Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Sections 74, 76, and 65(e) of the Indian Evidence Act. Section 74, sub-section (1)
  • Madras Plantations Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1955 (Act V of 1955),
  • provisions of Sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act
  • Section 54(1) and (2) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922,
  • Section 76 of the Indian Evidence Act. Section 76
  • Sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act,
  • Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Central Act I of 1872),
  • Section 54(1) and (2) of the Income Tax Act
  • provisions of the Indian Evidence Act.
  • Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act.
  • provisions in the Indian Evidence Act.
  • Section 54(1) of the Income Tax Act,
  • SECTION 54 INCOME TAX ACT
  • Section 54(1) and (2),
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Sections 74, 76, and 65(e) of the Indian Evidence Act. Section 74, sub-section (1)
  • Madras Plantations Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1955 (Act V of 1955),
  • provisions of Sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act
  • Section 54(1) and (2) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922,
  • Section 76 of the Indian Evidence Act. Section 76
  • Sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act,
  • Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Central Act I of 1872),
  • Section 54(1) and (2) of the Income Tax Act
  • provisions of the Indian Evidence Act.
  • Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act.
  • provisions in the Indian Evidence Act.
  • Section 54(1) of the Income Tax Act,
  • SECTION 54 INCOME TAX ACT
  • Section 54(1) and (2),
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Velu Pillai, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner (plaintiff) brought a suit in the Sub-Court at Tellicherry against the third respondent to recover an alleged loan of Rs. 20,000. The Sub-Court decreed the suit, but on appeal this Court remanded the case for a fresh decision and further evidence.

A principal piece of evidence for the petitioner were entries in two account books whose genuineness had been attacked. To prove genuineness the petitioner sought to show that the books had previously been produced before the Income Tax Officer in assessment proceedings under the Madras Plantations Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1955 (the Act).

The assessment order (Ext. P.1 dated December 31, 1955) did not refer to the account books. The petitioner sent a letter (Ext. P.2 dated April 30, 1956) stating that the books had been produced on November 28, 1955 and asking for revision. After remand the petitioner applied to the Income Tax Officer for copies of certain records (Exts. P.5 and P.7) and for production of records in Court (Ext. P.6). The Income Tax Officer refused by Ext. P.8 (dated July 23, 1959).

The petitioner also sought issuance of a summons from the Sub-Court to the Income Tax Officer to produce the records; the Sub-Court rejected that application by order dated July 21, 1959. That order was challenged in Civil Revision Petition 602 of 1959, heard with O.P. 851 of 1959. The main reliefs sought in O.P. 851 of 1959 were a writ of mandamus compelling the Income Tax Officer to furnish copies and a writ of certiorari to quash Ext. P.8.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, under the confidentiality provisions of the Madras Plantations Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1955 (in pari materia with Section 54 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922), a Court can require an Income Tax Officer to produce or give evidence about records in the assessment file.
  2. Whether the privilege created by that provision is solely the privilege of the assessee (and can be waived by him) or partly a privilege of the Income Tax Officer with respect to documents in which the assessee had no direct part.
  3. Whether records in an income-tax assessment file constitute "public documents" within the meaning of Sections 74, 76 and 65(e) of the Indian Evidence Act, and if so, whether an applicant has a "right to inspect" and obtain certified copies under Section 76.
  4. Whether, in the particular factual context (Exts. P.5, P.6 and P.7), the petitioner had a legal right to inspect and obtain the specific documents he sought.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner sought to prove the genuineness of his account books by showing they had been produced earlier before the Income Tax Officer during assessment proceedings under the Act.
  • He applied to the Income Tax Officer for certified copies of specified records (Exts. P.5 and P.7) and for production of records in Court (Ext. P.6). When pressed at hearing, the petitioner's counsel limited the prayer to the copies described in Ext. P.5.

