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  • Section 62 of the M.V Act, 1939, hereinafter referred to as the Act
  • provisions of S. 5(7) A of the Income-tax Act, 1922
  • MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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Advocates
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  • Section 62 of the M.V Act, 1939, hereinafter referred to as the Act
  • provisions of S. 5(7) A of the Income-tax Act, 1922
  • MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution by R.K.V. Motors and Timbers (Private) Ltd. (the petitioner), a motor transport company, seeking a writ of certiorari to quash Ext. B, the order dated 31-1-1959 of the first respondent (Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Trivandrum). Ext. B granted a temporary stage carriage permit to the second respondent (Director of State Transport, Kerala State) to operate a route Trivandrum (Cantonment)–Neyyattinkara via Kattakada for four months from 1-2-1959, described as a substitute service for the bus previously operated by Jaya Service (Private) Ltd.

Background facts set out in the opinion: the petitioner had been serving that route for about six or seven years under a stage carriage permit. Jaya Service had also been serving the route until it ceased service a few months before the petition. On 21-1-1959 the petitioner applied to the Regional Transport Authority for a temporary permit for an additional bus; that application was rejected the same day (Ext. A). On 30-1-1959 the second respondent applied for a temporary permit on the ground of a public need for departmental services; Ext. B was thereafter granted to the second respondent. The petitioner contended that the grant under Ext. B was not warranted by Section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and was therefore made without jurisdiction.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the grant of the temporary permit (Ext. B) to the second respondent was supported by the provisions of Section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (i.e., whether a "temporary need" existed that justified the temporary permit).
  2. Whether the petitioner should be precluded from invoking the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Article 226 because an alternative remedy (revision under Section 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act) was available.
  3. Whether the petitioner had, by applying on 21-1-1959 for a temporary permit, submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority and thereby lost the right to challenge Ext. B by writ.
  4. Whether, on the facts, the Regional Transport Authority acted wholly without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or in patent disregard of statutory requirements such as to justify exercise of the High Court's prerogative jurisdiction under Article 226.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The grant of the temporary permit to the second respondent (Ext. B) was not warranted by Section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and therefore was made without jurisdiction.

Respondents' (Government Pleader's) Arguments

  • First objection: If Ext. B was illegal, the petitioner had an alternate remedy under Section 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act by way of revision to the State Transport Authority, and therefore the High Court should ordinarily decline to interfere by writ at this stage.
  • Second objection: By applying on 21-1-1959 for a temporary permit, the petitioner submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority (the first respondent) and cannot now challenge the authority's jurisdiction in respect of Ext. B under Article 226.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in This Opinion
K. Balagangadharan v. Regional Transport Board, Quilon, 1957 Ker LT 1259 : AIR 1958 Kerala 144 Example of a case in which a temporary permit issued by the Regional Transport Authority was quashed. Noted as one of two earlier reported quashings of temporary permits; observed that in those cases the preliminary objection to Article 226 competency was not raised or determined.
Kunju Menon v. Secretary, R.T. Board, Trichur, AIR 19571 Trav-Co. 255 Example of a case in which a temporary permit issued by the Regional Transport Authority was quashed. Noted alongside K. Balagangadharan as an instance of quashing; observed that in those cases no preliminary objection to the petitioner's competency under Article 226 was raised or decided.
New Kerala Bus Transport v. Regional Transport Authority, Cannanore, 1959 Ker LT 405 : AIR 1959 Kerala 398 Illustrated application of the principle that the High Court will ordinarily decline intervention by writ where alternative remedies exist, as applied by T.K. Joseph, J., following Supreme Court authority. Distinguished from the present case: there the preliminary objection (availability of alternative remedy) was upheld; in the present case the court found different facts and held the Ext. B order invalid for other reasons.
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mahammed Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 Laid down limitations on the exercise of High Court's special jurisdiction under Article 226; stressed that writs ordinarily will not be issued where alternate effective remedies exist, but allowed intervention where an inferior body acts wholly without jurisdiction, in excess, or in breach of natural justice. The court applied the principles from this decision to frame when the High Court may properly intervene; used it to assess whether the Regional Transport Authority had acted in patent excess or disregard of the statute so as to justify writ intervention notwithstanding alternative remedies.
Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd., AIR 1952 SC 192 Defined the scope of Article 226: High Court's writs are intended for grave cases where subordinate bodies act wholly without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, in violation of natural justice, refuse to exercise jurisdiction, or where there is an error apparent on the face of the record producing manifest injustice; but Article 226 is not to convert High Court into an appellate court. Quoted and relied upon to emphasize that interference depends on the nature and gravity of the error; used as authority for limiting the High Court's intervention to cases of jurisdictional excess or breach of natural justice rather than re-appraisal of merits.
Jairamdas v. Regional Transport Authority, AIR 1957 Raj 162 Illustrates the procedure for grant of regular (pucca) permits under Section 57 of the Act and the proper procedure for regular permits as distinct from temporary permits. Referred to show that if a regular permit is to be granted, the procedure under Section 57 should be followed; the court noted that the first respondent did not claim to have issued the temporary permit as an interim measure pending a Section 57 procedure, which would have been a different factual situation.
Ponkunnam Erattupetta Motor Service v. R.T.A., Kottayam, 1958 Ker LT 1034 Applied the principle that a party who has submitted to the jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal may be precluded from invoking the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 to challenge that tribunal's order. Relied on by respondents' counsel; the court in the present case distinguished it on its facts and held the submission principle did not bar the petitioner here from seeking relief under Article 226.
Pannalal Binraj v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 397 Support for the proposition that a party who has participated in proceedings and thereby submitted to the jurisdiction of a tribunal may be precluded from later invoking writ jurisdiction to challenge that tribunal's jurisdiction. Was cited as authority relied upon in Ponkunnam; the present court considered the reasoning but distinguished the factual matrix of the present case and did not treat it as a bar to writ relief.
Gandhinagar Motor Transport Society v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 Bom 202 Authority illustrating the preclusion that may arise where a party has omitted to object to the jurisdiction in that tribunal and later seeks relief by writ. Cited in support of the submission-to-jurisdiction principle; the court distinguished the present facts and did not apply the preclusion principle to deny the petitioner relief.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two stages: (A) resolving the preliminary contention that the petitioner should first exhaust other statutory remedies and (B) resolving the distinct contention that the petitioner had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority and was therefore precluded from invoking Article 226.

