M.S Menon, C.J:— The petitioner in O.P No. 1188 of 1960 is the appellant before us. That petition sought, without success, a writ quashing Ext. P. 3, an order of the Regional Transport Authority, Palghat, granting a stage carriage permit to the 3rd respondent in preference to the appellant, and Ext. P. 4, a judgment of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Ernakulam, affirming the grant to the 3rd respondent.
2. In the evaluation by the Regional Transport Authority the appellant secured four marks and the 3rd respondent four and a half marks.
3. In the appeal before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal the appellant's marks were reduced to three and a half and the 3rd respondent's were maintained at four and a half.
4. The evaluation was in pursuance of the principles embodied in an order of the Government of Madras in the Home Department, G.O.M.S No. 1298 dated 28-4-1956. This Court has already upheld the validity of that G.O in Writ Appeal No. 93 of 1962.
5. According to the appellant mistakes have been made in the allocation of marks. The G.O embodies mere administrative directions and the mistakes alleged, even if they are established, will not attract our jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. In a recent judgment, in Civil Appeal No. 198 of 1962, the Supreme Court said:
“Assuming however that there has been a non-compliance with the provisions of the Government Order it is clear that would not entitle the respondent concerned to a writ of certiorari. In A.I.R 1959 S.C 694 this Court held in respect of a similar Order issued by the State of Madras that it was only an administrative direction and was not a law. A similar view was taken by this court again in A.I.R 1959 S.C 896. In view of these authorities the learned Solicitor-General who appeared for the respondent did not challenge the correctness of the position in law that the G.O No. 1298 dated April 28, 1956 was also a mere administrative direction and consequently any failure by the Regional Transport Authority or by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal would not entitle the respondent to a writ or order quashing the tribunal's order.”
6. The mistakes alleged, even if they are established, will amount only to errors of fact. It is settled law that only errors of law apparent on the face of the record that are amenable to correction under Article 226 of the Constitution; and that errors of fact, however patent on the face of the record, cannot be so corrected. (A.I.R 1961 S.C 970).
7. The broad distinction between a question of fact and a question of law can be stated in the words of the Indian Law Institute publication, Judicial Review through Writ Petitions:
“A question of fact arises when the issue is whether a phenomenon has happened, is happening, or will happen, independent of or anterior to any assertion as to its legal effect; a question of law arises when the issue is what rule is applicable to a particular case. (Page 99).
8. The publication goes on to say:
“A recent commentator has remarked that, in relation to jurisdiction to quash by certiorari in England, it is still too early to define the boundary between law and fact; it may vary with the nature of the subject-matter, and with the court's opinion of the tribunal's expertise.” (Page 100).
9. The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. No costs.