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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Paripoornan, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This set of connected references (12 cases) arises from assessments under the Wealth-tax Act for the assessment years 1973–1974, 1974–1975 and 1975–1976. The assessees are four brothers — P.I. George, P.I. Mathew, P.I. Issac and P.I. Itoop — each owning an undivided 1/4th interest in a property (old Door No. XXX/597 B to F) on M.G. Road, Cochin. The assessees purchased the land in 1969 for Rs. 1,76,884 and constructed a building in 1972 costing Rs. 2,07,388. Each returned the 1/4th share for wealth-tax purposes at Rs. 96,068 (aggregate return Rs. 3,84,272).

The Wealth-tax Officer, dissatisfied with the return, referred valuation to the Valuation Officer under Section 16(5). The Valuation Officer valued the entire property at Rs. 10,23,140 (capitalisation of net rent at 10 times net annual rent of Rs. 1,02,314), yielding a 1/4th share value of Rs. 2,55,775. The Wealth-tax Officer adopted that valuation and passed an assessment order dated 1-12-1975. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner affirmed this in orders dated 11-8-1976. The assessees appealed to the Appellate Tribunal.

The Appellate Tribunal, considering the appropriateness of methods of valuation, asked the Valuation Officer to undertake valuation by the land-and-building method. The Valuation Officer produced a report (8-5-1979) valuing the property by the land-and-building method at Rs. 7,32,000 (including an addition of Rs. 1,18,980 for potential value of land at second-floor/terrace level). The Appellate Tribunal excluded that addition, rounded the land-and-building value to Rs. 6,00,000, averaged it with the rental-capitalisation value (Rs. 10,23,140) to reach Rs. 8,00,000 as aggregate market value, and after applying a discount for the fact that each share was undivided, fixed each 1/4th share at Rs. 1,75,000. The Revenue filed references under Section 27 of the Wealth-tax Act to the High Court on questions of law extracted from the Tribunal's order(s).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Tribunal was justified in interfering with the figure of Rs. 2,55,775 adopted by the Wealth-tax Officer as the value of each assessee’s undivided 1/4th interest in the property on M.G. Road for assessment year 1973–1974?
  2. If yes to (i), whether the Tribunal was right in directing that an average between the land-and-building method and the rent-capitalisation method should be taken to arrive at the market value of the jointly owned property for assessment year 1973–1974?
  3. If yes to (ii), whether the Tribunal was right in holding that an addition of Rs. 1,18,980 (for value of land at second-floor level) was not warranted when arriving at the land-and-building valuation?
  4. If yes to (ii), whether the Tribunal was justified in discounting the 1/4th value of Rs. 2,00,000 (derived from an average of Rs. 8,00,000) to Rs. 1,75,000 because the share was undivided (as opposed to demarcated)?
  5. For the assessment years 1974–1975 and 1975–1976, whether the Tribunal was justified in affirming the reduction of the building value to Rs. 7,00,000 and consequently reducing the value of each assessee’s share from Rs. 2,55,775 to Rs. 1,75,000?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellees / Assessees' Arguments

  • The valuation based solely on probable yield (rental-capitalisation) does not necessarily reflect the real market value of the property.
  • The value produced by the rental-capitalisation method should be checked against other appropriate methods such as the land-and-building method.
  • The multiplier of 10 used in the capitalisation method was challenged as not necessarily appropriate.