Third Respondent's Arguments

  • The learned counsel for the third respondent contended that the privilege under Section 54(1) (counterpart to Section 52(1) of the Act) could be regarded as that of the assessee only for documents in the making of which the assessee had a part; for other documents the privilege (to the extent it exists) is of the Income Tax Officer and not of the assessee.
  • It was further urged that certain departmental documents are not self-proving evidence and require examination of the Income Tax Officer; if the Officer cannot be examined because of the statutory bar, such documents cannot be admitted in evidence.
  • The third respondent relied on several English authorities and a passage from Halsbury's Laws of England to support a narrower approach to production and copying of tax records.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Narasimha Rama Rao v. Venkataramayya (A.I.R. 1940 Madras 768) Held that the record of an income-tax case is the record of the acts of the Income-tax Officer and is therefore a public document within Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act. The Court followed Leach C.J.'s view and treated assessment-file records as public documents to support the petitioner's claim to obtain copies of specified records (Ext. P.5).
Somanna v. Subba Rao (A.I.R. 1958 Andhra Pradesh 200) Income-tax returns and annexures of accounts filed before Income-tax authorities are public documents. Used as supporting authority that documents in the assessment file (such as returns and annexures) can be public documents and thus may be copied under the Evidence Act framework.
Naim (Nairn) Singh v. Taikam Singh (A.I.R. 1955 Allahabad 388) An assessee is entitled to obtain copies of assessment orders made in proceedings before the Income-tax Officer. Referred to in support of the proposition that assessment orders and related documents can be regarded as public documents and obtainable by an interested party.
Buchibai v. Nagpur University (A.I.R. 1946 Nagpur 377) Copies of orders passed by the Income-tax Officer and of statements made were admissible. Cited to show instances where administrative records from tax files were held admissible or obtainable as public documents.
Suraj Narain v. Jhabhu Lal (A.I.R. 1944 Allahabad 114) Assessment orders treated as public documents. Relied upon as one of the decisions supporting the public-document character of assessment records.
Venkataramana v. Varahalu (1939 I.T.R. 560) Assessment orders regarded as public documents. Referred to among authorities holding assessment orders to be public documents.
Anwar Ali v. Tafozal Ahmed (A.I.R. 1925 Rangoon 84) Decision holding that issuance of copies of income-tax returns was illegal as contravening Section 54 of the Income-tax Act (a conflicting view). The Court described this decision as discordant and noted it was not followed by the Madras and Allahabad High Courts; it was not adopted for the present case.
Devidatt v. Shriram (A.I.R. 1932 Bombay 291) Held plaintiff not entitled to copies of another's income-tax return and assessment order; held an income-tax return may not be a public document (conflicting view). Not followed by the Court; the decision was distinguished from authorities that treated tax records as public documents.
Promatha Nath v. Nirode Chandra (A.I.R. 1940 Calcutta 187) While an assessee may waive privilege, a joint assessee cannot use particulars in the income-tax file against a co-assessee. Noted as distinguishable; cited for the limited proposition about waiver and co-assessee rights but not relied upon to deny the petitioner's access to his own produced documents.
Queen-Empress v. Arumugam (I.L.R. 20 Madras 189) Quoted regarding the meaning of "right to inspect" under Section 76 of the Evidence Act (per Shephard, J.). Used to frame the inquiry into whether the petitioner had a right to inspect documents (i.e., whether he had an interest necessitating inspection).
Mutter v. Eastern and Midlands Railway Co. (1888 L.R. 38 Ch. D. 92) Observation that when right to inspect and take copies is not expressly conferred, the right depends on the applicant's interest and what is reasonably necessary for protection of that interest. Adopted as an appropriate principle in assessing whether the petitioner had a right to inspect and obtain copies under Section 76.
Chand Charon Dhar v. Boistab Charon Dhar (I.L.R. 51 Calcutta 284) Plaintiff held entitled to inspect a bank's loan register to protect litigation interest. Referred to in support of a broad reading of "right to inspect" where a genuine litigation interest exists.
Muniammal v. The III Additional Income Tax Officer ((1960) 2 M.L.J. 96 at 101) Discusses limits on the sufficiency of interests; also held an assessee entitled to inspect and take copies of the return and documents produced by him. The Court treated the decision as contextually limited but as supportive of the proposition that an assessee may inspect and copy documents he produced; used to justify access in the present case.
Halsbury's Laws of England (15 Halsbury's Laws of England, p. 363, para 651) Passage quoted: where an original document is public, certain kinds of copy may be admissible at common law. The Court observed the passage but found it not directly relevant to deciding the case under Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act; it did not adopt it as determinative.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by setting out the confidentiality provision in the Madras Act, Section 52(1) and (2), and noting that these provisions are identical in substance to Section 54(1) and (2) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922. The Court accepted the settled proposition (and noted it was not contested) that the object of Section 54 is to protect an assessee against disclosure of particulars of his financial position by Income Tax Officers and that a Court cannot require an Income Tax Officer to produce the documents specified in such a provision or to give evidence about them.