A. On the question of whether the writ jurisdiction should be exercised despite the existence of alternate remedies, the court accepted and applied the binding principles from the Supreme Court authorities (notably State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mahammed Nooh and Veerappa Pillai). Those authorities establish that although the High Court will ordinarily decline to intervene where equally effective alternative remedies exist, it may nevertheless issue prerogative writs in plain cases where the subordinate authority has acted wholly without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or in a manner violative of natural justice. The court held that those considerations are matters of policy and discretion, but they do not prevent the High Court from intervening where the error is grave or jurisdictional.

B. The court examined the factual record: it discovered from the papers that the permit held by Jaya Service had been cancelled on 21 January. The court observed that cancellation revived a previously existing non-temporary need (i.e., a continuing requirement for transport on the route), and that the second respondent's covering letter and the counter-affidavit of the first respondent indicated a public or local demand rather than a particular, short-lived temporary need.

The court emphasized the statutory limitation in Section 62(c) allowing the grant of temporary permits only in the event of a temporary need. The authority granting such a permit therefore must be able to identify, and be satisfied of, the temporary character of the need. In the present case:

  • The counter-affidavit filed by the first respondent failed to disclose the material fact of the cancellation of the Jaya Service permit and did not explain any particular temporary need justifying Ext. B.
  • The covering letter from the second respondent actually described a continuing public demand (including what was felt by the public and by the local MLA) for departmental services — a description inconsistent with a short-lived, temporary need.
  • The first respondent issued a temporary permit (purportedly under Section 62(c)) despite the absence of any particular temporary need being identified or established; the court concluded the authority did not satisfy itself of a temporary need as required by law.

On this basis the court found that the first respondent had acted in "patent and total disregard of the provisions of the Act" and in excess of his powers. The court therefore held that the first preliminary objection (that an alternate remedy should have been pursued) could not be sustained because the facts disclosed a jurisdictional excess that warranted High Court intervention.

C. On the second preliminary objection (submission to jurisdiction by the petitioner), the court considered the authorities relied upon by respondents (including Ponkunnam Erattupetta Motor Service, Pannalal Binraj and Gandhinagar Motor Transport Society). The court distinguished those cases on their facts: in the Ponkunnam decision a party who had applied and participated in proceedings and where rival claimants were before the authority was held precluded from invoking writ jurisdiction. By contrast, in the present case the petitioner had earlier applied for a temporary permit on 21 January and that application had been rejected by the authority; there was only one proceeding (the application made by the second respondent) of which the petitioner became aware only after the second respondent had commenced services under Ext. B. The petitioner did not thereby surrender the right to challenge an act done in flagrant violation of the statute.