Revenue's Arguments

  • Because the subject property was tenanted, capitalisation of rental (yield method) is the appropriate and only proper method to determine market value on the valuation date.
  • There was no need to adopt other methods of valuation according to the Revenue's submissions before the Tribunal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
J.N. Bose v. C.W.T. (104 I.T.R. 83) Valuation is an art, not an exact science; valuation aims to find market price on valuation date; Commissioners express an estimate of money value based on evidence. Cited to support the proposition that valuation involves objective but inexact judgment and that authorities must base conclusions on available evidence.
Debi Prosad Poddar v. C.W.T. (109 I.T.R. 760) Enumerated principles for valuation: imagine a willing buyer and seller; there is no fixed market for immovable property; valuation requires intelligent guess based on facts and choice among methods depending on property features. Used to articulate specific factors/methods to be considered when determining market value and to support using methods that provide objective reliable data.
C.I.T. v. Vimalaben Bhagwandas Patel (118 I.T.R. 134) Authority emphasising that different methods may be necessary and that multiple recognised methods should be applied and compared where appropriate. Relied upon for the proposition that valuation may require application of several methods and that authorities should collect relevant materials by recognised methods to cross-check results.
Gold Coast Selection Trust Ltd. v. Humphrey (Inspector of Taxes) (1948 AC 459) Quoted (Viscount Simon) for the observation that valuation is an art and mathematical certainty is not demanded; Commissioners must estimate based on evidence. Used to underscore the non-exact nature of valuation and judicial acceptance that valuation decisions are conclusions of fact drawn from evidence.
Rajasekhara v. Chairman, City Improvement Trust Board, Mysore City (AIR 1957 Mys. 20) Listed among authorities dealing with valuation of immovable property in different statutory contexts. Included in the catalogue of cases from which general valuation principles are drawn; the court relied collectively on these authorities to extract general principles.
State of Kerala v. P.P. Hassan Koya (AIR 1968 SC 1201) Listed among authorities concerning valuation principles for immovable property. Relied upon as part of the body of precedent establishing principles about valuation and methods to be considered.
Narayana Gajapatiraju v. Revenue Divisional Officer (AIR 1939 PC 98) Listed as an authority addressing valuation issues. Included among precedents supporting general valuation methodology principles invoked by the court.
T. Kanagasabapathi Pillai v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax (1964) 51 ITR 146 (Mad) Listed among cases dealing with valuation under wealth/income/compensation statutes. Cited as part of the wider set of decisions from which the court distilled valuation principles.
Commissioner of Wealth-tax v. V.C. Ramachandran (60 ITR 102 - Mys.) Listed as a valuation authority. Part of the collection of decisions used to extract valuation principles for the court’s analysis.
Controller of Estate Duty v. Radha Devi Jalan (67 ITR 760 - Cal) Listed among authorities addressing valuation concepts. Included in the list supporting general principles guiding valuation methodology.
C. Krishna Prasad v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax (76 ITR 115 - Mys.) Listed among authorities on valuation. Relied upon collectively for the emerging principles summarized by the court.
Goutham Chand Galada v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax (86 ITR 292 - Mad) Listed as an authority on valuation of immovable property for revenue purposes. Included in the set of precedents the court considered when formulating valuation principles applicable to this case.
Mahmudabad Properties (P.) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax (85 ITR 500 - Cal) Listed among cases relating to valuation methodology under revenue statutes. Used as part of the body of decisions indicating accepted valuation approaches.
Sudesh Chandra Tulwar v. C.I.T. (137 I.T.R. 483) Followed earlier decisions and cited in support of multiple-method approach to valuation. Cited to reinforce the principle that different methods may be used and the choice depends on facts of each case.
Smt. Tribeni Devi v. The Collector, Ranchi ((1972) 1 SCC 480 : AIR 1972 SC 1417) Explained methods to ascertain market value for compensation (opinion of experts; bona fide transactions; capitalization of profits) and that more than one method may be necessary. Relied on as a leading Supreme Court authority establishing that multiple methods may be required to arrive at market value and that potential value must be considered.
Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore v. T. Adinarayan Setty (1959) Suppl 1 SCR 404 : AIR 1959 SC 429 Identified methods for valuation in acquisition context (expert opinion; price paid in bona fide transactions; years' purchase of profits). Cited for the proposition that recognised methods exist and that more than one method may need to be applied to reach a correct estimate.
Rarukutty v. Special Tahsildar (1973 KLT 573) Full Bench view that capitalisation-of-income is only one method and that courts may resort to more than one method; combined application of methods might be necessary. Relied upon locally to support the proposition that courts/authorities may apply multiple valuation methods depending on facts.
State of Kerala v. Chacko (1977 KLT 850) Decision cited to show later approval of the Full Bench approach in Rarukutty. Used to demonstrate local judicial consistency in accepting multi-method valuation approaches.
C.W.T. v. Raghubar Narain Singh (146 I.T.R. 228) Principle that market value is a question of fact but findings based on wrong principles can be reviewed by higher courts. Cited to explain standard of review — Tribunal’s factual finding is final unless wrong principles were applied; here Tribunal applied correct principles.
Commissioner of Succession Duties v. Executer Trustee and Agency Company of South Australia Limited (74 CLR 358) Observation that valuation perspectives differ between compensation cases and revenue cases; revenue cases call for a more conservative estimate. Invoked to underscore that the statutory context (revenue vs compensation) affects the court’s attitude in applying valuation tests.
C.W.T. v. Nagabhushana Setty (156 ITR 484) Cited in relation to recognition of discount for undivided share valuations. Relied upon as authority that a discount for undivided share is recognised in law.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed the dispute primarily by addressing (a) which valuation methods are permissible and appropriate, and (b) whether the Appellate Tribunal applied correct principles and reached a defensible factual valuation.

