there was no other evidence that the attesting witnesses signed in the presence of Devarajan when he signed or acknowledged the will.

The Sub-Registrar (Pw. 1) deposed that Devarajan acknowledged execution of the will, that he signed in Pw. 1's presence, that Pw. 1 made the registration endorsement and signed in Devarajan's presence, and that the identifying witnesses signed in Devarajan's presence and Pw. 1's presence. The lower Courts had relied on this Sub-Registrar's evidence and treated him as an attesting witness. The primary issue before the court was whether the Sub-Registrar (and identifying witnesses at registration) could be treated as attesting witnesses for the purposes of the attestation requirement.

The court noted a clear division of opinion among High Courts. Some High Courts (Madras, Calcutta, Sind, Patna, Nagpur, Rajasthan, Punjab) had held that the registering officer and identifying witnesses could qualify as attesting witnesses (including in relation to wills). Other High Courts (Allahabad, Bombay, Rangoon and the Chief Court of Oudh) had held they could not, particularly in the context of statutes (like the Transfer of Property Act) where registration is an essential step to complete the document.

The court analyzed the reasoning in the opposing authorities, particularly Mukerji, J.'s exposition in the Allahabad Full Bench (Lachman Singh). Mukerji, J. emphasized the special nature of documents governed by the Transfer of Property Act where three essentials—signature of the executant, attestation by at least two witnesses and registration—are required to make the document complete; if the Sub-Registrar and identifying witnesses were treated as attesting witnesses in such cases, a document could be validated by mere registration even if attestation were absent, producing anomalous results (for example, attestation after registration being treated as proper).

The court accepted the force of that reasoning in the context of documents which are not complete until registration (i.e., Transfer of Property Act documents). But the court distinguished wills: a will is a document which need not be registered for its validity; therefore the anomalous consequences described by Mukerji, J. do not arise in the same way for wills. The court also considered the contention that signatures must be made with the intention to attest, and that Sub-Registrars/identifying witnesses at registration lack such intention. The court observed that this contention may carry weight in cases under the Transfer of Property Act but is not convincing in relation to wills which need not be registered.

Having surveyed the authorities and distinguished documents requiring compulsory registration from wills, the court concluded that where a will is concerned (and provided the Sub-Registrar and identifying witnesses conform to the statutory attestation requirements), the Sub-Registrar may be treated as an attesting witness. Applying this principle to the evidence in the case, the court accepted the Sub-Registrar's testimony that Devarajan acknowledged execution and that the identifying witnesses signed in Devarajan's presence; the Sub-Registrar had been called and had proved the execution. Consequently, the court held the will was properly attested and proved.

On the separate question of the claim for improvements under Act XXIX of 1958, the court noted that the Act came into force in May 1958 while the appeal was pending before the lower appellate Court and that the appellant had not raised that plea there. The court held that because the appellant failed to take the plea before the lower appellate Court, she could not raise it for the first time in the second appeal. Nevertheless the court clarified that the appellant remained entitled to compensation for improvements effected subsequent to the date up to which compensation had been adjudged in the decree and to a re-valuation of improvements already awarded compensation, when necessary with reference to their condition at the time of eviction; specifically, she was entitled to rights under Section 5(3) of Act XXIX of 1958 and could claim them in execution proceedings.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Second appeal dismissed. The court confirmed the decrees of the lower Courts and held that the will (Ex. A-1) was properly attested and proved because the Sub-Registrar qualified as an attesting witness in the context of a will and had been called and had proved execution.

Implications and direct consequences:

  • The decree for redemption made by the lower Courts is confirmed.
  • The contested will is held validly attested and proved on the evidence of the Sub-Registrar; that finding was dispositive of the will-attestation challenge in this appeal.
  • The appellant's plea to claim value of improvements under Act XXIX of 1958 raised for the first time in this second appeal was rejected because it had not been taken before the lower appellate Court. However, the appellant retains rights under Section 5(3) of Act XXIX of 1958 (compensation for later improvements and re-valuation where necessary) and may pursue those rights in execution proceedings.
  • The parties were directed to bear their respective costs in this Court; leave was granted (as recorded in the opinion).