The court therefore concluded that the second ground of preliminary objection was also unsustainable: the petitioner retained locus standi to challenge the grant because the authority's action was in excess of its powers and in flagrant violation of statutory requirements.

D. Having resolved both preliminary objections against the respondents, the court quashed Ext. B as being made in flagrant violation of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and lacking jurisdictional validity.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court quashed Ext. B (the temporary permit dated 31-1-1959) and allowed the petition under Article 226. The opinion records: "The order is hereby quashed. The petition is accordingly allowed. No costs."

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The temporary permit granted to the second respondent by Ext. B was declared void and quashed; the petitioner's challenge succeeded and no costs were awarded.
  • Scope: The court's decision rests on the specific factual finding that the authority issued a temporary permit despite the absence of any particular temporary need and in the face of a revived non-temporary need after cancellation of a prior permit. The court treated the authority's conduct as patent disregard of the statutory provisions governing temporary permits (Section 62).
  • No broader or novel principle of law was asserted as being created by this opinion; the court applied and distinguished existing precedents to the facts at hand. (The opinion does not purport to set a general new precedent beyond its application of established principles governing writ jurisdiction and statutory limits on temporary permits.)

Order concluded in the text: "Petition allowed." (HC/V.R.B.)

    R.K.V Motors And Timbers Ltd. v. Regional Transport Authority, Trivandrum Opposite Party.

    1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution by R.K.V Motors and Timbers (Private) Ltd., a motor transport company, for the issue of a writ of certiorari, quashing the order Ext. B, dated 31-1-1959, passed by the first respondent, who is the Secretary, Regions Transport Authority, Trivandrum, granting a temporary stage carriage permit to the second respondent, the Director of State Transport, Kerala State, for the route Trivandrum (Cantonment)-Neyyattinkara via Kattakada. This route, among others was served by the petitioner for about six or seven years in the past, by providing motor transport under a stage carriage permit held by it. The Jaya Service (Private) Ltd., Neyyattinkara, or shortly the Taya Service, is another motor transport company, who had been similarly serving the same route, under a stage carriage permit held by it till a few months before the date of this petition when it ceased to do so. On 21-1-1959, the petitioner made an application to the first respondent, for the issue to it of a temporary permit for an additional bus to operate the same route, on the ground, that the Jaya Service had defaulted in service; this was rejected on the same day, by the order, copy of which is Ext. A. On 30-1-1959, the second respondent applied to the 1st respondent, for the issue to the department of a temporary permit for one of its buses, on the ground, that there was public need of departmental transport service to operate on the same route. By Ext B, the order sought to be quashed, a temporary permit was granted to the 2nd respondent to operate a service on the route, for a period of four months from 1-2-1959, in substitution of the service operated by the Jaya Service. The petitioner's chief contention is that the grant of a temporary permit to the 2nd respondent, was not warranted by the terms of Section 62 of the M.V Act, 1939, hereinafter referred to as the Act and was therefore wanting in jurisdiction.

    2. The learned Government Pleader, who appeared for both respondents has placed in my hands, the papers in the office of the 1st respondent relating to the issue of the permits. He has raised a two-fold objection to the issue of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution as prayed for; firstly, that if Ext. B was illegal the petitioner had its remedy under S. 64A of the Act, by way of revision to the State Transport Authority and secondly, that by applying on 21-1-1959 for the issue of a temporary permit, the petitioner had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority represented by the 1st respondent, and that it cannot now be heard to contend against it, and impeach Ext. B as lacking in jurisdiction.

    3. Two reported cases decided by this court which were mentioned by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in which temporary permits issued by the Regional Transport Authority were quashed, are K. Balagangadharan… v. Regional Transport Board, Quilon…., 1957, Ker LT 1259 : (AIR 1958 Kerala 144) and Kunju Menon v. Secretary, R.T Board, Trichur, AIR 19571 Trav-Co. 255; but in these no preliminary objection to the competency of the petitioner under Article 226, was raised or determined. The first of the above objections was, however, pointedly raised in New Kerala Bus Transport v. Regional Transport Authority, Cannanore, 1959 Ker LT 405 : (AIR 1959 Kerala 398), and upheld by T.K Joseph, J. following two decisions of the Supreme Court, notably the decision in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mahammed Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86, which has laid down the limitations, to the exercise of this special jurisdiction by the Court.