  1. The court began by restating Section 7(1) of the Wealth-tax Act: value is the price which, in the opinion of the Wealth-tax Officer, the asset would fetch in the open market on the valuation date. The market value standard governs.
  2. The court reviewed and collected established authorities (Supreme Court, High Courts, Full Bench decisions) that explain valuation methodology. From those authorities it distilled that:
    • There is no single fixed market for immovable property; valuation involves an element of intelligent guess grounded in objective factors.
    • Multiple recognised methods exist (comparable sales, rental-capitalisation, land-and-building/contractor’s method, municipal valuations etc.) and the choice of method depends on the property's nature, location, use and available objective data.
    • Where reliable objective data exists for more than one method, it is appropriate to apply and cross-check multiple methods and, in appropriate cases, use more than one method (or an average) to arrive at the market value.
  3. Applying these principles to the present facts, the Tribunal had before it:
    • A rental-capitalisation valuation produced by the Valuation Officer (Rs. 10,23,140 for entire property) based on net rent capitalised at 10 times.
    • A land-and-building valuation produced on the Tribunal's request (Rs. 7,32,000 as per Valuation Officer, which included Rs. 1,18,980 for potential second-floor development).
  4. The Tribunal excluded the Rs. 1,18,980 addition for the terrace/second-floor potential on the factual basis that Ernakulam/Cochin market conditions had not developed to make terrace/open space at second-floor a potential house site — a pure finding of fact which the High Court regarded as open to the Tribunal and not objectionable.
  5. After excluding that addition, the land-and-building value was reduced to Rs. 6,12,847 (rounded to Rs. 6,00,000). The Tribunal averaged the two values (Rs. 6,00,000 and Rs. 10,23,140) to get Rs. 8,00,000 as the market value of the whole property and thus Rs. 2,00,000 per 1/4th share.
  6. The Tribunal then applied a discount because each share was an undivided interest (transferable only as an undivided right), and after considering precedents and practice, fixed each 1/4th undivided share at Rs. 1,75,000.
  7. The High Court reviewed whether the Tribunal had applied correct principles: it held that the Tribunal's approach — to check values produced by one method against other reliable methods and, on these facts, to average rental-capitalisation and land-and-building values — was justified in law, supported by the cited authorities (including Tribeni Devi, Rarukutty, Vimlaben Patel, J.N. Bose and Debi Prosad Poddar).
  8. The court also emphasised that market value is a question of fact and, since the Tribunal as final fact-finding authority applied correct principles and reached a reasoned valuation, the High Court would not disturb the Tribunal’s factual conclusions.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: All questions referred were answered in the affirmative — against the Revenue and in favour of the assessees; the Appellate Tribunal's valuation approach and resulting valuation are upheld.

Direct effects on the parties (as answered by the court):

  • For assessment year 1973–1974 (I.T.R. Nos. 282–285 of 1980) the court held that the Appellate Tribunal was justified in interfering with the Wealth-tax Officer’s figure of Rs. 2,55,775 per 1/4th share, was right to direct averaging between the land-and-building and rental-capitalisation methods, was right to exclude the addition of Rs. 1,18,980 for second-floor potential, and was justified in discounting the averaged 1/4th value to Rs. 1,75,000 on account of the undivided nature of the shares.
  • For assessment years 1974–1975 and 1975–1976 (I.T.R. Nos. 431–438 of 1982) the Appellate Tribunal’s decision to value the building at Rs. 7,00,000 (and thereby fix each 1/4th share at Rs. 1,75,000) was held to be consistent with and governed by the earlier reasoning and therefore upheld.
  • A copy of the judgment will be forwarded to the Tribunal under the seal of the Court, as required by law.

Broader implications: The court reiterated and applied established principles (from Supreme Court and High Court authorities) that more than one recognised valuation method may be applied and cross-checked where appropriate. The opinion does not purport to establish a new rule of law beyond reaffirming the settled approach that objective, reliable data from multiple methods may be used to reach market value; the decision upholds the Tribunal’s fact-based valuation in the statutory (revenue) context.

    Commissioner Of Income Tax v. P.I George & Others

    Paripoornan, J.:— These are 12 connected cases. All these references are at the instance of the Revenue. The matter arise under the Wealth Tax Act for the year 1973–1974, 1974–1975 and 1975–1976. The 4 brothers, P.I George, P.I Mathew P.I Issac, and P.I Itoop, are the assessees. The matter concerns the assessments of these 4 brothers for Wealth-tax for the above three years. That is how 12 references have come up for the three years.

    2. In I.T.R Nos. 282 to 285 of 1980, relating to the assessment year 1973–1974, at the instance of the Revenue, the following 4 common questions of law have been referred for the opinion of this Court:

    “(i) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in interfering with the figure of Rs. 2,55,775 which was adopted by the Wealth-tax Officer as representing the value of undivided ¼th interest of each of the assessee in the immovable property jointly owned by each assessee with three others on M.G Road?