On this basis the Court concluded that the petitioner's application to the Sub-Court for production of the documents was incompetent; consequently Civil Revision Petition 602 of 1959 (which challenged the Sub-Court's refusal to issue summons for production) was to be dismissed.

The Court then addressed the third respondent's more nuanced contention: that privilege under Section 54 should be viewed as the assessee's privilege only in respect of documents in the making of which the assessee had a part, while for other departmental records the privilege—if any—was that of the Income Tax Officer. The Court found no textual or decided-law support for this distinction. It reasoned that Section 54 refers to a single privilege in respect of all the listed items, including "any record of an assessment proceeding," and does not contemplate two separate privileges. The Court observed that Section 54 imposes restraint on departmental disclosure rather than conferring a separate officer-specific privilege, and therefore overruled the third respondent's contention.

Turning to the petitioner's substantive right to obtain certified copies, the Court framed the question under Sections 74, 76 and 65(e) of the Indian Evidence Act. It accepted the approach of Leach C.J. in Narasimha Rama Rao v. Venkataramayya that records in an income-tax file are the acts or records of acts of a public officer and hence fall within the category of "public documents" under Section 74. The Court surveyed other authorities which held income-tax returns, annexures, profit-and-loss statements, and assessment orders to be public documents or admissible, and treated conflicting decisions as distinguishable or not followed.

Considering Section 76 (the "right to inspect"), the Court applied the established principle that when the right to inspect is not expressly conferred, it depends on the applicant's interest and what is reasonably necessary for protection of that interest (citing Mutter). The Court interpreted "right to inspect" broadly enough to encompass an assessee who wishes to appeal an assessment or otherwise to protect his legal interests; an interest that is illusory will not suffice, but a genuine litigation interest does.

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court held that the petitioner had a substantial right to inspect the documents specifically described in Ext. P.5. The Court acknowledged that in a proper case the Income Tax Officer might claim privilege under Sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act for some documents (and that some documents in Ext. P.7 could legitimately be so claimed), but found that no such claim applied to the documents listed in Ext. P.5. The petitioner had limited his present prayer to the copies described in Ext. P.5, and the Court found it could pass appropriate directions accordingly.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Original Petition (O.P. 851 of 1959) is allowed in part — mandamus is issued to the Income Tax Officer to furnish specified copies — and Civil Revision Petition 602 of 1959 is dismissed.

The direct orders made by the Court were:

  • Mandamus to the first respondent (the Income Tax Officer) to give the petitioner certified copies of:
    • (i) the authorisation dated November 25, 1955 by the petitioner to his agent Shri Vellodi, as produced before the Agricultural Income Tax Officer on November 28, 1955, together with the endorsement of the Officer; and
    • (ii) the proceedings of the Agricultural Income Tax Officer as recorded in the I diary and in the docket or order sheet on November 17, 1955, November 28, 1955, December 3, 1955, and June 6, 1956.
  • The Original Petition was allowed with costs, including advocate's fee of Rs. 100/-, payable by respondents 2 and 3.
  • Civil Revision Petition 602 of 1959 was dismissed; no costs were awarded in that matter.

Implications: The decision gave the petitioner the specific documentary relief he sought (limited to the items in Ext. P.5) and confirmed that certain records in an assessment file may be treated as public documents obtainable by an interested party under Sections 74 and 76 of the Indian Evidence Act. The Court did not purport to lay down any broader principle beyond the application of the cited authorities to the facts; no general new precedent beyond the conclusions reached in this case is asserted in the opinion.