    4. In deciding the preliminary objection, it has to be taken, that the petitioner has a good and sustainable case on the merits. The case of AIR 1958 SC 86 has decided that though there is no rule that certiorari will lie only where there is no other equally effective remedy provided the requisite grounds exist, it will be, notwithstanding a right of appeal. But ordinarily, the Superior Court will decline to interfere, until the aggrieved party had exhausted his other remedies. But this rule is one of policy, convenience and discretion, rather than a rule of law. Their Lordships observed:

    “If an inferior court or tribunal of first instance acts wholly without jurisdiction or patently in excess of jurisdiction or manifestly conducts the proceedings before it in a manner which is contrary to the rules of natural justice and all accepted rules or procedure, and which offends the superior court's sense of fair play, the superior court may quite properly exercise its power to issue the prerogative writ or certiorari to correct the error of the court or tribunal of first instance, even if an appeal to another inferior court or tribunal was available and recourse was not had to it or if recourse was had to it, it confirmed what ex facie was a nullity for reasons aforementioned.”

    5. The case itself was decided on the ground of a Violation of natural justice in a departmental trial, in which the officer holding the trial offered himself as a witness against the persons put on trial.

    6. The earlier case decided by the Supreme Court on which Joseph J., relied, was Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd., AIR 1952 SC 192, where the scope of Article 226, was defined in these terms:

    “Such writs as are referred to in Article 226 are obviously intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such act, omission, error or excess has resulted in manifest injustice. However extensive the jurisdiction may be, it seems to us that it is not so wide or large as to enable High Court to convert itself into a Court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decisions impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken or the order to be made.”

    7. The need for interference must therefore depend on the nature and gravity of the error committed by the inferior tribunal. Coming to the present case, if the petitioner is able to satisfy the court, that in granting the temporary permit to the 2nd respondent, 1st respondent has acted, not merely erroneously but in patent and total disregard of the provisions of the Act, or in flagrant violation thereof, there is nothing in the dicta of the Supreme Court referred to above, which debars this Court from exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226, on the ground, that the petitioner could have obtained his remedy in some other manner.

    8. It is necessary to see how the first respondent granted the permit. At the hearing of this petition before me, the argument proceeded on the assumption that the permit to the Jaya Service is still in force, and that notwithstanding default committed by it in maintaining the service, it had power to resume the service at any moment this might spell a “temporary need”. But on perusing the papers, which the learned Government Pleader had furnished to me, it is seen, that the permit originally issued to the Jaya Service had been cancelled on the 21st January, and the temporary permit was expressly stated to be “to operate as substitute service” in the place of the bus previously Operated by the Jaya Service.

    9. On the cancellation of the permit which had been issued to the Jaya Service, the need, which it was intended to meet, and which was non-temporary, stood revived. This, without anything more, cannot stand converted into a temporary need. The counter-affidavit of the 1st respondent, while asserting the existence of a temporary need, as supporting the grant of the permit, did not disclose what it is. The covering letter of the 2nd respondent, which accompanied his application for a temporary permit, disclosed temporary need; the need, if it was one, was expressed to be, “what was felt by the public and by the local M.L.A”, for departmental services on the route. Plainly, this was not a temporary need. It is strange, that the counter-affidavit of the 1st respondent did not disclose the material fact that the permit to the Jaya Service had been cancelled, and left this to be glanced from the papers supplied to me.

    10. Notwithstanding the allegation in the covering letter by the second respondent, of a non-temporary need and the revival of a need of that description, consequent on the cancellation of the permit to the Jaya Service, the 1st respondent chose to issue a temporary permit which could be done under S. 62(c) of the Act, only in the event of at temporary need. It was not alleged by the 1st respondent, nor was it contended on his behalf, that) on account of the shortage of the number of buses on the route upon the cancellation of the permit, he thought fit to issue a temporary permit, till a regular permit could be granted, after going through the procedure prescribed by Section 57 of the Act, as in Jairamdas v. Regional Transport Authority, AIR 1957 Raj 162. In AIR 1957 Trav-Co. 255, a temporary permit was issued to be in force for the duration of a stay order, pending an appeal against the grant of a regular pucca permit; yet this court held, it was not a valid issue.