    (ii) If the answer to question No. 1 is in the affirmative, whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in directing that an average between the values assessed by the land and building method and the rent capitalization method should be taken for the arriving at the market value of the jointly owned property for the assessment year 1973–1974?

    (iii) If the answer to question No. (ii) is in the affirmative, whether on the facts and in the circumstance of the case the Tribunal was right in holding that for arriving at the value by the land and building method an addition of Rs. 1,18,980 for value of land “at second floor level” was not warranted?

    (iv) If the answer to question No. (ii) is in the affirmative, whether the Tribunal was justified in discounting the ¼th value of Rs. 2 lakhs arrived at with reference to the average value of Rs. 8 lakhs by the land and building method and the rent capitalisation method to Rs. 1,75,000 for the special feature that the share of each assessee was only an undivided share as contra distinct with a demarcated share in the property in question?

    3. In I.T.R Nos. 431 to 438 of 1982, relating to the assessment years 1974–1975 and 1975–1976, at the instance of the Revenue, the following common question of law has been referred by the Appellate Tribunal for the opinion of this Court:

    “Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is justified in affirming the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, reducing the value of the budding on the M.G Road to Rs. 7 lakhs and consequently reducing the value of share of the assessees in the value of the building from Rs. 2,55,775/- to Rs. 1,75,000/-?”

    4. In the appeals, for the years 1974–1975 and 1975–1976, the Appellate Tribunal by its order dated 21-11-1981, followed its earlier decision rendered for the year 1973–1974. (order dated 30-6-1979). The controversy is regarding the valuation of a building for the purpose of Wealth-tax Act. All the relevant facts and materials are contained in the appellate order dated 30-6-1979. This is the subject matter of I.T.R Nos. 282 to 285 of 1980. The four brothers, P.I George, P.I Mathew, P.I Issac and P.I Itoop, jointly owned the property bearing old Door No. XXX/597 B to F, M.G Road, Cochin Corporation. Each of the assessees had an undivided ¼th interest in the said property. The common issue, for all these 12 cases, is regarding the valuation of ¼th interest of each assessee for Wealth - tax purposes in the aforesaid property as on the valuation date. The earliest valuation date relevant for the year 1973–1974 is 31-3-1973. The assessees purchased the land in 1969 for a sum of Rs. 1,76,884/-. A building was put up in 1972 at a cost of Rs. 2,07,388/-. The entire value of the, property was returned as Rs. 3,84,272 and eventually each brother returned the ¼th share at Rs. 96,068/-. It does not appear that the purchase value as also the cost of constructions of the building was ever questioned. The Wealth-tax Officer was not satisfied with the value of the property as returned. He referred the matter to the Valuation Officer who passed an order under Section 16(5) of the Act dated 3-10-1974. The entire property was valued at Rs. 10,23,140/- and the share of each brother was worked out of Rs. 2,55,775/-. The annual rental value of the property was Rs. 1,51,080/- and after deductions for property tax, ground rent, repairs etc., the net rent was fixed at Rs. 1,02,314 and by capitalising the same by 10 tames, the value was arrived at Rs. 10,23,140/-. The assesees objected to this valuation. Even so, the Wealth-tax Officer adopted the valuation made by the Valuation Officer and passed an order of assessment dated 1-12-1975. This was affirmed in the appeals, by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, by orders dated 11-8-1976. The assessees appealed to the Appellate Tribunal. It was contended that the valuation based solely on the probable yield would not reflect the real value of the property. It was contended that the value reflected by the rental capitalisation method should be checked up by other appropriate methods such as the land and building method etc. The multiplier of 10 adopted was also challenged. On behalf of the Revenue, it was submitted that since the instant property was a tenanted one, the capitalisation of rental method adopted is the only appropriate method to arrive at the value of the asset as on the valuation date. There was no question of adopting any other method of valuation. The Appellate Tribunal considered it necessary to arrive at a proper conclusion in the case to have the value of the building determined by the land and building method also. The Valuation Officer, who was present at the hearing before the Tribunal on 30-4-1979, was requested to make such a valuation. He did so. The report so submitted by the Valuation Officer is dated 8-5-1979. He took the value of the land at Rs. 15,000/- percent. So valued, the value of 17.85 cents will come to Rs. 2,67,750/-. The rate of construction of Rs. 265 per Sq.m was taken and additions were made for extra items of work. Besides the above, the Valuation Officer made an addition of Rs. 1,18,980/- towards the concept of value of land at second - floor level. Finally, the Valuation Officer fixed the value, on the basis of land and building method, at Rs. 7,32,000/-. The Tribunal heard the Valuation Officer as also the assessees counsel. It held that the addition of Rs. 1,18,980/- for the vacant land available for future construction at second floor level is a new concept and there is no scope for making an addition of Rs. 1,18,980 aforesaid. So deducting the above figure from Rs. 7,32,000/- the Appellate Tribunal found that on the basis of land and building method, as per the Valuation Report, the valuation will be at Rs. 6,12,847/- which was rounded to Rs. 6 lakhs. The Tribunal opined that under Section 7(1) of the Wealth-tax Act, the value of an asset has to be estimated to be the “price which in the opinion of the Wealth-tax Officer it would, fetch if sold in the open market”, on the valuation date. After referring to the principles laid down in the judicial decisions reported in J.N Bose v. C.W.T (104 I.T.R 83), Debi Prosad Poddar v. C.W.T (109 ITR 760) and C.I.T v. Vimalaben Bhagwandas Pctel (118 I.T.R 134), the Tribunal took the view: (a) that there are three different modes and approaches to find out the market value of a property like (i) comparable sales method, (ii) rental method of valuation and (iii) land and building method; and (b) that it is essential, as far as possible, to check the valuation arrived at by one method with that thrown up by another method provided both methods are based on objective reliable data and neither method is to be ruled out on the ground of its being inapplicable for any particular reason. The Tribunal proceeded to state further, that while capitalisation of rental is certainly an appropriate method, it cannot be said to be the only method which is to be applied. On the facts of the case, the Tribunal held that a proper value which takes into consideration the inherent value of the property as well as the value with reference to rental would be obtained by averaging the two values, i.e by the rental method and the land and building method. In this perspective, the Tribunal held that the value by the land and building method comes to Rs. 6 lakhs and value by capitalisation method is Rs. 10,23,140/-. The aggregate of the two values would work out to Rs. 16,23,140/- and the average value works out to Rs. 8 lakhs. So considered the value of each undivided share would be Rs. 2 lakhs. It cannot be forgotten that the building is one which is jointly owned and what is transferable in each case is the undivided right of ownership and therefore a discount has to be given for that aspect. Though there are cases in which the valuers had given a discount of 20% for the undivided share of the property, the Tribunal on the facts of this case, held that though the value of each undivided share would be Rs. 2 lakhs, taking into consideration the fact that a discount is called for, the value of each undivided share would be fixed at Rs. 1,75,000/-. The value returned by each assessee, regarding his ¼th share, was Rs. 96,068/-, the estimate made by the Wealth-tax Officer was Rs. 2,55,775/- and the value fixed for each sharer by the Appellate Tribunal was Rs. 1,75,000/-. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision of the Appellate Tribunal, the Revenue filed applications under Section 27 of the Wealth-tax Act, wherein the questions of law extracted herein above (Para 2) have been referred for the opinion of this court.