The opinion discusses a division of High Court authority regarding whether Sub-Registrars and identifying witnesses at registration may be attesting witnesses; the court distinguished documents that require registration for validity from wills (which need not be registered) and applied that distinction to hold the Sub-Registrar could qualify as an attesting witness in this will case. The opinion does not state that it is purporting to set a binding new precedent beyond resolving the issues in the appeal before it.

Show full summary ...

    Punnakkal Konnu'S Daughter Arnmu v. Thekkekara Kunhunni'S Son Krishnan And Othere

    1. Karuppan alias Devarajan, the brother of the plaintiff, first married the 1st defendant; and he executed two mortgages in her favour. Subsequent, he married the 8th defendant, the daughter of the 7th defendant, and begot the 9th defendant. He executed a will bequeathing his properties in moieties to the 8th and 9th defendants and the 7th defendant respectively. A few months after he cancelled that will and executed another will, whereby he bequeathed half of his properties to the 8th and 9th defendants and the other half to the plaintiff. A few days thereafter he died; and subsequent to his death, the plaintiff filed the suit for redemption of the two mortgages in favour of the 1st defendant. The 1st defendant raised several objections; but both the lower Courts decreed the suit for redemption. The 1st defendant comes up in second appeal. One of the questions mooted before the lower Courts as well as before me is whether the 1st defendant was validly divorced. Before the lower appellate Court the 1st defendant's counsel appears to have agreed that question need not be considered in this case. Another question raised before the lower Courts is whether Devarajan had the right to dispose of all his properties by will. On that question the lower appellate Court held that Devarajan had the right, subject to the right of maintenance of the 1st defendant, if any. That finding also is not disputed. The remaining questions for adjudication are whether the will, Ex. A-1, is not valid for the reason that it is not properly attested as required by law; and whether the appellant is entitled to further value of improvements, in case she is to be redeemed.

    2. There are two attesting witnesses to the will and the will is also registered. Pw. 3 is one of the attesting witnesses; but he deposes that he did mot see Devarajan sign the will and that he attested the will at the request of the plaintiff on being satisfied that the signature in the will was that of Devarajan and even that he did, not in the presence of Devarajan. Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act provides that a will shall be attested by two or more witnesses, each of whom has seen testator sign or affix his mark to the will; and that each of them shall sign the will in the presence of the testator. The evidence of Pw. 3 does not establish proper attestation as provided in this section. The other attesting witness is not called, because, according to the plaintiff, he is a teacher in a school run by the 1st defendant and therefore he is not likely to give evidence fairly. The complaint against Pw. 3 by the plaintiff is also the same.

    3. Under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, if a document is required by law to be attested, it shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if one is available. In this case that requirement is complied with; and in such a case, Section 71 of the Evidence Act provides that, if the attesting witness denies or does not recollect the execution of the document, its execution may be proved by other evidence. Therefore, if there is other evidence available that the attesting witnesses signed the will in the presence of Devarajan when Devarajan himself signed the will or acknowledged his signature, Section 71 would have been complied with and the will proved. But there is no such evidence. Even the plaintiff as Pw. 2 does not say that he saw the attesting witnesses sign the will in the presence of Devarajan when Devarajan himself signed or acknowledged his signature.

    4. The will, as already stated, has been registered. Pw. 1 is the Sub-Registrar who registered the will at the House of Devarajan. He deposes that Devarajan acknowledged the execution of the will and signed in his presence, whereupon he made the registration endorsement and also signed in the presence of Devarajan. He further says that the identifying witnesses also signed in the presence of Devarajan as well as himself. The lower courts have relied on this evidence and have treated the Sub-Registrar as an attesting witness. The main question argued before me is that the lower Courts should not have done this.

    5. On this question there is difference of opinion among the several High Courts in India. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court held in Veerappa Chettiar v. Subrahmany Ayyar, AIR 1929 Mad 1 (FB) that the signatures of the registering officer and of the identifying witnesses affixed to the registration endorsement were sufficient attestation within the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act. In this decision the learned Judges did not discuss the question in an detail, but merely gave their conclusion. In Radha Mohun Dutt v. Nripendra Nath Nandy, AIR 1928 Cal 154 a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court expressed the same opinion. In Sind also it was held in the Division Bench ruling in Thakurdas v. Topandas, AIR 1929 Sind 217 that the writer of a mortgage document who deposed that after he had written the document the executant admitted the contents of the deed and signed it and the Sub-Registrar who authenticated the mortgage deed after the executant had acknowledged his signature were both attesting witnesses within the meaning of Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act.