    11. What was achieved by the 1st respondent, was to set at naught the provisions of Section 62 of the Act, and to issue a temporary permit, in the teeth of an allegation of a non-temporary need, without his satisfying himself as to any particular temporary need and without being able, even now to point out, in his counter-affidavit when challenged to do so in these proceedings, what if any, the particular temporary need was. I am, therefore, of the view, that this is a case in which the 1st respondent has acted, in patent and total disregard of the provisions of the Act and in excess of his powers and therefore the first preliminary objection cannot stand. The case of 1959 Ker LT 405 : (AIR 1959 Kerala 398) decided by T.K Joseph, J. was different, as, on the merits of the case, the order sought to be quashed, was found to be perfectly valid and supportable, by reason of an amendment introduced in the Act by the Madras State Government.

    12. It remains to dispose of the second preliminary objection, that the petitioner, by its having made the application of the 21st January, had submitted to the jurisdiction of the 1st respondent. The case relied on in support of this, was Ponkunnam Erattupetta Motor Service v. R.T.A, Kottayam, 1958 Ker LT 1034, decided by Varadaraja Iyengar, J. on the principle, that the jurisdiction under Article 226, cannot be invoked by a party who had submitted to the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal. In Support of this, Varadaraja Iyengar, J. relied on Pannalal Binraj v. Union of India, (S) AIR 1957 SC 397 decided by the Supreme Court, and Gandhinagar Motor Transport Society v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 Bom 202.

    13. In the former, the petitioner-assessee by reason of several antecedent proceedings, in which he had participated, had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer at Delhi, to which the assessment case had been transferred under the provisions of S. 5(7) A of the Income-tax Act, 1922 and afterwards he sought to challenge the validity of the original transfer, on the ground, that S. 5(7) A was ultra vires. In the latter on second appeal against the decision of the State Transport Authority, in the matter of the issue of a permit under the Motor Vehicles Act, Government set aside the order, and the party aggrieved thereby invoked the jurisdiction under Article 226, contending that Government had no jurisdiction to sit in appeal over the decision of the State Transport Authority, Chagla C.J, held, that having omitted in appeal to object to the jurisdiction of the Government the writ jurisdiction under Article 226, which is a special jurisdiction, the limits and conditions of which could be set by the High Court for itself, could not be extended to him.

    14. These are not analogous to the present case. In the case before Varadaraja Iyengar, J. pending an appeal against the issue of a pucca permit, action was instituted for the issue of a temporary permit and rival claimants opposed one another, apparently in the proceeding and one of them who was disappointed, challenged the jurisdiction of the authority before whom he had applied, to issue the permit, by a petition under Article 226; it was held he was precluded from doing so.

    15. The petitioner, here, had made his application for the issue of a temporary permit, on 21st January, to the 1st respondent, who had every authority to issue a temporary permit, in circumstances warranted by law. Though in issuing a temporary permit it is not necessary to conform to Section 57 or the Act, there are matters to be considered by the authority in granting such permit. The first respondent in his counter-affidavit has affirmed, that the petitioner's application was rejected, not because the need was not temporary, but because it suffered from a disqualification that it had not provided adequate transport facilities even on the routes for which it held permits.

    16. The petitioner's present contention is not, that under no circumstances the 1st respondent has jurisdiction, to issue a temporary permit; if, therefore, in the exercise of his jurisdiction the authority disregards or violates the plain provisions of the statute I fail to see how the petitioner, whose locus standi to oppose the grant to the 2nd respondent is not open to question, can be precluded from seeking to quash the grant by a petition under Article 226, if the other conditions are fulfilled. Unlike the case in 1958 Ker LT 1034 here, at the material time, there was only one proceeding, for the issue of a permit to the 2nd respondent of which the petitioner became aware, only after the second responded had commenced to operate a service, pursuant to the grant of a temporary permit to him. I am, therefore, of the view, that the second ground of the preliminary objection too is not sustainable. The reasons discussed above while dealing with the first preliminary objection, are sufficient to hold, that Ext. B order was made in flagrant violation of the provisions of the Act and cannot stand; it is hereby quashed. The petition is accordingly allowed. No costs.

    HC/V.R.B

    17. Petition allowed.

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    Comments

    R.K.V Motors And Timbers Ltd. v. Regional Transport Authority, Trivandrum Opposite Party.
    (Apr 7, 1959)