    5. We heard counsel for the Revenue, Mr. P.K.R Menon, as also counsel for the assessees: Mr. V. Rama Shenoi. Under Section 7 of the Wealth Tax Act, the value of any asset shall be estimated to benne price which in the opinion of the Wealth-tax Officer it would fetch if sold in the open market on the valuation date. It is the market value of the asset, as on the valuation date, that should govern the issue. It is the price which a willing vendor might reasonably expect from a willing purchaser. Decisions of courts have explained the principles to be borne in mind in finding out the market price of the property for the purpose of Section 7 of the Wealth Tax Act. In J.N Bose v. C.W.T (104 ITR 83), delivering the judgment of the Bench Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. stated as follows:

    “The purpose of valuation of a property of this nature under the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, is to find out the market price likely to be fetched on the valuation date in respect of the properly by a hypothetical and willing purchaser in respect of a willing seller. The problem is not capable of easy solution.

    “Valuation is an art, not an exact science. Mathematical certainty is not demanded, nor indeed is it possible. It is for the Commissioners to express in the money value attributed by them to the asset their estimate, and this is a conclusion of fact to be drawn from the evidence before them.” - said Viscount Simon in the case of Gold Coast Selection Trust Ltd. v. Humphrey (Inspector of Taxes) (1948 AC 459). The problem of valuation of the immovable property has been dealt with under the Land Acquisition Act Wealth-tax Act and in computing the capital gains under the Income-tax Acts in various judicial decisions. We may mention the decisions in the cases of Rajasekhara v. Chairman City Improvement Trust Board, Mysore City (AIR 1957 Mys. 20), State Of Kerala v. P.P.Hassan Koya (AIR 1968 SC 1201), Narayana Gajapatiraju v. Revenue Divisional Officer (AIR 1939 PC 98), T. Kanagasabapathi Pillai v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax, (1964) 51 ITR 146 (Mad), Commissioner of Wealth-tax v. V.C Ramachandran (60 ITR 102 - Mys.), Controller of Estate Duty v. Radha Devi Jalan (67 ITR 760 - Cal), C. Krishna Prasad v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax (76 ITR 115 - Mys.). Goutham Chand Galada v. Commissioner of Wealth - tax (86 ITR 292 - Mad) and Mahmudabad Properties (P.) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income - tax- (85 ITR 500 Cal) From the said decisions the following principles emerge:

    (a) In respect of immovable property there is no fixed market, such as market for share, or for other commodities like sugar, cloth, etc.