    Kaderkutty v. Agrl. Income Tax Officer, Tellichery & Others

    Velu Pillai, J.:— The petitioner is the plaintiff in a suit against the third respondent, instituted in the Sub-Court at Tellicherry, to enforce repayment of an alleged loan of Rs. 20,000/-. The suit was decreed by that Court, but on appeal, this Court remanded the case for fresh decision after recording further evidence. One of the principal items of evidence on which the petitioner relies in the suit, is the entry relating to the transaction, in each of his two account books. He sought to establish the genuineness of the account books, which was impeached, by attempting to prove, that they had been produced earlier, before the Income Tax Officer in assessment proceedings against him, under the Madras Plantations Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1955 (Act V of 1955), which may be referred to hereafter as the ‘Act’. There was no reference in the assessment order, Ext. P. 1, dated December 31, 1955, to the account books, but a letter, Ext. P. 2, was addressed by the petitioner on April 30, 1956, to the Income Tax Officer, pointing out, that the account books had been produced by him on November 28, 1955, and praying for a revision of the assessment. After the case was remanded by this Court, the petitioner made two applications, Exts. P. 5 and P. 7, to the Income Tax Officer, requesting, that copies of certain records in the assessment file may be furnished to him, and a third application, Ext. P. 6, that such records may be produced in Court. The Income Tax Officer refused to comply with these requests by Ext. P. 8 dated July 23, 1959. The petitioner had also made an application to the Sub-Court for the issue of summons to the Income Tax Officer to produce the records but this was rejected by order dated July 21, 1959, which is sought to be revised in Civil Revision Petition 602 of 1959, which was also heard along with this petition. The main prayers in O.P 851 of 1959 are for the issue of a writ of mandamus to compel the Income Tax Officer to grant copies and for a writ of certiorari to quash Ext. P. 8.

    2. Section 52(1) and (2) of the Act may be quoted:

    Sec. 52(1): “All particulars contained in any statement made, return furnished or accounts or documents produced, under the provisions of this Act or in any evidence given or affidavit or deposition made in the course of any proceedings under this Act other than proceedings under this Chapter or in any record of an assessment proceeding or any proceeding relating to the recovery of a demand prepared for the purposes of this Act shall be treated as confidential and notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Central Act I of 1872), no Court shall, save as provided in this Act, be entitled to require any public servant to produce before it any such return, accounts, documents or record or any part of such record or to give evidence before it in respect thereof”.

    (2) “If a public servant discloses any particulars contained in any such statement, return, accounts, documents, evidence, affidavit, deposition or record, he shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months and shall also be liable to fine”.

    3. The above provisions are identical with Section 54(1) and (2) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, which may be referred to as the ‘Income Tax Act’, and the law as declared or interpreted under the latter enactment, is helpful in deciding this petition.

    4. It is well-settled under Section 54 of the Income Tax Act, that the object of that provision is to afford protection to the assessee, against disclosure of the particulars of his financial position to his detriment, by Income Tax Officers; it is also well-settled, that a Court cannot require the Income Tax Officer to produce before it, the documents specified in Section 54(1) of the Income Tax Act, or to give evidence in respect of them, whatever be the provisions in the Indian Evidence Act. These propositions were not contested. It must follow from the latter, that the application made by the petitioner to the Sub-Court for the production of the documents was incompetent, and that therefore Civil Revision Petition 602 of 1959 has only to be dismissed.