    6. In Sarada Prasad Tej v. Triguna Charan Ray*, AIR 1922 Pat 402 a Division Bench of the Patna High Court held that the Sub-Registrar before whom the testatrix admitted the execution of a will was an attesting witness. In Ganpatrao Yadorao v. Nagorao Vinayakrao, AIR 1940 Nag 382 the Nagpur High Court also expressed the view that a Sub-Registrar who signed a will in the presence of the executant after receiving from him an acknowledgment of execution was an attesting witness. The Rajasthan High Court held the same view regarding a will in its Division Bench ruling in Smt. Umrao v. Bakshi Gopal Bux, AIR 1957 Raj 180, The Punjab High Court in its recent Division Bench ruling in Makhan Mal v. Mst. Pritam Devi, AIR 1961 Punj 411 gave the same opinion regarding a will. The Calcutta High Court reiterated the same opinion regarding a will in its recent Division Bench ruling in Earnest Bento Souza v. Francis Souza, AIR 1958 Cal 440.

    7. On the other hand, we have the decisions of the Allahabad, the Bombay and the Rangoon High Courts and the Chief Court of Oudh. In the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Lachman Singh v. Surendra Bahadur Singha, AIR 1932 All 527 (FB) it was held that the signatures in the Sub-Registrar and of the identifying witnesses were not sufficient attestation of a deed for the purposes of the Transfer of Property Act, even assuming that the Sub-Registrar and the identifying witnesses did receive from the executant a personal acknowledgment of his signature or mark and that they did sign in the executant's presence. The Division Bench ruling of the Bombay High Court in Thimmavva Dundappa v. Channava Appaya, AIR 1948 Bom 322 took the same view that the signature made by the Sub-Registrar while he made the endorsement on the document admitting it to registration and the signatures of the identifying witnesses made by them when they identified the executant before the Sub-Registrar could not be regarded as the signatures of attesting witnesses.

    8. The Rangoon High Court also expressed the same opinion in its Division Bench ruling in Ma Thein Shin v. Ma Ngwe Nu, AIR 1939 Rang. 211. The learned Judges held that the Sub-Registrar and the identifying witnesses at registration were not attesting witnesses under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act. And lastly, a Division Bench of the Chief Court of Oudh considered the question in Mt. Chandrani Kuar v. Lala Sheo Nath, AIR 1931 Oudh 146, a case arising under the Transfer of Property Act, and held that the signatures of the Sub-Registrar or the identifying witnesses on the registration endorsement could not constitute them as attesting witnesses.

    9. These are the main decisions cited before me. Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act defines the term “attested”; and Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act provides as to how a will shall be attested. These two provisions are practically the same. After an analysis of the decisions enumerated hereinbefore, what I find is that the Allahabad. Bombay and Rangoon High Courts and the Chief Court of Oudh take the view that the Sub-Registrar and the identifying witnesses at registration are not attesting witnesses under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act; whereas, the other High Courts take the view that the Sub-Registrar and the identifying witnesses are attesting witnesses under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act and also under Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act. In short, there is no decision among the authorities cited above, wherein any High Court has taken the view that the Sub-Registrar and the identifying witnesses are not attesting witnesses under Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act.

    10. In fact, the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Lachman Singh's case, AIR 1932 All 527 (FB) gives, according to me, a clue to the decision of this question. In that decision arising under the Transfer of Property Act Mukerji, J. who spoke for the Court points out some difficulties in accepting the Sub-Registrar and the identifying witnesses as attesting witnesses in a case under the Transfer of Property Act. The learned Judge points out that a sale deed, a mortgage deed, etc., coming under the Transfer of Property Act, becomes complete only if three essentials are there, namely, the signature of the executant, attestation, by at least two witnesses and registration of the document. Otherwise, the document is not complete. In other words, the last of the requirements, namely registration, is essential to make the document complete. Mukherji, J. points out that, in such a case if the Sub-Registrar and identifying witnesses can be treated as attesting witnesses, then a document which under the law has to be attested by at least two attesting witnesses and registered can be validated by mere registration even if it is not attested.