    (b) There must be certain amount of guess - but the guess must be an intelligent one based on certain objective factors which have a rational nexus with the valuation.

    (c) There are different methods — and which one would be suitable for a particular property must depend upon the particular features of the property; of these methods the one should be preferred which can provide more objective data for reliance.”

    6. In a later case, delivering the judgment of the Beach, in Debi Prosad Poddar v. C.W.T (109 ITR 760) at page 773 the same learned judge stated the principles in the following terms:

    “………..(1) Attempt must be made to find out the price which the immovable property would fetch on the valuation date imagining a willing buyer to purchase the property from a willing seller in respect of the property;

    (2) In respect of the immovable property there is no fixed market such as market for shares or for other commodities, like sugar, cloth, etc. In order to arrive at a valuation in respect of the property there must necessarily be certain element of guess. But the guess must be based on certain facts and according to certain principles which would be, in the facts and circumstances of each case, as fair as possible to the revenue as well as to the assessee in trying to imagine reasonably and intelligently the price which was expected to be fetched if it was possible to sell the property in question on the relevant valuation date.

    (3) Such a determination, therefore, involves adopting certain, methods in determining the valuation and there are different kinds of methods, as mentioned in the circulars of the Board and the principles enunciated in the several decisions of the court as noticed before.

    (4) Which one of the various methods would be suitable for a particular case must depend upon the nature of the property, the location of the property, the purpose for which the property is used and several other objective facts, viz., the time when the valuation is made, the prospect of buying and selling in respect of the property at the relevant time and also special features in respect of the property, if there be any. Taking all these factors into consideration it is, therefore, necessary to determine which one of the various methods will be most suitable to reach as accurate as possible guess as to the valuation on the valuation date.

    (5) Another factor that has to be borne in mind is that such a method should be preferred which has more objective ??? data to rely upon than mere subjective opinions. For instance, if there are more objective data to work out in respect of one method more reliable than another, then that method for a particular land should be preferred. If, however, there is any objective reliable evidence of any transaction of sale of the land or property similar in quality or of the same type and in approximately same time then that would, however, provide more reliable method to follow.”

    7. The above two decisions were followed in a later decision reported in Sudesh Chandra Tulwar v. C.I.T (137 I.T.R 483 at pp. 488 and 489) These decisions were cited with approval by the Gujarat High Court in C.I.T v. Vimlaben Bhagwandas Patel (118 I.T.R 134 at p. 191). But the learned Judge of the Gujarat High Court went further and held that since there are different methods and approaches to find out the market value of a property, and there is really a problem in the application of these methods to the facts of a particular case and the choice as to which of the method should be preferred is really difficult, the competent authority shall collect all the relevant materials and evidence by applying the well-known and recognised methods, i.e land and building method, contractor's method, rental or yield basis method and comparable sales method, and work out each estimation of the market value on application of all. The four methods, and for purposes of counter-check compare it with the municipal valuation for ratable purposes wherever it is possible, since it cannot be said with certainty that preference of one method to another should be a real and in arriving at the real estimation. After referring to the relevant decisions of the Supreme Court and English decisions, the court took the view that it may be necessary to take even two or all of those methods into account in appropriate cases in order to accurately determine the market value. In Smt. Tribeni Devi v. The Collector Ranchi (A.I.R 1972 1417), the Supreme Court stated the proposition thus:

    “……….. The compensation payable to the owner of the land is the market value which is determined by reference to the price which a seller might reasonably expect to obtain from a willing purchaser, but as this may not be possible to ascertain with any amount of precision, the authority charged with the duty to award compensation is bound to make an estimate judged by an objective standard. The land acquired has, therefore, to be valued not only with reference to its condition at the time of the declaration under Section 4 of the Act but its potential value also must be taken into account. The sale-deeds of the lands situated in the vicinity and the comparable benefits and advantages which they have, furnish a rough and ready method of computing the market value. This, however, is not the only method. The rent which an owner was actually receiving at the relevant point of time or the rent which the neighboring lands of similar nature are fetching can be taken into account by capitalising the rent which according to the present prevailing rate of interest is 20 times the annual rent. But this also is not a conclusive method. This Court had in Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore v. T. Adinarayan Setty, (1959) Suppl 1 SCR 404 : (AIR 1959 SC 429) indicated at page 412 the methods of valuation to be adopted in ascertaining the market value of the land on the date of the notification under Section 4(1) which are: (i) opinion of experts, (ii) the price paid within a reasonable time in bona fide transactions of purchase of the lands acquired or, the lands adjacent to the lands acquired and possessing similar advantages; and (iil) a number of years' purchase of the actual or immediately prospective profits of the lands acquired. These methods, however, do not preclude the Court from taking any other special circumstances into considerate on, the requirement being always to arrive as near as possible at an estimate of the market value. In arriving at a reasonable correct market value, it may be necessary to take even two or all of those methods into acquit in as much as the exact valuation is not always possible as no two lands may be the same either in respect of the situation or the extent or the potentiality nor is it possible in all cases to have reliable material from which that valuation can be accurately determined.”

    8. The matter came up for consideration before the Full Bench of this Court in Rarukutty v. Special Tahsildar (1973 KLT 573). Issac, J. took the view that the market value of the land with buildings depends on a variety of circumstances, and that the method of capitalisation of income is ‘only a’ method which maybe resorted to in appropriate cases. The learned Judge further held that there is no hard and fast rule that can be applied for deter mining the market value of a properly and the court can take into account, in a suitable and appropriate case, more than one method. (Pages 577 to 580). Subramonian Poti, J. was also of the view and said that in some cases it may even be necessary to keep in view more than one method and even a combined application of these methods may be necessary to determine the real value. (Pages 583 and 584). Viswanatha Iyer, J. also took the same view and held that the court may have to resort to more than one method in arriving at the market value of the land and a correct estimate should be arrived at. (Page 586). The above Full Bench decision was cited with approval in a later decision of this Court in State of Kerala v. Chacko (1977 KLT 850).

    9. From a review of the above decisions and particularly the decision of the Supreme Court in Tribeni Devi v. Collector Ranchi ((1972) 1 SCC 480 : AIR 1972 SC 1417), Vimlaben Bhagwandas Patel's case (118 ITR 134 Gujarat) and Rarukutty v. Special Tahsildar (1973 KLT 573), it cannot be doubted that in fixing or estimating the correct market value of an asset, though there are different methods and approaches, the problem being difficult and a choice as to which of the method should be preferred, raises imponderables, it maybe necessary to take even two or all those methods into account and determine the market value. It is fairly clear that these decisions establish that to insist on finding out the market value by applying only one particular method would not give the correct estimation of the fair market value of a property. This principle seems to be well settled in view of the decision in Tribeni Devi's case ((1972) 1 SCC 480 : AIR 1972 SC 1417), the decision of the Full Bench in Rarukutty's case (1973 KLT 573) and the decision of the Gujarat High Court reported in Vimlaben Bhagwandas Patel's case (118 ITR 134). So, the principle adopted and followed by the Appellate Tribunal, that it is essential, as far as possible, to check the valuation arrived at by one method with that thrown up by another method provided both methods are based on objective reliable data and neither method is to be ruled out on the ground of its being inapplicable for any particular reason, is justified in law. We are satisfied that the approach of the Appellate Tribunal in finding out the value of the asset by taking into account more than one method is proper. Fixing the market value by taking into consideration the inherent value of the property as well as the value With reference to rental, obtained by averaging the two values, i.e by the rental method and the land and building method, is justified and is not open to any objection.

    10. If the principle of valuation adopted by the Appellate Tribunal is not open to any objection, the only further question that arises is whether the value of the asset, as fixed by the Tribunal, is open to any objection. As stated by the Supreme Court in C.W.T v. Raghubar Narain Sginh (146 I.T.R 228), the market value of an asset would be a question of fact, but if the Tribunal has arrived at the conclusion by taking wrong principles into consideration, then such a finding would not be binding on the High Court. We have already held that the principles borne in mind by the Appellate Tribunal in fixing the value of the asset is justified in law. On that basis, the Tribunal held that the value of the assets on the basis of the rental method (capitalisation) is Rs. 10,23,140/-. On the other hand, the value by the land and building method comes to Rs. 6 lakhs. The Tribunal worked out the average value at Rs. 8 lakhs. Since the value to be computed in the instant case is an undivided share, it called for an allowance of discount. Though the value of each undivided share was arrived at Rs. 2 lakhs, after giving the discount, the Tribunal fixed the value at Rs. 1,75,000/-. The fixation of Rs. 1,75,000/- as the value of each undivided share is perfectly justified. The fixation of market value is a question of fact, arrived at by the Appellate Tribunal, by applying the correct principles of law. The market value of each undivided share, fixed by the Appellate Tribunal, is correct and cannot be called in question. In this connection, we should stress one important aspect in fixing the market value of a property. It is settled law that the market value or the market price is one which a willing vendor might reasonably expect from a willing purchaser. The market value or the market price has got to be fixed with reference to many statutes, Land Acquisition Act, Wealth-tax Act, Income-tax Act. Gift Tax Act, Municipalities Act etc. In fixing the market value or market price of a property or asset, the perspective of the proceedings will have to be borne in mind before applying the principles enunciated by courts in different contexts. It would not be safe to wholly import the principles laid down by courts in ascertaining the market value in the context of one statute while determining the amount of compensation or market value under a different statute. The perspective and approach certainly calls for a different approach. This aspect is emphasised by the Gujarat High Court in Vimlaben Bhagwandas Pate's case (118 I.T.R 134 at PP. 188 and 191). So also, in Commissioner of Succession Duties v. Executer Trustee and Agency Company of South Australia Limited (74 Commonwealth Law Reports 358) at Page 373 Dixon, J. observed as follows:

    “I should like, however, to add for myself that there is some difference of purpose in valuing property for revenue cases and in compensation cases. In the second the purpose is to ensure that the person to be compensated is given a full money equivalent of his loss, while in the first it is to ascertain what money value is plainly contained in the asset so as to afford a proper measure of liability to tax. While this difference cannot change the test of value, it is not without effect upon a court's attitude in the application of the test. In a case of compensation doubts are resolved in favour of a more liberal estimate, in a revenue case, of a more conservative estimate.”

    11. The above observations have our respectful concurrence.

    12. We should state that the Appellate Tribunal is the final fact finding authority, under the scheme of the Act. The ultimate purpose is to arrive at the correct/proper “market value” of the asset. The law is clear that in arriving or fixing the “market value”, the-authority is not tied down to adopt any one or the other of the methods. It is open to the appropriate authority to adopt any one or two or more methods or even, a combination of the methods, provided they are reliable, objective and relevant. It is for the Appel att Tribunal as the final fact finding authority to determine on the facts of each case, which is the method to be adopted to arrive at the proper “market value”. That has been properly done in the instant case in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court and Full Bench decisions of this Court, cannot be doubted at all.

    13. In this case, the following aspects deserve special mention. The valuation report (land and building method), fixed towards the value of the second floor (terrace), a sum of Rs. 1,18,980/- on the basis that further structure can be constructed. The Appellate Tribunal, alter adverting to relevant facts and circumstances, held that in their experience and knowledge, conditions in Ernakulam (Cochin) have not developed to such an extent that such terrace (open space in the second floor) can be considered as potential house sites and property market in Ernakulam still adheres to only conventional trends and do not reckon such factors. This is a finding on a pure question of fact. On this basis, the sum of Rs. 1,18,980/- was excluded from the valuation report based on land and building method. We are of the view that this exclusion is justified and finding relating thereto being a pure finding of fact, is not open to objection. So also, the “discount” made to the undivided share, is one recognised in law. (See - J.N Bose's case, 104 ITR 83) and C.W.T v. Nagabhushana Setty - 156 ITR 484).

    14. In the light of the above discussion, our answer to the questions referred to us are as follows.

    I.T.R Nos. 285 of 1980.

    15. Question No. 1.— We are of the view that the Appellate Tribuual was justified in interfering with the figure of Rs. 2,55,775/- fixed by the Wealth-tax Officer. We answer the question in the affirmative - against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee.

    16. Question No. 2.— The Tribunal was justified in directing that an average between the values assessed by the land and building method and the rent capitalisation method should be taken for arriving at the market value of the jointly owned property. We answer the question in the affirmative - against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee.

    17. Question No. 3.— We answer question No. 3 in the affirmative - against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee.

    18. Question No. 4.— We answer the question in the affirmative - against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee.

    19. I.T.R Nos. 431 to 438 of 1982:

    20. These references relate to the assessment years 1974–1975 and 1977–1976 fixing the value of the property at Rs. 7 lakhs, the Appellate Tribunal followed the decision rendered by it for the earlier year 1973–1974, which is the subject matter of I.T.R Nos. 282 to 285 of 1980, and held that there is no justification to depart from the course, adopted by the Tribunal in valuing, the very same property for the earlier assessment year and fixed the value at Rs. 7 lakhs. The reasoning and conclusion stated by us in answering the questions referred to us in I.T.R Nos. 282 to 285 of 1980 will govern these references also. On that basis, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative-against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee.

    21. A copy of this judgment, under the seal of this Court and the signature of the Registrar, will be forwarded to the Tribunal, as required by law.

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