    5. Though the consensus of judicial opinion is, that the privilege under Section 54(1) and (2) of the Income Tax Act is that of an assessee and can therefore be waived by him, the learned counsel for the third respondent contended, that such privilege can only be, with respect to the documents specified in Section 54(1), in the making of which, the assessee has a part to play, but that, with respect to others with which he is not so directly connected, the privilege, such as it is, is that of the Income Tax Officer and not of the assessee. It was further urged, that documents of the latter description do not constitute evidence by themselves and have to be proved by examining the Income Tax Officer who made them or in whose custody they are, and if, by reason of Section 54(1) he cannot be examined, they cannot go in evidence at all. It may at once be stated, that the learned counsel was not able to point to a single decision which has made this distinction, on the terms of Section 54(1) and (2), between a privilege of the assessee and a privilege of the department. It is accidental that in some of the cases, the documents, copies of which were allowed to be furnished to the assessee, were income-tax returns, or annexures thereto, or profit and loss statements or statements made by the assessee; at the same time, cases are not wanting, in which copies of assessment orders, or other orders passed in proceedings before the Income-tax authorities, have been held to be admissible in evidence, at the instance of assessees. A few of these cases, are: Narasimha Rama Rao v. Venkataramayya (A.I.R 1940 Madras 768), Somanna v. Subba Rao (A.I.R 1958 Andhra Pradesh 200), Nairn Singh v. Taikam Singh (A.I.R 1955 Allahabad 388), Buchibai v. Nagpur University (A.I.R 1946 Nagpur 377), Suraj Narain v. Jhabhu Lal (A.I.R 1944 Allahabad 114) and Venkataramana v. Varahalu (1939 I.T.R 560). On a plain reading of Section 54(1), there is no room for thinking that two privileges, one a privilege of the assessee, and the other a privilege of the Income-tax Officer, are envisaged by it; it refers only to one privilege in respect of all documents, including “any record of an assessment proceeding.” The Income-tax Officer stands in need of no special privilege concerning the “particulars” referred to in Section 54(1), beyond what he can claim and what he is entitled to, under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. Far from conferring a privilege on the Income-tax Officer, Section 54(1) and (2) seems to impose a restraint on him from making disclosures of the contents of the file. The disjunctive word ‘or’ in Section 54(1) which precedes the clause “in any record of an assessment proceeding,” affords no foundation, whatever, to the above contention of the learned counsel. The learned counsel for the third respondent relied on a number of decided cases in England which, however, have no bearing on this ban against disclosure in income-tax proceedings; rather, they bear on the principles of English law, upon which the provisions of Sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act are based and I do not propose to consider them. I over-rule this contention of the third respondent.

    6. The petitioner's right to obtain certain certified copies, has to be adjudged on the terms and provisions of Sections 74, 76, and 65(e) of the Indian Evidence Act. Section 74, sub-section (1) and clauses (ii) and (iii) provide, that “documents forming the acts or records of the acts……..of official bodies and tribunals, and of public officers……..” are public documents. In Narasimha Rama Rao v. Venkataramayya (A.I.R 1940 Madras 768), Leach, C.J, delivering the judgment of the Full Bench held, that:

    “the record of an income-tax case must be regarded as the record of the acts of the Income-tax Officer in making his assessment and therefore any document properly on the record is just as much a public document as the final order of assessment.”

    7. The records specifically concerned in the case were the income-tax return and profit and loss statement furnished by the assessee, which were held to be public documents. In Somanna v. Subba Rao (A.I.R 1958 Andhra Pradesh 200) the income-tax returns and annexures of accounts thereto, were held to be public documents. In Naim Singh v. Taikam Singh (A.I.R 1955 Allahabad 388) an assessee was held entitled to obtain copies of assessment orders made in proceedings held before the Income-tax Officer. In Buchibai v. Nagpur University (A.I.R 1946 Nagpur 377) copies of orders passed by the Officer, and of statements made, were held to be admissible. Assessment orders were held to be public documents in Narasimha Rama Rao v. Venkataramayya, Suraj Narain v. Jhabhu Lal and Venkataramana v. Varahalu (1939 I.T.R 560). The decisions which strike a somewhat discordant note in Anwar Ali v. Tafozal Ahmed (A.I.R 1925 Rangoon 84) and Devidatt v. Shriram (A.I.R 1932 Bombay 291) were not followed by the Madras and Allahabad High Courts, in the case just cited. In the Rangoon case, copies of income-tax returns which were issued, were held to be illegal, as being in contravention of Section 54 of the Income-tax Act. In the Bombay case, the plaintiff was held not entitled to copies of the income-tax return made by another, and of an assessment order made upon a firm; incidentally, an income-tax return was held to be not a public document. Promatha Nath v. Nirode Chandra (A.I.R 1940 Calcutta 187) decided, that while an assessee may waive his privilege, a joint assessee cannot make use of the particulars in the income tax file against a co-assessee. These cases are distinguishable; some of the observations in them, are against the weight of decided cases referred to above. The learned counsel for the third respondent, relied on the following passage in 15 Halsbury's Laws of England, page 363, paragraph 651:

    “Wherever an original document is of a public nature, and would of itself be evidence if produced from proper custody, certain kinds of copy of the document are admissible in evidence at common law”.