    11. The learned Judge also points out that in a case where the Sub-Registrar knows the executant registers a document which is not attested by any witness at all and the document is attested by another witness subsequent to registration, even then the document would be one properly attested and registered. Lastly a Mukerji, J. again points out the distinction between a document compulsorily registrable and another like a will not required by law to be registered.

    12. In the Bombay case Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) who delivered the judgment of the Court follows the Allahabad ruling. This case also arose under the Transfer of Property Act; and the question whether the Sub-Registrar and the identifying witnesses signed as witnesses or not is material in such a case where registration is compulsory under the law, whereas, that question loses its significance in a case where registration is not essential for the completeness or validity of the document.

    13. In a case coming under the Transfer of Property Act, where a document becomes complete and valid only on registration, the Sub-Registrar and the identifying witnesses at registration may not become attesting witnesses. But in a case where the document is a will which does not require registration, the Sub-Registrar and the identifying witnesses, if they conform to the law regarding attestation, may become attesting witnesses.

    14. I may now revert to the anomaly of the case pointed out by Mukerji, J. of attestation after registration. Suppose a will was executed without any attesting witness and it was also registered. As-suggested by Mukerji, J., the Sub-Registrar knew the executant; and after getting an acknowledgment of his signature, the Sub-Registrar registered? the will. If registration was not an essential condition of the completeness or the validity of the will, why should not the testator obtain another witness-to attest the document even after its registration?

    15. One more contention has to be considered; and that is that the party who puts the signature-must do it with the intention to attest the document and not with any other intention. The argument is that the Sub-Registrar and the identifying witnesses at registration have no such intention when they put their signatures and therefore they cannot be considered as attesting witnesses. In support of this argument some decisions referred to by Gajendragadkar, J. in the Bombay decision have been brought to my notice including the two Privy Council decisions in Shiam Sundar Singh v. Jagannath Singh, AIR 1927 PC 248 and in Surendra Bahadur Singh v. Behari Singly AIR 1939 PC 117. Whatever might be the force of this contention in a case arising under the Transfer of Property Act, I do not think that this can avail in the case of a will, which need not be registered under the law.

    16. In the first of the Privy Council rulings mentioned above, there were attesting witnesses tr the will and the sons of the testator also signed the will “openly and palpably, with the knowledge of all present”, to express consent only; and the Privy Council held that they were not attesting witnesses. The second case arose under the Transfer of Property Act; and the observation of the Privy Council that the endorsements made at the time of registration were relevant to the matter of registration only can apply only to a case where registration is an essential requirement under the law.

    17. In the result, I agree with the lower Courts and hold that the Sub-Registrar in this case is an attesting witness; and since he has been called as a witness and has also proved the execution, the will is properly attested and properly proved.

    18. The next question relates to the claim for improvements by the appellant. She claims that she must be awarded value of improvements under Act XXIX of 1958. This Act came into force in May 1958, when the appeal was still pending before the lower appellate Court; and the appellant did not raise this plea there. Having failed to take the plea before, the lower appellate Court, I do not think she is entitled to have the same raised in second appeal before me. Therefore, I reject this contention. Still, I make it clear that she is entitled to compensation for improvements effected subsequent to the date up to which compensation has been adjudged in the decree and to a re-valuation of the improvements, for which compensation has been so adjudged, when and in so far as such revaluation may be necessary with reference to the condition of the improvements at the time of eviction. I mean, she is entitled to all her rights under Section 5(3) of Act XXIX of 1958 and she may claim them in execution. I confirm the decision of the lower Courts and dismiss the second appeal. I also direct the parties to bear their respective costs in this Court. Leave granted.

    IH/VRB/R.G.D

    19. Appeal dismissed.

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    Punnakkal Konnu'S Daughter Arnmu v. Thekkekara Kunhunni'S Son Krishnan And Othere
    (Jul 23, 1964)