    8. I fail to see how this passage has any relevance in deciding a case under Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act. It seems reasonable to hold, following the view taken by Leach, C.J, in the Madras case, that the records in the assessment file constitute public ducuments within the meaning of Section 74, as forming the acts or records of the acts of a public officer or of an official body. The documents specified in Ext. P. 5 of which copies were applied for are therefore public documents.

    9. The right to obtain copies of public documents still depends on the applicant's “right to inspect” them, within the meaning of Section 76 of the Indian Evidence Act. Section 76 does not state, under what circumstances a person would have an “interest for the protection of which it is necessary that liberty to inspect such documents should be given” — per Shephard, J. in Queen-Empress v. Arumugam (I.L.R 20 Madras 189). In Mutter v. Eastern and Midlands Railway Company, (1888 L.R 38) Chancery Division 92, Lindley L.J observed:

    “When the right to inspect and to take a copy is not expressly conferred, the extent of such right depends on the interest which the applicant has in what he wants to copy, and on what is reasonably necessary for the protection of such interest”.

    10. In Chand Charon Dhar v. Boistab Charon Dhar (I.L.R 51 Calcutta 284) the plaintiff was held to have a right to inspect the Loan Register in the Bank of Bengal for the purpose of ascertaining particulars about the conversion of certain promissory notes in order to protect his interest in a litigation. I see no reason to interpret the words ‘right to inspect’ in a restricted or narrow sense, though at the same time, an interest which is illusory is no interest whatever. The observations made in Muniammal v. The III Additional Income Tax Officer ((1960) 2 M.L.J 96 at 101) that

    “an interest in some other matter which would be better served by the inspection of the document would not be sufficient”.

    11. must be understood in the context in which they were made, as to whether when there is dispute between two rival legal representatives of an assessee, the privilege under Section 54 can be waived by any one of them as against the other. The term “right to inspect” did not directly arise for interpretation, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the observations do not constitute a decision on a disputed issue between the parties. If for instance, an assessee wants to prefer an appeal against the assessment, it seems improper to deny him the right to inspect the return, annexures, and statements which he had made, documents he had produced whether he had kept copies of them or not, and also orders passed by the Income Tax Officer from time to time. If so, his “right to inspect” is not to be negatived, on the ground, that his purpose is not to prefer an appeal, but is to safeguard his other interests. The right to inspect under Section 76 is not to be upheld or rejected, depending upon the purpose for which inspection is sought, though the purpose would have a relevance in determining whether the right set up is illusory or not. In Muniammal's case just cited, the assessee was held entitled to inspect and take copies of the return and the documents produced by him. The larger question, whether any one other than an assessee has a right to inspect, does not arise and need not be decided. I therefore hold, that the petitioner has a substantial right to inspect the documents specified in Ext. P. 5. It is needless to point out, that the Income Tax Officer may, in a proper case, claim privilege under Sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, and in the present case, he did and can legitimately claim privilege with respect to some of the documents specified in Ext. P. 7. But no such claim was made or could arise, in the case of the documents specified in Ext. P. 5. The prayer in the petition is for the issue of copies described in Ext. P. 6, but these not being specific, the learned counsel for the petitioner was content, at the close of the hearing, to limit his prayer to that in Ext. P. 5. It is open to this Court to pass appropriate directions.

    12. In the result, mandamus will issue to the first respondent, to give copies to the petitioner, of (i) the authorisation dated November 25, 1955 by the petitioner to his agent, Shri Vellodi, produced before the Agricultural Income Tax Officer on November 28, 1955 together with the endorsement of the Officer, and (ii) the proceedings of the Agricultural Income Tax Officer as recorded in the I diary and in the docket or order sheet, on November 17, 1955, November 28, 1955, December 3, 1955, and June 6, 1956. This Original Petition is allowed in the above terms with costs, including advocate's fee Rs. 100/- payable by respondents 2 and 3. The Civil Revision Petition 602 of 1959 is dismissed; no costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Kaderkutty v. Agrl. Income Tax Officer, Tellichery & Others
    (Aug 16, 1960)